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Abstract 
This thesis enacts a discursive approach to surveillance in the UK, revealing 
implications for surveillance theory, governmentality theory, and for political and 
social identity theories. It demonstrates the importance of a discursive approach to 
surveillance, as an expansion of assemblage models of surveillance. It finds 
convergence between government, governance, finance and media discourses, 
sufficient to conceive of these as forming a shared governmental discourse of 
surveillance. Governmental, financial and media discourses tend to privilege the 
assumption that surveillance systems are effective and accurate. This ideological 
function elides the contingent nature of surveillant practices, presenting them as non-
political technological functions. Governmentality accounts of surveillance are 
supplemented by an expanded understanding of identity as a contested concept, or 
floating signifier, articulated in particular ways in governmental discourses. The 
discourse theory informed analysis in this thesis points to a distinct articulation of 
identity ± the governmental surveillant identity ± a political attempt to fix the meaning 
of identity, and construct a surveillance-permeable form that draws upon the 
privileging of technological truth over human truth. Identity is articulated across many 
of the five discourses studied as socially vulnerable. The core articulation of the 
problem of governance is that identity is problematised; unreliable for the proper 
functioning of governance in society. Because identity is vulnerable and because 
LGHQWLW\¶VRQWRORJical nature makes it possible, identity must be checked and secured. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
There currently exists no thorough analysis of the discursive politics of surveillance 
and identity in the United Kingdom. This thesis therefore hopes to go beyond 
theoretical insights to provide greater understanding of the particular case study. The 
United Kingdom was recently ranked fourth in the world for surveillance of its 
population, coming in behind China, Malaysia and Russia.1 There has been significant 
concern over the extent to which the UK is, or is becoming, a surveillance society. 
Surveillance is politically controversial, encountering opposition, both organised and 
diffuse, attracting media attention and comment, and causing feelings of concern and 
discomfort. This thesis enacts a discursive approach to surveillance in the UK, 
revealing implications for surveillance theory, governmentality theory, and for 
political and social identity theories. 
 
There are shared regularities of articulation of surveillance practices across a number 
of fields of discourse. There is convergence between government, governance, 
finance and media discourses, sufficient to conceive of these as forming a shared 
governmental discourse of surveillance. Across the governmental discourses is 
identified a particular governmental articulation of identity and the technological-
utopian intentions constructed alongside this. 
 
Whilst discourse and governmentality theories suggest an understanding of identities 
as subject positions or subjectivities, the discourse analysis in this thesis points to a 
distinct articulation of identity ± the governmental surveillant identity. 
Governmentality accounts of surveillance are supplemented by an expanded 
                                               
1
 http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-559597 
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understanding of identity as a contested concept, or floating signifier, articulated in 
particular ways in governmental discourses, rather than solely a theoretical marker for 
subjectivities. Within governmental discourses there are political attempts to fix the 
meaning of identity, and construct a surveillance-permeable form that draws upon the 
privileging of technological truth over human truth. 
 
This thesis arises from within the field of surveillance studies, drawing upon a 
distinctly political post-structural perspective, bolstered by theories of information 
and technology. This thesis provides three novel interventions. Firstly the theoretical 
advance provided through the examination of the double role of identity as both 
subjectivity and contested concept, secondly the application of discourse theory 
methodology to the phenomena of surveillance, and thirdly, the detailed textual 
analysis of empirically occurring discursive politics of surveillance and identity in the 
UK. In so doing, the thesis introduces a discursive dimension to the theory of the 
surveillant assemblage, one of the most significant post-panoptic surveillance 
theories, fitting well with its Deleuzian origins. 
 
Discourses construct the reality of social problems, and what are deemed to be 
appropriate social and political responses to those problems. A dominant type of 
discourse in the UK at the start of the 21st century is one which privileges 
technologically mediated surveillant responses to a wide range of social problems, 
privileges the outputs of those systems and normalises both their use and 
implementation. At the heart of these discourses of surveillance is a particular way of 
understanding the concept of identity: the surveillant articulation of identity. Identity 
fraud and identity cards are both phenomena of surveillance and identification; one is 
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a criminal activity and the other a state function. What is shared between these two 
phenomena is a shared articulation of the concept of identity that operates across a 
number of social discourses. The very concept of individual identity is articulated by 
many of the practices and the discourses of surveillance, including identity cards, 
identity theft and the securitisation of identity. Identity is an act of power, and the 
ways political actors think and talk about identity have political effects. This can be 
understood as a struggle for discursive hegemony with political implications.  
 
Understanding this trend requires an exploration of the discursive environment of 
surveillance in the early 21st century. The governmental surveillance identity is 
ontologically objective, unitary, biologically determinist, shallow but compelling, 
behavioural and based on actuarial and probabilistic logics, attributed by structured 
society, historically persistent and resistant to change. Importantly, identity is 
articulated across many of the discourses of surveillance as vulnerable. It is this 
vulnerability that necessitates and legitimates the surveillant response. The core 
articulation of the problem of governance within the governmental discourse is that 
identity is problematised: it cannot be relied upon for the proper functioning of 
governance in society. Whilst identity is ontologically objective, its existing social 
manifestations are vulnerable. Because identity is vulnerable to theft and forgery, 
because multiple identities are associated with negatively evaluated practice and 
social actors such as terrorists and illegal immigrants, and becauVHLGHQWLW\¶VHVVHQWLDO
ontological nature makes it possible, identity must be checked and secured. It cannot 
be left undetermined or ambiguous. Governmental discourses of surveillance 
construct a range of social problems, such as fraud, terrorism and immigration and in 
so doing, delimit the range of acceptable solutions to those social problems. These 
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acceptable solutions rely heavily upon surveillance practices and thereby act as a 
direct driver of surveillance proliferation. 
 
This thesis adds to surveillance theory by providing increased understanding of the 
complex and nuanced understandings of identity actively in use in contemporary UK 
society. Prior to this, surveillance theory has either used identity in a technical form, 
or in terms of some form of political subjectivity. Investigation of the politics of 
identity cards, for example, is frequently focused upon the technology rather than the 
underpinning ontology, epistemology and rationality behind their use and 
introduction. Similarly, identity theft is often examined as a criminological, rather 
than a political, issue. Subjectivity accounts of identity are limited in that they do not 
account for all processes which can be understood as creating identity, instead 
focusing on processes through which the individual becomes a subject or identifies 
with a subjectivity. Political theories of identity which only understand identity as 
subjectivities miss the important effects of identity, as a concept, in active political 
use in contemporary societies, and they also miss the interaction of identities with 
systems of identification. The existence of a persistent, externally attributed identity, 
readable by surveillance systems, casts doubt upon accounts emphasising the 
flexibility and fluidity of (post)modern identities. This thesis demonstrates that not all 
identity creation processes are self-creation, and that there are strong structure-like 
effects of discourses and practices. Accounts of subjectivities are not sufficient, and 
studies of the discourses surrounding identification practices that make reference to 
supposed identities are necessary. Identification is taken to mean the practices and 
technologies that make reference to an identity, or attempt to single out or determine 
the identity of an individual. Jenkins suggests that to avoid reification, we should 
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SUREDEO\RQO\HYHUWDONDERXWµLGHQWLILFDWLRQ¶2 However, he calls for attention to how 
LGHQWLW\µLVZRUNHG¶WRLWVVRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGLQWHUDFWLRQ It is recognised that the 
distinction between identity and identification is frequently collapsed in the discourses 
under examination, and this demonstrates how part of the working occurs.3 Given the 
methodology of discourse analysis, it would be illegitimate to say that certain 
discourses are incorrect in their terminology, as the choice of terminology is taken as 
meaningful. Following Bourdieu, identity can be understood as both a category of 
analysis and a category of practice, where there is reciprocity between practical and 
analytic uses.4 
 
This analysis demonstrates the pressing need to conceptualise both the form and the 
content of identity in modern society. Subjectivity accounts should be supplemented 
by an understanding of attributive identity at shallower yet compelling levels. This 
necessity is reflected in the structure of Chapters Five and Six. Subject positions can 
be understood as the content of identity, whilst the articulation of identity examines 
the form in contemporary society. This thesis therefore contributes to the analysis of 
one of the strategies of filling of the empty ground of identity caused by 
postmodernity and other dislocatory factors.  
 
Discourse theory, derived from the work of Laclau and Mouffe, is a maturing research 
theory and methodology, with an understanding of the fundamental contingency of 
both language and social reality. Discourse theory also has an understanding of 
political contestation and the partial fixation of meaning. It also provides a set of 
                                               
2
 Jenkins, R. (2004) Social Identity. London & New York: Routledge. p.5. 
3
 Harper, J. (2006) Identity Crisis: How Identification is overused and misunderstood. Washington: 
Cato Institute. p.2. 
4
 Brubaker, R. & Cooper, )µ%H\RQG,GHQWLW\¶Theory and Society. 29: 1-47. 
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conceptual tools with which to interrogate the discursive politics of identity and 
surveillance. Discourse theory is leveraged for empirical analysis due to the 
ontological centrality of a theory of non-essential subjectivity and a theory of 
conceptual contestation, which allows for the analysis of both form and content. The 
politics of surveillance in the UK is highly dependent upon the way that surveillance 
is articulated, represented and evaluated. This occurs through discourses, making the 
analysis of discourses of surveillance a fundamental task. Discourse theory is 
combined with theories of contemporary surveillance. 
 
Research Findings 
The findings of this thesis have implications for the field of surveillance theory, 
governmentality theory, and for political and social identity theories, as well as for 
understanding the politics of surveillance and identity in the United Kingdom. 
 
This thesis identifies the characteristics of discourses of surveillance. These include a 
privileging of surveillant response to social problems, an identification of negative 
practices and social actors, political individualism, risk aversion, a positive orientation 
towards technology, and a particular understanding of identity. There is substantial 
consistency of representation across a number of surveillant practices. These 
discourses serve to legitimise and normalise the use of surveillance, based on 
accounts of risk and necessity, and complicates any attempt to resist or oppose such 
practices. 
 
The surveillant articulation of identity has social justice implications. It is likely to 
most negatively affect the most vulnerable in society, and be managed only by those 
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with sufficient resources, as well as creating practical problems for processes, 
institutions and individuals. Despite policies and rhetoric pointing in the direction of 
individual control of identity, the amount of meaningful control an individual can 
exercise over their own identity is distinctly limited, with implications for autonomy 
and the relationship between individuals and institutions. A particular, context-
insensitive articulation of identity is spread across a number of social areas. This has 
negative implications for any political project with an alternate, incompatible, 
articulation of identity. The use of discourse theory allows identity to be 
conceptualised as a floating signifier that this governmental discourse attempts to 
articulate in a specifically delimited and defined way, so as to further the raison 
G¶HWDW, effect government and counter the proliferation of identities.  
 
The core articulation of the problem of governance within the governmental discourse 
is that older forms of identity are problematised; they cannot be relied upon for the 
proper functioning of governance in society and must be updated, modernised and, 
critically, secured. In this way this governmental discourse positions the state as a 
guarantor of identity security, whilst the individual is responsible for appropriate 
security conscious behaviour. Identity is constructed as a series of institutional 
reputations mediated through specific types of personal information disclosed to the 
formal institutions of structured society. Identity produced and ascribed by 
surveillance is taken as more reliable than any account of themselves that any 
individual might be able to give, problematising any attempt to negotiate or escape 
from ascribed identities, or to challenge them with alternative forms or contents.  
 
 
 15 
Research Design 
 
7KHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQVH[SORUHGLQWKLVUHVHDUFKDUHµZKDWGLVFRXUVHVRIVXUYHLOODQFH
are identifiable in the contemporaU\8QLWHG.LQJGRP"¶µwhat rationalities are at play 
LQWKHVHGLVFRXUVHV"¶ µKRZLVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\SUREOHPGHILQHGLQ
WKHVHGLVFRXUVHV"¶µZKDWUROHVRUVXEMHFWSRVLWLRQVDUHPDGHDYDLODEOHE\GLVFRXUVHV
RIVXUYHLOODQFH"¶DQGIXQGDPHQWDOO\µKRZLVWKHLGHDRILQGLYLGXDOLGHQWLW\DUWLFXODWHG
ZLWKLQFRQWHPSRUDU\GLVFRXUVHVRIVXUYHLOODQFH"¶ 
 
This research design is a discursive, text analytical investigation of the various 
concepts of identity in contemporary discourses of surveillance in the United 
Kingdom, drawing on post-structuralist and post-Marxist approaches in discourse 
theory and analysis ± primarily the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe.5 This 
research pays close attention to empirical material in the form of texts and documents 
that make up discourses of surveillance, yet this empirical material is placed firmly 
within the theoretical contexts of both discourse and surveillance. The textual analysis 
is structured around five surveillance points of reference, the government, the Office 
of the Information Commissioner, the movements of opposition to identity cards, the 
news media, and the banking and financial sector. One of the key messages of the 
analytics of government approach that frames the empirical research is that we should 
look beyond the traditional model of the state to a broader range of surveillance actors 
and identity stakeholders.  
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
                                               
5
 Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics. Second Edition. London & New York: Verso. 
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Chapter Two (Surveillance Studies and Surveillance Theory: Governmentality, 
Identity and Discourse) provides an overview of current surveillance research 
including the central debates and controversies, demonstrates the importance of the 
concept of identity to surveillance, and shows the potential of discourse analysis 
approaches to provide a positive contribution to understanding how identity is 
articulated in discourses of surveillance. It draws upon governmentality theory to set 
out the research questions of the thesis.  
 
Chapter Three (Research Design and Methodology ± Discourse Theory and Analysis) 
sets out the methodological theory and empirical research design of the project, and 
turns theoretical research questions into answerable and operational questions using 
discourse theory derived from Laclau and Mouffe. It argues for, and codifies, the 
discursive analysis of textual documentary empirical material. 
 
Chapter Four (Representations of Surveillance), the first empirical chapter, sets out 
the results of the analysis of discourses of surveillance and identity around the five 
reference points of the project ± government, opposition, ICO, financial, and media 
discourses. It examines the representation and evaluation of surveillance practices, 
including data protection principles, the debates over national identity cards, and the 
phenomena of identity theft. This chapter also contextualises surveillance discourses, 
necessary for close analysis of specific issues in the subsequent two chapters. This 
chapter demonstrates the lines of conflict over surveillance practices in contemporary 
UK society. This chapter is structured by surveillant reference point, whilst the 
following two chapters break from this format to reflect the regularities and 
discontinuities between reference points. Mapping the representations of surveillance 
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is the necessary first step to map out the field of discursive politics of surveillance 
before further analysis can be conducted. This stage highlights the mechanisms of 
problem construction within discourses of surveillance, and how, along with 
evaluative frameworks, this serves to structure acceptable responses to social 
problems. 
 
Chapter Five (Subject Positions in Discourses of Surveillance), the second empirical 
chapter, demonstrates the subject positions available in discourses of surveillance and 
shows how these subject positions are differentially represented. Politically relevant 
subject positions are divided into three main categories. Firstly, the individual, 
secondly, negatively evaluated subject positions from the illegal immigrant to the 
terrorist and thirdly, the contested construction of the vulnerable. It concludes that 
most surveillance discourses are individualistic, dominated by negatively evaluated 
actors, and focus upon the responsibility of individuals for identity security rather 
than institutions or structures. 
 
Chapter Six (Articulations of Identity), the final empirical chapter, answers the core 
research question ± how identity is articulated in discourses of surveillance in the UK. 
The chapter demonstrates how a form of surveillant identity is articulated that is 
ontologically objective, unitary, physically determinist, shallow yet compelling, 
behavioural, attributed, persistent and socially vulnerable. Identity is constructed as a 
series of institutional reputations mediated through specific types of personal 
information disclosed to the formal institutions of structured society. 
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Finally, Chapter Seven (Conclusions and Implications) draws together the conclusions 
of the empirical chapters together with existing surveillance theory and the theoretical 
framework developed in Chapters Two and Three, to examine the theoretical, political 
and policy implications of these findings. It argues that dominant representations of 
surveillance reduce the efficacy of resistance to surveillance and normalise surveillant 
practices, and provides an account of machine truth dominant over human truth. The 
implications of the surveillant articulation of identity are discussed, including the way 
that attributed identities circumvent the subjectivities upon which much contemporary 
identity politics is predicated, the problems caused for people with non-normal 
identities, and the responsibility placed upon people to police their personal 
information in an environment weighted heavily against this. Attempts to place 
individuals in control of their identity are fundamentally frustrated by the surveillant 
attribution of identity. A number of policy recommendations are made which suggest 
ways to counter these issues of social injustice. 
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Chapter Two: Surveillance studies and Surveillance Theory: Governmentality, 
Identity and Discourse 
 
This chapter aims to perform four main tasks. Firstly, an overview of the field of 
surveillance research, including its history and origins, key models, lacunae and areas 
of contestation and debate. From this framework, the chapter demonstrates why 
governmentality theory provides the most promising framework for further research. 
Secondly, it demonstrates the centrality of the concept of identity to issues of 
surveillance, and how identity provides a critical entry point into empirical and 
theoretical surveillance debates. It highlights the definite politicisation of identity in 
surveillance. Thirdly, it will demonstrate the critical role to be played in surveillance 
research by a study of discourse, assessing existing work with a discursive 
orientation, drawing lessons from this and suggesting fruitful areas of discursive 
surveillance research, specifically in the concept of individual identity. Finally, it aims 
to draw together the contextual knowledge necessary for conducting discursive 
analysis and highlight a number of insights arising from surveillance theory that will 
influence the methodological and practical elements of the thesis.  
 
The working definition of surveillance used here is Lyon¶V µIRFXVHGV\VWHPDWLFDQG
routine attention to personal details for the purpose of influence, management, 
SURWHFWLRQRUGLUHFWLRQ¶6 A more detailed account is drawn out as the subfield is 
displayed and key controversies are examined.  
 
 
                                               
6
 Lyon, D. (2007) Surveillance Studies: An Overview, Cambridge, Polity Press. p.14. 
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Surveillance research 
 
This section first provides an overview of the emerging field of surveillance studies, 
identifying its various disciplinary origins and influential theorists. It will then 
examine key debates and controversies in the field. This section also contains a 
summary of the empirical research directly focusing on the United Kingdom case.  
 
Surveillance studies is a multi-disciplinary field. It has emerged from a number of 
disciplinary areas including classical sociology, urban geography, criminology, 
history, workplace and management studies, information technology and computer 
science, law, political theory, political science and international relations. The range 
of research into surveillance demonstrates that surveillance encompasses phenomena 
found across all elements of political, social and economic life, as well as a fruitful 
area for interdisciplinary research. This overview will examine the contributions of 
these disciplines. 
 
Giddens argues that surveillance is an essential part of modernity, and that it should 
be understood as a process in its own right rather than simply an outgrowth of 
rationalisation or a product of capitalist relations of production.7 Dandeker added to 
this the role played in the development of surveillance by processes of militarisation 
in the modern nation state and its external conflicts.8 
 
It is perhaps impossible to discuss surveillance without reference to the panopticon. 
The concept became a central trope of surveillance theory due to Foucault, who in 
                                               
7
 Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity.  
8
 Dandeker, C. (1990) Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to 
the present day. Cambridge: Polity. 
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Discipline and Punish used %HQWKDP¶V panopticon design as a model for his 
conception of disciplinary power.9 ,WEHFDPHDµFUXFLDOGLDJUDP¶IRU)RXFDXOW¶VZRUN
RQVXUYHLOODQFHGHVSLWHWKHSUHVHQFHRIVXUYHLOODQFHLQRWKHUDUHDVRI)RXFDXOW¶V
work.10 According to Lyon, it:  
 
encapsulated both an emphasis on discipline as the archetypal modern 
mode, supplanting previous coercive and brutal methods and a focus on 
classificatory schemes by which sovereign power would locate and 
differentiate treatment of the variety of prisoners.11 
 
Foucault writes:  
 
The major effect of the Panopticon is to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning 
of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its 
effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of 
power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this 
architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a 
power relation independent of the person who exercises it.12  
 
0F*UDWKKDVDUJXHGWKDWµ)RUPDQ\\HDUV)RXFDXOWZDVFRQVLGHUHGLQWKHDFDGHPLF
HVWDEOLVKPHQWWRKDYHVDLGDOOWKDWQHHGHGWREHVDLGDERXWVXUYHLOODQFH¶13 This 
dominance of the panopticon has been challenged in recent years, and an examination 
of this post-panoptic move will be developed later in this chapter. 
 
Sociology has also contributed research into the experiences of the subject under 
surveillance. Insights have been drawn from the work of Goffman on the presentation 
of self ± the social work done by individuals to present an appropriate public face to 
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other members of their social group. Additionally there are accounts drawing upon 
phenomenological and psychological approaches focusing on differing degrees of 
scopophobia and scopophillia (the fear and love of being watched).14 Many analyses 
of resistance to surveillance emerge from this level of analysis, focusing on the 
experience of the individual under surveillance,15 as do many of the artistic 
contributions to a cultural understanding of surveillance practices.16 
 
6XUYHLOODQFHWKHRU\LVLQIOXHQFHGE\WKHRULHVRIULVN%HFN¶VRisk Society examines the 
way risk, and the calculation of risk, have become central to modern societies.17 
Technology had created a category of risks with low probability of occurrence, but 
with such high potential for catastrophe if they did occur that they must be prevented. 
%HFN¶VZRUNfocused on scientific and environmental risks; however, his analysis has 
been expanded to society, crime and security, highlighting the use of pre-emptive 
mechanisms, and the operation of surveillance in supposedly non-political fields such 
as insurance underwriting, as well as in novel ways in more familiar arenas. Risk has 
a specific normative orientation. Because measures can be taken to prevent and 
anticipate potential risks, there is a normative requirement that they are taken. 
 
In the utilitarian morality of risk management, the norm or standard of 
acceptable risk is always both factual and moral. It signifies the typical or 
usual standard but also ethical constraint. Risk classifications infuse moral 
certainty and legitimacy into the facts they produce, allowing people to 
accept them as normative obligations and therefore as scripts for action.18 
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The identification of pre-emptive risk assessment combined with norms masquerading 
as non-political facts, can be seen in a number of fields of surveillance research 
LQFOXGLQJ*DQG\¶VPRGHOVRIVRFLDOVRUWLQJ0DU[¶VµNew Surveillance¶, and Erickson 
DQG+DJJHUW\¶VPolicing the Risk Society.19  
 
*DQG\¶VSLRQHHULQJZRUNRQGDWDEDVHVRUWLQJVKRZHGKRZFODVVLILFDWLRQZDVDQ
exercise of power, and a structural feature of contemporary society.20 *DQG\¶VZRUN
focused upon sorting and classification in marketing and economic relations showing 
KRZµWKHFODVVLILFDWLRQRISHUVRQVLQWRFDWHJRULHVRIWHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKULVNRUKD]DUG
RUSRWHQWLDOORVV¶21 He demonstrated that whilst personal information stored in 
databases was used to place people within categories, it was also used to exclude them 
from other categories: affecting µOLIHFKDQFHVOLQNHGWRHPSOR\PHQWLQVXUDQFH
KRXVLQJHGXFDWLRQDQGFUHGLW¶.22 7KHµ3DQRSWLF6RUW¶GHPRQVWUDWHGWKHSURFHVVRI
µVRFLDOVRUWLQJ¶± the sorting of people into categories on the basis of surveillance data 
and using these categories in social, political and economic decision-making ± 
involved complex discriminatory technology. In Customer Relationship Management 
companies use personal data to sort individuals into appropriate categories in order to 
focus their effort on the most lucrative 20% and avoid the most awkward 20% of 
customers. The Panoptic Sort also occurs in policing and criminal justice.  
 
                                               
19
 Gandy, O.H. (1993) The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press; Marx, G.T. (1989) Undercover: Police Surveillance in America. Berkeley: University 
of California Press; Ericson & Haggerty, 1997. 
20
 *DQG\2+µ4XL[RWLFVXQLWH(QJDJLQJWKHSUDJPDWLVWVRQUDWLRQDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶LQ/\RQ
(ed). 
21
 Ibid., p.320. 
22
 *DQG\2+µ&RPLQJWRWHUPVZLWKWKH3DQRSWLF6RUW¶LQ'/\RQ	(=XUHLNHGV
Computers, Surveillance, Privacy. Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press. p.132. 
 25 
Gandy considered the sort µSDQRSWLF¶as the logic considered all information about an 
individual SRWHQWLDOO\XVHIXODQGZRUWK\RILQFOXVLRQLQFDWHJRULVDWLRQVµ3DQRSWLF¶
was therefore an intention rather than an outcome. In fact, the categorisations were 
always missing elements. They are narrower than the myriad possible facts about 
unique individuals, yet their utility came from their efficiency. It is easy to lose 
individuals in wider categories, not all information about an individual may be present 
when the sort is made, and information abstracted from its source is easily taken out 
of context, resulting in conflicting interpretations. Yet the products of surveillance are 
taken as more reliable than any account of themselves that any individual might be 
able to give. The pronouncements of the manufacturers of surveillance technologies 
and the providers of geo-demographic and lifestyle mapping services hawk the 
accuracy of their systems. The image created from their various categories is seen as 
more real, accurate and accessible than the individual itself or its accounts of its own 
identity. This extends to attempts by the individual to correct inaccuracies in the data, 
which can prove remarkably difficult. 
  
Social sorting also accounts for the inferential logic behind many contemporary 
surveillance phenomena. Social sorting accounts, supplemented by the concept of the 
µSKHQHWLFIL[¶DUHVLWXDWHGDVDVROXWLRn to problems of governance. Arvidsson argues 
that contemporary geo-demographic techniques are much more interested in mobile 
µSRVWPRGHUQ¶LQGLYLGXDOVYLHZHGDWDPXFKKLJKHUµUHVROXWLRQ¶WKURXgh categories that 
are often themselves products of the collected data, in the sense that they are iterative 
and inductive.23 However, Gandy is highly conscious of the racial discrimination 
SUHVHQWLQVXFKSURILOLQJDQGµUDWLRQDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶VHHPLQJto suggest that not all 
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LQGLYLGXDOVVXEMHFWHGWRWKHVRFLDOVRUWDUHHTXDOO\µPRELOH¶DQGWKDWVRPHFDWHJRULHV
are remarkably persistent. He argues that because of the availability and visibility of 
controversial markers such as race, gender, age and ethnicity, these characteristics are 
liable to be more highly overused than their statistical contribution to the reduction of 
uncertainty would suggest.24 +HGUDZVXSRQWKHQRWLRQRIµFXPXODWLYHGLVDGYDQWDJH¶25 
to show how social hardships tend to cluster, and the ways that historical behaviour 
affects future opportunities. He also identifies the harm in the expressive character of 
profiling ± the treatment of certain groups disproportionately as suspects. 
 
People we value less to begin with are assured of being seen as less 
valuable in the future because of the ways in which they are treated today. 
It is for this reason that the expressive harms that flow from the 
reproduction and use of negative stereotypes complicate the rational 
calculus of choice.26 
 
Bogard draws upon Baudrillard to suggest that it is simulation rather than surveillance 
that is the critical contemporary category of social control.27 The potential speed of 
LQIRUPDWLRQWHFKQRORJLHVDOORZVVXUYHLOODQFHV\VWHPVWRSRWHQWLDOO\µRYHUWDNH
WKHPVHOYHV¶28 moving from surveillance to simulation, the prediction and anticipation 
RIHYHQWVUDWKHUWKDQDPRQLWRULQJRIµUHDO¶HYHQWV+RZHYHULQIRUPDWLRQSURYLGHGE\
surveillance is required to build simulation. Individuals interact with surveillance 
when their data is inserted into or compared against a simulation. It is possible to 
analyse how these different types of activity are articulated discursively. By avoiding 
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absolutist assumptions that all surveillance is simulation we gain greater sensitivity to 
those specific cases where surveillance is replaced by simulation.  
 
Criminology has provided strong insights into surveillance, including much early 
empirical research. Criminology deals with many of the subjects under surveillance, 
especially in periods where new technologies are being developed. Its focus on 
socially deviant groups, and methods associated with their control and management, 
gives criminology an insight into the sites in which surveillance technology is trialled 
and tested. Hence it is unsurprising that criminologists were amongst the first to 
DQDO\VHFKDQJHVLQVXUYHLOODQFH*70DU[¶VLQIOXHQWLDOVWXG\µ8QGHUFRYHU3ROLFH
6XUYHLOODQFHLQ$PHULFD¶LQWURGXFHGWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHµ1HZ6XUYHLOODQFH¶29 In 
comparison to old methods of surveillance such as WKHSROLFHµVWDNHRXW¶WKHQHZ
surveillance assisted by technology was able to transcend space in the forms of 
distance, darkness and physical barriers. It was able to transcend time due to the 
potentials for storage, retrieval, combination and communication provided by 
information technology. It was also often less visible or easily detected by the subject, 
capital-, rather than labour-intensive, involved decentralised self-policing, and 
critically, involved a shift from individual level suspicion to categorical suspicion: 
suspicion due to membership of particular social categories rather than due to 
individual actions. The insight that there is something qualitatively new about 
contemporary surveillance penetrates deeply throughout surveillance studies. The role 
of categorical suspicion was taken up in the work of Feeley and Simon who described 
WKHVKLIWIURPµROGSHQRORJ\¶WRWKHµQHZSHQRORJ\¶30 The new penology relied less 
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upon retroactive determination of guilt and more upon the actuarial and probabilistic 
identification of risk groups and the pre-emption and prevention of criminal or deviant 
DFWLYLW\(ULFVRQDQG+DJJHUW\H[SORUHGWKLVIXUWKHULQµ3ROLFLQJWKH5LVN6RFLHW\¶31 
ZKHUHWKH\LGHQWLILHGWKHSROLFLQJUROHDVDµULVNFRPPXQLFDWLRQV\VWHP¶DQG 
demonstrated the increased appetite of the police for more and more data.  
 
Research at the boundary between criminology and sociology has contributed to 
surveillance research through a number of strongly empirical studies of specific sites 
of surveillancH1RUULVDQG$UPVWURQJ¶VSDUDGLJPDWLFVWXG\RIFORVHGFLUFXLW
television in the UK set the pattern for a number of subsequent studies looking at 
CCTV in a number of different locations, environments and countries.32 Studies such 
as McCahill, Coleman and Smith examined the mechanisms of social control and the 
maintenance of order in urban environments such as retail environments and city 
centres, as well as the effects of exclusion, the redefinition of the normal use of public 
space, and the construction of deviance in CCTV control rooms.33 Studies such as 
these identified the spread of visual surveillance systems across the city and town 
centres of the United Kingdom, and identified the UK as the most surveilled country 
in the world, with the Square Mile of the city of London the most surveilled public 
space in the world.34  
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Historical studies of surveillance, originating in a number of disciplines, have helped 
to provide context, and the reminder that surveillance did not emerge with computer 
technology but has had significance throughout modernity. Key examples in this field 
LQFOXGH+DFNLQJ¶VZRUNRQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIVWDWLVWLFV35 Intimately tied up with the 
development of the census and the need for detailed knowledge of the population in 
preparation for war, statistics has a social origin often hidden in its supposedly 
neutral, scientific use. Papers in the edited collection Documenting Individual Identity 
by Caplan and Torpey, explore historical ways in which individuals have been subject 
to documentary identification techniques by modern governments. They identify the 
FUHDWLRQRIµOHJLEOHSHRSOH¶DVa fundamental activity of government.36 -R\FH¶VThe 
Rule of Freedom examined the construction of the liberal city as a site of surveillance 
and governmentality, designed to create a visible and freely flowing population, 
removing the dark and hidden areas of society.37 
 
Political science has been the origin of some of the earliest research into surveillance. 
5XOH¶VPrivate Lives and Public Surveillance, one of the first empirical investigations 
into surveillance, operationalised a measure of surveillance based on congruence with 
DQLGHDOW\SHPRGHORIWKHµWRWDOVXUYHLOODQFHVRFLHW\¶GHULYHGIURPDQ2UZHOOLDQ
model.38 Political studies of surveillance have tended to cluster around the concepts of 
privacy, regulation and governance, or analyse specific government activities, such as 
the introduction of identity cards in the UK.39  The focus is on the institutional and 
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policy frameworks that allow surveillance or provide opportunities to resist 
surveillance such as data protection. There is a wide-ranging debate about the 
usefulness of the concept of privacy, whilst it still remains in use in many analyses.40 
The international politics of surveillance draws upon the elite theories of Michels, 
Mosca and Pareto41, demonstrating the international pressures that drive surveillance, 
as well as a focus upon the security dimension of surveillance, situating it against a 
background of a hostile international condition of anarchy, added to by the threat of 
contemporary terrorism. Political theorists such as Bigo have focused on the role of 
the border as a key site of surveillance in liberal democracies.42 Political theorists 
have also drawn upon the Marxist tradition in analysing surveillance as part of a 
(neo)liberal project of exploitation and control, relating surveillance as a tool of the 
state.43 The work of critical theorists such as Marcuse has filtered through to add to 
the rationally administered society model in sociology. Surveillance research also 
draws upon the historical and political studies of totalitarian and authoritarian 
societies.44 
 
Two linked fields of surveillance research are workplace and consumer surveillance. 
Organisational studies researchers have examined the use of surveillance in call 
centres and retail environments.45 Research into consumer surveillance has shown the 
extent to which the consumer is the subject of intense surveillance, sorted into 
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categories, and targeted by direct advertising and marketing. This research questions 
the traditional state model of surveillance, highlighting the range of actors in the 
commercial sphere who engage in surveillance, ranging from supermarket loyalty 
card schemes to credit reference agencies and insurance companies. The dominant 
model is WKHµJODVVFRQVXPHU¶WKHLQGLYLGXDODVFRQVXPHUPDGHYLVLEOHWRFRUSRUDWH
entities through a huge, and growing, market for personal information.46 In the 
µSHUVRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQHFRQRP\¶GDWDEDVHVRIpersonal information constitute 
economic resources, raising concerns over who owns personal data: the individual to 
which it refers, or the private entity holding the database?47 
 
 
In the personal information economy, the risks that we present to large 
organisations as consumers, employees or citizens constitute the nature of 
RXUµPHULW¶DQGWKHEDVLVRIDGLVWLQFWNLQGRIPHULWRFUDF\48 
 
 
 
Information technology and computer science approaches have introduced a number 
of insights into surveillance research and will likely continue to do so. ClarNH¶V
FRQFHSWRIµGDWDYHLOODQFH¶49 applies to the vast majority of contemporary surveillance. 
He argued the dominant form of modern surveillance was not visual but rather 
conducted through mass volumes of personal information, sorted and analysed by 
computers and held in databases. Roper argued that computers are highly proficient at 
ZKDWKHFDOOVµSDVVLYHVXUYHLOODQFH¶WKHFROOHFWLRQRIGDWDDQGcomparison of that data 
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with models.50 ,QFRPSDULVRQZLWKµDFWLYHVXUYHLOODQFH¶KXPDQREVHUYDWLRQZLUHWDSV
etc), passive surveillance allows for a breadth of surveillance that pre-computerisation 
technology and record keeping could simply not accomplish. Lessig has contributed 
DQDQDO\VLVRIWKHVXUYHLOODQFHUHJXODWLRQDQGFRQWURORIF\EHUVSDFHWKURXJKµFRGH¶
that is useful for analysis of surveillance in the physical world.51 
 
Surveillance in the United Kingdom 
 
It is worth pausing to consider the insights of surveillance research into surveillance 
in the UK. This will position the UK as an appropriate case study for examining 
surveillance politics. The UK can be considered an exemplary case of the 
contemporary role of surveillance in politics and society. The UK has been identified 
by surveillance researchers as one of the most surveilled countries in the world, 
surprising for one of the oldest liberal democracies. Since the wave of CCTV 
development in the 1990s, CCTV systems are present in nearly every British town 
centre. It is roughly estimated that there is approximately one CCTV camera for every 
fourteen people in the UK, and that it is conceivably possible for an individual to be 
caught on camera around 300 times in an active day in a busy urban setting.52 The 
government is unable to state the number of CCTV systems in the country.53 The 
United Kingdom is in the middle of the contested process of bringing in identity cards 
with biometric identifiers and a centralised database of all residents of the country. 
This project is historically unprecedented. It has been argued, by the Information 
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Commissioner, that this heralds a significant change in the relationship between 
citizens and state.54 Surveillance stories are a weekly occurrence in the press and 
broadcast media. The Information Commissioner has warned that Britain may be 
µVOHHSZDONLQJLQWRDVXUYHLOODQFHVRFLHW\¶55 There do not seem to be the levels of 
public concern about privacy that exist in countries such as Canada and the USA. The 
UK has weaker data protection legislation than these, or European, countries, as well 
as a data protection commissioner with limited powers of enforcement.56 UK public 
services routinely collect significant amounts of personal data during interactions with 
citizens. Bellamy et al DUJXHWKDWWKLVDULVHVIURPDµPRGHUQLVLQJ¶DJHQGDRIWKH
/DERXUJRYHUQPHQWWKHGULYHWRµMRLQXS¶WKH provision of services across 
government, and the use of preventative risk assessment in social policy ± a model 
that requires processing large amounts of personal data.57 In addition the UK has the 
ZRUOG¶VODUJHVW'1$GDWDEDVHZLWKWKHSROLFHHPSRZHUHGWR collect DNA samples 
from anyone arrested on suspicion of a recordable offence since 2004.58 This range of 
factors makes the UK a significant site for surveillance research, with implications for 
a range of political issues.  
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Controversies and debates in surveillance research 
 
Given the widespread nature of surveillance, the multiplicity of its forms, and the 
wide range of potential effects, there is substantial heterodoxy in surveillance 
research. This section examines key controversies and debates: firstly, the analysis of 
the appropriate level of analysis for studies of surveillance, encompassing the extent 
WRZKLFKZHOLYHLQDµVXUYHLOODQFHVRFLHW\DµPD[LPXP¶RUµWRWDO¶ µsurveillance 
VRFLHW\¶7KLVLVRSSRVHGE\WKHRULHVprioritising micro-level sites of surveillance. 
This flows into an examination of the dystopian trends of surveillance theory, and 
assumptions about the smooth functioning of power. Following this is an analysis of 
the debates surrounding the supposed shifts from disciplinary to some form of control 
or risk society. Fourthly, questions about the importance or centrality of the state are 
examined, followed by an assessment of the level of technological determinism in 
surveillance theory. The final debate is an examination of the attempt to move 
surveillance theory beyond its dominance by the panopticon, and the potential of a 
post-panoptic surveillance theory.  
 
The surveillance society 
 
The United Kingdom Information Commissioner has stated that he fears the UK is 
µVOHHSZDONLng into a suUYHLOODQFHVRFLHW\¶ mirroring the title of the report 
commissioned by his office from the Surveillance Studies Network which suggested 
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that we now live in a µVXUYHLOODQFHVRFLHW\¶EHFDXVHRIWKHZD\PRGHUQH[LVWHQFHLV
underpinned by massive surveillance systems.59 Lyon argues that:  
 
 
Because of the widespread, systematic and routine ways in which personal 
data are processed in the twenty-first century, it is appropriate to talk of 
the surveillance society. This is not a sinister conspiracy or a comment 
about everyday prison like conditions, just a feature of social life today. 60 
 
 
 
5XOH¶VLGHDOW\SHµ7RWDO6XUYHLOODQFH6RFLHW\¶constructed a model of a surveillance 
VRFLHW\GUDZLQJKHDYLO\XSRQ2UZHOO¶VNineteen Eighty-Four.61 Rule aimed to 
compare actually existing societies against this ideal type by measuring the amount of 
information collected, the centralisation of that information, the speed of information 
flows and decision-PDNLQJDQGIRXUWKO\WKHQXPEHURIµSRLQWVRIFRQWDFW¶EHWZHHQWKH
population and the surveillance infrastructure.62 It involved a single system of 
surveillance and control that affects everyone, has uniform norms governing all 
DVSHFWVRIEHKDYLRXULQZKLFKVXEMHFWV¶HYHU\DFWLRQLVVFUXWLQLVHGDOOLQIRUPDWLRQ
collected through surveillance is collated to a single point, the whole fund of 
information brought to bear upon any decisions and any disobedience is likely to 
result in corrective action from authority. Rule found only a difference of degree in 
capability between this model and the contemporary UK and USA.   
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,QWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI)RXFDXOW¶VWKHVLVLQDiscipline and Punish have assumed that we 
live in a µGLVFLSOLQDU\VRFLHW\¶LQZKLFKGLVFLSOLQDU\VXUYHLOODQFHKDVOHDNHGRXWRI
institutional incubators and containers to become a dominant element in society.63  
It is at this level of analysis that we can situate many of the sociological or cultural 
theorists who might have something to say about surveillance, such as Giddens, 
Dandeker, Castells¶ The Rise of the Network Society, Deleuze¶VPostscipt on Societies 
of Control, Marcuse¶V One Dimensional Man, Hardt and Negri, or Lyotard.64 To the 
extent that these approaches operate at the general level of the social and make broad, 
all-encompassing claims, we can identify them with the surveillance society model.  
 
One advantage of the surveillance society heuristic is that it draws our attention to the 
myriad sites of surveillance across social life. If surveillance was previously limited to 
specific institutional sites (the prison, the workhouse), or to specific social categories 
(prisoners, the destitute), it has now spread to become a routine feature of the social 
ZRUOG3DUWRI+DJJHUW\DQG(ULFVRQ¶VDUJXPHQWLQµThe Surveillant Assemblage¶ is 
how (unlike historically) there are now no social groups totally free of surveillance:  
 
While poor individuals may be in regular contact with the surveillance 
systems associated with social assistance or criminal justice, the middle 
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and upper classes are increasingly subject to their own forms of routine 
observation, documentation and analysis.65 
 
7KLVVKRXOGQRWEHWDNHQWREHDµGHPRFUDWLF¶OHYHOOLQJ, as there is no corollary 
expansion of democratic control over surveillance. Whilst all groups can be exposed 
to surveillance, that exposure is not uniform. Capacity to evade, resist or oppose 
surveillance varies along familiar social strata such as, but not limited to, wealth, 
gender and race. 
 
Similarly, the surveillance society model draws our attention to the effects of large 
scale social events, such as globalisation or the development of information 
technology, and identifies features of contemporary social life that may be 
qualitatively different from those of previous eras and epochs. If for example, Hardt 
DQG1HJUL¶VFODLPWKDWWKHSDUDGLJPDWLFDnd hegemonic form of labour is now 
intellectual and cultural production, rather than material production, and that the 
world is increasingly interconnected through networks66 is accepted, then surveillance, 
as a form of knowledge production with a networked nature fits within this 
framework.  
 
However, by privileging surveillance in this way, it may actively occlude other 
important social factors. Surveillance is instrumental, and whilst the rationalities and 
logics of surveillance have important social and political effects, they are often in 
tandem with other logics and mentalities. Privileging surveillance as the core defining 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFRIFRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLHWLHVLVSHUKDSVWRRYHUSOD\RQH¶VKDQG7KLVLVD
problem common to accounts which elevate a particular element of the social to 
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hegemonic status, perhaps to draw attention to a previously unnoticed phenomenon, 
or for rhetorical effect5RVHDUJXHVWKDWWKLVDSSOLHVWRDQ\RIWKHµVRFLRORJLFDO¶UDQJH
RIDOWHUQDWHµVRFLHWLHV¶VXFKDVµVRFLHWLHVRIFRQWURO¶RUJHQHUDOµSRVW-disciplinary 
VRFLHWLHV¶DQGWKDWWKLVDSSURDFKLVXQVXLWDEOHIRUSROLWLFDOUHVHDUFK67 In addition, he 
argues that thinking in terms of epochal shifts in the nature of societies limits the 
analysis of forms of subjectivity and identity to epochal changes in which 
subjectivities are simply read off from total cultural transformations.68 It should 
however be understood that in many ways the surveillance society model arising in 
surveillance studies is a heuristic rather than a macro-sociological model. Whilst 
advocating thinking in terms of surveillance societies, Lyon also draws attention to 
multiple sites of surveillance with nuanced and complex particular dynamics.69 
 
There is now a large range of such micro-scale analysis of sites of surveillance. These 
often draw upon ethnographic techniques and participant observation to examine the 
specific practices in a specific site of surveillance. The classic example of this would 
be the studies of CCTV control rooms previously mentioned (Norris and Armstrong, 
McCahill, Coleman, Smith) as well as studies such as Dubbeld on the telemonitoring 
of cardiac patients.70 Lyon has also argued for the utility of thinking in terms of sites 
of surveillance, because whilst society is suffused with surveillance, surveillance 
operates in different ways across a variety of sites.71 These sites of surveillance are 
not a homogeneous mass and therefore whilst there is a need for research into these 
specific sites of surveillance, the transferability of this research may be somewhat 
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limited. The above studies have all used their specific sites of surveillance as a 
stepping off point for the discussion of more theoretical concerns, yet will, 
unavoidably, be located in their specificity.  
 
When selecting a level of analysis in surveillance research it is important to bear in 
PLQGWKHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQVRFLRORJLFDOOHYHODQDO\VLVRIWKHµVXUYHLOODQFHVRFLHW\¶W\SH
and the need to focus on specific sites of surveillance for the production of empirical 
evidence. This involves an opposition of abstraction and the ability to draw 
generalisations against specificity and locality. Research into surveillance must avoid 
the trap of the omnipresent homogeneous surveillance society, whilst still ideally 
being able to provide a level of analysis beyond descriptive studies of particular sites. 
,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRDYRLGWKHZRUVWH[FHVVHVRIHQGOHVVGHOLEHUDWLRQRQµZKDWLV
surveillance?¶IURPDSXUHO\WKHRUHWLFDOSRLQWZLWKRXWWKHJURXQGLQJRIVXFK
theorisation in empirical evidence, be that at the level of a specific institutional site, or 
more broadly (for example at the level of the discourse of various interacting groups 
in a society).  
 
Dystopias and perfect surveillance vs complexity and resistance 
 
Following on from the concept of the surveillance society is the degree to which 
surveillance research can be characterised by a dystopian attitude, and as an important 
component of this, the extent to which surveillant power is perceived of as operating 
seamlessly and smoothly. This section also examines the current theories of resistance 
to surveillance.  
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There are three main sources of the pessimistic trend in surveillance research. Firstly 
is the Orwellian inheritance. Secondly, ZKDW5RVHWHUPVDµVRFLRORJLFDOPLVUHDGLQJRI
)RXFDXOW¶.72 Thirdly, from journalistic and sensationalist accounts of the creeping 
spread of contemporary surveillance. These three strands are not isolated and can be 
seen feeding into each other in numerous ways. For example, journalistic accounts of 
surveillance draw heavily upon Nineteen Eighty-Four. Lyon suggests that much of the 
tendency to pessimism arises precisely because of the normative concerns of 
surveillance researchers, but that to write as if power is omnipresent and perfected is a 
µGLVVHUYLFHWRVRFLDOVFLHQFH¶.73 
 
,Q2UZHOO¶VNineteen Eighty-Four, the protagonist, Winston Smith attempts to resist 
the might of the omnipresent surveillance state of Oceania. Members of The Party are 
under near permanent surveillance through networks of spies and informers, overhead 
helicopters and the telescreen present in nearly every room. A landmark novel in the 
dystopian tradition, it was seen as a criticism of totalitarian societies, but also of 
WHQGHQFLHVH[LVWLQJLQOLEHUDOGHPRFUDFLHV6LPLODUO\.DIND¶VQRYHOVVXch as The 
Trial and The Castle, focusing on uncertainty and bureaucracy, arising from a critique 
of Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy with final judgement perpetually postponed, have 
also played a role in the development of surveillance theory. Whilst early surveillance 
studies drew explicitly upon this model of dystopic, centralised and perfected 
surveillance, it still exerts an influence. The novels provide strong images which 
continue to affect presumptions about surveillance, and these accounts do provide 
some insights and perspectives. The continual nagging fear is that we may be moving 
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closer to such a society. Whilst these accounts should not be ignored, it should be 
obvious that they are fiction not social science.  
 
Haggerty suggests dystopian trends are DOVRUHIOHFWHGLQ)RXFDXOW¶VDQDO\VLVof the 
µGLDEROLFDO¶FKDUDFWHURIWKDWµFUXHOLQJHQLRXVFDJH¶the panopticon, and that the 
GRPLQDQFHRI)RXFDXOW¶VPRGHOFRQWULEXWHVWRWKHG\VWRSLDQQRUPDWLYHRULHQWDWLRQRI
surveillance theory.74 However, Rose argues that dystopian trends emerge because of 
a misreading of Foucault. Whilst in Discipline and Punish Foucault examined 
disciplinary institutions, the 19th century was not completely disciplined. It should be 
XQGHUVWRRGWKDW%HQWKDP¶VSDQRSWLFRQZDVQHYHUEXLlt, and even had it been, its 
working may have been nowhere as effective as he envisaged. In analysing 
surveillance, we should be wary of taking the claims of those designing or promoting 
surveillance technologies and practices as social fact, although intentions of 
technologists are important. However this analysis goes deeper. Ransom criticises 
WKRVHZKRKDYHWDNHQ)RXFDXOW¶VZRUNDVHTXLYDOHQWWRWKHµUDWLRQDOO\DGPLQLVWHUHG
VRFLHW\¶WKHVLVRIWKH)UDQNIXUW6FKRROLQZKLFKWKHUHLVOLWWOHURRPIRUUHVLVtance or 
agency, the subject already being the product of power ± a docile body.75 Disciplinary 
technology is far from perfect, and always includes room for resistance.76 Power is 
fragile.  
 
The dystopian model portrays surveillance as simply a tool of social control. The 
reality is more nuanced and complex than this. Lyon has argued strongly and 
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consistently against this presumption.77 He believes that surveillance can be used to 
both control and care for others. Examples of this include tagging in neo-natal wards 
to prevent child abduction, or the storage and transmission of life-saving medical data 
in emergencies. Are parents not surveillance powers with regard to their children? 
This is an important argument to be made, and is itself a corrective to parts of the 
dystopian traditional view. Surveillance can be useful for us, as well as those in 
authority and power. However it is important to contrast between using surveillance 
in ways that benefit ourselves and using surveillance in ways that benefit others, but 
in ways decided upon by the surveillance agent rather than the surveillance subject.  
 
There is a rich emerging literature on resistance to surveillance, which Lyon feels is 
an important corrective to the dystopian trends in surveillance research.78 Much of 
this research necessarily involves paying attention to subjects of surveillance, their 
experience and activities. Lyon identifies a number of caveats when considering 
resistance to surveillance: firstly that surveillance is ambiguous, it is not a purely 
negative phenomenon; secondly that surveillance is complex, with different 
institutions or perspectives playing a large part in the specific politics of surveillance; 
thirdly, that surveillance technology is not infallible.79 These three factors affect the 
way that surveillance is complied with, negotiated, and resisted. As the converse of 
resistance, surveillance is frequently complied with for reasons of: the widespread 
presence of surveillance practices, that many practices are taken for granted, that we 
are unaware of many surveillance practices, and that many systems are accepted as 
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legitimate and necessary.80 Resistance can range from ad hoc and individual, 
(avoiding CCTV cameras by walking a different route) to organised and collective 
(joining a group to campaign against the introduction of identity cards). 
 
Marx presents a typology of eleven forms of resistance to surveillance. These include 
discovery, avoidance, piggy-backing, switching, distorting, blocking, masking 
(identification), breaking, refusal, cooperative and counter-surveillance moves.81 
These moves can be contrasted with explicitly political strategies to remove 
surveillance systems and practices through democratic political process or direct 
action. Work in political theory on resistance to surveillance often tends to take the 
form of analyses of privacy and practices of the regulation of personal data, 
emphasising the individual, owned nature of privacy rather than collective or social 
resistance. 
 
Lyon argues an important part of understanding resistance to surveillance is the 
subjectivities of those resisting surveillance, especially the alternate identities which 
can be mobilised against imposed and attributed surveillant representations.82 There is 
a politics of resistance associated with the subject¶s own understanding of their 
identity or identities and interaction with the data double. Rose identifies a problem 
with identity-based responses to surveillance. He argued experience of the actuarial 
processes of contemporary surveillance practices does not produce collective 
identities, in the same way as the collective experience of workplace exploitation or 
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racism.83 Anticipating the same impediments, Ogura provides a potential solution to 
this problem.84 +HVXJJHVWVWKDWµLGHQWLW\SROLWLFV¶VKRXOGEHGUDVWLFDOO\WUDQVIRUPHG
5DWKHUWKDQDWWHPSWLQJWRµHVWDEOLVKWKHFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\RIVRFLDOPLQRULW\JURXSV
DJDLQVWFXOWXUDOLGHRORJLFDORUSROLWLFDOLQWHJUDWLRQRUDIILOLDWLRQE\VRFLDOJURXSV¶KH
SRLQWVLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIDµGH-convergHQWSROLWLFV¶DEOHWRUHVLVWPHWKRGRORJLFDO
individualism and biological determinism he sees as present in information 
technology identity systems. Whilst he acknowledges that we have not yet seen such a 
social movement or politics based on identity, he idHQWLILHVµFULPLQDO¶LGHQWLW\
activity, such as fake ID cards and identity theft as manifestations of a surveillance 
RULHQWDWHGVRFLHW\¶VIRFXVRQPHWKRGRORJLFDOLQGLYLGXDOLVPDQGELRORJLFDO
determinants of identity (such as biometrics). He predicts the possibility of a politics 
based around self-determination of identity, potentially associated with the (non-
criminal) use of multiple identities, collaborative identities or anonymity.  
 
 
If the exploitation of identity expands and deepens, resistance against it to 
DFKLHYHVHOIGHWHUPLQDWLRQULJKWVRIZKRµLV¶ZLOODOVRIROORZ,QWKHYHU\
near future, we may grab hold of an alternative identity politics based on 
an identity of identities that is against identity exploitation.85 
 
 
 
Centrality of the state 
 
Classical accounts of surveillance assumed the state as prime agent of surveillance. 
The surveillance systems analysed by Rule were driving licenses and passports; 
LGHQWLW\GRFXPHQWVLVVXHGE\WKHVWDWH+HDVVXPHGWKDWWKHV\VWHPFORVHVWWRµWKH
total surveilODQFHVRFLHW\¶KDGWKHKLJKHVWGHJUHHRIFHQWUDOLVDWLRQSUHVXPDEO\LQWKH
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hands of the state.86 For Orwell, it was the state, personified by the figure of Big 
Brother at the apex of the surveillant system. Historically, only nation states, and 
perhaps the Catholic Church, possessed the resources to establish large bureaucracies 
and information handling systems necessary to perform censuses, or the military and 
LQWHOOLJHQFHDSSDUDWXVHVUHTXLUHGIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOHVSLRQDJH,Q*70DU[¶VHDUO\
work, the police and intelligence agencies as state agents were the main users of the 
µQHZVXUYHLOODQFH¶87 If the state is seen as the core or sole surveillance actor then anti-
surveillance politics take on a liberal or libertarian cast. The role of the state 
constitutes the distinction between public and private. The state is the public actor, 
attempting to penetrate the private sphere of the individual.  
 
However, contemporary surveillance is simply not one huge monolithic state 
apparatus. Arguments can be made that the state is no longer the primary actor in 
surveillance. Whitaker argues for a transition from the surveillance state to the 
surveillance society UHSUHVHQWLQJµDYHU\GLIIHUHQWFRPSOH[RISRZHULPSDFWLQJLQ
very different ways on authority, culture, security and politics, than did the state 
FHQWUHGVXUYHLOODQFHSRZHURIWKHLPPHGLDWHSDVW¶88 Non-state actors now play major 
roles in surveillance. This can range from supermarkets using loyalty cards to profile 
and track consumer purchases, to marketing agencies, insurance companies and 
political parties. In addition to this, charities make use of personal data to attract 
donations, and the vast majority of CCTV systems in the UK are owned and operated 
by the private sector.89 The three British credit reference agencies maintain profiles of 
GDWDFXOOHGIURPPXOWLSOHVRXUFHVWKDWKDYHUHDOHIIHFWVXSRQLQGLYLGXDOV¶OLIH
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H[SHULHQFHVDQGFKDQFHV0DUNHWHUVDUHµDJJUHVVLYHO\VHHNLQJSHUVRQDOLVHG
information and creating computer systems that categorize individual conVXPHUV¶.90 
 
Data mining, and consumer profiling conducted by private sector firms is a 
fundamental part of their business model. Hall states that 7.8 million adults in the UK 
have been barred from mainstream sources of credit because of credit scoring 
techniques, and that this raises problems of exclusion, because in many 
circumstances, credit and insurance can be seen as essential services ± for example, in 
very low income families who may require access to short term credit to cover gaps in 
income.91 However, she concedes that electronic collection and manipulation of data 
has resulted in many consumers being able to access credit and insurance they would 
have been unable to before.92  
 
:LWKWKHLQGXVWU\¶Vgrowth driven by government release of census data to the 
commercial sector in the 1970s and 1980s, 6 argues: 
 
 
Companies offering geo-demographic profiling data are the 21st Century 
equivalent of the great energy companies of the 20th, but subject to much 
more competition than were the old energy giants.93 
 
 
 
7KLVOLQHRIWKRXJKWUHDFKHVLWVPRVWSURGXFWLYHPRPHQWLQ+DJJHUW\DQG(ULFVRQ¶V
The µSurveillant Assemblage¶. The paper draws upon Deleuze and Guattari to 
describe the form of contemporary surveillance.94 This form involves the connections 
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between seemingly disparate and previously discrete surveillance technologies, sites, 
SUDFWLFHVDQGDJHQWVWUDGLWLRQDOO\VWXGLHGLQLVRODWLRQ$QµDVVHPEODJH¶LVD
µPXOWLSOLFLW\RIKHWHURJHQHRXVREMHFWVZKRVHXQLW\FRPHVVROHO\IURPWKHIDFWWKDW
these items function WRJHWKHUWKDWWKH\ZRUNWRJHWKHUDVDIXQFWLRQDOHQWLW\¶95 They 
GRZDUQDJDLQVWWDONLQJDERXWµ7KH¶VXUYHLOODQWDVVHPEODJHZKHQLWLVDQXQVWDEOH
entity with shifting boundaries. It is a potentiality, arising out of existing surveillance 
technologies, actors, signs, people and practices coming to act in certain ways. 
Connections are often informal rather than formal or legal. One example is journalists 
acting as buyers of personal information. This does not involve the state, being a 
relation between journalists and semi-legal personal information brokers.96 They also 
argue that surveillance is driven by the desire to bring systems together and that these 
combinations allow for the exponential growth in surveillance capacities.97 It is this 
assemblage model better than any unitary totalising model that explains the spread of 
surveillance in contemporary societies. It is not one process, but the interaction of 
numerous processes heading in similar directions. 
 
The assemblage works through a process of de-territorialisation and re-
territorialisation of individual bodies abstracted and turned into flows of information 
before being reassembled into data doubles. The multiplicity of the assemblage 
follows the Deleuzian tendency to problematise stable and unitary phenomena.98 The 
body is not perceived by the assemblage as a single, unitary entity, but rather as the 
source of a number of flows. Haggerty and Ericson offer a theory of a new type of 
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individual created by assemblage raising questions about the nature of identity in 
surveillance societies.  
 
 
Today, however, we are witnessing the formation and coalescence of a 
new type of body, a form of becoming which transcends human 
corporeality and reduces flesh to pure information. Culled from the 
tentacles of the surveiOODQWDVVHPEODJHWKLVQHZERG\LVRXUµGDWD
double.99 
 
And while such doubles ostensibly refer back to particular individuals, 
they transcend a purely representational idiom. Rather than being accurate 
or inaccurate portrayals of real individuals, they are a form of pragmatics: 
differentiated in how useful they are in allowing institutions to make 
discriminations among populations. Hence, while the surveillant 
assemblage is directed towards a particular cyborg flesh/technology 
amalgamation, it is productive of a new type of individual, one comprised 
of pure information.100 
 
 
 
The political ramifications of this multiplication of actors are varied, especially as 
many resistance strategies are orientated towards defending individual privacy against 
state surveillance. An example would be the question of political accountability. If 
data is gathered by a state then there may well be channels, albeit imperfect, of 
democratic accountability and transparency that allow citizens access to this data or 
information about how data is gathered, stored and used. These channels do not exist 
in the same way with corporate surveillance entities, and strategies developed to 
monitor or respond to the former may be ineffective with regard to the latter. 
Commercial data gathering practices are less visible that those of the state 
(bureaucratic administration, taxation, census practices etc) and citizens, whilst aware 
of the potential of state surveillance, may be unaware of the amount of data gathered 
about them by non-state actors. The visibility or awareness of a practice is the 
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prerequisite to holding an actor to account for that practice. Additionally, certain 
social categories are better placed to manipulate commercial surveillance practice 
through information technology literacy, education and material resources. In 
reference to the political effects of the surveillant assemblage, Haggerty and Ericson 
write:  
 
In the face of multiple connections across myriad technologies and 
practices, struggles against particular manifestations of surveillance, as 
LPSRUWDQWDVWKH\PLJKWEHDUHDNLQWRHIIRUWVWRNHHSWKHRFHDQ¶VWLGH
back with a broom ± a frantic focus on a particular unpalatable technology 
or practice while the general tide of surveillance washes over us all.101 
 
 
 
This theory has the advantage of empirical verisimilitude. Records and databases link 
up and various technologies and organisations are used to reach common goals. 
Witness for example the way that data from various surveillance sources (lists of 
missing people, CCTV images, international intelligence agencies etc) was used in 
tracking and identifying the London bombers in July 2005. This is an example of the 
operation of a surveillant assemblage. 
 
However, the state retains a role in surveillance research. Agamben has analysed how 
by creating states of emergency which were previously limited to wartime, 
FRQWHPSRUDU\VWDWHVKDYHEHHQDEOHWRFUHDWHµVWDWHVRIH[FHSWLRQ¶ZKLFKUHPRYHSULRU
limits on government action, including the use of surveillance, alongside permanent 
GHWHQWLRQRIµWHUURULVWV¶102 The logic allowing Guantanamo Bay, allows for increased 
state surveillance. Similarly, Bigo has shown the importance of the nation state with 
the continued existence (and the reinforcement) of the national border, even in (and 
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because of) a globalised world of supposedly free movement.103 Bigo situates this 
amongst sovereignty debates in international relations and the construction by the 
United States of a global state of insecurity. He suggests that the heavy monitoring of 
the border (see for example the fortified US-Mexico border, the so-called security 
fence built in the Palestinian territories by Israel and the experience of asylum seekers 
in UK detention centres) and the treatment of the immigrant should be understood as 
techniques of government by unease through the normalisation of a state of watchful 
emergency.104 
 
It is important not to forget that the state retains substantial coercive capacity and 
resources. Despite discourses of globalisation discussing the weakening of the nation 
state in the face of international pressures it should be remembered that this may be a 
weakening of specific elements of the nation state, whilst other elements may remain 
strongly intact or even redoubled in response to these pressures. Surveillance studies 
must proceed with recognition that there are multiple surveillance actors, with 
multiple technologies, resources and motivations underpinning their surveillance 
activities, yet it must not forget that one of these surveillant actors is the nation state, 
and that it is still a significant actor. From a political studies perspective, attempting to 
address the political effects of surveillance this is a highly important consideration.   
 
Technological determinism 
 
It would be possible to describe the capabilities of new developments in surveillance 
technology, and then deterministically read-off the social and political effects of these 
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developments from the technology. This occurs in popular, untheorised and 
journalistic accounts positing technological advances as the core reason for the spread 
of contemporary surveillance practices, but is resisted in contemporary surveillance 
studies. Contemporary surveillance does have a highly technological basis.105 This is 
not however, to obscure pre-technological forms of face-to-face human observation or 
surveillance. The bureaucratic file predates its computerised digital namesake.   
 
Any social or political theory that attempts to incorporate the 
WHFKQRORJLFDOLVYXOQHUDEOHWRFKDUJHVRIµGHWHUPLQLVP¶7Kat is, the 
impact of new artefacts and system may easily colonise the argument, 
such that already existing situations and processes are downplayed and 
µLQGLJHQRXV¶IDFWRUVPD\EHREVFXUHGE\DQH[DJJHUDWHGYLHZRIWHFKQLFDO
capacities.106 
 
 
 
Philosophically XQLYHUVDOWHFKQRORJLFDOGHWHUPLQLVPKDVODUJHO\EHHQDEDQGRQHGµIRU
DYLHZWKDWDGPLWVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIVLJQLILFDQWµGLIIHUHQFH¶LHFXOWXUDOYDULHW\LQ
UHFHSWLRQDQGDSSURSULDWLRQ¶107 There is still a temptation to look to the technological 
design and capabilities when faced with new developments such as data-mining, 
µVPDUW¶&&795),'FKLSV,'FDUGVRUELRPHWULFVXUYHLOODQFHWHFKQRORJ\ 
 
%HQWKDP¶VSDQRSWLFRQLVWHFKQRORJLFDOO\GHWHUPLQLVWLF+HKDGa priori visions of 
how the panopticon ± an architectXUDOWHFKQRORJ\IRUµVHHLQJZLWKRXWEHLQJVHHQ¶
ZRXOGFUHDWHFRQIRUPLQJLQPDWHVWKURXJKWKHµDSSDUHQWRPQLSUHVHQFHRIWKHLQVSHFWRU
FRPELQHGZLWKWKHH[WUHPHIDFLOLW\RIKLVUHDOSUHVHQFH¶108 and yet this was not tested 
in practice. There are many examples of technologies that do not live up to the 
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expectations, dreams or assertions of their designers. At the same time, studies 
utilising a panoptic framework have been beset by examples of negotiation and 
resistance which problematise the smooth, deterministic functioning of the panoptic 
technology. 
 
Surveillance research has been influenced by the broader field of science and 
technology studies that explore the complexity of the interactions between society and 
technology ± how social, political and cultural values affect scientific research and 
technological development, and how the latter also affect society, politics and 
culture.109 As such, the field predominantly rejects technological determinism and has 
produced a range of research with a nuanced approach to technology. These range 
from the impact on risk thinking from modern communications technology, to the 
effects of digital surveillance on inequality, and the role of technology in punishment 
and control.110 
 
In rejecting technological determinism, we should not commit the equal fallacy of 
assuming that technology is politically neutral. Whilst technology does not 
deterministically direct us in one necessary direction, specific technologies do have 
specific ways of working, specific optimal inputs, and specific outputs (both 
intentional and unintentional). We should also not depoliticise the actions of 
scientists, engineers and designers who create technologies with surveillance 
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capacities. We should not ignore the institutional norms and values which guide those 
designs, nor the commercial market or state channels through which they are 
introduced into society. Science and technology are not politically neutral, instead 
driven by political imperatives and logics. These logics are likely articulated in the 
discourse of scientists and engineers involved in producing surveillance. It may be 
productive to draw upon constructivist accounts of science and technology, which do 
not exempt scientists and technologies from sociological examination addressed to 
non-scientific beliefs.  
 
Constructivism argues that theories and technologies are underdetermined 
by scientific and technical criteria. Concretely, this means two things: 
first, there is generally a surplus of workable solutions to any given 
problem, and social actors make the final choice among a batch of 
technically viable options; and second, the problem-definition often 
changes in the course of solution.111 
 
 
 
New technologies make contemporary surveillance possible, but they do not make it 
inevitable. Whilst sufficient attention must be paid to the reality of surveillance 
capacities to ensure that they are neither over- or underestimated, it should not 
dominate an analysis which must incorporate the ways technologies are constructed 
and utilised in the world.   
 
The panopticon 
 
The final key controversy in surveillance research involves the dominance of the 
panopticon, and attempts to move beyond this model. This section engages with the 
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move to a post-panoptic theoretical position characteristic of the work of Boyne and 
Haggerty. 
 
Originating in a prison designed by Jeremy Bentham and his brother, the most 
dominating feature is the central tower, housing an inspector, enabling him to observe 
the cells surrounding the tower, whilst at the same time remaining concealed from 
inmates in the cells by a series of blinds.112 The prisoner is left exposed, and with no 
point where the gaze of the inspector might be obscured, the single occupant in each 
cell is rendered permanently visible.  
 
%HQWKDP¶VIXOOHVWH[SOLFDWLRQRIWhe panopticon stretched to twenty chapters, and 
included complicated and detailed elaborations to maintain the central principles of 
the panopticon: that the prisoners remained separated from each other and 
permanently visible to an inspector whose presence could never be directly confirmed 
or denied. The architectural features were to maintain the asymmetry of visibility. Any 
deviant behaviour by the prisoner could be observed by the inspector who could then 
take appropriate action. Unable to determine if they were under observation at any 
given moment, the prisoner was forced to assume they were under surveillance at all 
times, and act accordingly if they wished to avoid punishment. The panopticon is the 
µWKHOHDGLQJVFKRODUO\PRGHORUPHWDSKRUIRUDQDO\VLQJVXUYHLOODQFH¶and is therefore 
a widespread concept, pressed into a wide range of (often worryingly unreflective) 
intellectual service.113 Hardly any work on surveillance can ignore the panopticon, 
and many papers or books feature an extended description RI%HQWKDP¶VGHVLJQDQG
)RXFDXOW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRILW%HFDXVHRIWKHLQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\QDWXUHRIVXUYHLOODQFH
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research, theorists come to the panopticon from a number of perspectives. This can 
mean that the panopticon (or elements of it) can be taken out of specific contexts (for 
example the utilitarian reformist politics of Bentham, or the archaeological and 
genealogical work of Foucault). Additionally, simply because nearly every article on 
surveillance makes mention of the panopticon, there is a tendency to continue this. In 
order to talk about surveillance, it seems that one must mention the panopticon, and 
additionally, one must pay homage to Michel Foucault. 
 
The tendency exists to describe surveillance phenomena, invoke the model of the 
panopticon, and read off the supposedly panoptic characteristics of the latest iteration 
of surveillance technology. Accounts which untheoretically apply the term panoptic in 
front of the word surveillance miss the specificity of the account. A separate argument 
(using a particular model of what constitutes the panopticon) must be made to justify 
the specification of a surveillance event or phenomena as panoptic. These unreflective 
usages of panoptic to mean essentially any form of surveillance should be discounted 
as fundamentally meaningless statements where the word panoptic becomes an empty 
concept. Lyon argues that the concept persists because it is multifaceted, capable of 
multiple interpretations and draws on the major problematics of modernity.114 He 
however argues that to move forward, surveillance theory is obliged to look beyond 
the panopticon. Its dominance has stifled the range of possible questions in 
surveillance research. For some time, surveillance research focused on the question 
µWRZKDWH[WHQWLVFRQWemporary surveillance more/less panoptic.¶115 Haggerty 
presents a list of expanded or reworked panoptic models culled from the literature 
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which includes: the superpanopticon, the electronic panopticon, the omnicon, the ban-
opticon, the global panopticon, the panspecticion, the myopic panopticon, the fractal 
panopticon, the urban panopticon, the pedagopticon, the polyopticon, the synopticon, 
panoptic discourse, social panopticisim, cybernetic panopticon and the neo-
panopticon.116 He argues that this range of variations on the concept, as well as 
signalling the dominance of the model in surveillance theory, also demonstrates the 
lacunae, the inadequacies and the limitations of the model. Each extension or 
refinement points to a way in which the panopticon model does not fit with the reality 
of contemporary surveillance. For example, the electronic panopticon117 signals the 
ODFNRIDWWHQWLRQSDLGWRFRQWHPSRUDU\LQIRUPDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\LQ)RXFDXOW¶VVXSSRVHG
µKLVWRU\RIWKHSUHVHQW¶ZKLOVWWKHV\QRSWLFRQKLJKOLJKWVWKe way in which the 
powerful are exposed to public visibility through modern media technology in a way 
which parallels and supplements the panopticon model.118 
 
Boyne summarises arguments for abandoning the panopticon from a number of 
theorists. These are the displacement of the panoptic method by techniques of 
seduction in the work of Bauman, the redundancy of the panoptical impulse due to 
self-surveillance functions, the reduction in the need for panoptic surveillance due to 
simulation and prediction, the supplementation of the panopticon by the synopticon, 
and the failure of the panopticon to reliably produce docile subjects.119 However, his 
conclusion is that there is still room for the panopticon as an analytical ideal type. 
Bauman argues that the panopticon is an inappropriate model for societies based 
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around consumption, rather than soldiers and factory workers.120 Boyne suggests that 
this universalises the experiences of affluent western middle classes, and that 
positioning one method of social control as the method is problematic.121 However, it 
does echo the movement of surveillance to borders and the edges of society observed 
by Bigo.122 Boyne makes an important argument when he states that the panopticon is 
ORFNHGZLWKLQDµIXQFWLRQDOLVW¶SDUDGLJP123 Bogard is the source of the argument, 
based upon Baudrillard, that surveillance is increasingly being replaced by simulation 
by computer technology, by anticipation rather than retroactive monitoring.124 Boyne 
is sceptical of this thesis, but accepts an important question is the way models of 
µQRUPDO¶DFWLYLW\DQGEHKDYLRXUDUHSROLWLFDOO\DQGVRFLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHGE\HOLWHV
Boyne also draws upon MathieVHQ¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHV\QRSWLFRQ125 a parallel model of 
visibility through which the many watch the few. Mathiesen demonstrated the way in 
which these processes both involved forms of surveillance and the ways in which they 
interacted to increase levels of surveillance in society. Finally, Boyne traces the way 
WKDWVXEMHFWLYLWLHVDQGUHVLVWDQFHDUHH[SORUHGLQ)RXFDXOW¶VOater work on sexuality 
DQGJRYHUQDQFH+HFRQFOXGHVWKDW)RXFDXOW¶VODWHUZRUNFDQDOUHDG\EHXQGHUVWRRGDV
µSRVW-SDQRSWLF¶126 
 
Haggerty argues for the abandonment of the panopticon due to its limited perspectives 
on the purposes of surveillance, its focus on top-down, hierarchical forms of 
surveillance, the way it ignores both non-human targets and agents of surveillance 
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whilst rendering human subjects entirely passive, and the way that it includes no 
mention of new surveillance technologies.127 He also argues that the theoretical 
dominance of the concept in studies of surveillance leads to it obscuring other 
alternative theories that may be more productive.128 Surveillance is used for a wide 
variety of purposes, and the majority of these are not carceral. Surveillance does not 
just monitor people, but also the physical world and environment. This is not to say 
that this is not political ± the example Haggerty provides is the monitoring systems 
intended to detect tsunamis or disease epidemics ± but that the panoptic model is 
poorly designed for this sort of surveillance.129 In direct contradiction to Foucault, 
Haggerty suggests that it makes a significant social difference who the agent of 
surveillance is; that the power relation is not independent of who exercises it.  
 
It is profoundly important whether the people who use surveillance 
systems are members of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, The 
American Civil Liberties Union, or the Ku Klux Klan.130 
 
 
 
Haggerty argues that the subjects of surveillance in the panoptic model are entirely 
SDVVLYHDQGWKDWZKLOVWUHVLVWDQFHWRSRZHULVDQLPSRUWDQWWKHPHLQ)RXFDXOW¶VODWHU
work, this understanding is not present in the analysis of the panopticon.131 The model 
also requires that subjects of surveillance are aware they are under surveillance. 
Haggerty argues that many contemporary surveillance practices, such as 
dataveillance, require that this surveillance be covert or that subjects are not highly 
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aware of the practices. This mirrors an orientation within behavioural psychology that 
awareness of observation will somehow prevent access to true behaviours, potentially 
due to the numerous practices of negotiation, resistance and subversion that 
individuals engage in when they understand themselves as under surveillance.132 
 
Some of the previous discussions in this section can inform different notions of the 
panopticon. Panoptic models may suggest that modern society has been generally 
panoptic (and often that this is in fact the defining characteristic of modern 
disciplinary society), or that relatively recent developments in contemporary 
surveillance technology (for example digital and computer technology, information 
technology, facial recognition and biometric technology and even CCTV) have 
allowed the panopticon to expand from the prison to (potentially) cover the whole of 
the social world. This argument is looking somewhat dated, and has similarities with 
other heavily hyped theories arising out of the so-called digital revolution. It is no 
longer heavily favoured in academic studies of surveillance but it exists in less 
academic and older accounts and it has filtered through to a popular culture and 
artistic level.133 %RWKWKHVHPRGHOVIDOOIRXORI5RVH¶VFULWLTXHRIWKHµVRFLRORJLFDO
PLVUHDGLQJRI)RXFDXOW¶ZKLOVWWKHsecond seems to exhibit a distinct strand of simple 
technological determinism.  
 
The panopticon concept retains some utility as a model for the analysis of 
specific sites of surveillance. Simon has suggested that all that was necessary 
IRUDµVLPSOHSDQRSWLFPDFKLQH¶ZDVDKXPDQVXEMHFWRIVXUYHLOODQFHDIRUPRI
enclosure or territorialisation, a form of partitioning or segmentation and an 
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agent of surveillance.134 In these circumstances we can talk about the possibility 
of (or tendency towards) panoptic power. This suggests a partial response to 
Haggerty. Whilst it is politically important who the agent of surveillance is, it 
PD\VWLOOEHDµVLPSOHSDQRSWLFPDFKLQH¶)RXFDXOW¶VSXUSRVH can be interpreted 
as situating the panopticon within a model that attempts to decentralise the 
personal nature of political power located in the person of the sovereign, 
replacing it with more generalisable mechanisms of power. This panopticon is 
not state-based but micro-political, it is not permanent but contingent, it is not 
necessarily based on visibility but rather knowledge and information and the 
interaction between participants in a knowledge-based interaction ± one ridden 
with meaning, categorisation and subject constitution, and finally it is not 
automatic ± there is agency and resistance in this model. One of the most useful 
SRLQWVLQ+DJJHUW\¶VDQDO\VLVLVWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDWRQHVKRXOGQRWHQJDJHLQD
search for the pure panopticon found in the true Foucault, but instead one that 
fits with empirical reality and therefore provides a productive basis for further 
research. Haggerty concludes his article with an examination of the potential 
use of Foucauldian governmentality approaches to surveillance. This will be 
explored in the next section.  
 
Controversies and debates in surveillance research 
 
This section has demonstrated the main dividing lines, areas of debates and core 
questions in surveillance theory and research. Additionally, it has set out some 
contingent solutions to these questions, suggesting directions in which further 
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research should progress. There is a need for a nuanced understanding of the limits of 
the surveillance society, the appropriate level of analysis, the efficacy of surveillance, 
the role of the state, the effects of technology and a sceptical orientation towards 
previously dominant tropes of the genre. This points the way towards an approach that 
can navigate the potential pitfalls of surveillance research whilst still producing useful 
and revealing insights into surveillance phenomena. The next section presents such an 
approach.  
 62 
Governmentality 
 
Drawing upon the previously discussed surveillance research literature, and 
addressing itself to a number of concerns raised in the examination of the sub-ILHOG¶V
controversies and debates, this section outlines the approach known as 
governmentality or the analytics of government and demonstrates the suitability of 
this theory for research into surveillance. An overview of the approach and its key 
theorists will be followed by an analysis of its sensitivities and valuable perspectives.  
 
*RYHUQPHQWDOLW\DULVHVIURP)RXFDXOW¶VZRUNRQJRYHUQPHQWDQGOLEHUDOLVP7KH
OHFWXUHVDWWKH&ROOHJHGH)UDQFHIURPZKLFKWKHSLYRWDOHVVD\µ*RYHUQPHQWDOLW\¶ZDV
taken have only recently been published in English.135 However, the perspective had 
filtered throuJKE\WKHODWHV7KHWHUPµJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\¶ seeks to distinguish the 
particular mentalities, arts and regimes of government. The term government is used 
generally for any calculated direction of human conduct.136 Historically, 
governmentality emerged in early modern Europe from the uneasy combination of 
pastoral power and UDLVRQG¶HWDW3DVWRUDOSRZHULVDµGHGLFDWHGNLQGO\SRZHU¶WKH 
idea of the Christian shepherd¶s responsibility for his flock, bringing a requirement of 
µDQLQGLYLGXDONQRZOHGJHRIHDFKPHPEHUDWWDLQHGE\WHFKQLTXHVRIVHOI-knowledge 
DQGFRQIHVVLRQDQGWKHREHGLHQFHRIHDFKPHPEHU¶137 5DLVRQG¶HWDW is the modern 
way of integrating individuals, making the individual politically useful to the state in 
ZD\VWKDWHQKDQFHWKHVWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\LQUHODWLRQWRRWKHUVWDWHV$FRQWHPSRUDU\
example is the way that individuals are encouraged to become economically useful 
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producers and consumers. Governmentality emerges with the separation of the 
government from the person of the sovereign. Government then has to take account of 
WKHµWKLQJWREHJRYHUQHG¶ ± the population; in ways that sovereign power did not.138 
7KLVSDUDOOHOV/HIRUW¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHGHPRFUDWLFUHYROXWLRQDVWKHFUHDWLRQRIDQ
µHPSW\SODFH¶of power fillable by a number of actors.139 Critically linked to biopower 
± the control over the processes of life rather than the question of life or death, 
JRYHUQPHQWDOLW\LQWKHIRUPRIOLEHUDOLVPLVDQµDFWLYHDQGLQYHQWLYHGHSOR\PHQWRI
freedom as a wa\RIJRYHUQLQJSHRSOH¶140 The liberal governmental state acquires a 
responsibility for the care of its subjects, it cannot just control them. Bio-politics 
brings life and its mechanisms (health, sanitation, reproduction, birth rates) into 
explicit calculations, making power/knowledge an agent of the transformation of 
human life.141 
 
*RYHUQPHQWFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVWKHµFRQGXFWRIFRQGXFW¶DQ\DWWHPSWWRµVKDSH
with some degree of deliberation aspects of our behaviour according to particular sets 
of norms and IRUDYDULHW\RIHQGV¶142 Government involves not direct control, but 
encouraging forms of self-direction appropriate to certain situations. This is clearly 
ZLGHUWKDQWUDGLWLRQDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIµJRYHUQPHQW¶DVH[HFXWLYHVRYHUHLJQSRZHU 
In fact, governPHQWµHPSOR\VDQGLQILOWUDWHVDQXPEHURIGLVFRXUVHVRUGLQDULO\
FRQFHLYHGDVXQUHODWHGWRSROLWLFDOSRZHUJRYHUQDQFHRUWKHVWDWH¶143  
Governmentality is: 
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³QRWDPDWWHURILPSRVLQJODZVRQPHQEXWUDWKHUGLVSRVLQJWKLQJVWKDWLV
to say, to employ tactics rather than laws, and if need be, to use laws 
WKHPVHOYHVDVWDFWLFV´144 
 
 
 
Thought of as a perspective from which to conduct political research, and drawing on 
the above understanding of government and governmentality, Dean provides a 
typology of the apprRDFKKHWHUPVWKHµDQDO\WLFVRIJRYHUQPHQW¶. He lists the 
identification of problematisations, the priority given to questions relating to process, 
mechanisms and tactics of governance, the view of governments as assemblages or 
regimes rather than homogenoXVWRWDOLWLHV'UDZLQJRQ'HOHX]H¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKH
dispositif, he highlights a concern for technical aspects of government, such as means, 
mechanisms, procedures, instruments and (critically) vocabularies, ideas and values. 
The analytic also considers government as a rational and thoughtful activity ± how 
does government as an assemblage think? How does it approach problems, and how 
GRHVLWDWWHPSWWRRYHUFRPHWKRVHSUREOHPV"+HDVNVµ+RZGRWKHVHSUDFWLFHVRI
governing give rise to specific forms of truth?¶145 
 
The analysis of government is concerned with thought as it becomes 
linked to and embedded in practices and institutions, thus to analyse 
mentalities of government is to analyse thought made practical and 
technical.146 
 
 
 
From this perspective, thought is a collective rather than an individual activity. It is 
not a matter of the representation of the individual mind or consciousness, but instead 
of collective bodies of knowledge, opinions and beliefs. Mentalities are collective, 
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relatively bounded unities of thought that are not readily accessible to those who are 
inside them.147 Mentalities are highly associated with the discursive construction of 
WKHµSUREOHPVSDFH¶WKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHQDWXUHRIWKHYDULRXVSUREOHPVWRZKLFK
government can be addressed: 
 
 
 
The ways in which those who would exercise rule have posed to 
themselves the question of the reasons, justifications, means and ends of 
rule, and the problems goals or ambitions that should animate it.148 
 
 
Governmentality is inherently concerned with surveillance, predicated upon 
knowledge and visibility of the population. Surveillance is traceable to the 
JRYHUQPHQWDOLPSHUDWLYHWRµNQRZWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶'HWDLOHGNQRZOHGJHRIWKH
population is required before appropriate management strategies can be constructed.  
 
 
Governing a specific population requires an intricate knowledge of its 
particularities, tendencies and inclinations. This emphasis on the operation 
of knowledge, along with an understanding of the importance of different 
technologies for conceptualising and executing governmental ambitions, 
places practices of visibility at the forefront of governmental practices.149 
 
 
 
Foucault sees the origins of this in pastoralism and the need to watch over the 
Christian flock.150 Within governmentality, there is a need to harness collective 
energies that might otherwise be anarchic, self-destructive, or simply unproductive. 
Surveillance is perceived by Rose as part of the price paid for the liberal expansion of 
freedoms to act.151 Governance is therefore a site of bounded freedom. 
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Governmentality supports an awareness of the importance of data-based forms of 
surveillance. This arises from studies on the development of the census. The census is 
a critical response to the necessity of knowing the population before appropriate 
strategies can be applied. In a real sense, the census creates citizens.152 This 
perspective reveals the importance of databases, lists, records, files and the like for 
creating subjectivities and identities. Statistics is intimately linked with the state, 
developing out of the need to conduct censuses and analyse the data they produced. 
This parallels the way cartography maps the extent of the territory, and constitutes the 
nation state as geographically bounded entity.153 Governmentality reveals the political 
incentives that drive the production of a seemingly objective and autonomous 
scientific method.  
 
The governmentality model breaks down the centralised state model of surveillance, 
instead demonstrating the multiplicity of actors involved in government. A core 
DVSHFWLVWKHDZDUHQHVVRIµDSOXUDOLW\RIGLVWLQFWIRUFHV>WKDW@JRHVLQWRVKDSLQJ
PRGHUQIRUPVRISRZHU¶154 The government is not conceived of as a single unitary 
actor, but a wide range of agencies, bodies, institutions, practices and discourses. The 
JRYHUQPHQWDOSHUVSHFWLYHSD\VDWWHQWLRQWRWKHZD\JRYHUQDQFHLVµHQDFWHGDQG
coordinated by extra-state agents such as corporations, non-governmental agencies, 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOERGHVDQGFRPPXQLW\JURXSV¶155 The contemporary nation state must 
incorporate the governance capacity embodied in civil society. Coleman incorrectly 
suggests that:  
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The governmentality literature has thus forced a reconsideration of social 
control: its relationship to the exercise of power, the state and social order. 
Instead of being a leading social force, the state concept melts away into 
the social body and becomes no more than the combined effects of micro-
powers.156 
 
 
 
Governmentality instead recognises the heterogeneity of the state, and the blurry 
edges between the state and other governmental actors, but does not completely 
dissolve the state, nor abstract it to a single homogeneous actor. It recognises that 
power is not the preserve of the state as traditionally defined. This is useful for 
negotiating the contested role of the state in surveillance theory. Following 
governmentality, it is unsurprising that there are myriad surveillance actors beyond 
the state. This fits well with the arguments for the heterogeneity of surveillance 
emerging from the surveillant assemblage: 
 
 
5DWKHUWKDQH[HPSOLI\LQJ2UZHOO¶VWRWDOLWDULDQVWDWH-centred Oceania, this 
assemblage operates across both state and extra-state institutions.157 
 
 
 
In addition to a multiplicity of actors, governance makes uses of a multiplicity of 
strategies. Therefore this theoretical perspective can incorporate many surveillance 
theories such as social sorting or simple panoptic machines as particular strategies of 
governance without having to accept the sociological tendency to believe we reside in 
an electronic panopticon, or maximum surveillance society. Neither does 
governmentality preclude the exercise of sovereign or disciplinary strategies within a 
governmental framework, rather, according to Dean, all three are fundamental to 
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modern forms of authority.158 Rather than seeking an axiomatic explanation of 
surveillant power, this triad allows for nuance in determining which forms of power 
are in play at a specific surveillance site.  
 
Governmentality is sensitive to issues of identity and identification, which will be 
shown to be of key importance to issues of surveillance later in this chapter. 5RVH¶V
µVHFXULWL]DWLRQRILGHQWLW\¶PRGHOHPHUJHVIURPJRYHUQDQFH+HVXJJHVWVWKHQHHGWR
µLGHQWLI\WKHVSHFLILFORFLDQGSUDFWLFHVZLWKLQZKLFKFRQGXFWKDVEHHQSURblematised 
LQZD\VZKLFKKDYHOHGWRWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIQHZWHFKQLTXHVRILGHQWLILFDWLRQ¶159 He 
QRWHVWKHHPHUJHQFHDWDQXPEHURIVLWHVDQGSUDFWLFHVµSUREOHPVRIWKH
individualisation of the citizen to which securitization of identity can appear as a 
solXWLRQ¶160 7KHVHVLWHVDUHGLVSHUVHGDQGGLVRUJDQLVHGDQGWKH\DFWDVµVZLWFKSRLQWV¶
which must be passed by an individual, if that individual is to be able to access 
circuits and flows of benefits and services ± the benefits of liberty. Technologies such 
as ID cards, presented at a border, or when applying for work, operate as a surveillant 
check on entitlement to access social goods. Linked to this is the tension in the 
analytics of government between the individual and the collective. In terms of its 
development, pastoral power is associated with individualisation whilst the 
µSRSXODWLRQ¶LVFROOHFWLYLVLQJ7KLVKDVLQWHUHVWLQJSDUDOOHOVZLWKWKHZD\WKH
individual involved in social sorting is collectivised through their categorisation, but 
is individualised through the cross cutting nature of those categories, and the sheer 
volume of information tied to that individual. 
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The analytics of government draws upon a Foucauldian understanding of power, as 
power/knowledge, in the knowledge of the population as a prerequisite of governance, 
the inevitability of resistance to governmental power, the creative and constitutive 
role of power (especially with regard to identities), and the way that power is not 
owned or held, but instead flows through multiple sites. 
  
Dean suggests a number of perspectives that an analytics of government should pay 
attention to. These are potentially revealing for political surveillance research. Firstly, 
the examination of the fields of visibility of government: µby what light it illuminates 
and defines objects and with what shadows and darkness it obscures and hides 
others¶.161 The logic of government, and the rationalities involved, will construct 
social objects in differing ways, through the articulation of specific discourses. The 
objects of surveillance, and the specific ways in which objects of surveillance are 
viewed affect what is politically possible or acceptable. Governmentality allows the 
UHVHDUFKWRµFDSWXUHWKHVHQVHLQZKLFKVHHLQJDQGGRLQJDUHERXQGLQWRRQH
FRPSOH[¶162  
 
Secondly, Dean advises the extraction of the utopian element in government.163 He 
DUJXHVWKDWJRYHUQPHQWDLPVWRGRPRUHWKDQH[HUFLVHDXWKRULW\IRUDXWKRULW\¶VVDNH
*RYHUQPHQWDLPVWRPDNHWKLQJVEHWWHUDOWKRXJKWKHTXHVWLRQRIµIRUZKRP¶LV
highly relevant). It should be understood that whilst government should be considered 
as utopian, this is not an incitement to believe that government is utopic. This is not a 
naïve belief that government has all our best interests at heart, or that it always acts 
morally, but rather the intentional orientation towards ends and objectives. This 
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position is a useful corrective to dystopian trends in surveillance research, which at 
their worst can perceive government simply as a unified conspiracy against the 
individual, using surveillance to secure the position of power. Rose argues: 
 
 
The kind of empirical analysis that is involved here is not hermeneutic. It 
is not a question of decoding or interpreting a particular strategy to 
discover hidden motives, of critiquing a particular alignment of forces to 
identity class interests, or of interpreting a particular ideology to discover 
the real objectives that lie behind it.164 
 
 
 
Instead, strategies and tactics must be analysed in their own terms. Utopian strategies, 
with specific goals and intentions, must be analysed in terms of the identities, 
objectives, enemies, alliances, categories and relations of equivalence or difference, 
that are constructed by the strategies themselves. Coleman is concerned that this fails 
to challenge the terms of the reference of official discourse, and that critically, the 
µSROLWLFDOSURFHVVHVWKDWFRQVWUXFWSUREOHPVWKDWJRYHUQPHQWDOULVNVWUDWHJLHVUHVSRQG
WRDQGVHHNWRUHPHG\¶ are missing.165 7KHUHLVVRPHZHLJKWWR&ROHPDQ¶VFRQFHUQ
and an accurate analysis should have concern for the influences that cause 
governmental responses.  
 
6LPLODUO\JRYHUQPHQWDOLW\LQYROYHVWKHDYRLGDQFHRIµJOREDORUUDGLFDO¶SRVLWLRQV,W
cannot simplistically assume that all governing is good or that all governing is bad. 
7KLVHFKRHV/\RQ¶VDUJXPHQWVDERXWWKHGXDOQDWXUHRIVXUYHLOODQFH6XUYHLOODQFHFDQ
be used for both positive and negative aims. What is perceived as negative from the 
perspective of the social critic or the subject of surveillance may be regarded as 
socially beneficial aims in the discourse of police, social workers, health workers, or 
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managers. These points suggest an orientation towards the discursive constructions of 
both problems and solutions within governmental projects. According to Rose 
µgenealogies of government seek to reconstruct the problematisations to which 
programmes, strategies, tactics posed themselves as a solution.¶166 Dean mirrors this, 
stating: 
 
 
An analytics of government often commences analysis by examining the 
ways aspects of regimes of practices are called into question (or 
problematised) by such programmes.167 
 
 
 
$GGLWLRQDOO\DV+DJJHUW\SRLQWVRXWVFHSWLFLVPWRZDUGVJHQHUDOWKHRULHVRIµVRFLDO
FRQWURO¶LVFRPELQHGZLWKWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIVXEMHFWVDVDFWLYHVRFLDODJHQWVFDSable 
of resistance, avoidance or subversion.168 This allows an analysis of the politics of 
surveillance and practices of resistance, although he warns that this would require 
EUHDNLQJZLWK5RVH¶VSHUVSHFWLYHWKDWWKHUHLVQRVXFKWKLQJDVµWKHJRYHUQHG¶.169 
Haggerty suggests that:  
 
 
 In this quest for a form of methodology and epistemological purity, 
studies of governmentality inevitably forgo important lines of inquiry into 
the actual experience of being subjected to different governmental 
regimes. 170 
 
 
 
He suggests an awareness of the politics of surveillance, and attention to the subjects 
of surveillance as a corrective to a weakness in the governmental account. 
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For surveillance research, the analytics of government approach provides a way of 
negotiating the role of the state by presenting governance as a dispersed 
heterogeneous activity occurring across numerous sites and through numerous 
practices and regimes. It also allows the avoidance of totalistic accounts of 
surveillance societies. It avoids technological determinism, but is capable of 
incorporating a wide range of practices and techniques within an analysis of 
government. It incorporates surveillance as a critical element in the knowing of the 
population and the constitution of individual identities. It addresses risk and control in 
its understanding of the conduct of conduct, and avoids the worst excesses of 
dystopian theory through its concern for the utopian elements of government. The 
governance approach suggests attention to multiple sites of surveillance, the 
discourses that constitute governmental practices and strategies, the identities created 
through these processes and the problems that motivate them. For these reasons it 
provides a powerful toolkit for the analysis of the politics of surveillance.  
 
 
 73 
Identity ± contested and constructed 
 
This section demonstrates the centrality of the concept of identity to the politics of 
surveillance. It will demonstrate the range of sites in which identity is in play whilst 
presenting theoretical justifications for a focus on identity. This section shows why it 
is of critical importance to analyse the articulation of individual identity. The issues 
here strongly relate to the way that identity is conceptualised, either as an objective 
quality or as a social construction. 5DDELGHQWLILHVµLGHQWLW\¶DVPRVWO\DQH[DPLQHG
term in discussions of personal identity or identity management, and that hidden 
assumptions exist with implications for social and technical matters.171 He identifies 
that what counts as identity, or part of identity, is socially variable and contextually 
dependent. 
 
Identity in surveillance practice 
 
Identity is critical to contemporary surveillance practices. Whilst there are 
surveillance systems primarily concerned with behaviour rather than identification per 
se, even these systems (such as crowd monitoring CCTV systems) disaggregate 
individuals from collectives for technical purposes. The result is that: 
 
 
Identity is so embedded in our daily interactions that people rarely give it 
much thought, but it is an essential social and economic process. 
Identification is part of nearly every meaningful encounter among people. 
It is part of every sophisticated commercial and legal transaction. It is part 
of most [sic] every contact between a government and its citizens.172 
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Politically, Stalder and Lyon position a concern with the stable identities of subjects 
as the central concern of the modern state.173 Placing this model inside a 
JRYHUQPHQWDOIUDPHZRUN5RVH¶Vµsecuritization of LGHQWLW\¶ model describes a 
situation in which: 
 
 
At the close of the twentieth century, subjects are locked into circuits of 
control through the manipulation of sites where the exercise of freedom 
requires proof of legitimate identity.174  
 
 
 
Contemporary life has become impoVVLEOHZLWKRXWDµVHFXUHGLGHQWLW\¶'HPRQVWUDWLRQ
RILGHQWLW\LVUHTXLUHGIRUWKHµREOLJDWRU\DFFHVVSRLQWVRIDFWLYHFLWL]HQVKLS¶WRDFFHVV
FRQVXPSWLRQRUWRHQMR\WKHµEHQHILWVRIOLEHUW\¶$FFHVVWRVRFLDOSULYLOHJHVUHTXLUHV
an entry in the appropriate database and the presentation of the correct identity. Each 
subsequent access to social services, commercial products etc, adds another entry to 
the database. This will be visibly brought together in the UK with the planned 
introduction of the National Identity Register. Rose perceives these circuits and sites 
of identification as the inevitable cost of the exercise of liberal freedom, but notes that 
whilst the securitization of identity creates a secured space within certain limits 
VLPLODUWRWKHµERXQGHGIUHHGRP¶LQ-R\FH¶VDFFRXQWLVDOVRJHQHUDWHVPXOWLSOHSRLQWV
of exclusion.175  
 
However, this is not to say that identity and identification are solely contemporary 
issues. Attention has been paid to the development of technologies of identification, 
including the history of fingerprinting and its contested development and use in 
                                               
173
 Stalder & Lyon, 2003, p.1. 
174
 Rose, 1999, p.240. 
175
 Rose, 1999, pp.240-6. 
 75 
criminal identification, and the history of the passport.176 Various authors have 
explored the history of identification, situating this against a narrative of expanding 
paper-based bureaucracies, criminological theories, and social trends of modernity. 
Passports were initially a bill of safe travel for a small mobile minority, but 
industrialisation created a more mobile population which became divorced from 
locations in which they were known and recognised, and clustering in anonymous 
cities.177 Both fingerprinting and the census originated as technologies of control of 
subject populations, before being brought back to the centres of imperial power.178 
Policing, the control of deviancHDWKUHDWHQLQJUDQJHRIµVXVSHFWERGLHV¶DQGWKH
problem of criminal recidivism provided drivers for identification.179 The history of 
identification is a history of control through individuation, the attempt to create a 
SHRSOHµOHJLEOH¶to the emergent bureaucracies.180 
 
 
,GHQWLILFDWLRQWHFKQRORJLHVZHUHGHYHORSHGQRWIRUVRFLHW\¶VUHVSHFWDEOH
Jekylls, but for its suspicious looking Hydes. Not just criminal suspects 
EXWDOVRDZLGHUDQJHRISHRSOHFRQVLGHUHGµVXVSHFW¶DQGDOLHQIRURWKHU
reasons.181  
 
 
 
Hacking associates identification practices, such as Bertilionage with the development 
of theories of statistical correlation.182 However, technological development was not 
determined but highly contextual. Even technologies that are relatively unquestioned 
today had to construct their accuracy and purpose against a range of alternatives, and 
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with appropriate discursive and political support. Fingerprinting overtook the 
seemingly more scientific anthropometrics due to its greater support from police 
forces and prison wardens.183 
 
 
Early pioneers of identification did something extraordinary: they created 
a link between an individual body and a paper record held by the state. It 
was a link, moreover, that everyone believed in: judges, bureaucrats, 
scientists, and the general public alike.184 
 
 
 
The history of pre-digital identification demonstrates its relationship to control, the 
political nature of the uptake of particular methods, and the way that particular 
discourses structured what social problems were amenable to solution through 
identification. 
 
7KHSUDFWLFHVRIµLGHQWLW\PDQDJHPHQW¶RULJLQDWLQJLQRQOLQHHQYLURQPHQWV have 
started to emerge into the physical world.185 The potential anonymity of virtual 
identities, coupled with a commercial desire to exchange goods and services, check 
bank accounts, and manage relationships has led to a number of mechanisms for the 
authentication and verification of identity: 
 
 
The interactions of strangers across vast distances brought by credit card 
and cyberspace dealings also requires substitutions of the identification 
that came from face to face interaction with a known person.186 
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Lyon identifies individuation as basic to capitalist and bureaucratic practice, but 
suggests that it is highly amenable to incorporation within computer-based systems.187 
'RGJHDQG.LWFKHQDUJXHWKDWZHDUHQRZVHHLQJWKHFUHDWLRQRIDµPDFKLQH-readable 
ZRUOG¶LQZKLFKPHWKRGVRILGHQWLILFDWLRQFDQEHDXWRPDWLFDOO\UHDGDQGDFWHGRQE\
software without any human control.188 They situate identification codes as essential 
components of new forms of communication, transport and information management, 
that provide to business and government methods of authentication and accreditation 
that replace earlier forms of self-authentication and vouching.189 
 
UK ID cards 
 
Since the Identity Cards Act 2006 the United Kingdom has an act of parliament 
legislating for identity cards, but has not yet started to issue cards. The government is 
currently procuring technology and starting to bring online the administrative 
components of the system. From the legislation and supporting announcements, the 
Labour government seems to be aiming for a highly complex ID card system, 
involving biometric technology and a centralised national identity register spread 
across three existing databases. AWWKHV\VWHP¶VFRUHLVWKH1DWLRQDO,GHQWLW\5HJLVWHU
(NIR), of which identity cards are a physical manifestation. Surrounding the register 
are policies and legal statutes that ensconce the identity scheme within the wider 
framework of UK governance. The stated statutory purpose of the Act is to establish a 
µVHFXUHDQGUHOLDEOHUHFRUGRIUHJLVWUDEOHIDFWVDERXWLQGLYLGXDOVLQWKH8.¶190 This is 
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SHUFHLYHGDVSHUIRUPLQJWZRIXQFWLRQV)LUVWO\DµFRQYHQLHQWPHWKRGIRUVXFK
individuals to prove registrable facts about themselves to others who reasonably 
UHTXLUHSURRI¶DQGµDVHFXUHDQGUHOLDEOHPHWKRGIRUUHJLVWUDEOHIDFWVDERXWVXFK
individuals to be ascertained or verified wherever that is necessary in the public 
LQWHUHVW¶.191 µ5HJLVWUDEOHIDFWV¶LQFOXGHidentity, address of principal place of residence 
and other places of residence, previous residences, current and previous residential 
statuses (nationality, entitlement to remain in the UK), identification numbers, when 
information on the individual has been provided from the register and information 
UHFRUGHGLQWKHUHJLVWHUDWWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VUHTXHVW7KH$FWH[SOLFLWO\H[HPSWVWKLV
information from the definition of sensitive personal data in the Data Protection Act 
7KH$FW¶VGHILQLWLRQRIµLGHQWLW\¶UHIHUVWRIXOOQDPHRWKHUQDPHVE\ZKLFKDQ
individual might previously have been known, gender, date and place of birth and 
µH[WHUQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIKLVWKDWDUHFDSDEOHRIEHLQJXVHGIRULGHQWLI\LQJKLP¶192  
  
The Act criminalises the possession of false identity documents, identity documents 
obtained improperly, or identity documents that pertain to somebody else, with the 
LQWHQWWRXVHWKLVGRFXPHQWDWLRQWRHVWDEOLVKµUHJLVWUDEOHIDFWV¶DERXWWKHPVHOYHVRU
another. These offences carry a potential sentence of up to ten years¶ imprisonment 
DQGWKHUHOHYDQWµLGHQWLW\GRFXPHQWV¶LQFOXGH,'FDUGVLPPLJUDWLRQGRFXPHQWV
passports, and UK driving licenses. The Act also creates offences relating to the 
National Identity Register: unauthorised disclosure of information from the register 
(up to two years¶ imprisonment), providing false information to the register (up to two 
years¶) and tampering with the register (up to ten years¶).  
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The UK has previously had national identification systems during the First and 
Second World Wars, which were dismantled shortly after the second war, and have 
been the subject of detailed historical study.193 The present act appears to introduce a 
major restructuring of the way identification functions politically, economically and 
socially in the UK. Identity becomes associated with a singular centralised 
authoritative documentary source. This provides a significant political example of the 
ways in which identity is a core part of existing and developing surveillance practices. 
 
Identity in surveillance theory 
 
Identity plays a number of roles in surveillance theories. In traditional theories, up to 
and including the Orwellian model, identity is untheorised, unproblematic and 
generally the Cartesian subject. The liberal, Enlightenment subject is assumed to be 
prior to the social context, including surveillance. The individual is whole, but then 
oppressed by external social forces. The panoptic and disciplinary models of 
surveillance move to Foucauldian understanding of identity which includes the 
process of subjectification, soul training and normalisation. The individual is a 
product of processes which obscure the linguistically created nature of the Cartesian 
self.194 In the surveillant assemblage identity becomes associated with µGDWDGRXEOHV¶
flows and abstractions. Identity is shifted from the individual to their representation in 
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multiple databases. In Deleuzian societies of control, identity becomes codes and 
signatures, much like on the internet.195  
 
Identity exists in complicated relationship with privacy. Joyce argues that the liberal 
concept of the individual is historical rather than universal, and co-synchronous with 
political concepts of privacy.196 Notions of privacy are dependent upon a fully 
constituted individual with a reflexive sense of self. 
 
Identity is contested. Identity is not an objective characteristic. This is obvious from 
contemporary theories of identity; however it also emerges in practices when much 
surveillance activity is dedicated towards determining the identity of some unknown 
object. In these identification processes, identity is actively constructed. Marx sets out 
the historical origins of this process when he argues;  
 
 
The nineteenth century ways of classifying individuals that Foucault 
associated with the development of institutions have continued to expand. 
The validity of these abstractly constructed, indirect, profiled indicators is 
in general lower than with the simple determination of legal name and 
biological identity.197 
 
 
 
A number of theorists have explored the way in which surveillance phenomena 
involve the creation of new identities (or classifications) that represent the 
individual to which they aUHDWWDFKHG7KHVHµGDWDLPDJHV¶µGDWDGRXEOHV¶
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µGLJLWDOSHUVRQDH¶ RUµDGGLWLRQDOVHOYHV¶DUe created through surveillance 
processes.198 This is an: 
 
Electronic profile compiled from personal data fragments of an individual 
person and it takes on increasing social significance as assessment and 
MXGJHPHQWVDUHPDGHLQYDULRXVFRQWH[WVEDVHGXSRQLW«.the data double 
becomes part of the make up of the individual, a component of his or her 
identification even though the data subject may question its accuracy.199 
 
 
 
&ODUNHLQWURGXFHGµ'LJLWDOSHUVRQDH¶WRGHPRQVWUDWHWKHZD\LQZKLFKQHWZRUNHG
computing crHDWHVRUHQDEOHVDµPRGHORIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶200 Clarke noted the way in 
which these models can be potentially dangerous to the individual. They are a product 
of monitoring and potentially a tool of control. Data doubles have a much greater 
mobility than their physical counterpart, easily reproduced and transmitted. They are 
constantly updated due to the information flowing from the individual.201 They are a 
creation of information. The data double can experience a life of its own, becoming 
µPRUHUHDO¶WKDQWKH individual upon which it is based as it is used to inform decision-
making. Given individuals distanced from the institutions with which they interact, 
and otherwise anonymous except for the data double, the data double is the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VLGHQWLW\IRUWKH purposes of that organisation. Los identifies similarities 
EHWZHHQWKHGDWDGRXEOHDQGWKHµILOH¶RIWRWDOLWDULDQVRFLHWLHVDVVXPHGWRH[LVWEXW
never actually encountered.202 
 
 
3HRSOH¶VOLIHFKDQFHVDQGSURVSHFWVDUHDIIHFWHGDWOHDVWDVPXFKE\WKH
ways in which they are identified as by their identities.203 
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The nature of this ascribed, externally imposed identity, which is more an image than 
DUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VLGHQWLW\KDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWRHIIHFWYHU\UHDO
LQIOXHQFHRQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶s life chances and opportunities. If examples are taken 
from consumer profiling, decisions may be harmful if they are made on an inaccurate 
profile, or if they are made on an accurate profile.  
 
Identity in governance 
 
These external, imposed identities cannot unproblematically be compared with a 
µUHDO¶LGHQWLW\$WWHPSWLQJWKLVFRPSDULVRQZRXOGLJQRUHWKHZD\WKDWLGHQWLWLHVDUH
relationally and socially constructed. Attempting to demonstrate that these new forms 
of identity are somehow unwarranted impositLRQVRQWRSRIDµUHDOLVW¶DXWKHQWLF
unconstructed, unproblematic conception of identity, does offer the temptation of 
seeming to provide a strong foundation for a critique of the new forms of identity. 
However, it is misleading in that it occludes the historically situated and contextual 
nature of liberal democratic identity ± the Cartesian self of the Enlightenment. Any 
changes occurring must be contextualised as a part of a continuum of changes in both 
the construction of identity and the formation of specific subject positions. The new 
type of individual created by the surveillant assemblage is not contrasted to a prior 
existing, unitary, Cartesian individual, but instead must be compared to types of 
individual, with specific types of identity, created by actions of de-territorialisation 
and re-territorialisation through other forms of assemblages. The surveillance subject 
may also have their own perception of their identity.  
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As surveillance categories make people up to fit them, so these thus 
identified may also assert what they claim are their identities, those ways 
of thinking about themselves that make sense to them.204 
 
 
 
This is the defining difference between the post-structuralist model of subjectification 
and the ascription or attribution of identity. In subjectification, the subject is 
successfully interpellated as that subjectivity. With ascription, the subject may attempt 
to resist the externally imposed identity, may not acknowledge it, or may not even be 
aware that it has been applied to them. This is frequently the case for categorisation 
where we only experience the effects of the ascription indirectly, if we are able to 
separate the categorisation signals from social background noise. Lyon suggests the 
social sorting model tends to focus oQWKHZD\LQGLYLGXDOVDUHµPDGHXS¶E\RXWVLGH
H[WHUQDOIRUFHVUDWKHUWKDQRQWKH)RXFDXOGLDQPRGHORIµEHFRPLQJDVXEMHFW¶RU
self.205 
 
 
Subjectification refers to the multifarious process and practices, through 
which human beings come to relate to themselves as persons of a certain 
sort.206 
 
 
 
Rose adds that subjectification is simultaneously individualising and collectivising. 
Identities, as subjectivities, are therefore always collective and relational.207 However, 
his model of the securitisation of identity involves LGHQWLW\DVWKHµSDVVZRUG¶IRUHQWU\
to a number of sites and services, and fundamentally, to active citizenship in the 
liberal model. This draws on the model presented by Deleuze. Through this 
securitisation, identity is individuated ± rendered applicable only to a specific 
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individual, separate from the social mass, but also rendered permeable to forms of 
modulation and control. 
 
The focus in the governmentality literature and in wider field of surveillance studies 
on identity as subjectivity means that there is an element missing from the conception 
of identity. The content of the identity is up for discussion; much of the literature 
addresses ways subjectivities are created through discourses and interpellation, and 
the ways individuals come to recognise themselves as a subjectivity. Little attention is 
paid to the way that identity itself is articulated ± to the form as opposed to the 
content. The governmental accounts operate with their ontological understanding of 
identity as subjectivity. This ignores the fact that there is a world external to theory 
conceiving of identity in very different ways. This may be the historical view of 
identity as an unproblematic (and untheorised) category, or as is argued in this thesis, 
forms of identity which prioritise surveillance permeability. The form of identity has 
political effects above and beyond the effects of differing subjectivity. Models such as 
WKHGDWDGRXEOHGLJLWDOSHUVRQDHDQG3RVWHU¶VVXSHUSDQRSWLFRQSRLQWLQWKLV
direction.208 These networks of practices and technologies, including technologies 
such as identity cards, do not simply offer alternate subjectivities or subject positions; 
they actively attempt to rearticulate the meaning of identity itself. These political 
effects will be explored at the conclusion of this chapter. For now, it is worth 
examining the elements of surveillance research that focus upon traditional models of 
identity politics. 
 
 
                                               
208
 Poster, 1999. p.277. 
 85 
Identity politics 
 
Modern identity politics (a broad narrative stretching over more than forty years) 
revolves around demands for the recognition of group identities as opposed to 
universal recognition based on shared humanity. Identity in contemporary political 
theory often refers to these group identities. As seen in the section on resistance to 
surveillance, there are analyses of surveillance that draw upon identity politics. These 
accounts were challenged on the problematic nature of collective surveillance 
identities, and the need to develop an alternative identity politics based on self-
determination.209 Examples of identity politics in reference to surveillance include: 
*LOORP¶VXVHRILGHQWLWLHVVXEMHFWLYLWLHVWRORRNDWGLIIHUHQWIRUPVRIUHVLVWDQFHWR
surveillance based upon pre-existing identities, in his case women on restrictive 
welfare programmes.210 Research into CCTV has shown that it predominantly selects 
targets on the basis of external appearance and there is therefore a political dimension 
to the identities under surveillance.211 
 
The use of the concept of identity in social science is attacked by du Gay. He suggests 
that it has been stretched into too many areas, µH[SDQGLQJLWVHPSLUHDQGlosing its 
H[SODQDWRU\SRZHU¶.212 However, he accepts that there is still room for practical 
studies which invoke identity as a descriptive rather than theoretical termGX*D\¶V
FULWLTXHLVDGGUHVVHGDWWKHW\SHRIVRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLRQLVWDFFRXQWZKLFKWDNHVµWKLV
SDUWLFXODULGHQWLW\LVVRFLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHG¶DVDQHQGSRLQWDQGDSRVLWLRQRIFULWLTXH,I
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all identities are considered as socially constructed, then how can it be a critical 
position to reveal the socially constructed nature of a particular identity? However, if 
the socially constructed nature of identity is taken as the starting point for a practical 
and empirical analysis of the ways in which particular identities are created, or 
SULYLOHJHGRYHUDQGDERYHRWKHUVDQGWKHHIIHFWVRIWKLVSROLWLFDOPRYHWKHQGX*D\¶V
critique holds substantially less weight.  
 87 
Discourse and surveillance 
 
This section positions discursive approaches as an important contribution to 
surveillance research and demonstrates their further potential. 
 
0DU[XVHVDµWUXHILFWLRQ¶DFFRXQWWRRXWOLQHZKDWKHVHHVDVWKHGRPLQDQW
contemporary µsecurity-FRQWUROLGHRORJ\¶RUGLVFRXUVH213 Marx adopts a model of 
ideology critique derived from Mannheim which defines ideology as a 
weltanschauung in service of the interests of the more powerful.214 This is based upon 
WKHKLJKO\SUREOHPDWLFQRWLRQRIWKHDELOLW\RIDµIUHHIORDWLQJLQWHOOHFWXDO¶WR
µVFLHQWLILFDOO\XQPDVN¶(and thereby see beyond) ideology. Whilst this account has 
distinct methodological problems, it does provide a potential ideal type against which 
to compare actually existing discourses and the paper itself argues for the importance 
of examining surveillance in sociHW\WKURXJKLWVµFXOWXUDODVSHFWV¶0DU[KRZHYHU
draws a strong distinction between cultural and non-cultural elements as he sees 
FXOWXUDOHOHPHQWVDVµVXSSRUWLYHRIFRQWHPSRUDU\VXUYHLOODQFHWHFKQRORJLHVDVVRFLDO
FRQWURO¶UDWKHUWKDQSOD\LQJDQ\UROHLQtheir constitution.215 This is a familiar trend in 
surveillance research when significant attention has been paid to cultural depictions of 
surveillance, either as inspiration for theoretical models with which to understand or 
model surveillance or to argue for the role of cultural models of surveillance (for 
H[DPSOH(QGHPRO¶Vµ%LJ%URWKHU¶ IUDQFKLVHDQGWKH%%&¶VCrimeWatch) in the 
legitimisation of real-life surveillance practices.216 The list of relevant cultural 
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products is substantial and growing. Obviously Nineteen Eighty-Four in both print 
DQGILOP.DIND¶VThe Trial and The Castle, <HYJHQ\=DP\DWLQ¶VWe, Minority 
Report (2002), Gattaca (1997), Enemy of the State (1998), The Conversation (1974), 
Rear Window (1954), Sliver (1993), Hidden (Caché - 2005), Freeze Frame (2004), to 
name but a few. However, the focus of such research is often artistic and cultural 
production as either representation or critique/support of surveillance.217 Marks argues 
that such recent surveillance films show a: 
 
 
Variety of complex and nuanced accounts that range over entertainment, 
genetic scrutiny, new forms of access and exclusion and the use of social 
sorting to create social and cultural hierarchies.218 
 
 
 
Although such cultural products are undoubtedly political (or at the very least capable 
of being politicised) there is a need for research that investigates the discourses active 
LQWKHH[SOLFLWO\SROLWLFDOUHDOPDQGZKLOVWLWLVFOHDUWKDWµFXOWXUDOSURGXFWV¶FDQKDYH
political effects, it is also clear that so too does political language. 
 
Poster uses post-structural linguistic theory to construct databases containing personal 
information as discourses.219 Discourses are generally seen as producing 
VXEMHFWLYLWLHV\HWWKHµVXSHUSDQRSWLF¶GDWDEDVHVSURGXFHµREMHFWLILHG¶UDWKHUWhan 
µVXEMHFWLILHG¶LQGLYLGXDOVZLWKGLVSHUVHGGDWDLGHQWLWLHVRIZKLFKWKH\PLJKWQRWHYHQ
be aware. Poster also argues for the presence of discourse in previous surveillance 
theories. 
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Properly understood, the panopticon is not simply the guard in the tower, 
but the entire discourse/practice that bears down on the prisoner, one that 
constitutes him/her as a criminal. The Panopticon is the way the 
discourse/practice of the prison works to constitute the subject as a 
criminal and to normalise him/her to a process of 
transformation/rehabilitation.220 
 
 
 
Muller uses a discursive approach to analyse implementation manuals for biometric 
technology, concluding that these manuals (co-)construct the space of the database as 
the space of biometric technology, and reducHLGHQWLW\WRDµWHFKQRORJLFDO
LGHQWLILHU¶221 Whilst his research largely relies upon a relatively under-theorised 
version of critical discourse and frame analysis and draws from a relatively narrow 
population of texts, it demonstrates the utility of an explicit focus on discourse. 
 
Bowker and Star expand the realm of discourse to include information technology 
programming. Software programmes are linguistic ± albeit non-traditional language. 
Information technology freezes values and opinions at the time of its creation. 
6RIWZDUHFRGHVDQGSURWRFROVFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVµIUR]HQRUJDQLVDWLRQDODQGSROLF\
GLVFRXUVH¶222 Authorial software decisions are underdetermined by technical 
concerns. They include political and social issues even if these are unarticulated or 
uncontemplated. This is another aspect of the de-neutralisation of technology. 
Unfortunately for social scientists, it is difficult to determine the social and political 
effects from code itself if unfamiliar with the programming language. If code is frozen 
policy discourse, then it is highly likely that these discourses are articulated in similar 
ways through alternate media and texts more accessible to the non-computer scientist. 
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The final comment on discourse in surveillance research is the identification of an 
absence, where one might expect to find the concept of discourse in use. Haggerty and 
Ericson do not include a discursive dimension in The Surveillance Assemblage, 
despite the presence of such a linguistic dimension in the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari, upon whom Haggerty and Ericson draw. They discuss the drives to bring 
together technologies, systems and practices, but do not, however, deal with the 
discursive dimension of assemblages.223 Although Deleuze and Guattari freely 
encourage a selective toolbox approach to appropriating the concepts they prolifically 
create, they have provided a highly useful concept in the collective assemblage of 
enunciation. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the concept of 
assemblages that involve both a machinic (what Haggerty and Ericson would term 
V\VWHPVSUDFWLFHVDQGWHFKQRORJLHVDQGDQHQXQFLDWLYHFRPSRQHQWRIµDFWVDQG
VWDWHPHQWVRILQFRUSRUHDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDWWULEXWHGWRERGLHV¶224 Deleuze and 
Guattari give the example of the feudal assemblage. The machinic element composes 
the bodies of the overlord, the vassal, the serf, the horse and the relation to the stirrup, 
weapons and soil. The enunciative element includes the statements, expressions, the 
juridical regime of heraldry, and oaths of obedience or love. The two elements of 
assemblages are both equally necessary, and interweave and interpenetrate each other.  
 
 
 
Assemblages are also systems of signs, semiotic systems. That is 
DVVHPEODJHHOHPHQWVLQFOXGHGLVFRXUVHVZRUGVµPHDQLQJV¶DQGnon-
corporal relations that link signifiers with effects.225 
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7KLVDEVHQFHPD\EHGXHWRGUDZLQJXSRQ3DWWRQ¶VOLPLWHGDFFRXQWRIHQXQFLDWLYH
assemblages.226 Given the existence of a linguistic element, inextricably linked to the 
theory of assemblages in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, it is the argument here 
that this discursive element should be (re)introduced into the model of the surveillant 
assemblage, prompting an attention towards the discursive elements that construct and 
constitute the assemblage. This introduction will serve to drive forward a discursive 
analysis of the politics of identity and surveillance. 
 
Discourse in governmentality 
 
Because of its Foucauldian origins, the governmentality approach utilises discourse 
analysis to underpin its theoretical work. Governmentality as a logic and rationality is 
understood as permeating through discourses otherwise unassociated with the state or 
government as traditionally understood within political science. Discourse analysis 
plays an important role in understanding the way problems of government are 
constructed, articulated within the assemblage of governmental agencies and actors, 
and result in hegemonic understandings of problems leading to the selection of 
appropriate strategies and tactics.  
 
Ericson and Haggerty explore risk discourse; this promotes the interpretation of 
problems as errors or discrepancies in what exists, presents knowledge as the 
possession of experts, cultivates insecurities and focuses on scapegoats. It focuses on 
danger and the perpetual doubt that danger is being counteracted.227 Rationalities of 
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risk discourse promote the management of the irrational by rational means. This 
model is situated within a framework of biopower and governmentality. 
 
Haggerty has criticised governmentality for focusing purely on discourse and missing 
PRUHµUHDOLVW¶HOHPHQWVRIDSROLWLFVRIVXUYHLOODQFH228 Whilst suggesting that 
discursive approaches are unproblematic within the governmentality framework, and 
supported by the theoretical orientation, the focus on discourse may be problematic 
from outside the approach, and that it may be important to consider the wider politics 
of surveillance and produce an approach with a sufficiently wide understanding of 
discourse; that is not, for example, reducible to linguistics, but that also has a 
sufficiently grounded empirical dimension. It is hoped that such an approach will be 
outlined in the following chapter of this thesis.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This section has provided an overview of the linguistic, cultural and discursive trends 
in surveillance research, demonstrating that whilst discourse analysis has seen some 
use, it has been restricted to either highly theoretical positions which do not engage 
ZLWKDFWXDOO\H[LVWLQJGLVFXUVLYHFRQWHQWDVLQ3RVWHU¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQg of databases as 
discourse, or tends to focus on cultural products rather than the analysis of 
governmental tactics and strategies created and expounded through discourse. It is 
suggested that a productive approach to surveillance research involves the 
examination of the discourses of governance through surveillance and (re)introducing 
the assemblage of enunciation to the surveillant assemblage.
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Implications and considerations 
 
The section unites themes running through this chapter, taking forward the issues and 
conflicts in surveillance research, incorporating the perspective of analytics of 
government, the centrality of identity and the role of discourse in order to present 
considerations affecting the research design of this thesis. This section culminates in 
an argument for the political importance of the research project demonstrating the 
importance of identity in discourses of surveillance. 
 
7KHFRPELQHGLQVLJKWVRI'HOHX]H¶VVRFLHWLHVRIFRQWUROZLWKWKHLUFRQWLQXRXV
modulation and the replacement of GLVFLSOLQDU\ORJLFVWKHVXUYHLOODQWDVVHPEODJH¶V
heterogeneous surveillance actors, and the governance perspective on the multifarious 
range of governance strategies, tactics and actors show that surveillance is not limited 
to specific sites, and that it can be examined in multiple locations as it permeates all 
aspects of social and political life. This suggests the study of rationalities of 
surveillance in a number of differing sites, rather than at the limited level of a single 
type of site. An appropriate level of scepticism towards macro-sociological accounts 
suggests that we should focus on specific locations, strategies and practices rather 
WKDQDWWKHOHYHORIWKHVRFLDODVDWRWDOLW\7KLVVXSSRUWV5DQVRP¶VVXJJHVWLRQWR
µVWXG\SURFHVVHVRIUDWLRQDOisation in a number of fields not just at the level of 
VRFLHW\¶229 This contrasts governmentality with the approach of the Frankfurt school 
± IRUH[DPSOH0DUFXVH¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHµ/RJRV¶230 
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The wide range of surveillance research suggests that potential fields can be found in 
the workplace, in the private sector realms of consumption and financial services, in 
the police, military and security apparatuses, in government traditionally understood 
DVZHOODVLQWKHZLGHULQVWLWXWLRQVRIµJRYHUQDQFH¶LQVRFLDOservices, in the media, in 
science and technology where surveillance systems are produced, and amongst the 
activities of groups resisting surveillance practices. The key message of the analytics 
of government is that we should look beyond the traditional model of the state to a 
broader range of surveillance actors and identity stakeholders.  
 
From surveillance theory and research we can draw a number of concepts and ideas 
that will allow the appropriate attention to the context of the research. Attention 
should be paid to occurrences of panopticism, surveillant assemblages, social sorting 
techniques, identification protocols, chilling effects, drives for classification, 
categorical suspicion, statistical and inferential logics, conceptualisations of risk and 
security, data doubles, dataveillance, representation, the role of technology as an 
enabler and an influence in a non-deterministic manner, and a panoply of other 
theories of surveillance. There is a rich, developing field of surveillance studies, and 
in analysing the role of identity in discourses of surveillance it would be foolish to 
neglect this resource. 
 
Discourse is important. Governmentality is understood as operating through 
discourse, and particular subjectivities are constructed through discourse. Discourse is 
central to issues of identity. This directs research in the direction of a methodology 
incorporating a form of discursive analysis compatible with the core assumptions of 
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governmentality, providing sufficient analytical leverage and paying attention to the 
creation of subjectivities and subject position.  
 
Research should have a proper concern for the empirical. The analytics of government 
has a strong theoretical underpinning, but also a strong concern for the empirical 
nature of the subject of study. Research into surveillance should avoid the temptation 
to conduct a priori theorisation about the perspectives of surveillance actors or 
surveillance subjects. Instead, attention should be paid to the way identities and types 
of identity are actually constructed through the medium of discourse. Empirical 
manifestations of discourse should be examined and analysed in order to provide 
evidence for theoretical claims. The governmental attention to the ways in which 
discourses construct problems of governance, subjectivities, lines of exclusion and 
inclusion and strategies of power in their own terms is apposite here.  
 
Governmentality provides a framework for understanding surveillance from a 
political perspective. It also highlights the importance of the concept of identity, as 
well as the articulation of concepts through discourse. This points the way towards a 
number of research questions derived from the existing field of surveillance research, 
and prompted by the political problem of the contestation of identity, the problems for 
governance caused by the proliferation of identities and the effects of surveillance 
practices and discourses on the construction of identity. These research questions are 
detailed below. Chapter Three sets out the methodological approach towards 
answering these questions.  
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Research problem ± identity in discourses of surveillance 
 
The rationale for this topic situates the analysis of identity in discourses of 
surveillance against the background of governmentality and surveillant responses to a 
number of dislocatory political trends pertinent to late-modernity. This suggests that 
political (rather than purely theoretical) contestation over the nature of identity plays 
an important role in governmentality and that this has implications for a wide range of 
political projects.  
 
)RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSWRIgovernmentality, an explicit fusion of government and 
rationality, refers to the macro-rationality of responses to the problems of government 
(broadly conceived) that are phrased through discourses that serve to make these 
responses appear as formally non-political responses to shared problems rather than 
particularistic agendas.231 The political rationalities conceptualise and justify political 
goals, set the limits of acceptable political actions and create institutions. They are not 
F\QLFDOFDOFXODWLRQVRIVRFLDOFRQWUROEXWLQVWHDGFRQWDLQDµXWRSLDQHOHPHQW¶
*RYHUQPHQWDOLW\LVFORVHO\OLQNHGWR)RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSWVRIGLVFRXUVHELRSRZHUDQG
power/knowledge, and refers to the management of populations.232 
 
The problems of government relevant to this thesis are broadly conceived, multi-
faceted, and interlinked. There are broad themes, distinct events or series of events, 
and long term phenomena. Government is an over-determined problem. They can be 
thought of as the dislocatory forces of contemporary heterogeneous societies as they 
demonstrate the contingent nature of elements of these societies. Dislocation is a 
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concept taken from the discourse theory work of Laclau and Mouffe. It is any force 
which disrupts the appearance of objectivity and renders visible the contingency of 
WKHVRFLDOµ6RFLHW\¶LVXQGHUVWRRGLQDEURDGVHQVHWKDWLQFOXGHVEXWLVQRWUHGXFLEOH
to, the standard political realm, economics, culture, social relations, norms and 
identities. From the perspective of discourse theory, society is not an objective set of 
relations. Society does not exist in a realist sense; instead it is an active 
construction.233 Despite appearances, no given arrangement of society is objective or 
essential. Although there are certain features, remarkably resilient and resistant to 
change, that we might take to be structural, these relations could be otherwise. They 
are contingent constructions.  
 
The dislocation here is twofold; firstly, it HQFRPSDVVHVWKHEUHDNGRZQRIµall-
HQFRPSDVVLQJ¶LGHQWLW\VFKHPHVZKLOVWDWWKHVDPHWLPH 
 
 
The Modern era brought an increase in the multiplicity of identity 
schemes so substantial that it amounted to a qualitative break, albeit one 
unevenly distributed in time and space. In the modern era, identity is 
always constructed and situated in a field and amid a flow of contending 
cultural discourses.234 
 
 
 
 These problems of government are as follows.  
 
1) The continuation of what Mouffe, drawing upon Lefort, calls WKHµGHPRFUDWLF
UHYROXWLRQ¶± WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRISRZHUDVDQµHPSW\SODFH¶XQRFFXSLHGE\D
sovereign) and where social structures are exposed to radical 
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indetermination.235 The result is a society that it is impossible to universalise. 
This is the move from a sovereign or theocracy to a political system with a 
greater degree of plurality. 
2) Postmodernity ±broadly conceived politically as the destabilisation of 
established political identities and a development of modernity in culture, 
theory and technology. This could also be termed late modernity or late 
capitalism, but rather than drawing upon a particular theorist of 
postmodernity, this is used as a shorthand for broader cultural and social 
factors.  
3) The processes of globalisation as the mass movement of people and the 
interaction of cultures. According to Bhabha, this gives rise to new hybrid 
identities at the intersections of different cultures. Hybridity displaces familiar 
narratives and creates new political structures.236 Hybrid identities 
problematise what were previously thought of as objective social categories. 
The presence of well-established groups of migrant descent in the UK 
challenges what is means to be British, and by doing so reveals the 
contingency of that form of identity previously associated with white skin and 
a nominal Christianity. Demands for increased (and especially equal) rights 
for immigrants make claims that the nation state cannot fully accede to 
without changing its fundamental nature. An increasingly diverse Britain 
experiences the effects of globalisation with a concurrent fragility of 
%ULWLVKQHVV7KH(65&¶V %ULWRQ¶VFKDQJLQJLGHQWLWLHV stated µtraditional 
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JURXSVKDYHEHHQHURGHGE\DJUHDWHUGHJUHHRIµLQGLYLGXDOLVDWLRQ¶DQGWKH
need to compile our own narratives of identity.¶237 
4) The processes of globalisation, seen as the purported weakening of the nation 
state in the face of pressures both from above (supranational organisations 
VXFKDVWKH(8DQGEHORZSROLWLFDOGHYROXWLRQRUµORFDOLVDWLRQ¶OHDGLQJWRD
problematisation of identities based upon national narratives, traditional 
political identities premised on sovereignty and national political 
communities, making nationalist discourses less persuasive and more 
escapable.238 However, the state is not homogeneous and this weakening 
affects elements differentially.  
5) The rise of identity politics and new social movements. Fukuyama argues that 
identity politics arises from a lacuna in liberal political theory regarding the 
salience of groups.239 Modern identity politics revolves around demands for 
the recognition of group as opposed to universal identitites. Fukuyama ignores 
the role played by the nation state as collective. Identity politics should 
therefore be understood as the demand for non-state group identities. This 
contrasts identity politics against nationalism or national self-determination 
and associates identity politics with the decline of universal ideologies. 
6) Networked and decentred labour process and social formations. This includes 
the influence of information technology in speeding up political, social and 
economic phenomena and the establishment of virtual worlds in online social 
networks or role-playing games. These problematise bounded physical 
identities and allow for the re-creation of selves, closer links across national 
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boundaries and virtual alter egos. Networked and decentred technology also 
makes new levels of surveillance technically feasible. 
7) Threats to the state by non-state actors. Whether terrorists or the global justice 
movement, they challenge the traditional state monopoly on the use of 
violence within a territory and create traditional challenges to security. Whilst 
these movements may not be examples of identity politics in the sense we are 
most familiar with (for example feminism or gay pride), identity (for example 
as Muslims) is used as a mobilising factor. 
 
What unites these phenomena is the proliferation of the contingency of identity and 
forms of identities. This thesis argues this is a threat to governance and maps 
responses to this problem of government. 
 
How does the proliferation of identities produce a problem for government and a 
governmental response? Government is the technique of managing large and 
potentially unruly populations and µharnessing and organising energies that might 
otherwise by anarchic, self destructive or simply unproductive.¶240 This process relies 
on knowledge of the state (literally statistics and the contemporary equivalent, 
knowledge produced through mass dataveillance) to determine the effectiveness of 
these measures. FRXFDXOW¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPRGHUQSROLWLFDOUDWLRQDOLW\LVincreasing 
the happiness of citizens in ways that also enhance the competitive power of the state. 
Power for Foucault is not simply oppressive, but it also serves a generative function in 
the production of identities. According to Simons, this means that political power is 
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the constitution of subjects and also their regulation.241 Governmentality is therefore a 
combination of individualising and totalising poles; pastoral power is individualising, 
whilst UDLVRQG¶HWDW and statistics are totalising.242 5DQVRPPLUURUV)RXFDXOW¶V
cautions against focusing RQJHQHUDOSURFHVVHVRIµUDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ¶DQGLQVWHDG
suggests focusing on the particular process in a number of fields ± for example, 
surveillance.243 In order for a threat to exist, power cannot be conceived of as total. 
Foucault is often portrayed as allowing no room for resistance to power in the 
disciplinary model. However, Ransom suggests that we should not read Foucault as a 
VXFFHVVRUWRWKHµUDWLRQDOO\DGPLQLVWHUHGVRFLHW\¶PRGHORIWKH)UDQNIXUW6FKRROEXW
instead see how he shows that power is fragile, and that a number of techniques and 
processes must be actively undertaken in order to maintain power.244 
 
The proliferation of identities is a threat to this logic of power on both of these axes. 
Firstly, proliferation is a threat to the specific constitution of subjects required by the 
state. New subject positions are made available whilst the contingency of established 
modes of identity are revealed or brought into question. These subjectivities are 
politically different. Some are actively hostile and rebellious, ranging from terrorists 
to anti-FDSLWDOLVWVRUSRWHQWLDOO\VRDQGVRPHVLPSO\µXQSURGXFWLYH¶VXFKDVWKH
homeless or urban poor. 
 
Secondly it is a threat to statistics ± the regulation and inclusion of subjectivities. 
Knowing the population is a prerequisite of governmentality. Filtered through the 
human sciences, it is necessary in order to determine the most efficient ways to 
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manipulate relevant variables. Some of these new forms of subjectivity are nomadic, 
or explicitly anti-territorial. Many of these identities are complex, fitting uneasily into 
established categories. Statistics is therefore forced to attempt to hit a moving target. 
Knowledge of the population is made more difficult by the heterogeneity of late 
modern society. 
 
With regard to both of these forms of threat, a potential objection arises from Zizeck¶V
work in The Ticklish Subject. Whilst acknowledging that contemporary societies 
experience a proliferation of identities, in his critique of the transformative potential 
of identity politics, Zizeck claims that the proliferation of subjectivities and identities 
characteristic of late modernity is in no way a threat to capitalism (and by extension, 
governmental power).  
 
 
This struggle for the politicisation and assertion of multiple ethnic, sexual 
and other identities always took place against the background of an 
invisible yet all the more forbidding barrier: the global capitalist system 
was able to incorporate the gains of the post-modern politics of identities 
to the extent that they did not disturb the smooth circulation of capital ± 
the moment some political intervention poses a serious threat to that, an 
elaborate set of exclusionary measures quashes it.245 
 
 
   
äLåHN cannot be denying the potential dislocatory threat of these multiple identities. 
The final sentence of the quote talks about the re-cooperative mechanisms for dealing 
with threats. These cannot be thought of as automatic. Capitalism and government 
cannot simply get what capitalism wants (there is no mechanism for distinguishing the 
functional from the dysfunctional). Power is, at least in principle, fragile. As such, 
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WKHVHµPHDVXUHV¶PXVWEHWKRXJKWRIDVFRQWLQJHQWDQGSROLWLFDO$VVXFKDVWXG\RI
threats/responses is highly appropriate. 
 
The proliferation of identities is a threat to governance. It would be expected therefore 
that the rationalities of governmentality demand a response to that threat. Following 
the analytics of governance, one of the most important dimensions of governance is 
the way in which problems (including threats to governance itself) are actively 
constructed through discursive methods. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to map 
one dimension of that response ± the articulation of identity in discourses of 
surveillance. Surveillance is part of modernity and we should see contingency (as 
uncertainty) and a surveillant response as enmeshed in co-synchronous development. 
This double model can be further expanded. Both surveillance and individual identity 
DUHIHDWXUHVRIPRGHUQLW\/DFODXDUJXHVWKDWPRGHUQLW\LVDSDUWLFXODUO\µGLVORFDWHG¶
historical period.246 Surveillance practices are not the only response, as there is no 
single all-encompassing rationality but multiple points of application and multiple 
UDWLRQDOLWLHV7KHDLPLVWRWUDFHWKHUDWLRQDOLWLHVRIVXUYHLOODQFH/DFODX¶VZRUNRQWKH
idea of the universal is appropriate here. 
 
 
The impossibility of a universal ground does not eliminate its need: it just 
transforms the ground into an empty place which can be partially filled in 
a number of ways. The strategy of this filling is what politics is about.247 
 
 
 
This thesis therefore contributes to the analysis of one of the strategies of filling of the 
empty ground of identity caused by postmodernity and the other factors outlined 
HDUOLHU3UHVWRQ¶VUHFHQWDUWLFOHGUDZVDWWHQWLRQWRWKHHPHUJHnce of an elite sponsored 
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master status in attempts to encourage a sense of national identity in the UK 
(citizenship tests for immigrants, and valorisation in political discourse).248 In the face 
of growing awareness of multiple, non-essentialist identities, he questions why there 
KDVEHHQDQµXQH[SHFWHGLQWHOOHFWXDOO\LPSRYHULVKHGDQGVHHPLQJO\DWDYLVWLF
reassertion of the enduring value of µ%ULWLVKQHVV¶DPRQJVHFWLRQVRIWKH8QLWHG
.LQJGRPHOLWH¶249 7KLVµHOLWHPDVWHUVWDWXV¶LVDGHOLEHUDWHDWWHPSWWRFRQVWUXFWD
cultural identity. It can be seen as another response to the dislocatory forces of 
modern society.  
 
Governmentality operates through discourses; it µemploys and infiltrates a number of 
discourses ordinarily conceived as unrelated to political power, governance or the 
state.¶250 /DFODXDQG0RXIIH¶Vdiscourse theory provides a framework for analysing 
both of these roles of identity, firstly in terms of subject positions and discourses and 
secondly in terms of floating signifiers, antagonism, and hegemony. The Laclauian 
conception of discourse is broad; including practices makes this statement about the 
operation of governmentality through discourse even more accurate. The state is 
understood as LQFOXGLQJµSDUD-VWDWLVW¶DQGµSDUD-OHJDO¶HOHPHQWVLQOLQHZLWKWKH
FRQFHSWRIµVWDWH-WKRXJKW¶LQWKHZRUNRI*LOHV'HOHX]H251 
 
How is the state, in an intentional but non-subjective way, attempting to counter the 
threat of the proliferation of identities? It is possible to identify four potential 
responses to this threat. These are not mutually exclusive categories and may overlap. 
These responses may include: 
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1. Limiting the range of potential subject positions available 
2. Prioritising a particular subject position (or a small number of them) over 
other forms of identity  
3. Constituting a state-sanctioned identity252 
4. Reducing the impact of non-state identities. 
 
The articulation of identity becomes prevalent in the discourses that are attempting to 
create or destroy (in line with the above responses) particular subjectivities. Harper 
identifies this explicit focus on identity and identification as a novel factor.253 
µ,GHQWLW\¶WKHUHIRUHSOD\VDGRXEOHUROHLQ the politics of surveillance discourses: 
 
1) Ontological identity, seen as subjectivities or subject positions. From a post-
VWUXFWXUDOLVWSHUVSHFWLYHVHHQDVHPSW\RIµFRQWHQW¶DQGZLWKRXWDQHVVHQWLDO
foundation. These subject positions are the product of discourses. 
Subjectivities are generally the focus of the broader governmentality and 
critical security studies literature.  
 
2) Identity as a floating signifier that is articulated in these discourses in 
particular ways and therefore a critical point of contestation. In some 
discourses of surveillance, identity is more floating than in others. In some it 
has a hegemonic articulation whilst in others it is an active element of 
discursive contestation and struggle. This is significant from a political 
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perspective. From an alternate perspective, one could consider identity as a 
contested linguistic term, or a contested morphological cluster in terms of 
)UHHGHQ¶VFRQFHSWXDOPRUSKRORJ\254 
 
This second role is not particularly theorised in terms of governmentality, where 
identity as concept is often not explicitly articulated in discourses which produce 
particular identities in the form of subjectivities. The second role of identity is 
therefore currently missing. This focus on identity is critically apparent in the aspects 
of governmentality that can be included under the phenomena of surveillance, because 
identity is a privileged category in surveillance. Surveillance encompasses identity 
cards, biometrics, identification, personal identifiers, ascription of identities, 
uniqueness, attribution, differentiation, recognition, tracking and a number of other 
key concepts that tie into identity. Identity is a core concept in a number of 
surveillance theories, from Orwell to the panopticon to the surveillant assemblage. It 
exists in an ambiguous relationship with privacy, and is central to accounts of 
profiling and social sorting.  
 
The conflict here is over what identity is, because in order to limit identities you have 
to define non-identities. To establish one particular form of identity as paramount and 
others as subordinate involves privileging one definition of identity. You have to 
GHILQHZKDWLVPHDQWZKHQZHVD\µLGHQWLW\¶7KLVZLOOEHDKHJHPRQLFLQWHUYHQWLRQ
Identity is a floating signifier that this governmental discourse attempts to articulate in 
a specifically delimited and defined way, so as to further the UDLVRQG¶HWDW, effect 
government and counter the proliferation of identities.  
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Surveillance re-emerges here. Statistics, or knowledge of populations, is 
supplemented by the range of new surveillance technologies available as a result of 
digitalisation; biometrics, networked information technologies and predictive 
algorithms. Secondly, surveillance can be seen in attempts to fix identities and render 
them permeable to surveillance techniques. This involves the creation of surveillant 
data doubles and the discursive privileging of particular forms and understandings of 
identity over and above competing accounts. Finally, discourses of surveillance might 
privilege forms of identity which are most permeable to surveillance. A passport 
number, credit rating, social security number or ID card are all forms of identity 
permeable to surveillance; RQH¶VLQWHULRUVHQVHRIVHOILVQRW*LYHQLWVSURYHQDQFHVLQ
technology and bureaucratic systems, this identity is permeable to these technologies 
and easily interrogated by them. It is also regarded as more authoritative than 
competing accounts. It can also be hard to change if erroneous. These forms of 
identity have less room for marginality or hybridity and so thereby their privileging 
serves as a counter-dislocation strategy. If we take the UK ID card as an example, it 
privileges a particular understanding of identity throughout both the material 
processes of registration, issue and the database, and also through the language that 
surrounds and constructs the political technology. The form of identity privileged by 
the ID card is one issued by the state, assumed to be totall\DFFXUDWHDQGµVHFXUH¶ one 
that is historically persistent and permeable to surveillance. 
 
Preliminary discourse analysis suggests that identity is going to be articulated and 
defined in the following ways. This is not a typology, it is not unitary and univocal 
across all the analysed texts in this thesis, but there exist a number of significant 
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trends in the articulation of identity. This is a preliminary model, but can act as a 
guide during discursive text analysis to see to what extent this type of identity is 
empirically present in various surveillance discourses. It is also important to ask to 
what extent these elements are present in different discourses. There is some 
VLPLODULW\EHWZHHQWKLVPRGHODQG0DUFXVH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIRSHUDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\DQG
operational thinking (although unlike Marcuse, the account is not totalised across 
society, but rather tracked across a number of domains if and where it is encountered).  
 
 Univocality ± only one identity. 
 External ± can be ascertained with reference to external characteristics and 
biometric technology. 
 Shallow ± a relatively limited set of data concerning specific attributes that are 
deemed important and ignoring others that are deemed unimportant. 
 Permeable to surveillance practices and technology ± can be machine 
readable, digital rather than analogue. 
 Behavouralistic ± possibly including probabilistic or actuarial logic. 
 Attributed by a trusted source (most likely the state or corporate agencies 
licensed by the state). 
 Unchangeable (in principle, although prone to external change beyond legal 
mechanisms ± hacking of databases, identity fraud etc). 
 Historical and continuing. 
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Research questions 
 
What discourses of surveillance are identifiable in the contemporary United 
Kingdom? 
 
Discourse analysis requires a mapping and definitional exercise, to identify the terrain 
of the discursive field associated with surveillance in the UK. Discourses of 
surveillance must be identified. It is likely that a discourse of surveillance can be 
found running through the discourses of the many groups and institutions discussed 
above in relation to the multiple sites of governance: government, media and cultural 
products, resistance movements to surveillance, the private sector, and the full range 
of sites of surveillance. However, this is neither to assume the false extreme that all 
these sites share a common discourse of surveillance nor to assume that there are no 
commonalities and shared aspects. Discourses interact and flow into one another. It is 
likely that this will be observed for surveillance, given the relatively recent growth of 
many of these technologies and practices. If the genealogical work of theorists such as 
Dandeker holds true, many of these practices share similar sites of origins in militaries 
and bureaucracies. They may therefore bring similar discursive constructions with 
them from these origins. What are the differences in rationalities and mentalities 
across differing sites of discourse? An analytical tool for distinguishing between 
discourses of surveillance is the way that surveillance and surveillant practices are 
represented and evaluated. 
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How is the nature of the problem of governance defined in these discourses? 
 
Critical to the analytics of government is an understanding of the way problems of 
government are constructed, debated, contested and become (or fail to become) 
hegemonic. This occurs through the mechanism of discourse. Traces of these 
contestations and constructions can therefore be detected in discourses. The way the 
problem is constructed has effects on the political strategies and tactics of government 
that come to be defined as appropriate. This has effects on political actions, the 
adoption of technologies and practices of surveillance. Surveillance is always for 
some end, the construction of the problem of government, and in combination with 
the rationalities and mentalities discussed above leads to the particular end pursued. 
From Ericson and Haggerty we can anticipate the presence of risk discourse given the 
importance of risk in the politics of surveillance. Theoretically we would anticipate 
many of the same logics, rationalities and mentalities that emerge from the 
governmental literature ± for example the UDLVRQG¶HWDW, police science, pastoral 
power, the necessity of knowing the population. 
 
What roles or subject positions are made available by discourses of surveillance? 
 
Governmentality and discourse analysis suggest attention to the different subject 
positions made available through discourses, and the way in which subjects are 
interpellated by these through the process of subjectification. This research intends to 
map discourses of surveillance across a number of fields and as part of this process, 
should pay attention to the roles and subject positions made available by these 
discourses, as well as those that are denied/excluded or problematised.  
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The social construction of identities is taken for granted in this research, but this acts 
as a starting point, rather than an apolitical conclusion. The question then becomes 
what identities are available, and how are they made so? What is the content of 
identity? 
 
How is the idea of individual identity articulated within contemporary discourses of 
surveillance? 
 
It has been shown that a missing theoretical dimension in contemporary surveillance 
research is the focus upon the articulation of identity in differing discourses of 
surveillance. Therefore a key focus of this thesis is the way that the concept (the form) 
of individual identity is articulated. Are these articulations relatively consistent across 
discourses (as would be expected if such an understanding of identity was hegemonic) 
or are they multiple models of identity at play in discourse of surveillance? As such, a 
discourse analysis approach must be nuanced enough to detect potentially subtle 
differences in articulation. What is the form of identity? 
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Chapter Three: Research Design and Methodology ± Discourse Theory and 
Analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the methodological theory and empirical research design of this 
thesis; a discursive, text analytical investigation of the various concepts of identity in 
contemporary discourses of surveillance in the United Kingdom, drawing on post-
structuralist and post-Marxist approaches in discourse theory and analysis ± primarily 
the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe. This chapter provides an overview of 
discourse analysis before presenting a focused analysis of discourse theory, including 
the key concepts and models of the theory and a number of criticisms. This is 
followed by alterations to the theory to address these criticisms, and an evaluation of 
the applicability of discourse theory as a research methodology. The second part of 
the chapter deals with the operationalisation of the methodological theory into an 
empirical research strategy. This addresses issues of sampling and text selection, a 
defence of the case study approach, and an evaluative schema for qualitative textual 
analysis research. The chapter concludes with a rearticulatLRQRIWKHSURMHFW¶VUHVHDUFK
questions in light of this chapter.  
 
This research pays close attention to empirical material in the form of texts and 
documents that make up discourses of surveillance, yet this empirical material is 
placed firmly within theoretical contexts of both discourse and surveillance. The 
textual analysis is structured around six surveillance points of reference.  
 
 114 
Discourse analysis 
 
Discourse analysis is a broad church of approaches whose core component is a focus 
on language and meaning. Philips and Jørgensen present some generally shared 
assumptions of discourse analysis methodologies: a critical approach to taken-for-
granted knowledge, a link between knowledge and social processes, and a link 
between knowledge and social action.255 There is a strong focus in discourse analysis 
approaches upon epistemology. Reality is only accessible through language, and the 
representations of the world that we make and use are not reflections of an external 
objective reality, but are products of the way in which we categorise the world. Our 
representations of the world are products of discourse. Discourse analysis approaches 
politicise language. For example, Bourdieu states that language rarely acts as a pure 
instrument of communication:  
 
 
Utterances are not only (save in exceptional circumstances) signs to be 
understood and deciphered; they are also signs of wealth, intended to be 
evaluated and appreciated, and signs of authority, intended to be believed 
and obeyed.256 
 
 
 
Added to the realisation that much language is persuasive, commanding, or has other 
functions than pure communication, is an awareness that meanings are not natural; 
there is no inevitable connection between signifier and signified. This draws upon 
6DXVVXUH¶VVWUXFWXUDOLVWGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQVLJQDQGVLJQLILHUDQGXQGHUVWDQding of 
language as a system of differences in which there are no positive terms (things are 
                                               
255
 Philips, L. & Jørgensen, M. (2004) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. London: Sage. p.5-6. 
256
 %RXUGLHX3µ/DQJXDJHDQG6\PEROLF3RZHU¶LQ$-DZRUVNL	1&RXSODQGHGVThe 
Discourse Reader. London & New York: Routledge. p.502.  
 115 
understood and defined by what they are not, by the meanings they exclude).257 In 
poststructuralist theory however, meanings are understood as having no historical and 
social necessity. Systems of meaning are contingent and multiple. The necessary link 
(isomorphism) between the signifier and signified is denied and this allows for 
multiple systems of meaning or discourses. Wittgenstein argued that to think of 
connections between language and reality, to think of language separate and opposed 
to reality, is nonsensical. For Wittgenstein we dwell within language and there is no 
DFFHVVLEOHµRXWVLGH¶.258 If language is politicised it this way then it becomes possible 
to examine both language itself and actual existing language use for political insight. 
We turn now to discourse theory to attempt that.  
 
Discourse theory ± Laclau and Mouffe 
 
This section examines the discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, 
proviGLQJDVXPPDU\GHVFULSWLRQIROORZHGE\WKHWKHRU\¶VNH\FRQFHSWV,WWKHQ
examines a number of criticisms, before assessing its suitability for this specific 
research and any alterations that must be made to the methodology in light of these 
critiques or the specific demands of the project. Good explanations of discourse 
theory can be found in Best and Kellner, Howarth, Howarth et al, Andersen, Phillips 
and Jørgensen and Torfing.259  
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Discourse theory emerged from the joint work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. This explicitly post-Marxist and post-
structuralist work KDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVDµQRYHOIXVLRQRIUHFHQWGHYHORSPHQWVLQ
Marxist, post-structuralist, post-DQDO\WLFDODQGSV\FKRDQDO\WLFWKHRU\¶.260 Laclau 
himself beOLHYHVGLVFRXUVHWKHRU\WREHDµGHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH0DU[LVWWUDGLWLRQ¶,262 
Andersen in turn SHUFHLYHVDµUHZRUNLQJRI)RXFDXOW¶DµJHQHDORJ\RIKHJHPRQ\¶DQG
a tension between deconstruction and hegemony as the key logics of the theory.263  
 
Discourse theory is a political and social theory as much as a research methodology, 
therefore using discourse theory in a research project with strong empirical 
dimensions requires a careful approach to operationalising the key concepts and 
theoretical insights. Discourse theory cannot be thought of as simply a form of 
discourse analysis, especially if discourse analysis is falsely reduced to textual 
analysis. The definition of discourse in their terminology is broader than many 
discourse analysts¶ and expands well beyond the linguistic. Howarth states the 
following: 
 
 
WLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHLUFRQFHSWLRQRIVRFLHW\«/DFODXDQG0RXIIH¶V
approach depends on the trope of catachresis. That is to say, they 
µFUHDWLYHO\PLVDSSO\¶WKHFRQFHSWRIGLVFRXUVHVRWKDWLt can encompass all 
dimensions of social reality and not just the usual practices of speaking, 
writing and communication.264  
 
 
 
The formalisation of language arising IURPDFULWLTXHRI6DXVVXUH¶Visomorphism 
allows Laclau to argue for the expansion of the general principles of linguistic 
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analysis to all signifying systems.265 8QOLNH)RXFDXOW¶VHDUO\ZRUNZKHUHGLVFRXUVHLV
DOLQJXLVWLFUHJLRQZLWKLQDZLGHUVRFLDOVWUXFWXUH/DFODXDQG0RXIIHµ>LQWHUZHDYH@
semantic aspects of language with the pragmatic aspects of actions, movements and 
REMHFWV¶266 
 
The basic assumptions of discourse theory are that all actions and objects are 
meaningful, that this meaning is conferred by historically specific (and contingent) 
systems of rules. In other words, meaning is dependent on orders of discourse that 
constitute identity and significance and that discourses are social and political 
constructions establishing a system of relations between objects or practices, while 
providing subject positions with which social agents can identify. It therefore:  
 
Investigates the way in which social practices articulate and contest the 
discourses that constitute social reality. These practices are possible 
because systems of meaning are contingent and can never completely 
exhaust a field of meaning.267  
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Key concepts 
 
It is appropriate to outline discourse theory through an examination of its key 
concepts. These are interlinked, and by necessity refer back to each other. This section 
will examine discourse, articulation (including elements, moments, nodal points, 
empty and floating signifiers), hegemony, antagonism, the logics of equivalence and 
difference, the impossibility of the social, and importantly for our purposes here, the 
role of identity in discourse theory, including a discussion of subject positions and 
identification, dislocation and ideology. 
 
Discourse 
 
'LVFRXUVHLVGHVFULEHGE\/DFODXDQG0RXIIHDVµDVWUXFWXUHGWRWDOLW\UHVXOWLQJIURP
DUWLFXODWRU\SUDFWLFH¶.268 Howarth and Stavrakakis add µV\VWHPVRIPHDQLQJIXO
practices that foUPWKHLGHQWLWLHVRIVXEMHFWVDQGREMHFWV¶269 ,IZHIROORZ*HH¶V
distinction between discourse and Discourse (the former limited to linguistic forms of 
traditional textual and literary analysis) WKHQ/DFODXDQG0RXIIH¶VWKHRU\FOHDUO\
adopts the widest possible definition of Discourse.270 Discourse is effectively 
HTXLYDOHQWWRµWKHVRFLDO¶WKH\UHMHFWDQ\GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQGLVFXUVLYHDQGQRQ-
discursive practices. All objects are constituted as objects of discourse because their 
identity and meaning cannot be taken as given or arising from outside a discursive 
system. Denying any transcendental logic, meanings are necessarily relational. In this 
way, the identities of objects and subjects (qua objects and subjects) cannot be 
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considered objective. Because all objects are constituted by discourse, all objects are 
therefore meaningful. They gain meaning through their position in a system of 
µVLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHV¶)RUH[DPSOHDZHHGLVGLIIHUHQWIURPDIORZHUEHFDXVHRI
different discursive constructions of what they are, where they are supposed to be, and 
what they are for.  
 
This does not deny physical reality, but states this reality can only be accessed 
through discourses, there is therefore no objective knowledge of reality, and there can 
never be any Archimedean point from which to acquire knowledge. This is based 
XSRQDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµEHLQJ¶DQGµH[LVWHQFH¶GUDZQIURP+HLGHJJHU271 Laclau 
and Mouffe argue their conception of discourse does not adopt either idealism or 
realism: 
 
 
An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in 
the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But 
ZKHWKHUWKHLUVSHFLILFLW\DVREMHFWVLVFRQVWUXFWHGLQWHUPVRIµQDWXUDO
SKHQRPHQD¶RUµH[SUHVVLRQVRIWKHZUDWKRI*RG¶GHSHQGVupon the 
structuring of a discursive field.272  
 
 
 
This is a denial of extra-discursive meaning, rather than extra-discursive physical 
existence. We gain or attribute meaning, or have knowledge of physical phenomena 
through discourse. From this arises the understanding that discourses are systems of 
differential relations between objects, and that if supposedly non-discursive or 
µEHKDYLRXUDO¶SUDFWLFHVDUHDQDO\VHGDSSURSULDWHO\WKHQLWEHFRPHVDSSDUHQWWKDWWKH\
too are composed of: 
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more or less complex forms of differential positions among objects, which 
do not arise from a necessity external to the system structuring them and 
which can only therefore be conceived as discursive articulations.273 
 
 
 
The statement that µLWLVVXIILFLHQWWKDWFHUWDLQUHJXODULWLHV establishing differential 
positions exist for us to be able to speak of a discursive formation¶ demonstrates how 
discourVHLVIDUIURPV\QRQ\PRXVZLWKµWH[W¶RUµODQJXDJH¶DVLQRWKHUGLVFRXUVH
analytical approaches.274 A discourse is any network of meaning articulating both 
linguistic and non-linguistic elements ± this also avoids descent into a purely 
µLGHRORJLFDO¶PRGHRIDQDO\VLV, in which discourses are seen as packages of ideas 
much like ideologies.275 'UDZLQJRQ:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VWKHRU\RIWKHSHUIRUPDWLYH aspects 
of language games, Laclau and Mouffe affirm the material as opposed to the mental 
FKDUDFWHURIGLVFRXUVH'LVFRXUVHLVQRWWKHµSXUHH[SUHVVLRQRIWKRXJKW¶RSSRVHGWRD
non-discursive objective exterior.276 Discourse is therefore not superstructural, nor 
can it be limited purely to the linguistic.  
 
For Laclau and Mouffe there are multiple competing discourses. A single discourse 
can never establish itself so that it becomes the sole discourse structuring the social. 
There are always competing discourses at play structuring meaning in different ways. 
If it appears that a particular discourse is unopposed, then that is the result of a 
hegemonic process. These processes can, however, never be fully completed. This 
follows from the contingency of meaning and discursive antagonism. There is no 
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single underlying principle fixing the whole system of differences. For Laclau there is 
no going beyond the play of differences and no a priori prioritising ground.277  
 
Related to this is the understanding of the limits of concrete discourses. Laclau and 
Mouffe follow Foucault in claiming the unity of discourses cannot be understood in 
terms of reference to the same object, common style, constancy of concepts or 
reference to a common theme.278 Foucault argues that the consistency of a discourse is 
given in the regularity of dispersion.279 This serves to deconstruct accepted unities in 
order to enable the search for discursive unities beyond those immediately apparent . 
As shown in the previous chapter, it is not the intention of this thesis to map a single 
discourse of surveillance, which would be in contradiction to this theoretical position. 
Instead, practices of surveillance are used as starting points in a search for discursive 
regularities in much the same way as Foucault started with the human sciences ± 
VXUYHLOODQFHLVWKHµSRLQWRIUHIHUHQFH¶.280  
 
Articulation 
 
)RU/DFODXDQG0RXIIHDQDUWLFXODWLRQLVµDQ\SUDFWLFHHVWDEOLVKLQJDUHODWLRQDPRQJ
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatRU\SUDFWLFH¶281 
Articulation is a process that changes relations between objects so that their meaning 
and identity are changed, and fixed in a particular way. Given the rejection of the 
discursive/non-discursive distinction, any social practice can be an articulation.  
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The work of articulation is not therefore, as has sometimes been asserted, 
PHUHO\µLGHRORJLFDO¶RUµFXOWXUDO¶DOWKRXJKLWKDVEHHQWKHVHWKLQJVWRR,W
also takes place across material institutions and practices. It is political 
work in its fullest sense.282  
 
 
 
The concept of articulation depends on the idea of polysemy, the idea that signs have 
multiple meanings ± potentially infinitely multiple but in practice somewhat more 
restricted. An articulation is an attempt to fix meaning. This is achieved by 
FRQVWUXFWLQJµQRGDOSRLQWV¶ZKLFKSDUWLDOO\IL[PHDQLQJ$UWLFXODWLRQVDUHQHYHU
complete, as meaning can never be completely fixed, since discourses are always 
vulnerable to the exterior that they exclude as they attempt to fix meaning. Nodal 
SRLQWVDUHSULYLOHJHGRUPDVWHUVLJQLILHUVVLPLODUWR/DFDQ¶Vµpoint de capiton¶
which give meaning to a chain of signifiers by partially fixing meaning within those 
chains, yet arise from the play of differences instead of being a priori privileged. Any 
centring effects proceed from the interaction of differences. The field of discursivity, 
the range of all potential meanings from which particular elements are drawn, is 
infinite, and this infinitude continually intrudes back on any articulation or fixation of 
meaning within a particular discourse.  
 
Nodal points are not those words most laden with meaning, but are characterised by a 
µFHUWDLQHPSW\LQJRIWKHLUFRQWHQWVZKLFKIDFLOLWDWHVWKHLUVWUXFWXUDOUROH¶283 
 
 
When we quilt the floating signifiers tKURXJKµ&RPPXQLVP¶IRUH[DPSOH
µFODVVVWUXJJOH¶FRQIHUVDSUHFLVHDQGIL[HGVLJQLILFDWLRQWRDOORWKHU
HOHPHQWVWRGHPRFUDF\VRFDOOHGµUHDOGHPRFUDF\¶DVRSSRVHGWR
µERXUJHRLVIRUPDOGHPRFUDF\¶DVDOHJDOIRUPRIH[SORLWDWLRQWR
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feminism (the exploitation of women as resulting from the class-
conditioned division of labour); to ecologism (the destruction of natural 
resource as a logical consequence of profit-orientated capitalist 
production); to the peace movement (the principal danger to peace is 
adventuristic imperialism), and so on.284  
 
 
 
Elements are differences not currently articulated in a discourse. When articulated in a 
discourse, arranged in differential relations around a nodal point, elements become 
moments. This transformation is never fully complete, so the categories of elements 
and moments overlap, and exist primarily as analytical categories. Floating signifiers 
are signifiers over which no discourse has hegemony and for that reason are the 
subject of political struggle. They occupy a contested position during periods of social 
crisis and dislocation. There are some similarities here with the concept of essentially 
contested concepts ± such as freedom, democracy or justice, which different political 
ideologies attempt to articulate and fix meaning to in different ways. Empty signifiers 
KDYHDPHDQLQJVXIILFLHQWO\EURDGVRDVWRDSSURDFKEXWQRWUHDFKWKHµXQLYHUVDO¶285 
These empty signifiers act as bearers of universal signification despite their 
particularity.  
 
This combination of elements, moments and articulation gives discourse theory an 
understanding of the fundamental contingency of both language and the social. Social 
identities and meanings are never given nor fundamental; they are historically and 
socially contingent. Meaning is political, as any articulation involves the exercise of 
power, and the repression of alternative articulations. Discourse theory also has an 
understanding of the partial fixation of meaning, of how meaning can be made to 
appear to be fixed, or to go unquestioned. This allows a negotiation of the relativistic 
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aspects of some post-modern approaches. The social is fundamentally contingent; it 
could have been otherwise, but in localised environments, in given places and times, it 
can be incredible difficult to change meanings  
 
Hegemony 
 
 
TKHXQLYHUVDOPHFKDQLVPRILGHRORJLFDOµFHPHQW¶ZKLFKELQGVDQ\VRFLDO
body together, a notion that can analyse all possible socio-political orders 
IURPIDVFLVPWROLEHUDOGHPRFUDF\´286 
 
 
 
/DFODXDQG0RXIIH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIKHJHPony emerges from a deconstruction of the 
Marxist tradition, and specifically the work of Gramsci. They attempt to free the 
theory from its essentialist and reductionist tendencies. Lenin theorised hegemony as 
temporary class alliances in the process of revolutionary struggle.287 Gramsci 
however, saw hegemony as the process by which the proletariat could become able to 
represent the interests of a people or nation.288 *UDPVFL¶VKHJHPRQ\VWLOOUHOLHGRQD
fundamental social class responsible for bringing about social change (the proletariat) 
and the economy still remained the object of political struggle, ultimately determining 
the social and political superstructure.289 Laclau and Mouffe discard these elements 
and attempt to formulate hegemony in a way compatible with postmodern theories of 
discourse, such as Wittgenstein or Foucault.290 Hegemonic struggle therefore becomes 
political struggle over discourses, hegemonic projects are projects to articulate 
discourses together to structure and thereby dominate a field of meaning, to create 
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µKHJHPRQLFIRUPDWLRQV¶WRIL[LGHQWLWLHVDQGmeanings in a particular way to the 
exclusion of other potential formations. We can draw a distinction between 
hegemonic practices (practices that articulate differences) and hegemonic formations 
(the result of these practices). Hegemony involves two regimes: 
 
 
The hegemonic discourse establishes a truth regime that defines what can 
be considered as true or false, and a value regime that provides criteria for 
judging what is good and what is bad.291 
 
 
 
A necessary precondition of this operation of hegemony is the open and contingent 
nature of the social. Only because elements have no necessary relation between them 
can they be re-arranged and placed in different relationships by hegemonic projects.292 
Hegemony also requires antagonistic social forces divided by unstable political 
frontiers. If the distance between two antagonistic political forces is too great, if there 
is no discursive overlap and the forces are essentially unable to communicate, then 
there could not be a hegemonic formation capable of structuring the relationship 
between the differences.  
 
Laclau and Mouffe view hegemony as the central category of political analysis. They 
DVNµKRZGRHVDUHODWLRQEHWZHHQHQWLWLHVKDYHWREHIRUDKegemonic relation to 
EHFRPHSRVVLEOH"¶293 How does a particular non-universal, historical and contingent 
social force assume the representation or appear to become a totality or universality 
ZKLFKLWFDQQRWEHZKLFKLVµUDGLFDOO\LQFRPPHQVXUDEOHZLWKLW¶?294 Because no 
discourse can entirely structure the social, and completely fix all meaning, this 
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appearance of universality (for example the Enlightenment image of the universal 
rational human actor) is the only form of universality that can be achieved. This 
opposes Marxist theories of class determinism as well as models that radically deny 
any possibility of relations between particularities other than some form of arbitrary 
bricolage. Hegemony is for Lacalu and Mouffe, using the Derridian concept of 
µXQGHFLGDEOHV¶DWKHRU\RIµGHFLVLRQVRQXQGHFLGDEOHWHUUDLQ¶.295 This universality is 
an always reversible µFRQWDPLQDWHGXQLYHUVDOLW\¶7RUILQJ¶VGHILQLWLRQRIGLVFRXUVH
takes into account the partial fixation of hegemony, and the way it involves the 
creation of a µXQLYHUVDO¶KRUL]RQ 
 
 
We can define hegemony as the expansion of a discourse, or set of 
discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by 
means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a 
context crisscrossed by antagonistic forces.296 
 
 
 
The possibility of a fully hegemonic society is problematised, firstly on empirical 
grounds in that there will always be competing articulations, but secondly due to the 
lack of perfect unity of the hegemonic force.297 For example, different conceptions of 
democracy can be found even within socialist and liberal discourses. This relates well 
to the understanding of the operation of discourses within regimes of governmentality. 
Discourses are not unitary and total, but attempt to spread meanings and 
understandings, in the form of problematisations and appropriate strategies and tactics 
in response, through the assemblage of governance actors. 
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Torfing presents neo-liberalism as a hegemonic discourse, due to the way it has 
redefined pROLWLFDOGHEDWHWKURXJKDWWDFNVRQFHQWUDOLVWEXUHDXFUDWLFµQDQQ\VWDWHV¶
celebrating entrepreneurship and the market as steering mechanism.298 The very 
existence of critique shows the neo-liberal hegemony is not total; however, even 
oppositional currents such as Marxism have had to engage with neo-liberalism, being 
changed in the process. Mainstream UK political discourse is highly hegemonised by 
neo-liberalism. However, even within what can be termed the neo-liberal discourse, 
there exist divisions, and contested articulations of certain concepts. A discourse 
cannot be considered as a monolithic totality, but rather regularity in dispersion. 
 
Logics of equivalence and difference 
 
/DFODXDQG0RXIIH¶VORJLFVRIHTXLYDOHQFHDQGGLIIHUHQFHDUHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHn 
subject positions and differential terms within a particular discourse. They are ways in 
which discourses construct relations, and by doing so construct political frontiers in 
particular ways.  
 
The logic of equivalence consists of µWKHGLVVROXWLRQRIWKe particular identities of 
subjects within a discourse by the creation of a purely negative identity that is seen to 
WKUHDWHQWKHP¶.299 In this way an external identity serves to unite a series of 
differences. It is associated with the paradigmatic pole of language and reduces the 
number of positions that can be combined in a discourse. The logic of equivalence is 
the mechanism through which a notion of the universal is constructed.300 This 
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necessarily involves the construction of a constitutive outside.301 These µSDUDWDFWLFDO¶
divisions of the political space reduces political struggle into an antagonism between 
the two divided groups.302 The logic of equivalence is a logic of political 
simplification, that makes elements more interchangeable and reduces the number of 
distinct subject positions available.303 Through this, the establishment of chains of 
equivalence tends to simplify the social and political space.304 Relations of 
equivalence tend to produce metonymical relations, and as these relations become 
more powerful they lead to the emergence of metaphors ± the presence of metonymy 
and metaphors are a strong signal of the operation of logics of equivalence.305 
Relations of equivalences are precarious and reversible. Equivalence implies some 
difference, otherwise the related elements would simply be identical, however a 
relation of equivalence subverts and minimises the differences between the 
elements.306 An example is the way in which trade unionist, ecological, fair-trade and 
anti-capitalist social movements were brouJKWWRJHWKHULQWRDJHQHUDOµDQWL-
JOREDOLVDWLRQ¶PRYHPHQWLQRSSRVLWLRQWRJOREDOFDSLWDODQGLWVHPERGLPHQWLQWKH
WTO, during the Seattle 1999 protest. Burgos uses discourse theory to argue that the 
0H[LFDQUHYROXWLRQZDVSRVVLEOHEHFDXVHµWKHSHRSOH¶ZHre able to dissolve their 
GLIIHUHQFHVDQGFRQVWLWXWHWKHPVHOYHVDVµWKHRSSUHVVHG¶LQRSSRVLWLRQWRµWKH
RSSUHVVRUV¶DJURXSLQJWKDWZHDNHQHGGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHJRYHUQPHQWWKH
president, the church and capital.307 Torfing argues Jacobin discourse during the 
)UHQFK5HYROXWLRQGLYLGHGVRFLHW\EHWZHHQWKHHTXLYDOHQWLDOFKDLQRIµWKHSHRSOH¶DQG
the µDQFLHQUHJLPH¶. He compares this with the British Chartists, who despite drawing 
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upon similar discourses, were unable to bring about the splitting of the political space, 
and experienced a proliferation of the difference.308 äLåHN cites the Polish Solidarity 
movement as one of the most extensive logics of equivalence in recent politics.309 
 
In contrast, the logic of difference is the expansion of a discursive order by breaking 
down existing chains of equivalence, turning moments into disarticulated elements 
and then incorporating these elements back into an expanding discursive formation. 
These are often an attempt to displace and weaken relations of antagonism, serving 
the function of displacing divisions to the margins of society.310 The logic of 
difference is the logic of increasing complexity in the political, and increases the 
number of available subject positions. The logic of difference tends to dominate in 
GLVFRXUVHVWKDWVWUHVVLQFOXVLYLW\DQGµWKHV\QWDJPDWLFSROHRIODQJXDJH¶.311 Unlike 
equivalence, logics of difference tend not to produce any metaphors or metonyms. 
The logics are not mutually exclusive and there is always a tension between them in 
any antagonistic social situation. No society could be structured solely by difference 
or equivalence. Andersen considers the logics as a deconstruction of the binary 
difference/equivalence to show the interaction between the two.312  
 
The relation between difference and equivalence is undecideable. The 
discursive identities are inscribed both in signifying chains that stress 
their differential values, and in signifying chains that emphasise their 
equivalence. The tension between the differential and equivalential 
aspects of discursive identities is unresolvable, but political struggles may 
succeed in emphasising one of the two aspects.313 
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The tension cannot be resolved, and this tension is, for Laclau and Mouffe, at the core 
RIWKHLPSRVVLELOLW\RIWKHµIXOOQHVV¶RIWKHVRFLDO/DFODXDUJXHVWKDWJLYHQWKDW
identities are purely differential and with no necessary structural centre, social 
WRWDOLWLHVVXFKDVµVRFLHW\¶UHTXLUHDQRXWVLGHE\ZKLFKWRGHILQHWKHPVHOYHV
+RZHYHUWKLVµRWKHU¶SURYLGLQJWKHFRQVWLWXWLYHRXWVLGHLVLQWHUQDOWRWKHV\VWHPRI
differences. It can only take on the appearance of an outside. It is excluded by the 
totality to define the totality, to allow the limits of the totality to be grasped. In 
relation to the excluded identity, all other identities are in a relation of equivalence to 
each other by their rejection of the excluded element. However, this equivalence 
subverts difference and identity formation must take place within the tension between 
equivalence and difference. Ultimately, this is a failed totality. The tension between 
difference and equivalence cannot be resolved, yet some (precarious) closure is 
necessary for signification or identity at all. Any identity is therefore precarious.314  
 
Identity in discourse theory 
 
Discourse theory has a distinct understanding of identity, and given the focus of this 
research this is worth exploring in detail. For Laclau, the constitution of a social 
identity is an act of power and because of this, identity is power.315 As the result of an 
act of political decision, identity is therefore ethical.316 Norval identifies identity 
construction as a political process heavily inscribed by power. Drawing on a 
Foucauldian reading of the productive nature of power, she sees any attempt to 
impose or form social identities (for example a hegemonic articulation that changes 
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the available subject positions within a discursive field) as a constitutive act of power 
that will therefore always experience resistance.317   
 
The starting point is the assumption that identities (like all social objects) are 
discursively constituted, and are thus subject to articulations, antagonisms and 
hegemony. The model of identity in discourse theory is anti-foundationalist, 
discursively constructed, multiple and plural, contingent and open to change, 
vulnerable, and an outcome of processes of power. It is therefore a highly political 
conception of identity. Because identity is a political construction, it cannot be prior 
to politics, but is maintained, constructed, transformed through political struggles.318 
All attempts to ground identities are therefore understood as precarious and political 
attempts to naturalise or objectify politically constructed identities.319  
 
Torfing argues that a requirement of a systematic approach to discourse analysis is 
breaking with the Cartesian subject as willing author of all his statements.320 The 
model of identity in discourse theory emerges from a post-structuralist critique of 
Althusser. Althusser holds that ideological language constructs social positions 
through a process termed interpellation or hailing and they are best understood as 
positions within discourses.321 The subject is not sovereign but determined by 
structural discourse. Despite $OWKXVVHU¶Vattempt to escape from the economic 
determinism (and scientism) of Marxism, his WKHRU\RIµGHWHUPLQLVPLQWKHODVW
LQVWDQFH¶RIµUHODWLYHO\DXWRQRPRXV¶LGHRORJ\E\WKHHFRQRP\UDSLGO\FROODSVHVWR
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HFRQRPLFGHWHUPLQLVPJLYHQQRPHFKDQLVPIRULGHQWLI\LQJµWKHODVWLQVWDQFH¶)RU
Laclau and Mouffe there is no objective logic (such as class position) that determines 
identity, but rather identity is created through competing discourses, and identity 
WKHUHIRUHKDVQRHVVHQWLDOFKDUDFWHU$OWKXVVHU¶VHVVHQWLDOLVWXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILGHQWLW\
reduces the autonomy of social agents to effects of social structures.322 To avoid this, 
Laclau and Mouffe distinguish between subject positions and political subjectivity. 
Subject positions refer to the way subjects are positioned within a discursive order, 
whilst political subjectivity deals with the question of agency by identifying the action 
of subjects with the radical contingency of the discursive structures from which they 
draw their identities.323 With the death of the subject, there is still a notion of a 
creative subjectivity; however it is one governed by rules that define what is 
sayable.324 
 
Identities are therefore constructed through discourse in a way that is not deterministic 
and does not reduce identities to products of economic relations. Identity is 
changeable, fragmented and decentred.325 Using the catachretic analogy from the 
linguistic model, identities are relationally determined; they are given meaning 
through their positioning vis-à-vis other identities. Identities must always be thought 
of in the plural, as any given individual can occupy multiple subject positions (for 
example, being at the same time English, male, student, employee, tenant, friend and 
partner). There is no necessary relationship between the various discourses that 
provide the multiple different subject positions. This multiplicity should not be 
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thought of as coexistence, but rather as a constant, multidirectional subversion.326 
Identities are contingent and all processes of identification presuppose a moment of 
exhaustion ± a moment in which existing identities are not capable of dealing with a 
dislocatory situation. 
 
Dislocation and ideology 
 
The two concepts of ideology and dislocation can be thought of as opposites of each 
other, and are dependent upon the understanding of politics in discourse theory. 
Rather than the interaction of pre-constituted individuals with pre-given interests, they 
assert the primacy of the political over the social ± political decisions and struggles 
shape and reshape social relations. However, political social relations can become 
sedimented into organisational norms, rules and regularities which are then taken for 
granted. According to Blumenberg, the primacy of politics:  
 
 
does not consist in the fact that everything is political, but rather in the 
fact that the determination of what is to be regarded as unpolitical is itself 
conceived as falling under the competence of the political.327 
 
 
 
Ideology for Laclau and Mouffe is anything eliding the contingency of the social, for 
example, a discourse constructing a traditional social arrangement as God-given 
rather than the product of human agency, and therefore impossible to alter. If from an 
anti-essentialist discourse perspective everything is contingent and political, then 
ideology, for Laclau and Mouffe, is any statement or activity that denies this 
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contingency. For Laclau, all ideology critique is intra-ideological, with no recourse to 
QRWLRQVRIWUXWKRUIDOVLW\,GHRORJ\LVDµFRQVWLWXWLYHGLVWRUWLRQ¶:328 
 
Not a distortion of a pre-constituted identity, but rather a discursive 
operation that constructs a constitutive closure of social and political 
identities.329 
 
 
 
Given that identities can never be totally sutured, and are threatened by their 
constitutive outside, ideology reflects the concealment of this ontological 
undecidability, and projects onto the discursive identity the closure that it lacks.330 
Ideology therefore has strong similarities with concepts such as reification. 
 
Dislocations, in turn, are processes that make visible the contingency (and therefore 
the politics) of the social. They are events which bring new social identities into being 
through crisis, as existing identities and discourses prove incapable of sufficiently 
suturing the social and articulating the event so that it is understandable within that 
discourse. Existing identities and discourses are unable to provide answers to political 
or existential questions raised by the external environment. This external is not extra-
GLVFXUVLYHEXWRXWVLGHRIWKHKHJHPRQLFGLVFRXUVH1RUYDO¶VVWXG\of 6RXWK$IULFD¶V
apartheid era discourse examined the dislocatory effects of urbanisation and 
agricultural capitalism on the emergence of apartheid. She notes the critical 
importance of examining the way apartheid discourse articulated these dislocations.331 
Dislocation is, for Howarth, a source of agency in discourse theory. The structure fails 
to provide an identity which compels the subject to act in the face of a literal identity 
crisis; the subject then has to identify with or create alternate identities, discourses or 
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political projects.332 Following this logic, it is consistent to consider discourses 
themselves as having dislocation effects. They can put hegemonic discourses 
providing subject positions into crisis through the encounter with alternative 
articulations. The proliferations of identity discussed in the previous chapter can be 
thought of as arising from a number of powerful locations. It is therefore reasonable 
to expect political projects that attempt to suture this dislocation to attempt to provide 
an encompassing identity.  
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Criticisms of discourse theory 
 
The intention of this section is to examine critical perspectives, and whilst there are 
alterations that could, and in some instances should, be made to discourse theory in 
the light of these perspectives, the theory is an appropriate basis for conducting 
political research. Responses to the concerns will be followed by an argument for the 
suitability of this form of research to the issues of surveillance and individual identity. 
There exists no one-size-fits-all research methodology and decisions about methods 
and analytical strategies must be made in the light of empirical and theoretical 
concerns. We can divide the main criticisms into a number of categories. These are 
positions which take issue with the idea of catachresis or more specifically with the 
concept of discourse in discourse theory, questions about the levels of contingency 
and openness of the social, specifically with regard to the political role of structure, 
and concerns regarding the empirical applicability of discourse theory.  
 
Marxism? 
 
Discourse theory attracted criticisms upon the publication of Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy. Some Marxist theorists such as Forgacs and Aronowitz were broadly 
sympathetic, although sceptical of the possibility of putting the theory into political 
practice.333 However more vitriolic criticism came from Geras¶UHDFWLRQWR/DFODXDQG
0RXIIH¶VUHZRUNLQJRI0DU[LVWWKHRU\DQGWKHLUJHQHDORJ\RIWKH0DU[LVWWUDGLWLRQ
He argues the history of Marxism presented is an inaccurate caricature that over-
exaggerates the essentialism of Marxism, by presenting the economic determinism of 
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the Second International as characteristic of all Marxism, ignoring the complex 
historical reality. This is, for Geras µa reduction of the breadth, the panorama, the 
continent, of Marxist thought¶334  
 
Because of the purpose for which discourse theory is utilised in this research, 
providing a methodology and theoretical structure for the analysis of identity in 
discourses of surveillance, this usage does not stand or fall on the accuracy of the 
history of Marxism presented in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and providing a 
definitive answer to this question is beyond the bounds of this chapter. Laclau and 
0RXIIH¶VUHVSRQVHDUJXHVWKDW*HUDVPLVWDNHVDIRFXVRQHVVHQWLDOLVPIRUDQDUURZHU
focus purely on economic determinism, ignoring the fact that they are tracing an 
intellectual history of the progressive disintegration of essentialism within Marxism 
(not picking Marxists at random) .335 In turn they accuse Geras of taking for granted 
the democratic and egalitarian aspects of Marxism even after Stalinism. Regardless of 
WKHDFFXUDF\RI*HUDV¶FODLPVWKH\KDYHOLWWOHLPSDFWRQWKHUHVHDUFKLQWKLVWKHVLV,W
is possible to separate discourse theory as a positive methodology from the critique of 
Marxism in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
 
Catachresis and the concept of discourse 
 
Several commentators take issue with the linguistic analogy for society within 
GLVFRXUVHWKHRU\/DFODXDQG0RXIIHµFUHDWLYHO\PLVDSSO\¶WKHFRQFHSWRIGLVFRXUVH 
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Chouliaraki and Fairclough argue a key problem with the (catachresis) approach of 
discourse theory is the rejection of the distinction between discursive and non-
discursive.336 Rejecting this distinction supposedly confuses discourse analysis, as 
µWKHGLVFXUVLYH¶VKRXOGEHWDNHQWRUHfer to language and the semiotic rather than to 
other structural elements of the social. They call for a distinction between discourse 
(semiosis) and other elements of the social such as physical actions, institutions etc. 
As we have seen above, Laclau and Mouffe believe that such distinctions inevitably 
collapse under close examination ± given that we only have access and give meaning 
to the physical world through discourse. Institutions provide a good example of this: a 
series of buildings in an area with a number of human beings present becomes a 
university, rather than a factory or concentration camp, through constituting 
discourses. It becomes hard to draw a distinct line between the semiotic elements of 
social practices and the social practices themselves. You can separate off a purely 
physical element perhaps, but again this raises the question of meaning outside of 
discourses. They instead believe that the existence of relational systems of differences 
allow us to think in terms of discourse in ways that are analytically productive. If 
everything is discursive, does the concept inflate to such a degree that it is unable to 
provide analytical utility, and become a tautology? This would be the case if discourse 
was the only element of the theory and if there was only one discourse ± as in the 
model of the episteme. However, as we have seen, the idea of multiple competing 
discourses is central to discourse theory. These discourses are competitive and attempt 
alternate hegemonic articulations. The concepts of hegemony and antagonism, as well 
as various logics of the social do significant analytical work in the theory. 
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A wide conception of discourse is a necessary component of the theoretical 
framework set out by Laclau and Mouffe, however there are suggestions for ways in 
which to address some of the problems caused by a wide conception whilst still 
remaining compatible with the other theoretical assumptions. Phillips & Jørgensen 
suggest potential confusion arises from the concept of the µfield of discursivity¶, the 
discursive exterior of any utterance or statement (or indeed, any articulation) which 
contains all other potential meanings and against which the articulation is defined; the 
µVXUSOXVPHDQLQJ¶337 They suggest a distinction between the entire field of meaning, 
and those meanings that are actively competing in a specific articulation.  
7KHLUH[DPSOHRIGLVFXUVLYHFRQWHVWDWLRQLQYROYHVPHGLFLQH(OHPHQWVIURPµVFLHQFH¶
FRPSHWHZLWKHOHPHQWVIURPµDOWHUQDWLYHWKHUDSLHV¶WREHLQFOXGHGLQWKHGLVFRXUVHVof 
medicine. Elements from discourses of football rarely do. To provide analytical 
FODULW\3KLOOLSV	-¡UJHQVHQERUURZWKHFRQFHSWRIµRUGHURIGLVFRXUVH¶WRGHVFULEHD
limited range of discourses that struggle in the same terrain.338 Adapted from Foucault 
aQGGHILQHGE\)DLUFORXJKDVµDQHWZRUNRIVRFLDOSUDFWLFHVLQLWVODQJXDJHDVSHFW¶ and 
µWKHVRFLDOO\RUGHUHGVHWRIJHQUHVDQGGLVFRXUVHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDSDUWLFXODUVRFLDO
ILHOGFKDUDFWHULVHGLQWHUPVRIWKHVKLIWLQJERXQGDULHVDQGIORZVEHWZHHQWKHP¶
orders of discourse are an intermediary distinction between specific features of 
language (semeiosis) and the discursive as such.339 The order of discourse is distinct 
from the total field of discursivity, which is infinite. Whilst it may seem common 
sense we can use the concept of orders of discourse to exclude articulations of identity 
that are not competing within the social field of surveillance, for example the concept 
of identity in the mathematical-geometrical sense. It therefore suggests that one 
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should not go looking for surveillance and identity in all texts or all discourses, but 
only those operating within the order of discourse associated with surveillant social 
practices, those that are struggling within the same discursive terrain.  
 
This concept is compatible with discourse theory because it draws on similar 
foundations, and does not demand pre-given social divisions between particular social 
fields, allowing them contingency and flow, whilst at the same time allowing for 
some precarious fixity based on the actual social context (and emerging from actually 
existing differential relations). The addition of this concept is advantageous because it 
increases analytical clarity, aids in developing categories of discourses for selection 
and gathering of empirical material and helps us to focus on actively competing 
discourses. It could be argued that it is not a necessary addition to discourse theory, 
and that this work could be done without the addition of an extra intermediary layer, 
however it is likely to be a productive addition, especially with regard to analytic 
division of the discursive for empirical research. However, Phillips & Jørgensen 
FRQFHGHLQIRRWQRWHVWKDWWKHWHUPµRUGHURIGLVFRXUVH¶KDVPXFKWKHVDPHPHDQLQJDV
)RXFDXOW¶VWHUPµ'LVFXUVLYHIRUPDWLRQ¶± µWKHGLIIHUHQWDQGSRWHQWLDOO\FRQIOLFWLQJ
GLVFRXUVHWKDWRSHUDWHLQWKHVDPHWHUUDLQ¶.340 Given the Foucauldian origin of the 
Governmentality approach against which the use of discourse theory is 
FRQWH[WXDOLVHGWKHWHUPµGLVFXUVLYHIRUPDWLRQ¶ZLOOEHXVHGUDWKHUWKDQµRUGHURI
GLVFRXUVH¶ 
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Contingency and structure 
 
A point of confrontation between discourse theory and its critics is the perceived 
belief in the unconditional openness of the social; discourse comprising nothing but 
µFKDRWLFIOX[¶.341 
 
 
/DFODXDQG0RXIIH¶VRQH-sided focus on the contingency of the social 
depends upon how persons and practices are positioned within social 
structures. We argue [that] positioning in terms of gender, class, race and 
age relations affect the contingency of the semiotic in particular.342  
 
 
 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough argue that regarding the social as contingent ignores the 
structural permanence and fixity of certain social relations, and these structures play a 
strong role in determining the degree of contingency that any given actor can 
experience.343 People are conceived of as in different relations to discourse dependent 
on class, gender, race, generation and other social structures. This is a common 
critique of post-modernist approaches in general, especially theorists focusing on 
play, indeterminacy and the creative construction of meaning such as Baudrillard and 
Lyotard, and often falsely extended to theorists such as Foucault. Torfing traces the 
RULJLQRIWKLVFULWLTXHWR'HUULGD¶VFRmments on the infinite extension of the play of 
meaning in the absence of a transcendental signifier.344 The political argument is that 
whilst this may hold true for some people, many people are not in such a post-modern 
condition and their lives are strongly dictated by structures such as class, race, gender 
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or sexuality. They reject the fundamental fragility and instability of hegemonic 
articulations.345 
 
The argument is expressed in a similar but stronger form by Geras.346 He argues that:  
 
 
Out RIIHDURIµHVVHQWLDOLVP¶/DFODXDQG0RXIIHGRQRWUDLVHWKHSUREOHP
of whether some articulatory agents or practices might be more central 
than others in attaining political hegemony and achieving a socialist 
transformation of capitalist society.347 
 
 
 
)DLUFORXJK¶VFULWLque speaks to the use of discourse as an analytical tool. Philips and 
Jørgensen agree that is important to identify a structural domain where structures are 
socially constituted but are inert and difficult (if not impossible) for dominated groups 
to alter or overturn.348 Both Fairclough¶V DQG*HUDV¶FULWLTXHVH[SOLFLWO\UDLVHLVVXHV
about the implications of discourse theory for emancipatory politics. The concern is 
that in the effort to decentre the proletariat in a post-Marxist manoeuvre - abandoning 
any claims about the centrality of a particular social actor or class as the motor of 
historical necessity - /DFODXDQG0RXIIHµOHYHOSROLWLFDOIRUFHVVRWKDWHYHU\WKLQJKDV
HTXDOZHLJKW¶349 They are seen as promoting an, µDnarcho-YROXQWDULVWIDQWDV\¶in 
ZKLFKµevery link in a political chain is, in every place and time, equally weak, 
HTXDOO\DSSURSULDWHDVDSRLQWRIDSSOLFDWLRQIRURQH¶VFULWLFDOHQHUJLHV.¶350 
Responding to this requires a certain degree of empiricism in locating weak links in 
political chains, rather than wishing for them to be determined a priori. Concepts such 
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as classes, genders etc may have some utility here, but must be considered internal to 
discourse. The response to Geras is that whilst some social groups may be more 
politically effective than others, this is the result of political and historical 
contingency rather than some fundamental essence.  
 
However, Laclau and Mouffe, whilst maintaining the contingency of the social, do not 
state that any social actor can simply change the social, which would be both idealism 
and Idealism (and voluntarism).351 Whilst in theory, language and other social 
formations are contingent; in many, if not most practical situations they are relatively 
fixed. The persistence of racism, sexism, classes et al, is explained in terms of 
hegemony. This rearticulated Gramscian concept at the heart of discourse theory is an 
account of fixity. Successful hegemonic articulations establish (sediment) concepts 
and social practices as µFRPPRQVHQVH¶HVWDEOLVKHGLQUHODWLYHO\stable chains of 
PHDQLQJ7KLVFRQWLQJHQF\FDQEHVHHQDVIXQGDPHQWDOµXQGHFLGDELOLW\¶ZKLFKUHIHUV
to a determinate openness which permeates every concrete discourse, and involves the 
play between pragmatically determined possibilities.352 Importantly, the repressed 
cRQWLQJHQF\FDQEHµUH-DFWLYDWHG¶ by discourse and processes that put the social 
LQVWLWXWLRQRUµVWUXFWXUH¶LQWRTXHVWLRQ353 It is useful to make a distinction between 
contingency and probability. Just because a social object or identity is contingent, 
does not mean that it is likely to suddenly disappear. This is a distinction between 
ontological possibility and ontic probability. 
 
The point made by critics such as Geras and Fairclough is that the focus on 
contingency could be taken to imply a lack of attention to structure, but the argument 
                                               
351
 Torfing, 2003, p.70. 
352
 Ibid, p.96. 
353
 Ibid, p.70. 
 144 
must be made in the context of a critique of structural Marxism and as part of an anti-
essentialist project. Ontologically, the subject is decentred, multiple and non-essential. 
However it will often appear to have an essence, or be ascribed an essence by 
particular discourses (for example the dominant notion of the Enlightenment universal 
reflexive subject). In the context of social structures, these structures appear to be 
fixed, persistent and inaccessible to discursive strategy, but in truth they are 
constituted by discursive practices that support this interpretation, attempt to position 
social institutions as common sense and to normalise their existence. Fairclough is a 
strong critic of normalising operations of language in contemporary political 
discourses, but perhaps does not go far enough, and accepts some of the common 
sense position of the essential stability of certain social formations (sex, class etc). 
Laclau and Mouffe teasingly refer to this as tKHµREMHFWLYH¶± the field of sedimented 
discourse.354 Structure becomes reduced to stability in chains of signification. These 
stable chains of meaning elide their contingent possibility; contingent possibility is 
necessary for theorising social change over time.  
 
The theories of hegemony and objectivity go a long way to explain structural effects, 
as does the theory of subject positions. It is worth making a conscious decision to hold 
this in mind whilst conducting analysis of empirical material and developing 
substantive findings. Rather than a radical alteration of discourse theory, this is a 
reminder to take seriously the Critical Discourse Analysis point about the limitations 
on semeiotic flexibility by divisions such as class, race, and gender, whilst at the same 
time still considering them as contingent discursive social constructions and 
associated discursive practices. In a sense we should perhaps consider the concepts 
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under erasure in a Derridian sense, written crossed through to represent how they are 
constructed, but still retain social force. Class, gender, race and other social divisions 
have what we might tentatively call structural effects on discourses and the subjects 
of discourses, but they are not external to the discursive. 
 
Empirical concerns 
 
Andersen notes that Laclau has conducted relatively little empirical work using the 
discourse theory framework.355 :KLOVWWKLVLVWRDFHUWDLQH[WHQWWUXHDQG/DFODX¶V
published work has largely been theoretical, developing discourse theory, the theory 
of hegemony, and investigating the roles of the universal within political theory, his 
most recent work On Popular Reason draws on empirical material from numerous 
historical and geographical sources.356 Additionally, empirical work by other 
researchers makes use of the discourse theory model to good effect, for example 
1RUYDO¶VZRUNRQWKHGLVFRXUVHVRIDSDUWKHLG6RXWK$IULFD.357 There is a variety of 
research from the Essex School, ranging from inter-war French fascism, homosexual 
political identities in Hong Kong, Romanian social democracy and the emergence of a 
green political ideology, collected in Howarth et al.358 These are strong examples of a 
productive research methodology that makes use of the ontological categories and 
concepts of discourse theory in WKHµRQWLF¶DQDO\VLVRIVSHFLILFSROLWLFDOGLVFRXUVHV359  
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 Applicability of discourse theory as methodology 
 
This section argues for the applicability of discourse theory to investigation of the 
specific research questions of this thesis. It will highlight the strengths of discourse 
theory as a research methodology. Before this it must answer a challenge from 
another area of discourse analysis: The level of importance given to the work of 
Foucault. 
 
Foucauldian discourse theory 
 
)RXFDXOW¶VZRUNKDVPDGHDmajor contribution to the field of discourse analysis. His 
work investigated the structures of differing regimes of knowledge. Most discourse 
DQDO\VLVDSSURDFKHVIROORZ)RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIGLVFRXUVHVDVOLPLWHGrule-bound 
sets of statements, limiting what can be said, or accepted as meaningful.360 )RXFDXOW¶V
work on subjectivity is also foundational to discourse analysis. The subject is created 
through discourses, undermining the idea of the fully self-aware, rational actor as 
intentional author of his own statements. Foucault also challenges the conception of 
knowledge as neutral by showing how the humanities and social sciences establish 
regulatory regimes of truth and knowledge.361 
 
/DFODXDQG0RXIIHEXLOGXSRQ)RXFDXOW¶VZRUNDFFHSWLQJKLVPRGHORIGLscourse, his 
FRQFHSWRISRZHUDVDFRQVWLWXWLYHIRUFHDQGIROORZLQJ)RXFDXOW¶VSUREOHPDWLVDWLRQRI
regimes of truth and falsity, making use of a concept of ideology stripped of much of 
                                               
360
 Philips & Jorgensen, 2004, p.13. 
361
 Andersen, 2003, p.3. 
 147 
its content.362 Both analytics share the same focus upon subjectivation, power and 
politics.363 +RZHYHUWKH\UHMHFW)RXFDXOW¶VLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIRQO\RQHNQRZOHGJH
regime (episteme or dispositif) in each historical period. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe 
provide a model with multiple, competing discourses in competition with each other 
through the model of antagonism and hegemony.364 )RXFDXOW¶VHDUO\ZRUNDOVR
maintains a distinction between discursive and non-discursive which becomes 
problematic to maintain, and which Laclau and Mouffe reject.  
 
This raises the question: in a research project drawing heavily upon governmentality, 
DVFKRRORIWKRXJKWZLWKLWVRULJLQVLQ)RXFDXOW¶VZRUNRQOLEHUDOLVPWHUULWRU\
security and population, would it not be most appropriate to make use of a 
straightforwardly Foucauldian form of discourse analysis rather than a form of 
discourse theory which draws upon, but presumably moves away from, )RXFDXOW¶V
own theories and understandings? Or in similar terms, why not attempt to develop the 
WKHRU\RIODQJXDJHLQ'HOHX]HDQG*XDWWDUL¶VA Thousand Plateaus as part of 
supplementing the surveillant assemblage with its assemblage of enunciation? 
 
This assumes a true Foucault extractable from the voluminous literature of Foucault 
studies and that the theories of this true Foucault are firstly consistent, and secondly 
more appropriate for the research questions. It is argued here that neither of these 
conditions holds. Foucault himself problematised the very concept of the holistic 
DXWKRULDOYRLFHDQGWKHRHXYUH'LYLGLQJ)RXFDXOW¶VZRUNLQWRIRXUPRGHV: 
archaeology, genealogy, self-technology analysis and dispositif analysis 
JRYHUQPHQWDOLW\LVPLVVLQJ$QGHUVHQDUJXHVWKDW)RXFDXOW¶VZRUNZDVQRW
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systematic. Foucault was explicitly not engaged in school building.365 His work was 
instead seemingly motivated by problems and specific research questions rather than 
systematic theory building. The result of this is the difficulty (Andersen suggests the 
impossibility) of drawing out a coherent discourse theory. 
 
 
His analytics is simply too consciously unsystematic for it to develop into 
an actual theory; he himself does not even cohere to the more 
programmatic proposals which nevertheless exist. It is primarily a 
particular analytics, a practice which beckons meditation and imitation 
without possible repetition.366 
 
 
 
There has however been a definite attempt to develop a systematic approach to 
GLVFRXUVHWKHRU\E\WKH8QLYHUVLW\RI(VVH[¶VJUDGXDWHSURJUDPPHLQ,GHRORJ\DQG
Discourse Analysis. Laclau argues for the increasing precision and detail given to the 
categories and systems originally articulated in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 367 
Discourse theory therefore is arguably in a stronger position to be used in a research 
strategy than an artificially purist Foucauldian approach. 
 
An automatic presumption in favour of a Foucauldian discourse theory assumes the 
HDUOLHUPRUHDUFKDHRORJLFDOIRUPRI)RXFDXOW¶VH[SOLFLWO\GLVFXUVLYHZRUNLVPRUH
compatible with governmentality than the developed Discourse Theory model. There 
DUHVXEVWDQWLDOFKDQJHVEHWZHHQ)RXFDXOW¶VHDUOLHUand later work, given the different 
targets of inquiry. Dyrberg suggests the similarities between the analytics of 
)RXFDXOW¶Vlater work and that of Laclau and Mouffe mean they could be considered 
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as one and the same analytic.368 This suggests few, if any, compatibility problems 
EHWZHHQWKHDQDO\WLFVRIJRYHUQDQFHDQG/DFODXDQG0RXIIH¶VGLVFRXUVHWKHRU\,IWKH
PRVWUHOHYDQWµ)RXFDXOW¶IRUWKLVUHVHDUFKLVWKH)RXFDXOWRISecurity, Territory, 
Population,369 and there is not significant difference between this perspective, and 
that of Discourse theory, then it is possible to combine insights from discourse theory 
with those of governance theory. 
 
Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari deny the possibility of individual enunciation ± 
language is a collective and politicised activity.370 $VWKH\H[SORUHLQµ3RVWXODWHVRI
/LQJXLVWLFV¶LQA Thousand Plateaus, language is not about communication, or 
representation, but primarily composed of order words.371 Deleuze and Guattari 
critique linguistic determinism, whilst understanding the integration and 
interpenetration of language and the social.372 Because of these underlying 
assumptions, discourse theory is compatible with the linguistic theory of Deleuze and 
Guattari, and as such is capable of being mobilised as a way to analyse the discursive 
component of the surveillant assemblage model. 
 
Strengths of discourse theory 
 
Discourse theory has a number of strengths rendering it appropriate for answering the 
specific research questions of this thesis, above and beyond its compatibility with 
governmentality. These can be summarised under four aspects: the focus on identity, 
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the focus on the political, the access to empirical material and the level of analysis. 
The combination of these aspects suggests that a discourse theoretical approach is an 
appropriate way to explore the politics of this issue.  
 
As seen, discourse theory has a strong focus on issues of identity. Surveillant social 
practices often (although not always) involve identity in some manner. The core 
hypothesis of this research is that concepts of identity, different models and meanings 
of the concept are being contested in surveillance politics. Discourse theory does not 
take identity for granted as there is no a priori ground for identity and it is a product 
of differential relations between elements with no essential, positive content. This 
non-essentialist identity perspective allows for the examination and theorisation of 
change, conflict and contestation. Related to this is the sensitivity of discourse theory 
to issues of power and struggle. This particular understanding of political identity 
makes discourse theory well suited to analysing the role of individual identity in 
surveillance politics. Specifically, the dual role of identity as ontological 
philosophical category, and as politically contested concept can be examined using 
discourse theory concepts of hegemony, articulation and antagonism. Identity as an 
element of discourse becomes articulated by a number of discourses in differing ways. 
Certain discourses, and articulations of identity, are likely to become hegemonic, 
eclipsing other alternate meanings and understandings of identity. 
 
Discourse theory also has a strong focus on the political ± this is a discourse analysis 
grounded in politics and political theory. It operates with an active conception of 
politics which is flexible and can be adapted to a wide range of political research 
topics. The models of both identity and politics in discourse theory have a keen 
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awareness of power in the productive, Foucauldian sense. Language is explicitly 
politicised and distinctly non-neutral. Discourse theory allows for multiple discourses 
and interdiscursivity. Meanings, objectivity and identity are all explicitly politicised, 
mirroring developments in surveillance practices. Again, this explicit politicisation 
talks to the political nature of surveillance practices ± for example what they exclude 
or include, and the repercussions of these divisions and categorisations.  
 
Discourse theory provides a method of addressing empirical material. There is no 
possibility of theory independent observation and a purely inductive approach runs 
the risk of reproducing unconscious categorisations and division of the world. The 
concepts and tropes offered by discourse theory allow for a theorised way of 
examining the social and political world, a set of theoretical lenses through which to 
examine surveillance politics. As such there already exists a body of research making 
use of this research methodology and producing valid and informative results. This 
allows discourse theory to provide a model for a research design.  
 
The analytic focus of discourse theory operates at a level that allows for a relatively 
wide-ranging scope of analysis in comparison with some other discursive approaches 
(conversation analysis for example). Incorporating the concept of discursive 
formations allows us to examine the range of discourses operating within a political 
field, in this case the wide-ranging spread of surveillant social practices. Whilst 
surveillance theory has sympathy with micro-political analysis, The hypothesis here is 
that there is something more widespread about surveillance practices and the specific 
role of identity in these practices that would benefit from a macro-scale analysis, 
whilst stiOOPDNLQJXVHRIFRQFUHWHHPSLULFDOPDWHULDO'LVFRXUVHWKHRU\¶VVRPHZKDW
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µGHSHUVRQDOLVHG¶ discourses suit this role and fits well with the non-intentional, inter-
subjective perspective of the analytics of governmentality.373  
 
Operationalising the theory ± textual analysis 
 
This section addresses the requirements of turning this methodological theory into an 
operational research programme through textual analysis. Therefore this section 
provides an overview of textual analysis, and a summary of its strengths and 
suitability for this research, before examining practical issues involved with text 
selection and text analysis.  
 
Discourse is not simply language, but also includes material practices. Discourses are 
systems of meaningful practices and differential relations that form the identities of 
objects and subjects. This is an ontological understanding. Practically, these 
discourses (understood as sets of differential relations that partially fix the structure of 
society) will have physical manifestations, and will leave traces in physical artefacts 
which include texts. For McKee µtexts are the material traces that are left of the 
practice of sense-making.¶374 Translating this into discourse theoretical terms, 
discourses are already considered material, so texts become traces left by the practices 
of discursive articulation, antagonisms, hegemonic formations and operations and the 
logics of equivalence and difference. For Norval, linguistic changes in texts show the 
impacts of contesting discourses.375 Texts allow access and recovery of discursive 
politics in an empirical form, in a manner not dissimilar to forensics. From a post-
structural perspective, the definition of text is broad, and cannot be limited to familiar 
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books or speeches; however these do make up a significant population of texts. 
Almost anything can be read as a text, as demonstrated by Barthes in Mythologies 
wherHKHSURYLGHVµUHDGLQJV¶RI, DPRQJVWRWKHUWKLQJVZUHVWOLQJFKLOGUHQ¶VWR\VDQG
steak and chips.376 However, traditional texts still exist as part of this universe of 
readable things and are available for empirical analysis. Their selection is an analytic 
and pragmatic one rather than an ontologically privileged one. A source of empirical 
evidence would be selected in any empirically-focused research project, even if that 
project were not driven by discourse theory. It is argued below that textual analysis is 
an appropriate choice. 
 
Textual analysis is a strong method for social and political research for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, texts are sensitive barometers of movement and diversity; they are 
good indicators of social change and provide evidence of ongoing processes ± in this 
case the reconstruction and rearticulation of social identities.377 Texts can be thought 
of as frozen moments of discourse, thus enabling the analysis of discourses over time. 
A second strength of textual analysis is the availability and accessibility of texts, 
especially compared with interviewees. This is especially true for political research 
that looks at the discourses that structure society in a broad sense. Given the nature of 
discourses across texts, intertextuality, and the presence of multiple discourses within 
texts, discursive textual analysis does not prioritise the necessity of access to specific 
documents, in the way that a documentary policy analysis might. Discourses at the 
level of discourse theory, upon which many social actors draw subject positions and 
are involved in hegemonic contestations, are likely to be found across multiple texts 
(otherwise they are statements rather than discourses), a range of which will be 
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accessible. Additionally, preliminary analysis identified a significant population of 
publicly available texts dealing with issues identified as surveillance by the variety of 
surveillance research detailed in Chapter One. Access to sufficient textual material 
therefore does not pose a problem for a discourse theory based, textual analysis 
methodology. The research questions of this thesis focus on active public discourses 
rather than uncovering hidden (elite) discourses. Texts are therefore publicly available 
and in the realm of politics, and the establishment of hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic articulations. Texts are themselves social actions; Fairclough argues that it 
is increasingly through texts that social control and social domination are exercised.378 
This raises the importance of textual analysis for critical research. It should be 
understood that many of the links in surveillant assemblage of enunciation are textual. 
The analytics of government likewise has an orientation towards the communicative 
acts (both internal and external) of governance structures: 
 
 
The ways in which those who would exercise rule have posed to 
themselves the question of the reasons, justifications, means and ends of 
rule, and the problems goals or ambitions that should animate it.379 
 
 
 
Finally, research often makes use of textual evidence even if the research is not 
explicitly textual and texts are created during the research process. 
 
Textual analysis should not, and indeed cannot, be simply inductive.380 Descriptive 
tools do not provide privileged access to the text, but if brought to the text with 
contextual knowledge (in this case provided from existing surveillance research) and 
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a theoretical framework (in this case the combination of discourse theory and the 
analytics of government) then linguistic textual analysis becomes a µmeans of getting 
VRPHSXUFKDVHRQWKHVLJQLILFDQFH>«@DVVLJQHGKHXULVWLFDOO\WRWKHWH[W¶381 Discourse 
analysis should not presume privileged access to hidden realities at a level deeper than 
the text, thereby accessing the Truth of text. This is compatible with the governance 
insight into the need to analyse the strategies and tactics of governance in their own 
terms: 
 
The kind of empirical analysis that is involved here is not hermeneutic. It 
is not a question of decoding or interpreting a particular strategy to 
discover hidden motives, of critiquing a particular alignment of forces to 
identity class interests, or of interpreting a particular ideology to discover 
the real objectives that lie behind it.382 
 
 
 
A textual approach to discourse analysis should follow Fairclough in involving: 
 
 
A transdisciplinary process in which perspective and categories from 
outside textual analysis or discourse analysis can be operationalised as 
ways of analysing texts which enhance insight into the textual aspect of 
the social practices, processes, and relations which are the focus of a 
particular research project.383  
 
 
 
Discourse theory serves as the theoretical framework through which textual material 
will be analysed in order to provide answers to the research questions articulated in 
Chapter One, and drawn from surveillance theory and governmentality. 
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Text selection 
 
Of critical importance in any research design that involves textual analysis is the 
question; which texts? Or, more accurately, the question of how texts to be analysed 
will be selected. This section elucidates the limitations and criteria for text selection in 
this thesis.  
 
Sampling 
 
An ideal research project would be able to assess and analyse the entire population of 
legitimate texts. This is clearly not practicable in any realisable, real-world research 
project. The size of the potential universe of texts is unknown, yet likely extremely 
large and heterogeneous. Given this limitation, some form of sampling is required. 
Random sampling is intended to eliminate selection bias and provide a sample that is 
truly representative of the population. However, random sampling would be 
impossible for textual analysis. The supposed benefits of random sampling methods 
rely on assumptions about the relationship between sample and population. These do 
not hold true for the population of texts and the techniques of discourse analysis. A 
sample constructed randomly from an extremely heterogeneous population is likely to 
be highly unrepresentative, even if it was possible to construct a valid sampling 
frame. This is especially true given the requirement for small n samples in discourse 
analysis due to the resource requirements of close reading of textual material. Equally, 
given the presence of discourses in multiple, heterogeneous texts, not every text will 
be equally revealing, nor speak towards the research questions with the same level of 
productivity. Whilst it could be possible to read a discourse of surveillance from an 
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SDUWRIWKHXQLYHUVHRISRWHQWLDOWH[WVDQGDFWXDOO\D
material trace of the recording of commercial transactions ± which might raise 
questions about how that text was anticipated, predicted or represented in market 
research databases imperceptible to the consumer) it is likely more productive to 
analyse the contents of a report on identity cards produced by the Office of the 
Information Commissioner. The model of sampling in this research must therefore be 
conceptually driven. Texts must be selected that are most illustrative of wider trends 
rather than statistically representative of their proportion of the population. 
Therefore, it is necessary to provide conceptual and contextual justification for the 
inclusion of texts or group of texts ± based upon the research questions and 
surveillance theory. This justification is set against criteria that necessarily limit the 
free play of selection based upon pragmatic grounds and in order to ensure research 
consistency and validity. 
 
Case study approach 
 
Philips and Jorgensen argued for the need in conducting discursive analysis: 
 
 
To make a strategic selection, likely discourse and orders of discourse 
need to be identified through an initial survey of relevant texts, including 
research on the topic.384 
 
 
 
This is part of a response to the question posed by Foucault regarding the appropriate 
units of analysis for discursive research.  
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A provisional division must be adopted as an initial approximation: an 
initial region the analysis will subsequently demolish and, if necessary, 
reorganise. But how is such a region to be circumscribed? On the one 
hand, we must choose, empirically, a field in which the relations are likely 
WREHQXPHURXVGHQVHDQGUHODWLYHO\HDV\WRGHVFULEH«2QWKHRWKHU
hand, what better way of grasping in a statement, not the moment of its 
formal structure and laws of construction but that of its existence and the 
rules that govern its appearance, if not by dealing with the relatively 
unformalised groups of discourses, in which the statements do not seem 
necessarily to be built on the rules of pure syntax?385  
 
 
 
The discursive textual analysis in this research project is structured around five 
reference points which will define a discursive area, or discursive formation/order of 
discourse. These reference points should be regarded as contingent, provisional 
analytic divisions of the field of surveillance discourse. They arise from an 
examination of the scope of surveillance research combined with assessments as to 
the level of likely productivity. These reference points are not isolated from each 
other, and are not studied in isolation. They act as a starting point whilst analysis 
attempts to identify any cross field regularities or internal discontinuities in order to 
deconstruct these contingent categories. As a result, after Chapter Four, the 
subsequent two chapters use structures derived from the empirical material. This 
division pays attention to the multiple discourses that structure any social field, as 
well as the numerous sites of surveillance in contemporary UK society. It follows 
suggestions from surveillance theory to examine specific sites of surveillance and 
avoids making generalisation across the totality of society.386 It is guided by the 
model of the surveillant assemblage, enhanced by re-introducing language, and the 
analytics of governance to examine surveillance practices beyond the traditional 
model of the state and government.387 Drawing on discourse theory, it also allows for 
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the examination of antagonistic conflict, hopefully with productive insights into the 
discursive antagonisms constructed through opposing discourses. The range of 
reference points allows the inclusion of technologies and practices, the public and 
private sectors, central government and NGOs, direct action and pressure groups, 
actors responsible for the mediation and reinforcement of discourses, the creators of 
surveillance systems, and to engage with a large potential range of articulations of 
identity. The reference points for discursive formations are as follows. 
  
 Government discourse  
 
As the theoretical underpinning of this study acknowledges the importance of 
government as a site of governance (without overly privileging it), government 
produced discourse must be examined. An analytic focus on identity cards allows the 
examination of the predominant sites of identity rearticulation where identity is 
contested and in play.  
 
Identity cards are one of the most contested practices of surveillance in the United 
Kingdom. With the passing of the 2006 Act they are a contemporary phenomenon.  
Identity cards can themselves be understood in discourse theoretical terms as an 
articulation of identity. The introduction and future use of identity cards is a practical 
action that rearticulates what identity is in UK society. Identity cards are 
(unsurprisingly) fundamentally about identity. It would be impossible to ignore 
identity card discourses in a study of the articulation of identity in discourses of 
surveillance. Many of the themes and regularities found in other discursive areas are 
strongly represented in identity card discourses and many even find their point of 
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origin near to identity cards. To not include identity cards in an analysis of discourses 
of surveillance in the United Kingdom would be to risk obscuring a significant 
element of those discourses. 
 
 Opposition to ID cards discourse 
 
As a contested surveillance practice, there is a distinct discourse of opposition to 
identity cards. This often attempts to rearticulate government statements and contest 
its definitions. Examining both sides of the conflict is holistic and allows for 
examination of the nature of that conflict. 
 
A large number of arguments have been mobiOLVHGDJDLQVWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
SURSRVDOV7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VGLVFXUVLYHDUWLFXODWLRQVKDYHUHVSRQGHGWRWKLV
oppositional discourse and have developed over time. This is an area of conflict and 
contestation in the politics of surveillance in the United Kingdom. It therefore 
produces more concrete articulations as positions are attacked and defended, rather 
than silently accepted. Both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects are at work in 
this discursive field. 
 
 ,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFHGLVFRXUVH 
 
The Office of the Information Commissioner, created by the Data Protection Act 
1998, superseded the Data Protection Registrar set up by the Data Protection Act 
1984. The role and profile of the Information Commissioner increased substantially 
with the passing of the Freedom of Information Act 2005. The office has two main 
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responsibilities, data protection and freedom of information. The ICO holds statutory 
and regulatory powers but it is not a government ministry or department. It is in this 
direction that we are led by an analytics of governance, to agencies of government 
broadly conceived. 
 
ICO is active in UK surveillance politics. Therefore to not include such an actor 
would be remiss. ICO has also been heavily involved in efforts to combat identity 
theft, often through public education efforts. This has resulted in a significant degree 
of media attention directed at the office. ICO has an active press office and a 
substantial catalogue of press releases. 
 
ICO appears to have (and express) a nuanced view on surveillance. Whilst 
surveillance is critically evaluated, it is not totally discredited or evaluated in 
pejorative terms. ICO therefore occupies a position between an unquestioning 
acceptance of surveillance practices (perhaps in pursuit of other objectives such as 
crime prevention) and a blanket opposition to all surveillance practices. ICO therefore 
is an appropriate point of reference due to its position in relation to other points. 
 
 Media discourses 
 
Mass media is a site where battles over identity, distribution and social control are 
fought out.388 Mass media institutions are socially significant actors. The news media 
frequently feature accounts of surveillance technologies and practices in areas of 
news, comment and features. Both surveillance and identity are active concepts in 
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news media discourse. The perspective of the news media is not unitary, as is 
expected from a site of political contestation. 
 
Mass media helps to establish and maintain the hegemony of specific social groups by 
producing and promulgating social myths and imaginaries, but they also provide the 
means and material for resistance and counter-hegemonic struggle.389 The mass media 
provides some of the interpretative reservoirs of discursive participants and of the 
general public; these are used to make sense of surveillance processes. Various actors 
and institutions also attempt to make use of the news media to broadcast their 
message, with varying degrees of both success and sophistication. 
 
Mass media (re)produces and sustains hegemonic representations of surveillance. The 
discourse is highly inter-textual and draws upon other discourses of surveillance. This 
is never a completely transparent automatic process, and as such it is important to pay 
attention to the ways in which media discourses of surveillance and identity can 
reinterpret or rearticulate material drawn from other discursive sources. 
 
 Banking and financial discourses 
 
Banking and financial services and regulatory bodies serve as a reference point for 
examining private sector surveillance activity and the accompanying discourses of 
surveillance. The activity of the credit reference agencies in establishing the credit 
ratings of individuals is a significant example of the operation of social sorting. 
Significant identification activity occurs in banking and finance, involving ways of 
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proving and validating the identity of individuals and organisations. Thirdly, the 
discourse around this reference point also speaks to criminal surveillance, the 
monitoring and information gatheULQJE\µLGHQWLW\WKLHYHV¶ZKRDUHWKHPVHOYHVVLOHQW
but represented in this field of discourse. Within the banking and financial sector there 
is currently a prominent discourse of identity, providing the opportunity for a 
significant number of selectable and analysable texts. These debates arise from the 
importance of identification practices required by legislation as well as the apparently 
growing threat of identity fraud. The sector is part of governance broadly understood. 
The discourses of identity at play here link into the ID card debate and also the 
protection of personal identity espoused by the Information Commissioner. An active 
role is ascribed to actors in this field in dealing with the problem of identity. The 
banking and financial sector can be understood as forming an important part of the 
surveillant assemblage. 
 
Positive text selection 
 
Moving from these reference points there is a requirement for positive guidelines for 
selection ± these include references to what should be included, and what it is 
(provisionally) assumed would be productive with regard to producing valid answers 
to the specific research questions of this project. It should be possible to show that 
such texts are illustrative of trends common to that type of text, whilst using 
contextual knowledge to determine outlying occurrences or misspeaking. The criteria 
for text selection are primarily concerned with determining the extent to which any 
given text is about surveillance (in its specific manifestation in that discursive 
formation). It will not do to simply search for the signifier surveillance in the text and 
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a more nuanced approach must be taken. Due to the negative connotations of the word 
surveillance, which conjures up images of spies and espionage, many texts which are 
clearly about surveillance practices do not use the word itself.390 Whilst placeholders 
could be determined (observation, measurement, or perhaps research) this highlights a 
lack of nuance in the approach. The about part of the requirement is simple enough ± 
A text is considered about surveillance if it depicts, describes, argues for or against, 
debates, critiques, legitimises, questions, contemplates or provides an account of 
surveillance. This is not an exclusive list but it provides examples of the type of 
relationship a text must have to surveillance to be justified for inclusion. With regard 
to surveillance, we draw from surveillance theory a picture that the text performs 
these activities relating to practices that involve surveillance, supervision, 
identification, data gathering on individuals or populations, categorisation, social 
sorting, panopticism, dataveillance, purposive information gathering, or any practices 
identified as such using the theories of surveillance as depicted in the previous 
chapter. Whilst it is somewhat abstract in relation to this wealth of practices, it is 
ZRUWKUHVWDWLQJ/\RQ¶VGHILQLWLRQRIVXUYHLOODQFH µIRFXVHGV\VWHPDWLFDQGURXWLQH
attention to personal details for the purpose of influence, management, protection or 
diUHFWLRQ¶391 In summary, in looking for discourses of surveillance the search is for 
documents that refer to, articulate or orient towards practices identified as surveillant 
or including significant surveillance dimensions.  
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Limitations on text selection 
 
The following criteria act as limitations on the populations of texts from research 
design and validity perspectives. They serve to reduce the population of texts, prior to 
the selection of specific texts within that universe for further analysis.  
 
 The text must have an identifiable source, even if that source is an institution 
or organisation rather than a single named author. Pseudonyms are also 
acceptable as long as there is signification of origin. The author is a concept 
placed under question by poststructuralism, but the knowledge of the producer 
is necessary for classification, and post-hoc external verification of the 
research. It also filters out orphan texts produced through search engines. 
Whilst these may contain elements of identifiable discourse they cannot be 
located within the analytic framework. 
 Given the concentration of this research on the UK, they will be produced in 
the UK or refer to the United Kingdom. Discourses rarely strictly follow 
national boundaries, especially in the contemporary globalised word, but this 
restriction performs some narrowing of focus.  
 Texts must be publicly available. This is an issue of practical access and 
allowing assessment of the validity of the research, whilst the theoretical focus 
is on public discourses that are struggling to suture the social, provide subject 
positions etc. 
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Locating texts 
 
The previous criteria limiting texts available to select would be sufficient if combined 
with complete knowledge about the universe of texts, including what is contained in 
texts and where they can be located. However as we have seen, this is impossible. If 
achieved, discourse analysis would be rendered redundant. This leads to a 
requirement for a mechanism by which texts can be found before they can be selected 
or deselected.   
 
The five case study reference points act as starting points for locating texts. This 
process is driven primarily through an understanding of the field of surveillance 
politics, supplemented by a contextual knowledge of the United Kingdom, and 
preliminary research activity suggesting the potential locations of illustrative texts. 
Many of the sectors involved in this research openly and publicly publish texts and 
documents. This holds especially true for government and governance institutions, 
social movements and media (by definition). This is where the intertextual aspect of 
discourse analysis emerges. Intertextuality is the understanding that every text is 
dialogical: it gains meaning in relation to other texts (which have come before, and 
will come after it).392 Texts are riddled with the presence of other texts. For example 
footnotes and references in this chapter signal intertextual relations to numerous other 
texts, in fields of political theory, discourse and textual analysis, which in turn will 
have their own array of intertextual relations. It is possible to trace relationships 
between texts in this manner in a similar way to snowball sampling methods in 
interview research. The advantage of this in textual analysis is that it is much easier 
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given the pervasive nature of textual material in contemporary society to find entry 
points should intertextual chains run dry. Additionally, these chains and contextual 
knowledge can lead to texts that should talk about surveillance but do not. Absences, 
what is not said, are as important as what is said to discourse analysis.  
 
Evaluation of Research 
 
Any research design must provide a justification for its analytical choices, and attempt 
to provide criteria through which those choices and justifications might be evaluated. 
This section deals with the evaluation of this research design and consequentially any 
findings arising from this research. Due to the post-structuralist underpinnings and 
politicisation of language there are limits to the knowledge claims that can be made. 
Every analysis of a text or discourse is an interpretation; closely involved with the 
µODQJXDJH-plus-VLWXDWLRQ¶ that is the focus of analysis.393 It is not quantifiable, nor 
perfectly repeatable, nor about the relationships between variables.394 Fairclough 
argues that;  
 
 
We should assume that no analysis of a text can tell us all there is to be 
said about it ± there is no such thing as a complete and definitive analysis 
of a text. That does not mean that they are unknowable ± social scientific 
knowledge of them is possible and real enough and hopefully increasing, 
but still inevitably partial.395  
 
 
This is far from advocating an anything-goes approach to research. Whilst discourse 
DQDO\VLVPD\EHPRUHRIDQµDUWRUVNLOO¶UDWKHUWKDQD µULJLGSURFHGXUH¶, there are still 
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criteria by which we can assess the validity of conclusions.396 The post-positivist 
perspective is that we must be careful about the breadth of our conclusions and that 
discourse analysis is thickly descriptive, uses small samples, and involves discovering 
as many possible explanations as possible. The objective Archimedean position is not 
available and as such, the findings of discourse analysis are by their very nature 
partial and provisional. This is not a deficiency of the approach, but rather the 
recognition is an advance over positivist approaches which elide their own partiality 
to claim objectivity. This reflexivity leads to a need to explicitly consider the effects 
of subjectivity upon any substantive findings. Various writers suggest a number of 
criteria for the evaluation of work within this paradigm, which are adopted here: 
 
 A valid analysis is an analysis that explains social phenomena in a way that 
any serious investigation into the same social phenomena will have to take 
seriously into account.397 In a similar vein, Howarth argues that some 
discursive analysis accounts will simply be more persuasive that other 
accounts.398 Johnstone argues that there must be a search for a convincing 
argument (or plausible narrativeUDWKHUWKDQDILQDODXWKRULWDWLYHµ7UXWK¶.399 
3LHUFHZULWHVDERXWWKHQHFHVVLW\RIDSSHDOWRDµFULWLFDOFRPPXQLW\¶ZKHQ
operating from anti-foundationalist assumptions.400  
 Discourse analysis is systematic, to the extent that multiple interpretations are 
produced from textual material, before a single one is argued for.401  
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 The theoretical tools used in analysis must not prejudge, a priori, what is to be 
found in the analysis.402  
 7KHDQDO\VWPXVWFRQGXFWKLVKHUDQDO\VLVLQµJRRGIDLWK¶.403 As a result the 
onus is on the researcher to make his/her interpretation and analysis as explicit 
as possible in the development of the argument.404  
 If there is convergence and coherence between various elements of the 
analysis. 
 Source material is retained; texts and other sources of discursive material are 
available for alternative interpretations.405 This is most important if the 
research draws on interviews or data produced by the researcher during the 
research. If the textual material is publicly available, then this need not be 
retained by the researcher, but material drawn upon must be made clear. 
Different researchers bring different perspectives to bear upon the material, 
and disagreement is inevitable. If however, the interpretation presented is 
considered plausible, this enhances the validity of the research.  
 
Additionally, the limitation of knowledge claims, and the partial and provisional 
nature of knowledge claims that can be produced by discourse analysis place limits 
upon how far one can generalise from any findings to other external cases. Given that 
discourse analysis is interpretative, it can make knowledge claims only about the 
discourses that it has analysed. To this end this research speaks to particular 
discourses of surveillance with the politically and geographically delineated 
environment of the United Kingdom in the early 21st century. Whilst it could be 
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argued that discourses of surveillance display great similarity between the United 
Kingdom and similar English-speaking, neo-liberal countries (specifically the United 
States, Canada and Australia), and that some conclusions of this research could hold 
true in those countries or even further beyond, it would require additional empirical 
research into existing discourses in those countries to verify this. At this stage it 
remains in the realm of conjecture or a direction for further research. Nor does this 
research make claims about all discourses of surveillance, but only about those 
discourses featured in the empirical material, with the qualifier that these areas have 
been selected on the basis of the strongest theories of surveillance available. 
 
µRearticulatHG¶UHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQV 
 
This section takes the research questions extracted from surveillance research and 
governmentality and expands the research questions with insights from discourse 
theory. This therefore performs an operationalisation of the concepts and questions 
into a form that can guide empirical textual analysis. 
 
What discourses of surveillance are identifiable in the contemporary United 
Kingdom? 
 
The discourses of surveillance in the UK are understood as discursive regularities, as 
differential relationships between objects. There will not be one totalised discourse of 
surveillance, but multiple discourses with surveillance as their object. Discourse of 
surveillance is an analytic strategy rather than an ontological category. These 
discourses can be distinguished by regularities in the way they arrange and constitute 
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objects. There is no necessity to these discourses, and their development and 
separation will be the result of political contingency and decision. Discourses with a 
surveillant dimension will be in antagonistic conflict with other discourses, and the 
contours of these conflicts will determine the shape of the surveillance discourse. 
There may be discourses that appear to be hegemonic, to the point they appear as 
objective social facts. However, these hegemonies will never be total, and will always 
be vulnerable to the rearticulation of their component elements by their constitutive 
outside.  
 
Discourses are not purely linguistic, and included practices as well as language. 
However, fruitful research can be conducted on the basis of the traces left by 
discourses in texts. This research question involves a mapping exercise, the contours 
of differing discourses explored with reference to particular chains of equivalence and 
nodal points. Attention should be paid to how the discursive field is structured. The 
concepts of nodal points, floating signifiers, and chains of signification are important 
for this. What are the regularities across discourses? How do discourses cohere or 
conflict? What are the tensions and dissonances within discourses? Do discourses of 
surveillance simplify or increase the complexity of the social space? The mapping of 
discourses of surveillance in the UK starts from a number of points of reference with 
the intention of deconstructing these and searching for regularities and dissonances 
across discourses. 
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What rationalities are at play in these discourses of surveillance? 
 
Rationalities and logics map onto a number of concepts in discourse theory. They can 
be associated with the way concepts, identities and objects are articulated. Logics can 
be derived from the chains of signification formed by discourses. It is in relation to 
rationalities and logics of discourses of surveillance that the discourse theory logics of 
difference and equivalence become relevant. Rationalities and logics are also signified 
closely by the way that particular objects, concepts and identities are evaluated, 
privileged or occluded, problematised or normalised, included or excluded.  
 
What roles or subject positions are made available by discourses of surveillance? 
 
Subject positions are explicitly conceptualised in discourse theory, drawing upon the 
post-structuralist understanding of the non-essential subject as constituted through 
multiple competing discourses.406 Subject positions will therefore be multiple. 
Discourses provide a number of subject positions, which act as constraints on the 
available identities. These subject positions may be incompatible with each other, and 
social antagonisms play important roles in the constitution and limits of particular 
identities. The formation of social identities involves the suppression of alternatives. 
Subject positions are relational and attention should therefore be paid to the ways that 
subject positions are linked or contrasted through relations of equivalence or 
difference. Textually, attention should be paid to the representation of social actors, 
the ways that different subject positions are privileged, negatively evaluated or 
occluded. How are identities positioned in relation to each other? Which subject 
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SRVLWLRQVDUHFDSDEOHRIFRH[LVWLQJDQGZKLFKDUHDQWDJRQLVWLFQHJDWLQJWKHRWKHU¶V
identity? Are identities understood in terms of groups or individually? Some subject 
positions will be the constitutive outsides of various discourse ± how are these 
excluded identities constituted ± are they positioned as enemies or adversaries?  
 
With regard to surveillance, the asymmetries of power associated with many 
surveillance practices suggest that ascribed identities can be particularly powerful. 
Many surveillance practices appear to involve the ascription of identity as part of their 
enunciative element. For example, a biometric access system differentiates between 
included member and unknown stranger denied access. In this manner, technologies 
as well as linguistic practices can produce subject positions. These subject positions 
are never total however, and these gaps allow for resistance to the identity ascription 
of surveillance practices. Discourse theory draws attention to the political dimension 
of the production of subject positions, regarding identity as the effects of a political 
act, and therefore as an inherently ethical (or unethical) act. 
 
How is the idea of individual identity articulated within contemporary discourses of 
surveillance? 
 
As well as playing an ontological role as subject positions, identity must also be 
understood as an element that discourses will attempt to articulate as a moment in 
chains of signification with other moments.  
 
It is possible, but not necessary, that identity may serve the function of an empty 
signifier in some discourses of surveillance. The discourse of the Enlightenment 
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articulates identity differently to the discourse of post-structuralism. The articulation 
of identity in discourses of surveillance is likely to be different to both of these. It is 
the specificity of this articulation in actually existing political discourse which is of 
most interest in this thesis. Identity may be a floating signifier, an element over which 
no discourse has hegemony in a particular field, in which case the potential 
hegemonic articulations should be examined and analysed. Identity may also appear 
to be unquestioned or missing from a discourse but a particular understanding may 
have achieved partial fixation and hegemony, its meaning becoming sedimented and 
apparently objective. All attempts to ground identities are therefore to be understood 
as precarious and political attempts to naturalise or objectify politically constructed 
identities.407 Is there therefore an ideology of identity in attempts to articulate 
authoritative, essential forms of identity, which elide the contingent nature of social 
identities?  
 
How is the nature of the governmentality problem defined in these discourses? 
 
In addition to the operation of hegemonic articulations of governmental problems, the 
definition of the problem of governmentality can be also be associated with discourse 
WKHRU\¶VGLVORFDWLRQVRIWKHVRFLDO'LVORFDWLRQVFDQDULVHIURPVRXUFHVZKLFKFDQDOVR
be considered as problems of governance. If governmentality pre-problem is 
understood as a hegemonic discourse within government (broadly conceived) then 
dislocation can arise from problems of government understood as counter-hegemonic 
articulations, which must be discursively constructed as problems and responded to.408 
Governmentality also requires the constitution of specific types of subjectivities, 
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limiting the range of acceptable subject positions available in governmental 
discourses. For example, the failure or inability of a government to provide security in 
a territory problematises the hegemonic understanding of the role of governance, and 
requires a response to re-establish that hegemonic understanding. Problems of 
governance will be articulated in discourses, most likely in relation to particular logics 
and rationalities of discourses of surveillance. 
 
As we can see, discourse theory provides a number of theoretical concepts, categories 
and models which allow the refinement of the research questions produced by 
surveillance theory and the analytics of governance. This allows a finer definition of 
discourses and a closer level of analysis. Discourse theory highlights a number of 
features to which attention should be paid in empirical analysis. 
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Chapter Four: Representation of Surveillant Social Practices 
 
This chapter examines the five areas of discourse structured around the five reference 
points: ICO, government, opposition, financial, and media discourses. It examines the 
representation and evaluation of surveillance practices, including data protection 
principles, debates over national identity cards, and the phenomenon of identity theft. 
This chapter presents the first results of the analysis of the empirical textual material, 
providing answers to the first two research questions. This chapter also contextualises 
surveillance discourses enabling closer analysis of specific features in the following 
two chapters. This chapter maps the lines of conflict over surveillance practices in 
contemporary UK society.  
 
Referenced texts were not the only texts analysed, but they are representative and 
illustrative of the regularities, rationalities and logics of these discourses. Elements in 
bold are added for emphasis.  
 
ICO discourses 
 
7KHILHOGRIGLVFRXUVHVXUURXQGLQJWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFHUHSUHVHQWV
surveillant social practices in various ways. Surveillance practices can be harmful, in 
quantifiable or intangible ways. Surveillance has the potential to invade privacy. 
However, surveillant social practices are normalised and their contingency reduced; 
they can be mitigated, but not removed from social life. Surveillant social practices 
are normatively evaluated through the categories of necessity, appropriateness, 
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legitimacy and consent. Firstly, the potential harm of surveillant social practices: 
potentially highly damaging, but hard to objectively assess: 
 
Disclosure of even apparently innocuous personal information ± such as 
an address ± can be highly damaging in some circumstances, and in 
virtually all cases individuals experience distress when their privacy is 
breached without their consent.409 
 
Such individual harm can present itself in different ways. Sometimes it 
will be tangible and quantifiable, for example the loss of a job. At other 
times it will be less defined, for example damage to personal relationships 
and social standing arising from disclosure of financial circumstances. 
Sometimes harm might still be real even if it is intangible.410 
 
There is also harm which goes beyond the immediate impact on 
individuals. The harm arising from improper use of personal information 
may ± at least initially ± be imperceptible or inconsequential to 
individuals, but cumulative and substantial in its impact on society. 
This societal harm might for example arise through the development of a 
surveillance society. Societal harm can have multiple causes but improper 
use of personal information could be a significant factor in: 
 excessive intrusion into private life which is widely seen as 
unacceptable; 
 loss of personal autonomy or dignity; 
 arbitrary decision-making about individuals, or their 
stigmatisation or exclusion; 
 the growth of excessive organisational power; 
 a climate of fear, suspicion or lack of trust.411 
 
Judgements especially about seriousness are not always easy. Loss of 
privacy can qualify as a harm in its own right, but there are difficult 
issues of objectivity and subjectivity. Some individuals value their privacy 
more than others. Our approach will be as objective as possible.412 
 
 
 
An ICO leaflet demonstrates the confusion that can result from errors in information 
processing or records. In this leaflet Information held about you may be wrong a child 
KDVDVLJQRQKHUEDFNWKDWUHDGVµ,1'(%7¶ZKLOVWD\RXQJPDQEHDUVDVLJQ
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WKDWUHDGVµ0217+635(*1$17¶7KLVUHSUHVHQWVWKHIDLUO\REYLRXVFDVHVRI
incorrect data, which could be fairly easy to correct. ICO produced a number of short 
films with a similar message: 
 
 
Films featuring an old lady labelled as a pole dancer and a toddler in court 
for EHLQJLQGHEWZLOOZDUQVKRSSHUVLQVRPHRIWKH8.¶VELJJHVW
malls what could happen if they become a victim of mistaken identity 
because their personal information is stolen or inaccurately held.413 
 
 
 
Despite the potential harm of such practices, surveillance practices are represented as 
inevitable. Practices such as the sharing and aggregation of personal data will be 
conducted by organisations. At best what might be possible is mitigation of the worst 
effects. ICO discourse does not construct a vision of the world in which it is possible 
to do away with or prevent these practices, likely a result of their legal responsibility 
and status.   
 
 
Today, like it or not, our personal information is held by many public and 
private organisations.414 
 
We will also seek to mitigate the negative effects of surveillance by 
promoting privacy friendly approaches, influencing stakeholders, 
developing relevant tools and increasing the confidence of individuals in 
exercising their data protection rights.415 
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Normative evaluation of surveillant social practices 
 
The discourse provides four main criteria for the normative evaluation of surveillant 
social practices; necessity, legitimacy, appropriateness and consent. These are derived 
from data protection principles enshrined in legislation. The use of surveillance must 
be justified. These principles are summarised as:  
 
 
The eight principles of good practice: anyone processing personal 
information must comply with eight enforceable principles of good 
information handling practice. The data must be: 
 fairly and lawfully processed; 
 processed for limited purposes; 
 adequate, relevant and not excessive; 
 accurate and up to date; 
 not kept longer than necessary; 
 SURFHVVHGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VULJKWV 
 secure; 
 not transferred to countries outside the European Economic Area, 
unless there is adequate protection.416 
 
 
 
Necessity 
 
In this discourse deeming a practice unnecessary is a strong negative evaluation. 
Necessity is an empty signifier; with a range of meaning so broad it has the potential 
to be universal.417 It is left unfilled in this discourse, open to a wide range of strategies 
of filling based RQµREMHFWLYHV¶DQGDLPV 
 
 
You must not share information if it is not necessary to do so. It is good 
practice to periodically review the information sharing and to check that 
                                               
416
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all the information being shared is necessary to achieving your 
objective. Any unnecessary sharing of information should cease.418 
 
Personal information shall not be kept for longer than is necessary.419 
 
The measures in the Bill go well beyond establishing a secure, reliable 
and trustworthy ID card. The measures in relation to the National Identity 
Register and data trail of identity checks on individuals risk an 
unnecessary and GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHLQWUXVLRQLQWRLQGLYLGXDOV¶SULYDF\
They are not easily reconciled with fundamental data protection 
safeguards such as fair processing and deleting unnecessary personal 
information.420 
 
 
 
Appropriateness 
 
Closely linked to necessity is the evaluation of how appropriate (or not) a surveillance 
technology or practice is. This is again linked to the functional aims of the 
surveillance practice, making the argument that a technology must be appropriate to 
WKHVWDWHGSXUSRVHVWRZKLFKLWLVSXW7KLVLVH[HPSOLILHGLQ,&2¶V&&79GDWD
protection guidance.421 This document asks what problems CCTV is meant to address 
and if other non-privacy-invasive technologies might not achieve the same objectives. 
A surveillant, privacy-invading practice or technology is inappropriate if not installed 
for specific purposes, if the technology is not an effective way to meet those purposes, 
or if a less privacy-invasive approach could be used instead to the same efficacy. 
Similarly to the contents of necessity, the purposes of surveillance are not detailed. A 
particular purpose must be held in mind (presumably by the installer and future 
RSHUDWRUGHILQHGDVWKHµGDWDFRQWUROOHU¶LQGDWDSURWHFWLRQGLVFRXUVH,&2GLVFRXUVH
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SULRULWLVHVµIDLUSURFHVVLQJ¶RISHUVRQDOGDWDDQGFROOHFWLRQUDWKHUWKDQDXQLYHUVDO
diminution in the collection of personal data.   
 
Legitimacy 
 
A distinction is drawn between actors who can legitimately access personal 
data, or perform surveillant social practices, and those who cannot. This 
distinction is largely made on the basis of formal legality rather than normative 
underpinning. Legitimate surveillance actors include banks, credit reference 
agenciHVDQGILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVµRUJDQLVDWLRQVZHGHDOZLWKLQRXUGDLO\OLYHV¶
utility and telecommunications companies, transport operators, schools, 
hospitals, internet service providers, local councils and public services. 
Illegitimate surveillance actors LQFOXGHFULPLQDOVµEODJJHUV¶VRPHSULYDWH
detectives, pHUVRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQµPLGGOHPHQ¶DQG identity thieves as well as 
otherwise legitimate actors failing their obligations. Some methods are 
evaluated as illegitimate simply because of the actors which make use of them. 
 
 
However laudable the aim, we need to make sure that increasing access to 
government held information for those with a legitimate need to know 
does not also open the door to those who seek to buy, beguile or barter 
their way to information that is rightly denied to them in law.422 
 
Criminals can use a number of methods to find out your personal 
information and will then use it to open bank accounts, take out credit 
cards and apply for state benefits in your name.423 
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Consent 
 
The concept of consent is highly evaluated in this discourse. Surveillance practices 
are evaluated as acceptable and legitimate if they are conducted overtly rather than 
covertly, and if the subject of surveillance is both aware of the surveillance and 
consents to its occurrence. Consenting to surveillance, and the valorisation of choice 
override privacy (privacy rights are not absolute or inalienable) and limitations on 
personal data collection. Therefore, the guidance from ICO to surveillance actors 
consists of exhortations to inform the subjects of surveillance to the fact that they are 
under surveillance, and the extent and nature of that surveillance.  
 
 
You must let people know that they are in an area where CCTV 
surveillance is being carried out. The most effective way of doing this is 
by using prominently placed signs.424 
 
For example, if a supermarket wanted to record information about 
LQGLYLGXDOFXVWRPHUV¶SXUFKDVHV using RFID tags on products, they would 
have to tell their customers why they were doing so.425 
 
 
 
The second stage of validation of surveillance occurs with the granting of consent to 
surveillance on the part of the informed subject. This is constructed as an active, 
agentic choice on the part of the surveillance subject.  
 
 
If organisations want to share sensitive or confidential information, they 
are more likely to need your consent. For example, if information about 
your health is to be shared.426 
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The High Court ruling confirmed that it was unlawful to sell copies of the 
electoral register to private businesses without giving people a choice not 
to have their information used in this way.427 
 
Individuals may divulge such information to others, but unless the law 
compels them to do so the choice is theirs.428 
  
 
Given that consensual surveillance practices are often linked to access (for example to 
services or to credit), this construction of consent becomes problematic. If a service is 
a necessity, and consenting to surveillance is made as a requirement for that service, 
to what extent can this be authentic consent? The discourse does engage with this 
concern. 
 
 
If you are asked to consent to information sharing, you should have a 
genuine free choice. &RQVHQWVKRXOGQ¶WEHXVHGDVWKHEDVLVIRUVKDULQJ
information if, in reality, you have little or no choice.429 
 
 
 
However, to the extent that massive scale dataveillance is endemic to contemporary 
society, and crosses national jurisdictional boundaries, the extent of this choice is 
OLPLWHG7KH,&2ZHEVLWHVWDWHVµWKHUHLVQRULJKWWRFUHGLW¶VXJJHVWLQJWKDWLI\RXwant 
or need access to credit, you will have to disclose the personal information requested 
E\WKHEDQNVHYHQLI\RXZRXOGQRWQRUPDOO\µFRQVHQW¶WRGRVR 
 
If surveillance practices are necessary, appropriate and legitimate, and consent has 
been obtained, then the practices should receive public approval. 
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This should engender the trust of the public and ensure that they 
understand, and participate in, your information sharing initiatives.430 
 
If businesses take up the challenge of presenting shorter and clearer 
information, it will mean a better understanding for individuals and 
less bureaucracy for organisations ± a win-win situation.431 
 
 
Government discourses of surveillance. 
 
Identity cards 
 
 
The National Identity Scheme is an easy-to-use and extremely secure 
system of personal identification for adults living in the UK.432  
 
 
 
Governmental discourse articulates the identity scheme in a number of positively 
evaluated ways. Many of these are counter-articulations responding to oppositional 
discourses in public debates over identity cards. The discourse here is reactive and 
shifting. Shifts in the discursive prominence of various aspects of the scheme over the 
past five years, include the motivations of the scheme and its benefits for society and 
individuals.433 This section examines the representation of the functioning of the 
scheme, its benefits and projected motivations, and finally the relationship between 
the card scheme and surveillance, civil liberties and privacy.  
 
Identity cards are not represented in government discourse as surveillance. This is 
unsurprising given the negative connotations of the term surveillance in common 
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use.434 It occurs in counter-articulations attempting to deny opposing constructions of 
the ID card scheme as a surveillance tool. Surveillance is generally associated with 
the discursive trope of Big Brother drawn from the Orwellian model of surveillance. 
If ID is not Big Brother, then it cannot be surveillance. 
  
 
7KH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSODQVIRUDQDWLRQDOFRPSXOVRU\,'FDUGVVFKHPHZLOO
create a practical, simple and secure way for ordinary citizens to protect 
and prove their identity ± not a Big Brother-style surveillance tool, the 
Home Secretary, David Blunkett promised today.435 
 
Suggestions of Big Brother-style surveillance are ludicrous. For the 85 
per cent of UK households who hold at least one store loyalty card, a far 
greater and growing database of personal information will already be held 
by private industry.436 
 
 
 
The identity card system is articulated as fundamentally secure, robust and reliable. It 
is presented as a distinct improvement on the security of previous (document-based) 
LGHQWLW\V\VWHPV,WPDNHVXVHRIPRGHUQµFXWWLQJHGJH¶WHFKQRORJ\ 
 
 
The ID card will be the most secure and reliable form of verifiable 
identification issued by the Government. It will be designed to be 
verifiable in a way that is not possible with current forms of ID such as 
passports and driving licences.437 
 
The National Identity Scheme is designed to be far more secure than 
anything we use at present.438 
 
The link between secure biometric cards and the new secure register will 
bring a new level of protection against forgery of ID cards and other 
identity documents.439 
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Identity cards are represented as beneficial for the individual user. It is a tool for the 
individual to use when he or she wishes to voluntarily prove his or her identity. It 
allows this to happen quickly, easily and with the minimum of fuss or embarrassment. 
The most frequently articulated benefit is the protection and securitisation of identity.  
 
 
In summary, the scheme will simplify the process of proving your 
identity, making day-to-day transactions easier and safer. It will also 
make your identity more secure and help to reduce levels of identity 
fraud throughout society.440 
 
This technology brings many benefits, including increased protection 
against identity theft or fraud.441 
 
A secure national identity cards scheme would SURWHFWHYHU\RQH¶V
identity and help prepare the UK for the challenges of the 21st century. 
Across the world there is a drive to increase the security of identity 
documents, to safeguard borders and reduce threats from overseas. The 
plans set out today will ensure the UK is at the forefront of that drive and 
making the most of the benefits for our citizens.442 
 
ID cards will also help transform the delivery of public services to the 
citizen, making interactions swifter, more reliable and more secure and 
helping to reduce costs by eliminating wasteful duplication of effort.443 
 
The National Identity Scheme will place a publicly accountable power to 
protect identity in the hands of citizens - an essential defence against 
challenges created by revolutions in technology, travel and society, Home 
Office minister Liam Byrne told a Chatham House conference today.444 
 
 
 
The system is articulated as necessary. This arises from a number of sources. Firstly, 
the vulnerability of identity, explored in detail in Chapter Six. Secondly, the need to 
introduce an identity card system arising from international obligations on passport 
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standards. The government argues that given the requirements of these obligations, 
the majority of the identity card scheme would already be required. The identity card 
is therefore articulated as taking advantage of otherwise wasted infrastructure. This 
articulation elides governmental agency in introducing the scheme, and normalises the 
scheme by drawing a relationship of equivalence with other national identity cards. 
These obligations are constructed as mandatory and unavoidable. Additionally, there 
is a strong discourse of international competition in the following extracts, where the 
8.JRYHUQPHQWFDQQRWDOORZWKH8.WRIDOOEHKLQGDQGLVVXHµVHFRQGFODVV¶
passports.  
 
 
The EU has mandated biometric passports, incorporating the recording 
of fingerprints as a Schengen building measure. The costs of recording 
biometric information and issuing more secure identity documents (in the 
form of biometric passports) will become unavoidable.445 
 
Biometric technology is increasingly being used to all over the world to 
combat fraud. The first biometric ePassport, containing a facial biometric, 
will be introduced here from early 2006. The Government does not want 
British citizens to have ´second class´ passports and we will be moving 
towards fingerprint as well as facial image data in passports in the future 
to keep in step with our European partners.446 
 
The drive towards secure identity is, of course, happening all over the 
world.447 
 
Not only are the benefits we have listed above economically tangible, but 
it is also important to realise that much of the cost of what we are doing 
would be incurred regardless of the Scheme. Specifically, biometric 
passports will soon be required in almost all of the largest passport-
issuing countries. Around 70 per cent of the cost of the combined passport 
and ID card will be required to keep our passports up to international 
standards.448 
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Additional sources of necessity are the µFKDOOHQJHVRIWKHWZHQW\-ILUVWFHQWXU\¶
including globalisation, migration, organised crime and terrorism. These are presented 
as environmental problems, which the country, and individuals within it, are exposed 
to without the identification of any agent.  
 
 
Our plans to bring in a national ID card scheme lie at the heart of our 
work to ensure that the UK can meet the challenges of a changing 
world449 
 
The Government is acting now to prepare the UK for 21st century 
challenges such as crime, security, the speed and nature of 
communication and international travel, and the number of sophisticated 
and complex transactions that we as individuals need to do effectively and 
securely.450 
 
The scheme will ensure that the UK can meet the challenges of the 21st 
century, helping protect against terrorism, organised crime, identity theft, 
illegal immigration and illegal working.451 
 
 
 
Preventing terrorism was articulated as a motivation for the introduction of 
entitlement cards after 9/11. It rapidly diminished in discursive importance. Terrorism 
was repositioned as a social problem that identity cards could contribute towards 
solving.  
 
 
The National Identity Scheme will disrupt the use of false identities by 
terrorist organisations, for example in money laundering and organised 
crime. We know that terrorist suspects make use of false identities. The 
scheme would also be a useful tool in helping to maintain and disrupt the 
activities of terrorist networks.452   
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No-one has ever claimed ID cards are a panacea for global terrorism 
or crime. But we do know they will make a contribution to tackling 
crimes such as illegal working, money laundering and benefit fraud, 
which are enabled by the possession of multiple identities. Terrorists are 
known to use multiple identities to avoid detection and hide their 
activities. ID cards will make it much harder for criminals to build up 
multiple fraudulent identities by securely linking one person's identity 
with one set of unique biometrics.453 
 
 
 
Stalder and Lyon argue that in security climates influenced by 9/11 identity 
cards are frequently presented as part of (necessary) binary trade offs between 
civil liberties and national security.454 However, in UK government discourse 
civil liberties and national security are not presented as mutually exclusive and 
in opposition, but instead rearticulated as mutually supporting. Civil liberties are 
equated with the protection of personal identities and access to public services. 
These are constructed as threatened by subject positions external to society. The 
state and government play an enabling role in protecting civil liberties and 
freedom. 
 
 
At the heart of the scheme, a secure national database linking basic 
personal details to unique biometric information will strengthen, not 
erode, civil liberties by protecting individual identities.455 
 
Liberties will be strengthened, not weakened, through an ID cards 
scheme which will help everyone protect their own identities and access 
the public services to which they are entitled.456 
 
We need to have the freedom to live without being exploited, to prove 
quickly and decisively who we are and to travel freely. And we need to 
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ensure the security of our country and make sure that our public services 
are only used by those who are entitled to them.457 
 
 
Similarly, the identity card scheme is constructed as protecting the privacy of 
individuals. Privacy is equated with security of personal information.  
 
 
The National Identity Scheme has been designed with your privacy in 
mind.458 
 
Safeguards to ensure protection of privacy are a critical part of the 
national identity cards scheme and I would not be prepared to let the 
scheme go forward if I were not convinced that we have a level of 
protection which ensures personal information is secure.459 
 
Critics of the national ID cards scheme who suggest that it would threaten 
our privacy should be reassured that under the proposed scheme only 
very basic personal details such as name, address, date and place of birth 
ZLOOEHKHOG«The extent of the information held will be strictly 
limited and subject to tight controls.460 
 
Those who are concerned about civil liberties should be reassured by the 
strict safeguards in the Bill to ensure protection of privacy.461 
 
 
 
Identity cards are articulated as having widespread public support both for the general 
principle of identity cards and the JRYHUQPHQW¶VVSHFLILFSURSRVDOV$QDQWDJRQLVPLV
created between the public and critics of the proposals. Special attention is given to 
the opinions of minority groups, articulated by some opposition to ID cards as in a 
vulnerable position vis-à-vis the proposals. The construction of support normalises 
and reinforces the arguments. 
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The Government also carried out an extensive programme of research into 
public attitudes towards identity cards. This showed an overall level of 
support at 79% (with 13% opposed and 8% unsure).462 
 
Mr Blunkett used a speech to the Institute of Public Policy Research to 
restate the case in favour of a secure national ID cards scheme, which 
four out of five citizens support.463 
 
A sample taken from four ethnic minority groups was also asked about 
their overall support for the scheme. There was a clear majority in 
favour in all groups ± especially with Chinese respondents (84 per cent). 
Support for ID cards had increased among all four groups since 
2003.464 
 
 
 
Related to this construction of public support is the argument made that the 
introduction of national identity cards would contribute towards a shared sense 
of national identity.  
 
 
Our national ID card scheme will also help to develop a sense of 
identity and entitlement among those who have settled legally in this 
country.465 
 
Ceremonies and classes for those taking British nationality together with 
support and empowerment for local communities and the introduction of 
our ID card scheme will help to reinforce a sense of citizenship and 
identity.466 
 
 
 
This equivalence between an entry on a national identity register with an identity card 
DQGDVHQVHRIµ%ULWLVKQHVV¶ZDVDUWLFXODWHGE\'DYLG%OXQNHWWLQ,WKDVVLQFH
dropped away, replaced in 2007 E\DQRWLRQRIWKHLGHQWLW\V\VWHPDVDµVWcentury 
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SXEOLFJRRG¶/LDP%\UQHGUDZVHTXLYDOHQFHEHWZHHQWKHLGHQWLW\V\VWHP and public 
infrastructure.  
 
 
The scheme is a 21st century public good.467 
 
Like the railways in the 19th century and the national grid in the 20th 
century, I think there are strong arguments for thinking of the National 
Identity System as a modern day public good - that very quickly 
becomes part and parcel of everyday life in Britain.468 
 
 
 
This normalises a scheme that could be articulated as highly novel. A distinction is 
drawn between the national identity FDUGVFKHPHDQGµODLVVH]IDLUHLGHQWLW\¶,IWKH
gRYHUQPHQWGRHVQRWDFWLWULVNVDµSUROLIHUDWLRQRISODVWLFSDVVZRUGVDQG3,1V¶,Q
contrast to this, the identity card is constructed as regulated, safe and reliable. This is 
contextualised against an image of the historical role of the Labour party and 
constructs opposition to the identity card scheme as support for unaccountable power 
and inequality.  
 
 
The great risk of laissez-faire identity systems is the risk that they could 
exclude people deliberately ± or price them out of secure access to 
things.469 
 
But if we persist with this public and private laissez-faire, it is frankly 
easy to see how, before long in Britain, the day will come when we have a 
mish-mash of unregulated, potentially unsafe systems, mushrooming in 
growth and size in a way that is just uneconomic.470 
 
My party has always been suspicious of growth in unregulated and 
unaccountable power and the risk of new inequalities. That is why we 
                                               
467
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advocate a publicly accountable, national solution. Something that 
becomes, in time, another part of our critical national infrastructure.471 
 
 
 
Non-identity card surveillant social practices 
 
Given the disassociation of identity cards from surveillance practices, it is not 
surprising that surveillance is not heavily represented in this discourse. When 
surveillant social practices are found in government discourse, surveillance is 
associated simply with the police, visual surveillance and wire-taps rather than 
dataveillance. There is a significant distinction drawn between identity cards and 
practices explicitly defined as surveillance. Identity cards are contrasted with 
surveillant practices from the private sector. The argument is if we consent to these 
information gathering practices, therefore ZHVKRXOGFRQVHQWWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V,'
card scheme.  
 
 
The Home Secretary also drew a contrast between the basic information 
that would be held on individuals, backed by strict privacy safeguards and 
the far more detailed personal information people volunteer, often 
without realising it, through supermarket loyalty or credit cards.472 
 
Suggestions of Big Brother-style surveillance are ludicrous. For the 85 per 
cent of UK households who hold at least one store loyalty card, a far 
greater and growing database of personal information will already be 
held by private industry.473 
 
If you do hold a store loyalty card ± and the odds are that you do ± you 
have already consented to all this information being repeatedly shared 
with other companies without any requirement to ask again for your 
approval.474 
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This articulation normalises the surveillant activities of the private sector and reduces 
the many differences between the state and the private sector. A relation of 
equivalence subverts the differences between the two terms. Similarly, the data 
gathering and analysis practices of private sector financial organisations are held up as 
good practice to be emulated, whilst private databases are seen as source of identity 
verification. This normalises the surveillant practice of the personal data gathering by 
financial organisations.  
 
 
This methodology is tried and tested by the private sector, where any 
organisation wishing to give credit relies on the ability of credit reference 
agencies to draw together information from different sources to 
DXWKHQWLFDWHDFXVWRPHU¶VLGHQWLW\DQGGHvelop a measure of their credit-
worthiness.475 
 
Supplementing existing systems with private sector-style checks against 
³ELRJUDSKLFDO´HYLGHQFHRILGHQWLW\IURPJRYHUQPHQWRUSULYDWH
sector databases (or both), making changes to the legal gateways for 
data-sharing where required. This would enable more identity fraudsters 
to be detected and would effectively offer a sophisticated way of risk 
profiling.476 
 
 
 
The only other surveillance practices positioned close to the identity card reference 
point come from the Home Office Strategic Plan. Here ID cards are articulated as 
HTXLYDOHQWWRRWKHUFRQWHPSRUDU\SROLFLQJµWRROV¶ 
 
 
We will give police officers the tools they need to do their job effectively 
and to combat modern criminals. This will mean harnessing the 
technology on offer through DNA, biometric ID cards, joined-up 
computer systems and satellite tracking of offenders.477 
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Identity theft 
 
Identity theft and identity fraud are constructed as highly dangerous, both to the 
individual and to society as a wholH,GHQWLW\WKHIWLVDµKDUURZLQJ¶H[SHULHQFH478 The 
discourse uses the image of a criminal assuming the identity of a dead child, tapping 
into a strand of visceral horror. Identity theft distorts the individual¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK
the world.479 
 
 
Criminals can use stolen personal details to open bank accounts, obtain 
credit cards, loans, state benefits and other documents in your name - and 
if your identity is stolen it can take a long time to put your records and 
your life straight.480  
 
Most distressing are ³'D\RIWKH-DFNDO´IUDXGVZKHUHDFULPLQDOassumes 
the identity of a dead infant. Parents may be contacted by the police to 
answer for crimes allegedly committed by someone who in fact died in 
infancy.481 
 
 
Moreover, the offences commonly used to prosecute identity fraud-related 
crimes do not sufficiently take into account the serious damage and 
harrowing experience of individual victims of identity theft. Such 
offences are often prosecuted as conspiracy under the Theft Act. This 
takes account only of the financial loss, not the personal injury 
involved.482 
 
 
 
Identity fraud is constructed as socially problematic. It is associated with criminals, 
terrorists, illegal immigrants and other socially undesirable actors. It is also 
constructed as costing the country large amounts of money and putting undue pressure 
on social welfare institutions. Identity fraud is perceived as a modern problem, one 
that is intrinsically difficult to measure, but is significant and is assumed to be 
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growing. The construction of this governance problem supports moves towards 
identity verification practices.  
 
 
Strong evidence that identity fraud is a growing problem comes from 
CIFAS « CIFAS figures showed an increase in identity fraud of 462% in 
2000 compared with the previous year, followed by a further increase of 
122% in 2001, although some of the increase in 2000 is accounted for by 
changes in their systems/growth in membership.483 
 
More than 100,000 people are affected by this crime every year in the 
UK. It occurs when personal information is obtained by someone else 
without the owner's knowledge. It may support criminal activity 
including fraud, deception, or obtaining benefits and services in the 
victim's name.484 
 
7KH8.36KDVDOHDGUROHLQWKHILJKWRQLGHQWLW\IUDXGRQHRI%ULWDLQ¶s 
fastest growing crimes. Identity crime costs the UK £1.3 billion a year, 
facilitates other crimes such as terrorism, illegal immigration and 
organised crime, and creates personal misery as well as major expense 
and inconvenience. It can take some victims up to 300 hours to put their 
records and their lives straight.485 
 
For the state, theft and fabrication of identity is linked to organised 
crime in a variety of ways.486 
 
Identity theft is difficult to measure, because there is no set offence of 
identity fraud (until the 2006 act) and so it is not measured. It is also 
difficult to separate from other types of fraud, and it can be perpetrated in 
a number of ways.487 
 
It is not easy to gauge the extent and nature of identity fraud: 
SURSHUPHDVXUHPHQWZRXOGQHHGto take account both of obtaining 
genuine documentation under false pretences and of theft and 
counterfeiting; 
ZKDWLVPHDVXUHGLVonly detected identity fraud.488 
 
Detected fraudulent applications for passports or driving licences form an 
unknown percentage of the totality of fraudulent applications.489 
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In many cases the costs and benefits associated with tackling identity 
fraud, though large, are unquantifiable ± for example, the cost of a 
passport in the hands of a terrorist, the cost of a paedophile continuing to 
work with children or the cost of an election result won on the basis of 
IUDXGXOHQW³SHUVRQDWHG´YRWHUV490 
 
 
 
The combination of the uncertainty with regard to the scale of identity fraud, with 
assertions that whilst not completely known, that scale is large, and the negative 
effects of identity fraud constructs a significant social problematic. Given that the 
exact level of risk is unknown, following a precautionary principle, action must be 
taken against the highest possible levels of risk. This discourse deals primarily with 
appropriate reactions to this growth rather than any assessment of the reasons for this 
JURZWKEH\RQGLGHQWLW\WKHIWEHLQJDPRGHUQSUREOHPRUDµFKDOOHQJHRIWKHst 
FHQWXU\¶ 
 
 
Oppositional discourses of surveillance 
 
Representation of surveillant social practices 
 
Non-ID card surveillant practices are represented in the discourse of opposition to ID 
cards. Some texts construct identity cards as part of a broader range of phenomena. 
Britain is identified as the most highly surveilled nation in the world, with substantial 
CCTV coverage and a number of significant government projects with surveillance 
capacity. There is explicit concern that the country may be heading towards a 
µVXUYHLOODQFHVRFLHW\¶,GHQWLW\FDUGVDUHFRQWextualised against a background of 
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surveillance practices and are understood as inseparable from wider trends. 
Surveillance is predominantly pejoratively evaluated; there is very little positive 
surveillance.  
 
 
Britain is already the most highly surveilled nation on the planet.´491 
 
The Government knows we will be keeping an eye on their scheme. 
We will also investigate commercial FRPSDQLHV¶LQYROYHPHQWWKH\PD\
find that people ZRQ¶W do business with a firm busy helping the 
Government build a surveillance society.492 
 
7KHFUHDWLRQRIWKLVGHWDLOHGGDWDWUDLORILQGLYLGXDOV¶DFWLYLWLHVLV
particularly worrying and cannot be viewed in isolation from other 
initiatives which serve to build a detailed picture of peoples lives such as 
CCTV surveillance (with automatic facial recognition), use of automatic 
number plate recognition recording vehicle movements for law 
enforcement and congestion charging and the recent proposals to 
introduce satellite tracking of vehicles for road use charging purposes. 
The Information Commissioner is concerned that each development puts 
LQSODFHDQRWKHUFRPSRQHQWLQWKHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHRIDµVXUYHLOODQFH
VRFLHW\¶.493 
 
%HDULQJLQPLQGWKHH[SDQGLQJGHILQLWLRQRIFULPHLVIDVWEHFRPLQJµZKDW
small PLQGHGSHWW\PLGGOHFODVVIRONGRQ
WOLNH¶Whe scope for an ID 
scheme seems limitless. It appears to tie in nicely with the huge 
number of CCTV cameras in this country (the most in Europe if not the 
planet) and anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs), dispersal orders and the 
other new powers given to police and courts to penalise people without 
HYHQWKHDOUHDG\GXELRXVµGXHSURFHVV¶RIWKHODZ494 
 
 
 
The vast majority of surveillant social phenomena represented in the discourse are 
state driven, and surveillance is predominantly understood as a government activity. 
There is however some acknowledgement of the surveillance activities of the private 
sector. These are not as negatively evaluated as the surveillance activities of 
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government which may be associated with the ability to consent, which is not possible 
with state systems. 
 
 
%LJ%XVLQHVV7KH\ORQJIRUDOOµFRQVXPHUV¶WREHORJJHGILOHGDQG
classed according to demographics and spending profiles. This is not a 
sinister motive. It merely increases their profits as they can more 
carefully and cost-effectively target their marketing.495 
 
Every day you choose who to share personal information with. You may 
give your supermarket limited information in return for cheaper shopping; 
but you have the right to prevent them from passing your information to 
anyonHHOVH8QGHUWKH,'FDUGVFKHPH\RXZRQ¶WKDYHDVD\DERXWZKR
has access to your details, or what details are stored. The range of 
information will grow, as will the list of those who can access it.496 
 
 
 
Representation of the ID card scheme 
 
In discourses of opposition to the national identity card and register, the scheme is 
represented as changing the nature of the relationship between the state and the 
individual, discriminatory and burdensome on vulnerable groups, unreliable and 
insecure due to the goYHUQPHQW¶VSRRU,7UHFRUG7KHV\VWHPLVDOVRUHSUHVHQWHGDV
invasive of privacy, unnecessary, disproportionate, out of the control of the 
individual, a waste of money, incomparable to ID systems in other countries, and 
unlikely to achieve any of the objectives set out for it by government, unwanted and 
unsupported by the general public, a distraction from other solutions to social 
problems, a tool of social control, and compulsory not voluntary. The discourse also 
deconstructs the separation of the card from the register, de-emphasising the physical 
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card, and highlights the agency and drive for the card provided by government. The 
representation of the ID card system allows an evaluative framework to be drawn out. 
 
The identity card scheme is frequently and consistently constructed as being invasive 
of privacy. Privacy is not constructed as an absolute but the identity system is 
constructed as an excessive invasion of privacy. 
 
 
The measures in relation to the National Identity Register and data trail of 
identity checks on individuals risk an unnecessary and 
GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHLQWUXVLRQLQWRLQGLYLGXDOV¶SULYDF\. They are not 
easily reconciled with fundamental data protection safeguards such as fair 
processing and deleting unnecessary personal information.497 
 
The bringing together of separate information centres as proposed, creates 
a major privacy vulnerability and has extremely profound implications 
for the protection of our right to privacy.498 
 
The Law Society agrees there should be an audit trail, but has reservations 
because this will provide ³DQHQRUPRXVDPRXQWRIYHU\SULYDF\
sensitive and valuable information DERXWDSHUVRQ¶VDFWLYLWLHV 
and their interaction with public services.499 
 
 
 
The identity system is constructed as not solving any of the problems the government 
argues it will. This works in three ways: universal scepticism (ID will not solve any 
problems), particular objections (ID will not solve problem X) and minor exceptions 
(ID card will only solve problem Y, but problem Y is trivial). Scepticism is directed at 
the validity of some of the stated motivations.  
 
 
ID cards seem unlikely to meet many of the aims for which they are 
being introduced.500 
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Equally, there is no evidence to suggest the claim that an identity scheme 
will address the problem of bHQHILWIUDXG7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VILJXUHVVKRZ
that around five per cent of fraud relates to identity. The vast majority 
of cases of benefit fraud involve lying about circumstances by, for 
example, claiming state benefit and working cash in hand.501 
 
Those of us charged with looking at whether the proposals are 
proportionate to the problems individuals and society face, find it 
impossible to come to such a judgement and are left with severe 
reservations about the other potential uses, many of which appear to be 
almost makeweights.502 
 
 
 
The government has stated that the identity scheme has high levels of public support. 
The opposition discourse attempts to deconstruct this claim and show that this level of 
support is substantially lower, or is falling in response to greater public knowledge 
about the costs and risks of the scheme. 
 
 
All polling data shows that the popularity of the scheme drops away when 
the costs are considered.503 
 
As the true details of the proposed identity card scheme and national 
identity register have become clearer, public support has fallen.504 
 
While polls do show a majority in favour, the commonly used figure of 
80% support was based on proposals for a voluntary identity card. Polls 
that factor in financial implications of the scheme show greatly 
diminished enthusiasm. Similarly, support falls when people realise the 
lack of evidence to support claims that identity cards will tackle terrorism, 
crime and illegal immigration.505 
 
 
 
ID is constructed as a significant waste of money and resources (including 
parliamentary time) EHWWHUVSHQWHOVHZKHUH7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQLWV
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specific model prevents assessment of alternative approaches that could be less 
expensive and less privacy-invasive. 
 
 
As well as being a tremendous waste of public money, the scheme will 
cost us personally, both financially and in terms of our privacy and 
relationship with the state.506 
 
We do not believe that the scheme has been accurately costed; this bill 
effectively presents DEODQNFKHTXHRIWD[SD\HUV¶PRQH\WRWKH+ome 
Office.507 
 
Why is the government intending to spend a minimum of 5.5 BILLION 
pounds on an ID card system, instead of using that money on schooling, 
housing or urgent infrastructure improvement?508 
 
We are not happy with the compulsory card and if you have got three 
billion to spend on this, I think we could find other ways of spending it: 
social services and housing.509 
 
The Government has not even tried to show that national ID management 
will be more cost-effective than less spectacular alternative, targeted, 
solutions to the same problems (whether tried and tested or novel). We are 
to trust to luck that it is.510 
 
 
 
The system is represented as a novel and untried system based on new and untried 
technology. Existing ID cards accepted in countries with similar politics are dissimilar 
and do not provide evidence for the appropriateness of this system. The lack of 
evidence undermines technological reliability.511 
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The card system envisioned by the Home Office in 2001 is substantially 
different in nature than anything that had been previously 
proposed.512 
 
The government is quick to point out that various governments in 
Europe have registration schemes in place, some of which date back to the 
fascist dictators of the twentieth century. However, the central database 
proposed by the UK Government is not comparable with similar 
systems operated by governments in Europe.513 
 
 
 
The identity card is de-emphasised compared to the NIR. The register is invasive of 
privacy and will create a record of daily lives. The government is represented as 
trying to deflect attention from the register.  
 
 
IW¶VWKHGDWDEDVHZKLFKLVWKHGDQJHUQRWWKHFDUG So try always to 
lead with the dangers of the National Identity Register, not the card itself. 
The dangers are having a file held on each citizen with ever increasing 
amounts of personal data being added and an increasing army of 
µDXWKRULVHGXVHUV¶KDYLQJDFFHVVWRVXFKGDWD.514 
 
The Identity Cards Bill is not just about the introduction of ID cards for 
individuals, it will establish a whole system of identity verification with 
the recording of information about individuals on a government controlled 
central register with a record being kept of when it is checked by both 
public and private sector organisations.515 
 
 
  
Banking and financial discourses 
 
There are four forms of surveillance represented in this discourse: the practice of 
identification by banks and providers of financial services, the compiling of credit 
records by the credit reference agencies, identity theft and the environment of the 
personal information economy. These will be addressed in turn. 
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Identification 
 
Identification is the term used in this discourse for an individual proving their identity, 
as a precursor to establishing a business relationship with a bank or financial 
institution. The discourse has strong levels of agreement on what this entails, often 
derived from legal statutes and guidance issues by industry regulators. The core 
concepts with identification are proof, identity and reasonable satisfaction. 
 
 
ID involves obtaining identity information from a customer and verifying 
that information, as necessary, in order to enable the firm to be reasonably 
satisfied, as required by the law, that the customer is who they claim to be 
(and to meet WKHILUP¶VRZQEXVLQHVVneeds).516 
 
 
 
Identification is constructed as a legal necessity due to anti-money laundering 
legislation. Banks and financial service providers have a legal obligation to perform 
identification so that they are reasonably satisfied as to the identity of their potential 
client.  
 
 
First, identification is and will remain a legal obligation and 
international standard. It has been an obligation on Member States since 
the first EU Directive was adopted in June 1991. It has been an obligation 
in UK law since 1 April 1994. It is part of the revised FATF 40 
Recommendations.517 
 
Please remember though, the law requires your financial services 
provider to verify your identity.518 
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Identification involves evidence and proof of identity. This articulates identity 
as something provable; this is explored in more detail in Chapter Six. 
Acceptable sources of identity proof are primarily documentary sources. These 
tokens are represented as readily available, and normally possessed by most 
people accessing financial services. These identity documents are understood as 
offering more reliable verification of an individual¶s identity than any statement 
provided by the individual. They allow organisations to know the person is who 
they say they are. The explicit hierarchy of acceptable documents is based on 
security, authority, accuracy and difficulty of fraudulently acquiring or forging 
such documents. Government issued documents incorporating a photograph ± 
such as passport or driving license - are at the top of this hierarchy. At the 
bottom are ad-hoc documents generated if more trusted documents are not 
available. Whilst there are distinctions between documents, it is fundamentally 
accepted that identity is something that can be proven, and that this proof can 
originate in documents. 
 
 
We need to check that you are who you say you are.519 
 
Evidence of identity can take a number of forms. In respect of individuals, 
much weight is placed on so-FDOOHGµLGHQWLW\GRFXPHQWV¶VXFKDV
passports and photocard driving licences, and these are often the easiest 
way of EHLQJUHDVRQDEO\VDWLVILHGDVWRVRPHRQH¶VLGHQWLW\,WLVKRZHYHU 
SRVVLEOHWREHUHDVRQDEO\VDWLVILHGDVWRDFXVWRPHU¶VLGHQWLW\EDVHGRQ 
other forms of confirmation, including, in appropriate circumstances, 
written or otherwise documented assurances from persons or organisations 
that have dealt with the customer for some time.520 
 
 
Documentation purporting to offer evidence of identity may emanate from 
a number of sources. These documents differ in their integrity, reliability 
and LQGHSHQGHQFH6RPHDUHLVVXHGDIWHUGXHGLOLJHQFHRQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V 
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identity has been undertaken; others are issued on request, without any 
such checks being carried out. There is a broad hierarchy of documents:  
 certain documents issued by government departments and 
agencies, or by a court; then 
 certain documents issued by other public sector bodies or local 
authorities; then 
 certain documents issued by regulated firms in the financial 
services sector; then 
 those issued by other firms subject to the ML Regulations, or to 
comparable legislation; then 
 those issued by other organisations.521 
 
 
 
However, documents are not unproblematic. There are varying levels of scepticism 
regarding the integrity of documentary proofs of identity. Scepticism increases down 
the hierarchy, but even documents issued by government departments attract 
questions.522 The use of utility bills attracts the most opposition as they are considered 
easy to forge or acquire under false identities.523 Documents are presented as 
threatened by fraudsters using false documentation, who undermine the use of 
documentation to prove identity. This scepticism even extends to questioning the 
practice of identification.  
 
 
The top three false or stolen documents used by fraudsters to attempt 
identity fraud in 2006 were utility bills, passports and bank statements.524 
 
As well as the use of fraudulently obtained card details, criminals will use 
fictitious identity documents in order to travel. Identifying such 
documents is key to fighting fraud. For further assistance on the 
identification of fictitious identity documents visit 
www.idfraudpreventiontraining.com.525 
 
One source of scepticism about the value of ID is the widely-expressed 
view that forgeries of official documents on which the ID regime depends, 
such as passports and driving licences, are readily available.526 
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An alternative to documentary proof of identity evaluated positively in this discourse 
is the practice of electronic identity verification, carried out online against a wide 
range of information sources and databases. This is constructed as quicker, easier, and 
cheaper; taking advantage of modern technology and available data to provide proof 
of identity that is more reliable, less easily forged, and therefore more authoritative 
than traditional documents. These checks can be made without the assistance of the 
individual whose identity is being verified and can assist with risk management 
practices.527  
 
 
Historically, ID has relied on the customer providing documents. In the 
case of personal customers, these are passports, driving and other licences, 
utility bills, letters from care home managers etc. This documentary 
approach will continue for some customers. However, the industry now 
PDNHVLQFUHDVLQJXVHRIµHOHFWURQLFYHULILFDWLRQ¶SDUWLFXODUO\ for UK-
based personal customers. This involves confirming identity - either alone 
or in conjunction with documentary methods - via a credit reference 
agency (CRA) (or one of the non-CRA service providers that are now also 
entering the market).528 
 
Electronic delivery does not in itself make verification more robust. But 
electronic verification can have significant advantages: 
IRUILUPVLWFDQEHDVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGZD\RIDFFHVVLQJVHYHUDO
corroborative sources (because CRAs draw on multiple data sources, 
iQFOXGLQJLQGLYLGXDOV¶FUHGLWKLVWRU\ 
FXVWRPHUVGRQRWQHHGWRSURYLGHGRFXPHQWVXQOHVVWKHILUPFRQVLGHUV
that further corroboration is required in the circumstances; 
UHFRUG-keeping is easier and cheaper; 
LQQRQ-face-to-face business it reduces the need for customers to send 
important personal documents by post, with risk of loss and 
inconvenience; 
LWFDQEHFKHDSHUWKDQREWDLQLQJSDSHUGRFXPHQWV 
LWFDQEHGHOLYHUHGLQWKHEURDGHUFRQWH[WRIRWKHUUHODWHGFKHFNVHJ
checks against terrorist sanctions lists or credit history checks).529 
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The identification services articulate perspectives on their own data surveillance 
activities. Whilst caution must be exercised as the following texts are addressed to 
potential clients rather than the general public, the aims and objectives are telling. 
These services make use of massive databases to authoritatively associate an 
individual with a financial identity and to provide a profile of an individual, allowing 
for detailed risk analysis. The services are articulated as a response to the problem of 
accurately and reliably identifying individuals.  
 
 
Equifax Identity Verification Solutions are designed to confirm the 
existence of an identity and confirm that the applicant owns the identity. 
Additionally the solution will highlight detrimental data relating to an 
identity by screening negative data sources such as deceased lists, 
forwarding address databases, sanctions lists and politically exposed 
peoples lists.530 
 
The Equifax database includes information on 45 million consumers and 4 
million businesses, derived from the most extensive range of public and 
closed user group data sources currently available. Our innovative and 
flexible products and services can meet a variety of industry needs. We 
host a range of powerful data sources that you can cross reference 
applicant supplied information against, a variety of delivery options.531 
 
Callcredit has been at the forefront of the initiative to establish electronic 
solutions as the most comprehensive and secure way of establishing 
identity.532 
 
 
 
Identification is constructed as aiding in the prevention of crime and terrorism. Anti-
money laundering measures are represented as essential to fighting terrorism by 
providing useful information to law enforcement. This message explicitly needs to be 
received by the general public if they are to accept identification.  
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Making sure that people are who they say they are is essential in the fight 
against crime and terrorism.533 
 
We need to get one important message across to the Consumer. By 
providing ID, they are helping in the fight against financial crime and 
terrorist finance. Nowadays, no one minds the inconvenience of security 
when boarding an aircraft, because they see the benefit to themselves and 
the other passengers of tight security. Being prepared to provide ID in 
financial transactions has the same benefit.534 
 
 
 
Current identification practices are equated with fighting terrorism. This hides 
other potential motivations for conducting identification, for example 
connection to a profit motive or to risk management. Additionally, by stating 
WKDWµQRERG\PLQGV¶WKLVSDUDJUDSKHOLGHVWKHFULWLFVZKRKDYHTXHVWLoned the 
scale, necessity or discriminatory effects of contemporary security regimes. This 
discourse uncritically accepts the link between security processes and individual 
safety. 
 
 
After all, society suffers from crime and terror and we are all part of 
society. We must all be prepared to provide valid ID, so that those who do 
not wish to do so can be more readily identified. After all, would you go 
on a plane if some of the passengers had refused to go through the metal 
detector but were still allowed to board the flight?535 
 
 
 
The assumption is that declining to provide identification is automatically a signal of 
criminality. This statement does not suggest why individuals providing ID makes 
identification of those who do not easier. It also attempts to create an equivalence 
between financial and airline security, drawing upon evocative imagery of airline 
hijacking, despite differential implications of security lapses.  
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Identification is constructed as potentially problematic, even with the banking and 
finance discourse because of costs and customer dissatisfaction.536 Despite these 
problems, identification is represented as generally accepted and understood by the 
public. This serves a normalising discursive function. Most people are constructed as 
being able to fulfil and comply with identification without any significant problem. A 
distinction between levels of support from young and old people reflects an 
assumption that all people will come to accept and understand identification in 
time.537 The problem is difficulty in provision not unwillingness to provide. 
 
 
,QWKHEDQNV¶SHUVSHFWLYHmost individuals now understand the need 
for firms to do ID, take ID for granted and FDQUHDGLO\VDWLVI\ILUPV¶
standard ID requirements. Instead, the banks see the issue as primarily 
about individuals who cannot produce the standard ID tokens.538 
 
 
 
The discourse constructs the need for the public to accept and understand 
identification more than at present. This is to be accomplished through the active 
communication to customers of the motivations behind identification and the 
necessity of conducting it. The discourse suggests that with understanding comes 
acceptance. The constructions of motivations and necessity are re-used and 
communicated in public-facing texts addressed to a mass audience. This 
communication process is understood as a continuing exercise.   
 
 
 
There also needs to be effective communication of the reasons for ID and 
what it normally involves. There has been some progress in recent years. 
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Increasingly, firms include material on the reasons for ID in their own 
application packs.539 
 
Provide for active education of customers in the reasons for ID and what 
may be expected of them. AML is for the benefit of consumers as citizens 
and as potential victims of identity theft or fraud.540 
 
 
 
Identification is a widespread, normalised process. The public-facing aspect of 
this discourse constructs identification as a normal, everyday process, 
undertaken by all manner of organisations; it is therefore non-political and 
unproblematic.  
 
 
ID is not just a financial sector practice - it is pervasive in modern society. 
For example, it is used to prevent fraud by mobile phone companies, 
video rental stores, and retail stores issuing store-cards. The drinks 
industry asks young customers for ID to check that they are not under-age. 
Under the Money Laundering Regulations 2003, a range of non-financial 
sectors (e.g. solicitors, accountants, casinos, estate agents) are now 
required to do ID.541 
 
 
 
Identification acts as a gatekeeper process, restricting access to financial 
services for those without the appropriate proof of identity. What counts as 
proof of identity is a limited range of accepted sources; however, even these are 
subject to some levels of doubt about their accuracy and reliability. The 
scepticism about current methods of checking identity, combined with a legal 
necessity to perform identity checks, drives a search for alternative mechanisms 
which currently present three options. Firstly, the strengthening of authoritative 
identity documents (including the introduction of a government identity card), 
secondly, greater reliance upon identity checking performed by other, trusted 
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institutions, and thirdly, greater use of database surveillance as identity 
verification. 
 
 
Credit ratings 
 
Credit ratings, the process of their production, and their mechanisms of disclosure are 
actively normalised in this discourse. Data is publicly available, and therefore can be 
freely drawn upon to support decision-making. Credit ratings are framed as relating to 
individuals as customers, reflecting a particular type of voluntary relationship with 
organisations. The existence of credit blacklists is explicitly denied. The possibility 
that organisational thresholds are likely to converge is unexplored. Profiles are 
articulated as authoritative, factual, complete and objective.  
 
 
Information held by a credit reference agency and displayed on a 
consumer credit report includes data available in the public domain such 
as Electoral Roll Information, Bankruptcies, Insolvencies and County 
Court Judgments. Most lenders also share some, or all of their customer 
data with credit reference agencies. A consumer credit report from a credit 
reference agency may also contain a consumer's present credit 
commitments and their credit history, plus any previous credit searches 
that have been conducted with the credit reference agency using your 
information.542 
 
A UK credit reference agency collates and stores financial and publicly 
available information about UK consumers. This information is then 
supplied by the credit reference agency to lenders and other relevant 
organisations to assist them in establishing an individual's identity, credit 
standing and ongoing credit commitments. The information provided by 
credit reference agencies helps lenders to make credit±granting decisions 
and prevent identity theft.543 
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Regular self-monitoring of an individual¶s credit report provided by the credit 
reference agencies is articulated as a key defence against identity theft. In this way, 
the individual is encouraged to maintain self-surveillance, and what could be 
understood as mechanism of financial surveillance is instead rearticulated as a tool for 
the individual. This tool comes with responsibility; if this monitoring fails, and the 
individual is a victim of identity theft, this is constructed as having serious and 
damaging repercussions for the credit rating of the individual, with implications for 
future financial dealings. 
 
 
Regularly checking your credit report is the best way to spot identity 
fraud early. Your credit report includes details of the electoral roll, court 
judgments, bankruptcies and your current and past credit commitments, as 
well as recent credit applications.544 
 
Identity fraud can significantly damage your credit history, and 
victims can have terrible trouble getting a mortgage, a credit card or a 
bank loan until the matter has been cleared up.545 
 
 
 
Refusal of credit is presented as a warning of identity theft. The critical distinction is 
between unexpected and expected refusal. Given that decision-making practices of 
financial institutions are opaque to the individual, the likely outcome of application 
for credit can only be inferred from what the individual perceives as their financial 
VWDWXV5HIXVDORIFUHGLWPD\VLJQLI\WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VLGHQWLW\LVOHVVFUHGLW-worthy than 
they estimated. 
 
 
The following are common signs that someone is using your identity: 
Your credit report includes entries you do not recognise 
You are unexpectedly refused credit.546 
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Identity theft  
 
Identity theft is the negatively evaluated surveillance activity in this discourse. 
Identity theft and identity fraud are consistently distinguished in a number of ways. 
Identity theft is narrowed to a limited range of actions and broken up into component 
SUDFWLFHVVXFKDVµDSSOLFDWLRQIUDXG¶DQGµDFFRXQWWDNH-RYHUIUDXG¶547 
 
 
In essence, identity theft is the assumption of the identity of another 
person, living or dead, irrespective of the motivation underlying this 
course of action. For example, taking on the identity of a dead person and 
living life as them, KDYLQJDEDQGRQHGRQH¶VRZQLGHQWLW\548 
 
 
 
Identity theft and identity fraud are parallel concepts. As activities are articulated as 
identity fraud, the concept of identity theft is emptied out. In extremisµLGHQWLW\WKHIW¶
becomes the illegitimate possession of the personal data of another. This raises 
questions about the organisations and individuals articulated as having legitimate 
possession. The distinguishing criterion is permission and consent on the part of the 
data subject, and the intent of the possessors of that data. Identity thieves acquire 
personal data to commit identity fraud; banks and credit reference agencies acquire 
personal data to assist decision-making or to protect the identity of individuals. 
 
 
Identity theft is when someone gets hold of your personal information 
without your permission. This can include your name, PRWKHU¶VPDLGHQ
name, date of birth, current and previous addresses, phone number, bank 
account details and credit card or debit card PIN. Identity fraud is when 
someone uses your identity to commit a crime, usually by getting goods 
or services fraudulently. This may involve using stolen or forged identity 
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documents, such as your driving licence, or just a few pieces of your 
personal information.549 
 
Most identity thieves not only steal your identity, but they also steal 
money from financial companies by impersonating their victims ± this is 
known as identity fraud.550 
 
By contrast, identity fraud is the transient or partial assumption of 
DQRWKHU¶V identity. This involves the fraudster retaining his own identity 
for most purposes but (mis)using the identity of another for some 
particular purpose.551 
 
 
 
Identity theft is represented as a hidden threat, the true extent of which is hidden from 
victims and unknown to society:  
 
 
When it strikes, the effects can be devastating. What's more, because it 
frequently involves no physical theft, identity theft may not be noticed 
by its victims until significant damage has been done ± often, several 
months and thousands of pounds later.552 
 
92 per cent of identity frauds are not reported to the police.553 
 
In relation to identity fraud, this view is echoed by the Home Office who 
DGPLWWKDWWKHUHLVµno comprehensive measure of the extent of identity 
fraud since different sources measure it in different ways.¶554 
 
 
 
Whilst the extent of identity theft may be problematic to measure, it is constructed as 
becoming more frequent. A wider range of people are vulnerable. This increase in 
frequency is associated with the construction of identity theft as conducted by 
organised crime, and as a response to increased security efforts in other areas.555 
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The spread of identity fraud means that all UK residents are more at 
risk than ever before.556 
 
YLFWLPVFRQWDFWHG([SHULDQ¶V9LFWLPVRI Fraud team for the first 
time in the second half of 2006. This represents a 69 per cent year-on-
year increase in identity fraud activity reported to Experian.557 
 
According to recent research, the number of crimes involving criminals 
XVLQJRWKHUSHRSOH¶V financial details doubled last year.558 
 
 
 
Identity theft and identity fraud are constructed as dangerous, increasing, and highly 
damaging to individuals. Identity theft is a driver for the wide range of security 
responses and strategies. These weigh most heavily upon the individual, advised to 
undertake a wide range of actions in order to protect themselves against the threat. 
Almost every text that articulates identity theft provides a range of strategies in 
response to the danger. There is remarkable level of consistency in this advice, 
constructing a hegemonic articulation within this field of discourse of what is 
appropriate conduct and behaviour with regard to personal information. ICO provide 
YHU\VLPLODUJXLGDQFHDQGµFRXQWHU-VXUYHLOODQFH¶WHFKQLTXHV 
 
 
10 ways to keep your personal information secure: 
 'RQ¶WOHW\RXUFDUGVRU\RXUFDUGdetails out of sight when making 
a transaction. 
 Do not keep your passwords, login details and PINs written down. 
 Destroy, preferably shred, any documents or receipts that contain 
personal financial information when you dispose of them. 
 Do not disclose PINs, login details or passwords in response to 
unsolicited emails claiming to be from your bank or police. 
 When entering your PIN in a shop or a cash machine use your 
spare hand to shield the number from prying eyes or hidden 
cameras.  
 Only divulge your card details in a telephone transaction when you 
have instigated the call and are familiar with the company. 
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 Make sure your computer has up-to-date anti-virus software and a 
firewall installed. 
 Use secure websites by ensuring that the security icon (locked 
padlock or unbroken key symbol) is showing at the bottom of your 
browser window.  
 Access internet banking or shopping sites by typing the address 
into your web browser. Never go to websites from a link an email 
then enter personal details.559 
 
If you have already received a copy of your credit report, look for: 
 Accounts in your name that you do not recognise; 
 Credit applications in your name that you have not made; 
 Previous searches made by companies that you have no knowledge 
of; 
 Linked addresses that you have had no connection with.560 
 
Be careful about giving out personal information. Whether on the 
phone, by mail, or on the internet, never give anyone your credit card 
number, or other personal information for a purpose you don't understand. 
Ask to use other types of identifiers when possible.561 
 
Pay attention to billing cycles. Contact creditors immediately if your 
bills arrive late. A missing bill could mean an identity thief has taken over 
your credit card account and changed your billing address.562 
 
Find out who has access to your information at work. Be sure to verify 
that records are kept in a secure location, and are accessible only to 
employees who have a legitimate reason to access it.563 
 
Don't advertise your personal information online - From social 
networks to blogs and forums, don't put details such as your email or 
home address online for anyone to see. Details of your employer, team 
you play in, colleges you attend, can also be misused by cyberstalkers and 
other online criminals, so keep control of all aspects of your personal data 
wherever possible.564 
 
 
 
This advice constructs an image of perpetual, environmental threat to personal 
information. Employers, tenants, flatmates, neighbours, the general public may all be 
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potential identity thieves.565 The individual is constructed as personally responsible 
for risk management, control of their personal details and self-surveillance as the 
individual is advised to carefully and regularly monitor themselves in order to guard 
against threats to their financial integrity. The discourse also provides explanations as 
to why individuals must adopt these precautionary strategies. These strategies are 
constructed as necessary in order to convince the relevant financial service provider 
that the individual is not liable for any financial losses. The individual may be liable 
for losses if they are deemed to have acted negligently. The definition of negligent is 
drawn from the extensive list of strategies to avoid identity theft. If the individual has 
not followed the appropriate conduct (they wrote down passwords, or did not report 
suspicions rapidly), then they have left themselves open to identity theft. The 
definition of negligent shifts as these strategies are put into the public domain. If these 
strategies are assumed to be common and necessary behaviour, normalised as part of 
everyday life, then deviation from them becomes more and more problematic for the 
individual. Regardless of personal perception of the risk of identity fraud, if one 
wishes not to be liable for losses to financial institutions, one has to adopt these 
strategies of identity management, devoting appropriate resources to buying a 
shredder, anti-virus and firewall software, learning how to use them, and frequent, 
regular self-monitoring through credit reports. 
 
It was clear that the fraudster had stolen the FDUGDQGWKH3,1IURP0U%¶V
post. Once the bank was satisfied that Mr B was not trying to commit 
fraud himself, it wrote off the loss.566 
 
Identity fraud can have serious consequences ± although you are rarely 
financially liable unless you have been negligent in taking care of your 
details, it can take a long time and a lot of effort to rectify the situation.567 
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Writing down computer passwords and PIN numbers, even in code, can 
be risky and might mean that if a crime did take place, you could be 
responsible for any money that was spent or withdrawn in your name.568 
 
In practice your card company will usually refund the full amount lost. 
But if you are found to have acted fraudulently or without reasonable 
care, for example, by keeping your PIN written down with your card, you 
would have to meet all the losses yourself.569 
 
 
 
This provision of response strategies is accompanied by an uncertainty as to how 
effectively these strategies have been communicated to the general public. Whilst 
VRPHWH[WVVXJJHVWWKDWµFRQVXPHUV¶DUHDZDUHRIWKHULVNVRILQIRUPDWLRQGLVFORVXUH
they also suggest that individuals are not adopting enough of these strategies and 
taking appropriate responsibility for the management of their personal information. 
This is highly negatively evaluated by the discourse of banking and finance. 
 
 
Consumers are more aware than ever of the risks of disposing of 
sensitive information and are increasingly shredding important 
documents.570 
 
Consumer awareness of identity fraud has never been higher and 
sensible organisations, wide awake to the reputation damage a breach 
could cause, have taken steps to maximise their data protection systems.571 
 
Because PDQ\RIXVGRQ¶WWDNHVLPSOHVWHSVWRSURWHFWRXUVHOYHV (by 
keeping our identities safe and by looking out for signs of fraud), identity 
fraud typically takes 15 months to discover.572 
 
APACS research shows that: 
 One in eight online shoppers have failed to log out when shopping 
online, leaving their financial details available to others 
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 One in four online shoppers do not check whether a website is safe 
and secure.573 
 
 Almost two-thirds (63 per cent) failed to ensure their dustbin was 
emptied and two-thirds (65 per cent) did not lock away key 
documents.574  
 
The public is continuing to dispose of their personal information 
irresponsibly, regardless of numerous reminders, potentially putting 
their identity at risk. At the start of National Identity Fraud Prevention 
:HHN([SHULDQWKH8.¶VODUJHVWFUHGLWUHIHUHQFHDJHQF\has issued a 
stark warning to consumers that they are not doing enough to protect 
themselves.575 
 
New research conducted by Fellowes for National Identity Fraud 
Prevention Week has shown that similar numbers of people are still 
carelessly throwing away information that has a high value to fraudsters. 
What is most alarming is that the numbers of households who are 
disposing of personal information in an unsafe manner have in many 
cases actually increased. For instance, the number of bins containing bank 
account numbers and sort codes has risen by a massive 20 per cent.576 
 
 
 
Inappropriate conduct prompts communication strategies by business, finance and 
government to educate consumers in appropriate conduct with regard to personal 
information and identity management. 
 
 
Experian works on a range of initiatives, through its long-running 
consumer education programme, to help consumers understand and look 
DIWHUWKHLUFUHGLWUHSRUWV([SHULDQ¶VFUHGLWUHSRUWPRQLWRULQJVHUYLFH
CreditExpert also does much to highlight the importance of regularly 
checking your credit report.577 
 
Banks have a significant amount of experience and some expertise in 
delivering education, information and advice to a vast range of 
consumers.578 
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"The starting point is to make people aware," says Ilube. "We want to 
help them understand why this information is there, what practical steps 
they can take, and provide an easy way to keep monitoring it.´579 
 
 
 
The personal information economy 
 
The discourse of banking and financial services makes use of a concept found in 
surveillance theory, the data double, to articulate the way that personal information 
flows through organisations and is aggregated together to compile detailed images of 
individuals.580 Most online and many offline activities contribute to this data image.581 
7KHµGLJLWDOSURILOH¶LVSUHVHQWHGDVQRQ-contingent; it is a fact of life that cannot be 
voluntarily discarded. Agency, other than that of the individual producing their data 
profile, is elided. The actors responsible for the storage, sharing and aggregation of 
data are hidden as are their motives for doing so. This data profile is never explicitly 
linked to the credit profile compiled by credit reference agencies from just such 
personal information, arguably one of the most significant elements of the data 
double. The individual is actively encouraged to take control of their digital 
representation, to make sure that it presents the best possible image of them in order 
to experience favourable treatment from organisations. The potential effects of this 
digital profiling are extended to all people and all areas of social and economic life. In 
this element of the discourse the individual is constructed as vulnerable subject of 
surveillance processes. Organisations exist that can provide services to assist the 
individual with the management of his or her data profile. DataPatrol advanced from 
web security company Garlick goes even further than simply financial image and 
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draws on concepts similar to the data double to bring an individual face to face with 
their digital reflection, showing them the amount of information available about them 
online, and advising them on how best to manage that information so as to present the 
best possible image. 
 
 
These days everyone has a digital profile. If you've ever paid a bill, 
shopped online or signed up for an internet service then your details will 
be stored somewhere online.582 
 
You might be amazed to learn how much of your information is kept at 
places like the department store where you bought your last sofa. Not to 
mention a whole host of marketing lists that catalogue your buying habits, 
income, education, and much much more.583 
   
Incredibly, outside parties can often access this information easily. 
Because of the growing concern and incidence of identity theft, recent 
legislation has stepped up efforts to protect consumer information from 
being viewed by outside sources. But for now, you are vulnerable to a 
wide range of prying eyes.584 
 
In recent years, there has been an explosion of ways to collect, store, share 
± even steal ± personal information about you. Your information has 
become big business, and it's available to many people and organisations. 
They can look at it when it's time to evaluate you for a credit card, a 
mortgage, a car loan or life insurance, and when you are applying to rent a 
house, a flat, or even getting a job!  
You can take control of your personal information by understanding 
how it is gathered and used. This helps ensure that your information is 
only used in lawful ways, is accurate, and reflects positively on you.585 
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News media discourses. 
 
Dominant media frames 
 
Representations of surveillant practices in the media discourses of surveillance are 
bifurcated between two evaluative schemas. These two schemas are associated with a 
discourse of appropriate surveillance, which draws upon discourses of crime, 
terrorism and national security, and a discourse of inappropriate surveillance which 
draws upon discourses of privacy, Big Brother, and personal liberty. Whilst these both 
draw upon shared discursive sources, the extent to which they do so varies. There is 
substantial consistency of representation across different surveillance technologies. 
 
Neuman et al argue that five key frames dominate news reporting; economic themes; 
divLVLRQVRISURWDJRQLVWVLQWRµWKHP¶DQGµXV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIFRQWUROE\SRZHUIXO
others; the human impact of issues; and the application of moral values.586 According 
to Negrine, several of these frames can be in use in the same representation.587 The 
model of frames can be translated into discourse theory terms through the use of 
hegemonic articulations. It is possible to identify the strong role these hegemonic 
articulations play in media discourses of surveillance. Accounts of surveillant social 
practices frequently invoke such frames. The choice of frame makes a significant 
difference to the way that a surveillant practice is negatively or positively evaluated. 
Whilst these frames can be articulated in support or condemnation of a surveillant 
practice, the way they are filled in with particular content is distinct. These 
regularities are explored below.  
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 Economic themes 
 
The economic cost of surveillance is a frequent trope in representations of 
surveillance, especially of high technology variants associated with high costs. In 
discourses supportive of surveillance, cost is interpreted as a sign of investment or 
attention to the problem the technology is constructed as solving. 
 
 
One of the reasons Liverpool has invested in its new security camera 
system is that the images of Child A and Child B in the Bulger case were 
so indistinct.588 
 
 
 
 However, in discourses that negatively evaluate surveillance, cost is problematised ± 
perhaps this money is being wasted, going to the wrong beneficiaries, could be better 
spent on other things or perhaps the cost is being carried by the wrong people. 
 
 
Far from costing individuals no more than the government's estimate of 
£110, the LSE study released yesterday put the minimum cost of an ID 
card at £170 and a medium estimate of £230.589 
 
 
 
A second way that surveillance issues are framed in terms of economics is the 
JURZLQJDZDUHQHVVRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDµVXUYHLOODQFHLQGXVWU\¶:KHUHSRVLWLYHO\
evaluated, this is a sign of success or growth. However it is more frequently 
associated with anti-capitalist discourses operating with similar structures to those 
focused on the arms trade. The industry is seen as being significant in size, 
international and expanding, with numerous actors involved.  
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One striking measure of the burgeoning of surveillance is the growth of 
the industry that provides it: in the three years to 2006 the top 100 US 
surveillance companies had doubled in value to $400bn. Surveillance is 
big business.590 
 
 
 
 'LYLVLRQVRISURWDJRQLVWVLQWRµWKHP¶DQGµXV¶ 
 
The diviVLRQVRISURWDJRQLVWVLQWRµWKHP¶DQGµXV¶LVLQGLVFRXUVHWKHRU\DORJLFRI
HTXLYDOHQFHOLQNLQJVLJQLILHUVµXV¶WKURXJKWKHDFWRIH[FOXVLRQRIQHJDWLYHO\YDOXHG
VLJQLILHUµWKHP¶ZKLFKVHUYHVWRSURYLGHDVKDUHGLGHQWLW\IRUWKHHTXLYDOHQFHV591 
This is common in accounts that focus upon the function of surveillance technology 
DQGSUDFWLFHVLQGHDOLQJZLWKFULPLQDOVWHUURULVWVRUWKRVHEHKDYLQJLQµDQWL-VRFLDO¶
ways. This frame incorporates the core point of antagonistic constitution of subject 
positions in these discourses. 
 
Where surveillance activity is positively evaluated, it is constructed in terms of efforts 
to provide safety and security. In this way the successes of surveillance practices are 
emphasised as in tracing of the movements of the 7th July London bombers, or the 
Soho pub bomber in 1999.592 Safety and security involve the prophylactic protection 
RIµXV¶IURPWKHWKUHDWFUHDWHGDQGUHSUHVHQWHGE\DKRVWLOHH[WHUQDOµWKHP¶ In this 
positive evaluation associated with security, surveillance as a signifier is strongly 
associated with the police and the intelligence services. This involves the watching of 
individuals by individuals also known as covert policing. Representations of this form 
include large scale operations by police in the context of organised crime or terror 
investigations. This is surveillance conducted against potential terrorists who are 
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constructed as actively resisting the surveillance and skilled in doing so.593 Positive 
representations of surveillance as safety and security support this construction by 
drawing upon accounts of the success of surveillance systems in reducing crime, or 
enabling criminal prosecutions. 
 
 
In council car parks in King's Lynn, thefts dropped from 207 in 1991 to 
none in 1994, post-CCTV. In Newcastle, the installation of a 16-camera 
system brought incidents of assault and wounding down by 20 per cent in 
three months. In Sutton, street crime was cut by almost 80 per cent upon 
introduction of CCTV. In Newcastle, there have been 800 arrests as a 
direct result of the city centre's 4-year-old CCTV scheme. And similar 
successes have been claimed for roadside cameras: though it is as yet 
unclear whether crimes are displaced elsewhere.594 
 
Since John Smith, then local MP and Labour leader, opened Airdrie's 
closed-circuit television system on 7 November 1992, the success stories 
have been legion. The original plan was to cut crime by 17 per cent and 
increase the detection rate by a similar amount. But police claim crime has 
plummeted by 74 per cent and the number of detections almost trebled.595 
 
 
 
The representation of surveillance as security limits the questions that can legitimately 
be asked about surveillance practices. Questions become limited to effectiveness of 
surveillance; does it go far enough in order to achieve the goals of crime prevention 
and security? However, a particular episode of surveillance can be rearticulated within 
a discourse more broadly supportive of surveillance, when that surveillance is not 
effective.  
 
Negative evaluations of surveillaQFHDOVRGUDZXSRQµWKHP¶DQGµXV¶FRQVWUXFWLRQVRI
society. For surveillance to be positively evaluated in media discourse, it must be 
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WDUJHWHGDWWKHDSSURSULDWHVXEMHFWSRVLWLRQV:KLOVWµ\REV¶µWURXEOHPDNHUV¶
µFULPLQDOV¶µSHUVLVWHQWFULPLQDOV¶µSDHGRSKLOHV¶µOLWWHUEXJV¶µEHQHILWFKHDWV¶DQG
µLQVXUDQFHIUDXGVWHUV¶PLJKWDOOEHDSSURSULDWHVXEMHFWVRIVXUYHLOODQFH,596 µYRX¶
µ\RXUIDPLO\¶DQGHVSHFLDOO\µ\RXUWHHQDJHGDXJKWHU¶ are not.597 A distinct division is 
drawn between criminals and innocent citizHQV7KHLGHQWLW\RIµFLWL]HQ¶LVFRQVWUXFWHG
through the radical exclusion of the criminal. 
 
 
Electronic tags belong on the ankles of criminals, not in the pockets of 
innocent citizens.598 
 
 
 
This provides the core point of distinction between an appropriate and inappropriate 
surveillance activity shared between both of these discourses, and drawing upon 
similar discursive foundations.  
 
Surveillance is negatively evaluated when it is constructed as constant and as mass 
rather than targeted surveillance. ThiVIRUPRIVXUYHLOODQFHDOVRGUDZVXSRQµWKHP¶
DQGµXV¶GLVWLQFWLRQVEXWfocuses on the way that surveillance technologies can break 
GRZQDSSURSULDWHGLVWLQFWLRQVDQGSODFHµLQQRFHQW¶SHRSOHXQGHUVXUYHLOODQFHZKR
should not be so. There should be a difference between different groups in society. 
Some individuals are criminals, others are not. It is acceptable to put criminals under 
surveillance but not non-criminals. A reason for the negative evaluation of mass 
surveillance is that these technologies ignore this distinction. The technology is 
WKHUHIRUHXQGHUVWRRGDVFUHDWLQJHTXLYDOHQFHEHWZHHQFULPLQDOVDQGµWKHLQQRFHQW¶
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Mass surveillance is considered equivalent to putting the wrong people under 
surveillance through mistaken targeting. 
 
 
Police will then remove a DNA sample, which stays on a database, 
regardless of whether the person is charged or not. Tens of thousands of 
innocent people's DNA is retained as standard procedure.599 
 
The Government is creating a system of 'mass public surveillance' capable 
of tracking every adult in Britain without their consent, MPs say. They 
warn that people who have never committed a crime can be 'electronically 
monitored' without their knowledge.600 
 
 
 
A second form of this construction in negative discourses occurs when tKHVRFLDOµXV¶
that is constructed, is created through the exclusion of a powerful surveillant actor, 
such as the government, or a corporation. The relation of equivalence changes to a 
more dystopian tone. A collective identity is still threatened by an excluded signifier, 
but instead of this constitutive outside being criminals or terrorists, it is the 
surveillance actor that is the threat. This construction is very strongly linked to the 
following frame. Both involve an excluded outside ± they differ in the perception of 
the source of significant threat.  
 
 Perceptions of control by powerful others 
 
The frame of perception of control by a powerful other is most strongly exhibited in 
the trope of µ%LJ%URWKHU¶7KHXVHRIWKHWURSHRIBig Brother, and a number of 
variants (Orwellian, 1984, etc) are ubiquitous in media discourse of surveillance. It is 
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the predominant representation of surveillance across a wide range of news media 
sources. It is possible to consider the trope as having spread so widely that it has 
become a dominant media frame even for non-surveillance issues. This framing is 
actively contested by attempt to rearticulate the equivalence between contemporary 
society and totalitarian surveillance. Even supporters of specific surveillance practices 
engage with the metaphor in attempts to disarm its critical potential. 
 
 
Big Brother is the malevolent use of surveillance by a wicked state. But 
for as long as the state remains democratic we can decide what use is 
made of it and how we are protected from possible abuses. To refuse to 
use technology for fear of some monstrous future government is 
paranoid.601 
 
 
 
Surveillance is commonly represented through the metaphorical employment of the 
image of Big Brother GUDZQIURP2UZHOO¶VNineteen Eighty-Four. Despite 
H[KRUWDWLRQVWRµORYH%LJ%URWKHU¶WKHJD]HRI%LJ%URWKHU¶VVWDWHLVDKRVWLOHRQH
Surveillance is mobilised as a tool of social control. In this dystopian scenario any 
positive side to surveillance is diminished. It is entirely negative. 
 
We could identify a number of factors contributing to the hegemony of this trope in 
news media accounts of surveillance. The first is metaphorical; a critical discourse 
uses Nineteen Eighty-Four to equate contemporary society with a dystopia inspired by 
2UZHOO¶Vunderstanding of fascism and communism in Spain, Nazi Germany and 
Soviet Russia. In discourse theoretical terms this creates a chain of equivalence 
through dystopia, between contemporary society and types of society positioned as 
the antithesis of how our society should be organised. The protagonist of Nineteen 
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Eighty-Four is dehumanised by his society, and the trope serves as the warning that 
RXUVRFLHW\PLJKWEHHTXLYDOHQW7KHLQYRFDWLRQRIWKH8665¶V.*%RU(DVW
*HUPDQ\¶VHTXLYDOHQWWKH6WDVLIXUWKHUVLmplifies this logic. It draws an equivalence 
between contemporary surveillance practices and the activities, logics and intentions 
of authoritarian or totalitarian states. This form appears in articles that use the film 
The Lives of Others to draw parallels between Stasi surveillance and contemporary 
surveillance in the UK.602 
 
6HFRQGO\WKHWURSHDFWVDVDFXOWXUDOVKRUWKDQG7KHVLJQLILHUVµ¶µ2UZHOOLDQ¶RU
µ%LJ%URWKHU¶FRQMXUHXSDULFKYLVXDODQGWH[WXDOLPDJHU\RIRSSUHVVLRQFRQWURODQG
dehumanisation. This eases communication, the term acting as a signifier for a 
complex of practices and technologies. Representations of surveillance in other 
cultural products, including books and films can fulfil a similar role in discourse, for 
example the writing of Franz Kafka or Philip K. Dick.603 
 
A new trope has entered the discourse in recent years: understanding contemporary 
society as (or becoming) a surveillance society. This draws upon ICO and academic 
discourses. The µsurveillance society¶ has started to eclipse the trope of Big Brother, 
yet is stripped of much of the nuance associated with the concept in academic 
discourses of surveillance, and in many texts is functionally equivalent to metaphors 
of Big Brother. 
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Surveillance discourse is not isolated, but is framed according to narratives with 
familiar lines of antagonism. Whilst positive evaluations of surveillance draw upon 
discourses of crime control and security, surveillance is often negatively represented 
in terms of wider civil liberties implications. 
 
 
Some might consider these proposals far-fetched. In fact, we are already 
progressing down this road. Consider: DNA sampling is now routine, trial 
by jury is under threat, electronic tagging is increasing, no detainment 
without trial - once a hallowed tenet of British law - has been curtailed, 
surveillance by government and other bodies is commonplace, the double- 
jeopardy rule is being abandoned, and ID cards are in the offing. It's a 
salami process, driven by "the ends justify the means" utilitarianism.604 
 
 
 
In more positive evaluations of surveillance, the frame of control by a powerful other 
is drawn upon much less frequently. Control is limited, either constructed as 
proportional and necessary, or actively over-estimated by opponents of surveillance 
and civil liberty groups. The subjects of surveillance resist or attempt to evade 
surveillance. The other manifestation of this frame is acknowledgement of its 
existence incorporated in attempts to subvert and rearticulate its meaning. 
  
Human impact of issues 
 
News media accounts of surveillance are frequently focused on named and 
individualised individual actors. The internal mental states and ambitions of prime 
ministers and home secretaries are considered of high importance to the narrative 
constructed. Identity cards are constructed as belonging to David Blunkett.605 Many 
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texts appear to be produced in reaction to press releases or statements by Richard 
Thomas, the Information Commissioner. Such texts frequently include verbatim inter-
textual reports of these statements. Regular voices also include Phil Booth of NO2ID 
and Shami Chakrabati of Liberty. Antagonistic relationships appear to be the norm for 
media coverage of political issues. A statement by the government is frequently 
matched by a counter-statement from one or two leading opposition parties.  
 
Human impact frames again take two main forms. Positive evaluations of surveillance 
provide accounts of people or communities saved by surveillance, or accounts of 
people who would have been saved, if systems were in place. Victims of crime such 
as Victoria Climbié or James Bulger who may have been saved by surveillance 
technology had it been present, or were caught on CCTV, are also frequently 
personalised. 
 
Negative evaluations of surveillance instead focus upon the victims of surveillance. 
Personal anecdotes are used to illustrate the potential effects or dangers of 
surveillance practices. For example the victim of identity theft recounts how it took 
him several months and much inconvenience to rebuild his identity.  
 
 
It took James Bristow, the manager of a large property firm, 13 months to 
have his daughter Caitlin's DNA details erased from the national 
database.606 
 
Leaving Mrs Howlett in the situation where she might be placed under 
surveillance at any time would cause her anxiety and uncertainty and was 
a course of conduct amounting to harassment under section 1(1) of the 
1997 Act.607 
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 Involve the application of moral values 
 
Neuman HWDO¶s final dominant frame is the application of moral values, thus segueing 
into the evaluation of surveillance practices. Both evaluative discourses draw upon 
moral values in their evaluation, however the choice or emphasis of particular moral 
frameworks highly affects the evaluation of surveillance.  
 
Positive evaluations draw upon frameworks of crime prevention, protection of the 
innocent, risk management and security. Risk management can appear as a moral 
prerogative, whilst states and institutions have duties of care and protection. Crime 
and terrorism are clear forms of moral deviancy and meet with substantial 
disapproval. The ultimate articulation of positive perspectives of surveillance is an 
active call for more surveillance technology, or for greater support of its use. This can 
take the forms of calls for more funding to replace outdated surveillance technology 
or for the lifting of restrictions on the use of surveillance evidence in court.608 Certain 
articles represent critics of surveillance as paranoid and ignoring more pressing social 
issues ± an explicit critique of a skewed value structure.609 
 
 
It takes a delusion of some grandeur to imagine that an all-seeing eye 
really cares what you are up to every minute of the day. But it's one that 
seems to be shared by the vociferous campaigners against "the 
surveillance society."610 
 
 
 
The negative evaluative discourses of surveillance draw upon different moral values 
for evaluation. The foremost of these is the value of privacy. Surveillance is generally 
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represented in negative discourses of surveillance as in an antagonistic relationship to 
privacy. Privacy is positively evaluated, and surveillance reduces privacy, therefore 
surveillance is negatively evaluated. Privacy is mainly constructed as a value to be 
protected rather than a principle which can act to protect the individual. Privacy is 
associated with individuals; it is a right, both in terms of human rights discourse and 
in terms of legal rights granted by legislation such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Human Rights Act. Privacy constructs a set of limitations on 
surveillance activity. These can be related to data protection principles, but are only 
infrequently associated with these in media discourses. These limitations provide a 
framework for the evaluation of specific instances of surveillance activity; 
surveillance can be represented as violating privacy in a number of ways. 
 
Surveillance is antagonistic to privacy when it is too invasive and when it is 
disproportionate or excessive; when it is automatic and excludes human beings from 
decision-making; when it is covert and the watched are not aware of being watched, 
or the identities of those conducting surveillance are unknown or inaccessible to the 
subjects of surveillance, for example when secret files are held on citizens.611 
Transparency of surveillance practices is therefore seen as a positive value. 
 
 
Up until now the best ally of governments and big corporations who wish 
to place every individual under total and unwavering surveillance has 
always been ignorance.612 
 
As CCTV systems become as much part of the landscape as postboxes 
and telephone kiosks, we have all joined the legions of the watched. 
Mundane strolls through shopping centres or slow weaves back from pubs 
render us actors in a grainy low-resolution drama watched by an unknown 
audience of security forces in control rooms.613 
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Heather Rowe, partner at Lovells, says companies should be doing data 
audits and work out how WKH\ZRXOGGHDOZLWKUHTXHVWVµOn surveillance, 
employers should be setting out their policy in staff manuals and 
employment contracts - Big Brother can watch you as long as you know 
he is.¶614 
 
 
 
Surveillance invades privacy when conducted for inappropriate purposes, for example 
snooping or voyeurism. Surveillance is negatively evaluated if it is used for sexual 
gratification instead of security or crime control. Surveillance is also problematic 
when individuals have no choice but to be under surveillance. Choice is therefore an 
important element of negative surveillance discourses. Individual behaviour and 
choices can make an individual a legitimate subject of surveillance, but an individual 
should not become a target through no action of their own, or because of actions over 
which they have no voluntary control. Privacy is also understood as having a 
locational and spatial component. It is invaded by surveillance when surveillance is 
conducted in inappropriate places, for example, the home. 
 
 
I wonder if our insouciance is about to change. The story in yesterday's 
Standard about Ealing Council using spy cameras to catch residents who 
put their rubbish out on the wrong day is one of many showing that the 
authorities' desire to pry is becoming maniacal.615 
 
 
 
Surveillance may also be seen as threatening to democracy, which can be constructed 
as a moral imperative and an important value to maintain.  
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But if we go too far down the surveillance route, we are tampering with 
the very freedoms and democracy we're purporting to protect.616 
 
 
 
News media discourses that provide positive evaluations of surveillance draw upon 
the effectiveness of surveillance, constructing surveillance practices and technologies 
as a useful technique for achieving a set of highly valued social aims, which are 
universalised; crime prevention, national security and the prevention of behaviour 
deemed anti-social. These discourses make strong use RIµWKHP¶DQGµXV¶
constructions and make use of human impact examples of the victims of the lack of 
surveillance. When surveillance does have problems, these are due to the failures or 
actors and institutions rather than of the technology itself. When surveillance is 
negatively evaluated there is a more complex set of discursive sources. However the 
core elements of this discourse are the concepts of privacy, intrusion, and dystopian 
models of society evoked through images like Big Brother. This discursive regularity 
constructs a number of lines of appropriateness across which surveillance practices 
can cross and thus receive a negative evaluation. These lines are not clear and distinct, 
but instead blurry and contextual. Surveillance is negatively evaluated when it is 
invasive, when it is directed an the wrong subjects, when it is disproportionate or 
excessive, when it is automatic and excludes human beings from decision-making, 
when it is covert and the watched are not aware of being watched, when it is constant, 
when it is mass surveillance rather than targeted surveillance, when it is snooping or 
voyeurism, when individuals have no choice but to be under surveillance and when it 
is conducted in inappropriate places.  
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In conclusion, there exists a complex web of discourses related to surveillance, both 
critical and supportive, and providing understandings of political and social problems 
and evaluative frameworks through which to evaluate surveillance. These discourses 
have strong commonalities and recurring logics. The implications of these discursive 
constructions are explored in Chapter Seven. The next chapter adopts a thematic 
approach derived from the empirical material to examine the subject positions made 
available in this field of discourse. 
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Chapter Five: Subject Positions in Discourses of Surveillance 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter adopts a thematic approach, collapsing initial analytical categories and 
drawing out regularities across the overlapping discourses surrounding the five points 
of reference explored in the previous chapter to provide a direct answer to the 
research question: what subject positions are made available in discourses of 
surveillance? The purpose here is to show the subjectivity (content) dimension of 
identity in discourses of surveillance, in contrast to the subsequent chapter, which 
demonstrates the contested articulation of the form of identity.  
 
Subject positions are the non-essential relationally determined locations within 
discourses with which it is possible for a subject to identify. They are the social roles 
and identities made available by different discourses. The way that subject positions 
are represented, articulated and positioned in relation to each other can have political 
effects. The formation of social identities involves the suppression of alternatives. 
Subject positions may be incompatible with each other, and social antagonisms play 
important roles in the constitution and limits of particular identities. Representation is 
the way that subject positions are presented in the discourse, the qualities and 
characteristics associated with them. This also includes the way that subject positions 
are evaluated. Representation also includes the discourse theory concept of 
articulation in the way that the subject positions are constructed in chains of 
signification with other subject positions. Subject positions (as subjectivities) are the 
way that identity is commonly understood in post-structural discourse theory 
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approaches. This chapter contains the results of textual analysis in identifying 
available subject positions in UK discourses of surveillance, their representations and 
articulations. Politically relevant subject positions can be divided into three main 
categories emerging from the data. Firstly, the individual, secondly, negatively 
evaluated subject positions from the illegal immigrant to the terrorist and thirdly, the 
contested construction of the vulnerable. 
 
The individual 
 
In all of the discourses in this thesis, the individual is the most common subject 
position available and one that is frequently privileged. The content of the individual 
is filled in in markedly different ways. In the government identity card discourse, 
individuals have one legitimate identity, although this identity may have multiple 
component parts. This identity can be tied to them through biometrics ± unique 
physical characteristics of the individual. Individuals can also be the victims of 
identity theft and can have their identities stolen from them or assumed by another. 
Individuals are relatively defenceless against identity fraud, and should be protected 
from crime. Individuals lead relatively complex lives in the modern world, involving 
travel and complex financial transactions. Individuals produce personal data, and have 
records held about them. They produce a biographical footprint and have a place in 
the community. Individuals will want to, and need to, prove their identity. When 
interacting with organisations, individuals can also be citizens, clients or customers. 
 
The individual is also the most commonly used signifier for a subject in ICO 
discourses. Occasionally, subjects are represented as consumers in certain 
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(commercial) circumstances, but even there, this usage is problematised through the 
use of inverted commas:  
 
 
7KH)7&FKDLUPDQVSHOWRXWEOXQWO\WKDWµ&RQVXPHUV¶¶SULYDWHGDWDPXVW
be protected from theft.617 
 
 
 
6XEMHFWVDUHFROOHFWLYHO\UHIHUUHGWRDVµWKHSXEOLF¶RUµVRFLHW\¶EXWFROOHFWLYHVXEMHFW
positions occur much less frequently than references to the individual. 
 
Drawing upon discourses of universal human rights, individuals are represented as 
bearers of rights. These attributions of rights are often closely related with inter-
textual references to specific legal acts, such as the Data Protection Act 1998, The 
Freedom of Information Act 2005, or the European Convention on Human Rights. 
One of these individual rights is the right to privacy. 
 
  
Individuals have a right of access to information about them.618 
 
The DPA not only creates obligations for organisations, it also gives 
individuals rights such as to gain access to their details and to claim 
compensation when they suffer damage.619 
 
Good practice may go beyond simply meeting the requirements of UK 
law but will always be consistent with the law as well as with the EU Data 
Protection Directive (95/46/EC) and ultimately with the right to respect 
for private life enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.620 
 
                                               
617
 Information Commissioner¶s Office. (2006) What Price Privacy? The Unlawful trade in 
confidential personal information. London: The Stationery Office. p.26. 
618
 Information Commissioner¶s Office. (undated) Framework Code of Practice for Sharing Personal 
Information: Consultation Draft. 
619
 ,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFH. (August 2007) CCTV Data Protection Code of Practice: 
Consultation Draft. Wilmslow: The InfRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFH. p.4. 
620
 ,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFH-XQHData Protection Strategy: Consultation Draft. 
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We want to provide a practical, clear set of advice to help individuals 
understand their rights in everyday situations621 
 
However, just as an LQGLYLGXDO¶VULJKWWRWKHLURZQLGHQWLW\ is important 
WKHUHDUHIHZHUPRUHMHDORXVO\JXDUGHGFRPPRGLWLHVWKDQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
own personal privacy.622 
 
 
 
Subjects are producers and possessors of information; as individuals they are the 
subjects of surveillant social practices. This can place them in antagonistic relations 
with organisations that collect and process personal information.  
 
 
 
Most CCTV is directed at viewing and recording the activities of 
individuals.623 
 
Today, like it or not, our personal information is held by many public 
and private organisations.624 
 
Almost every organisation we deal with in our daily lives holds some 
personal information about us.625 
 
7KHUHKDVEHHQDUHFHQWµH[SORVLRQ¶LQWKHQXPEHURIEXVLQHVVHVKROGLQJ
personal information, and with that surge, an increase in the potential for 
the information to be misused.626 
 
The collection and use of personal information is essential to the 
functioning of our modern society.627 
 
 
 
Individuals also have (or should expect) a certain level of privacy. This privacy acts 
as a limit on what others can do with personal information regarding to that 
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individual, theoretically restricting antagonism and allowing coexistence. Privacy can 
be invaded and compromised. Privacy is constructed as both an experience and as a 
spatial/territorial area.  
 
 
People care about their personal privacy and have a right to expect that 
their personal details are and should remain confidential. Who they are, 
where they live, who their friends and family are, how they run their lives: 
these are all private matters. Individuals may choose to divulge such 
information to others, but information about them held confidentially by 
others should not be available to anyone prepared to pay the right price.628 
 
The primary objective of data protection or privacy legislation has always 
been to secure proper behaviour by those who process personal 
information, but the underlying policy objective has been to allay 
concerns about the invasion of privacy, and so to reinforce public and 
individual trust in public and private sector handling of personal 
information.629 
 
 
 
Again, the subject position of the individual occurs in opposition discourse. Here, the 
individual is a placeholder for a wide range of subject positions, as individuals can 
have diverse and varying ages, genders, ethnicities, nationalities or social roles. As in 
ICO discourse, individuals are bearers of a number of rights. They have a right to 
privacy, a right to access to their own information and under the common law 
tradition, freedom except where constrained by law. The individual is a source of 
agency in the discourse. Whilst it is acknowledged that some individuals (including 
terrorists and criminals) can be malicious, these are represented as a minority and the 
category of the individual is generally positively evaluated in this discourse. The 
discourse creates the possibility of antagonistic relations between individuals and 
government. Individuals should be in control of their own personal information. 
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Only vicious, out-of-control dictatorial regimes believe in monitoring and 
FRQWUROOLQJDOOFLWL]HQVDOORIWKHWLPHMXVWµLQFDVH¶a tiny minority of 
individuals get up to no good.630 
 
For the vast number of people who are not involved in terrorist 
activity, their entry is irrelevant in combating terrorism.631 
 
 
 
The individual is represented as profoundly affected by the introduction of identity 
cards. The individual is placed under obligations by the legislation, will bear the costs 
of the scheme and will be placed at risk by the scheme. Of key concern is the 
obligation placed upon the individual to keep the National Identity Register updated 
with changes to the registrable facts. These obligations are constructed as excessive 
and disproportionate and unaccompanied by any corresponding obligation on the part 
of government. 
 
 
There was a concern that the onus of renewal and updating information 
is on the individual.632 
 
Clauses 11-13 relate to maintaining the accuracy of the Register. This is 
largely achieved through obligations on individuals to notify of changes 
in relevant information. It does not, however, create any obligation to 
audit the information contained on the register.633 
 
You will have to keep the authorities informed of changes in your 
SHUVRQDOGHWDLOVDQGSD\KDUVKSHQDOWLHVLI\RXGRQ¶W<RXZLOOKDYHWR
produce your card for scanning before being allowed to see your doctor. 
Your ID card will be your license to live.634 
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Whether compelled or not, WKHELOOPDNHVPDLQWHQDQFHRIRQH¶VUHFRUG
on the National Identity Register both onerous and expensive ² and 
all polling data shows that the popularity of the scheme drops away when 
the costs are considered.635 
 
 
 
In addition to legal obligations the discourse negatively evaluates the way that the 
costs for establishing and running the identity card scheme will be borne primarily by 
individuals, both qua individuals, and as taxpayers, through tax contributions, the 
registration costs and the possibility of incurring the wide range of fines and penalties 
for non-compliance.  
 
 
 
The costs of the project would be huge, and the Committee fears that, 
because these costs will be borne by individuals, those least able to 
afford the costs would be the most likely to incur them.636 
 
0DLQWDLQLQJRQH¶VUHFRUGRQWKH1DWLRQDO,GHQWLW\5HJLVWHULVPDGHERWK
onerous and expensive. Any change in personal circumstances, such as 
moving house, requires notification to the Home Secretary and a 
concomitant fee to be paid. To make matters even worse, should a card be 
issued with an error, such as a misspelling of the name, the individual 
has to pay such a fee for mistakes made by civil servants!637 
 
Taxpayer pain: Even at current estimates, the additional tax burden of 
setting up the scheme will be of the order of £200 per person. The direct 
cost to individuals (of a combined passport and ID card package) is 
quoted as £85. The impact on other departmental and local authority 
budgets is unknown. The scope and impact of arbitrary penalties would 
make speed cameras trivial by comparison.638 
 
 
 
Thirdly, in addition to the legal obligations and financial costs, the individual is 
placed under increased risk by the scheme. This risk arises from the reduction of 
difference between normal individuals and criminals, as they are placed on the same 
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registers and databases. For the opposition discourse, this is a distinction which 
should be maintained in the face of attempts which they perceive as creating a 
functional equivalence. A second source of risk arises from the way a card may 
function to prevent the exercise of legal freedoms or the maintenance of bodily 
integrity.  
 
 
The introduction of biometric measurements increases the risk to the 
individual within society. The state already forces people that are arrested 
to have their fingerprints recorded by the police, whether they are charged 
with an offence or not. As a result, the police already have a substantial 
number of fingerprints on various databases around the country. Most of 
the records are of convicted criminals. This risk to the individual is caused 
by the erosion of our ability to control our own security.639 
 
Imagine being refused access to your doctor when you are sick, or being 
suspected of a crime and unable to prove your identity to the police. 
These are real risks.640 
 
 
 
As part of these risks, the individual has little power and opportunity for redress if 
problems emerge due to the structure or operation of the National Identity Register.  
 
 
Lost identity, becoming an un-person: By making ordinary life dependent 
on the reliability of a complex administrative system, the scheme makes 
P\ULDGVPDOOHUURUVSRWHQWLDOO\FDWDVWURSKLF7KHUH¶VQRKLQWIURPWKH
government how it will deal with inevitably large numbers of mis-
identifications and errors, or deliberate attacks on or corruption of what 
would become a critical piece of national infrastructure. A failure in any 
part of the system at a check might deny a person access to his or her 
rights or property or to public services, with no immediate solution or 
redress²³OLFHQVHWROLYH´ZLWKGUDZQ641 
 
What happens when a person is falsely rejected from the system, or is, for 
example, incapable of providing the required biometric is barely 
considered [in the Bill]... No consideration has been made on what 
happens if the process does fail at any stage. No provision is made for 
an individual included on the Register, or any person or organisation 
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relying on the Register to operate correctly, to seek redress if any part of 
the system fails and causes them loss in some way.642 
 
As if the dangers of a large National Identity Register were not enough, 
clause 3(3) introduces a presumption of accuracy in that Register, 
meaning that any consequences of inevitable errors in the database will 
be left with the individual, who will have no opportunity for 
redress.643 
 
 
 
,QWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHLQGLYLGXDORIWHQEHFRPHVµWKHLQQRFHQWLQGLYLGXDO¶RUWKH
µLQQRFHQWSHUVRQ¶UHSUHVHQWHGDQHFGRWDOO\ZLWKH[DPSOHVRIWKHKDUPVGRQHWR
individuals by identity systems. The impact of the harms is magnified because the 
individual has not done anything to bring them upon himself.  
 
 
In fact it is the innocent who have the most to fear. Criminals and 
terrorists will simply find a way around these cards ± it will be a minor 
irritation (or even a golden opportunity) to them. Only the careless and 
guileless will be caught up in the bureaucratic nightmare. It is they who 
ZLOOEHILQHGDQGFULPLQDOLVHGIRUDQ\RQHRIWKHSURSRVHGµ,'FULPHV¶
such as failure to renew on time.644 
 
 
 
In banking and finance discourses, individuals are represented as generally accepting 
and understanding of the necessity of identification practices discourse. Most people 
are constructed as being able to fulfil and comply with identification without any 
significant problem.645 There is a distinction between levels of support from young 
and old people that reflects an assumption that all people will come to accept and 
understand identification in time.646 The discourse constructs the need for the public 
to accept and understand identification more than it currently does. 
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With respect to invasions of privacy, ICO, financial and media discourses exhibit a 
division between subject positions. This involves the concept of celebrity. Subject 
positions are divided by their degree of celebrity, constructing a distinction between 
celebrities, and normal people. Concern is raised that this distinction is not respected 
by surveillance practices. It is a social problem when normal individuals are treated as 
the alternate category. Celebrities can expect additional surveillance, whilst normal 
SHRSOHVKRXOGEHSURWHFWHGEHFDXVHWKH\KDYHµGRQHQRWKLQJWRFRXUWPHGLD
DWWHQWLRQ¶647 Presumably celebrities and people in the public eye have done 
something to court media attention and should therefore be prepared for a certain 
degree of privacy invasion. This division suggests that rights to privacy are not 
absolute and inalienable, but can be traded away in certain circumstances.  
 
 
Having the press camped on your doorstep or receiving intrusive calls to 
self, family or friends is an experience few enjoy, especially if they have 
done nothing to court media attention. 
 
Just as revealing were the interviews conducted with individuals whose 
privacy had been violated. As one would expect, they included a number 
of celebrities and others in the public eye such as professional footballers 
and managers, well-known broadcasters, a member of the royal household 
and others with royal connections, and a woman going through well-
publicised divorce proceedings. But they also included people caught 
up in the celebrity circuit only incidentally, such as the sister of the 
partner to a well-known local politician and the mother of a man once 
linked romantically to a Big Brother contestant.648 
 
The evidence also demonstrates that we are all equally at risk of having 
our privacy invaded. In cases sparked by media interest, for instance, the 
targets include celebrities and their families but also people with only the 
slimmest connection to the stars, and some individuals who have simply 
no idea why their personal details might be of interest to anyone.649 
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Chains of equivalence and negatively evaluated actors 
 
7KHGLYLVLRQVRIVXEMHFWSRVLWLRQVLQQHZVPHGLDGLVFRXUVHLQWRµWKHP¶DQGµXV¶FDn be 
described in discourse theory terms as the operation of a logic of equivalence creating 
DQHTXLYDOHQFHEHWZHHQOLQNHGVLJQLILHUVµXV¶WKURXJKWKHDFWRIH[FOXVLRQRI
QHJDWLYHO\YDOXHGVLJQLILHUµWKHP¶ZKLFKVHUYHVWRSURYLGHDVKDUHGLGHQWLW\IRUthe 
equivalences.650 This is common in accounts that focus upon the function of 
surveillance technology and practices in dealing with criminals, terrorists, or those 
EHKDYLQJLQµDQWL-VRFLDO¶ZD\V7KHH[FOXVLRQRIGHYLDQWVRFLDODFWRUVVHUYHVWR
provide a shared collective identity to normal, law-abiding people as non-criminals 
and non-terrorists, thus occluding other potential sources of difference. This frame 
incorporates the core point of antagonistic constitution of subject positions in these 
discourses. In similar ways, discourses construct chains of equivalence between 
negatively evaluated subject positions antagonistic to normal, law-abiding citizens.   
 
Government discourse articulates a distinction between UK citizens and foreign 
nationals. ID cards will be issued to foreign nationals before they are issued to British 
FLWL]HQV:KLOVW8.FLWL]HQVKDYHDGHIDXOWµULJKWWREHKHUH¶IRUHLJQQDWLRQDOV¶
presence is contingent and must be demonstrated.651 The chain of equivalence of 
foreign nationals incorporates asylum seekers, legal and illegal immigrants and even 
terrorists.  
 
 
It will take several years for the scheme to come fully into operation and 
for all eligible citizens to be enrolled. We will introduce biometric 
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identification for foreign nationals in 2008 and we expect the first ID 
cards to be issued to British citizens in 2009.652 
 
 
 
A broad range of equivalences are drawn between subject positions that would wish 
to avoid their identification. These subject positions are all negatively evaluated for 
multiple reasons, but in this construction pejorative labelling is (at least in part) due to 
their reluctance to maintain their legitimate identity; anonymity is tainted by 
association with negatively evaluated subjects.  
 
 
This includes illegal immigrants wishing to stay in the country, money 
launderers, disqualified drivers who wish to continue driving, 
paedophiles wishing to continue working with children, people with 
poor credit histories wishing to obtain financial services, wanted 
criminals and bigamous marriages. False identity is also used by those 
working undercover ± some terrorists etc working against the interests of 
the UK653 
 
 
 
%LJDPRXVPDUULDJHLVDUHPQDQWRIROGHUGLVFRXUVHVVXUURXQGLQJWKH8.¶VZDUWLPH
identity card schemes. A popular argument for the retention of the card after the 
Second World War was that it would prevent bigamous marriages.654 The chain of 
HTXLYDOHQFHVDWWKHWLPHLQFOXGHGµURJXHVYDJDERQGVVSLHVGHVHUWHUVELJDPLVWVDQG
DOOWKHµOXQDWLFIULQJH¶¶655 In both cases the social evil of illegitimate identity is spread 
across a wide range of practices and subject positions articulated as socially 
undesirable. A distinction is drawn between these subject positions and the positively 
evaluated subject position of the UK citizen oUµKRQHVW FLWL]HQ¶WKHKRQHVWFLWL]HQLV 
RIWHQWKHYLFWLPRIWKHPDOLJQVRFLDODFWRUV$GLVWLQFWLRQLVGUDZQEHWZHHQµSHRSOHLQ
SRVLWLRQVRIWUXVW¶DQGµWKRVHZKRKDYHOLHGWRJDLQSRVLWLRQVRIWUXVW¶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You need to know that people in positions of trust (such as nannies, 
carers for the elderly, childminders, and so on) are who they say they 
are. Biometric data in the ID card means that a potential employer could 
TXLFNO\DQGUHOLDEO\FRQILUPDQDSSOLFDQW¶VLGHQWLW\ The Criminal 
Records Bureau could also XVHWKHDSSOLFDQW¶V,GHQWLW\5HJLVWUDWLRQ
Number (IRN) in order to check that they have no criminal record, for 
example. Use of the IRN will speed up such searches significantly.656 
 
Enhance checks as part of safeguarding for the vulnerable: the Scheme 
will introduce a high level of efficiency in authentication of identity, and 
this will significantly support checks on people working with children 
and the most vulnerable.657 
 
 
 
Constructed in chains of equivalence with these ad hoc users of illegitimate identity 
are subject positions that make use of illegitimate identities and identity theft/fraud. 
Equivalences are drawn between terrorists and organised crime. These groups are 
constructed as organised and networked, and as responsible for societal costs and 
misery. The use of false or multiple identities by these actors is represented as easy 
and commonplace. The effect of this chain of signification is that the terrorist 
becomes a nodal point for the whole chain. Each subject position is associated with 
the terrorist, the worst of all possible subject positions in contemporary discourses of 
government and security; terrorists are always enemies rather than adversaries of 
positively evaluated subject positions. 
 
 
False identities and false identity documents are VWDQGDUGµWRROVRIWKH
WUDGH¶IRUorganised criminal organisations. As well as the economic 
costs of organised crime it is also linked to many of the crimes which 
cause most misery in society such as drugs misuse and drug-related 
crimes, people-trafficking, prostitution and people working illegally in 
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unsafe and overcrowded conditions. It is estimated that organised crime 
may cost the country up to £20bn pa.658 
 
The use of false identities plays an increasing part in illegal activity, with 
sometimes devastating and costly results.659 
 
Terrorists and fraudsters have used modern IT to forge identities 
easily.660 
 
The National Identity Scheme will disrupt the use of false identities by 
terrorist organisations, for example in money laundering and organised 
crime. We know that terrorist suspects make use of false identities. The 
scheme would also be a useful tool in helping to maintain and disrupt the 
activities of terrorist networks.661 
 
The identity cards scheme will help to disrupt the support networks of 
terrorists and organised criminal operations which rely extensively on 
the use of multiple identities to make it more difficult to monitor their 
activities.662 
 
Those involved in facilitating and funding terrorist and organised criminal 
activities make use of multiple identities to make it more difficult to 
investigate their crimes. At least one-third of terrorist suspects are 
known to have used more than one identity either for facilitation or 
planning the commission of terrorist acts.663 
 
 
 
The final important subject position in this chain of equivalence is the illegal 
immigrant. The illegal immigrant is articulated as not entitled to be in the country and 
not entitled to work here. Related to illegal immigrants are the sub-set of foreign 
nationals who could become illegal immigrants, and must be discouraged. The illegal 
LPPLJUDQWLVFRQVWUXFWHGDVQHHGLQJµLGHQWLW\¶LQRUGHUWRIXQFWLRQLQVRFLHW\; given 
that the (depersonalised) immigrant is not legitimately allowed to be in the country, 
this identity can never be legitimate. Illegal immigrants are portrayed in this discourse 
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DVGUDLQVRQVRFLDOVXSSRUWVWUXFWXUHVµ7KRVHZKRDUHHQWLWOHGWRSXEOLFVHUYLFHV¶
LPSOLHVµWKRVHZKRDUHQRW¶DQGPXVWEHGHQLHGDFFHVV,WDOVRFRQVWUXFWVDVLWXDWLRQLQ
which the continued delivery to those who are entitled is dependent upon the denial to 
those who are not.  
 
 
We will put in place an effective approach to managing the identity of 
foreign nationals to help secure our borders, manage migration, cut 
illegal working and shut down fraudulent access to benefits and services. 
Better ways of identifying people will help us to facilitate travel for those 
we want to welcome to the UK. They will also help us to remove those 
not entitled to be here.664 
 
There are an estimated 430,000 illegal migrants living in the UK, and 
employers currently have no reliable way of establishing whether or not a 
job applicant has a right to work here.665 
 
The National Identity Scheme will help employers find out about the 
immigration status of job applicants and about any visa restrictions 
which mean they cannot legally work in the UK. This will speed up the 
checking process and could be an advantage to those immigrants who 
are entitled to work. It could also help to identify people who try to 
work here illegally and could deter potential illegal immigrants from 
coming to the UK.666 
 
Illegal immigrants require identity to access goods and services in this 
Country.667 
 
The government is responding to these changes and has introduced 
biometrics into UK passports as part of a comprehensive programme to 
improve border controls and security, make travel safer and improve the 
delivery of free public services and benefits for those who are entitled to 
them.668 
 
 
 
Terrorists are less frequently present in banking and finance discourse than ordinary 
criminals. They are primarily articulated in terms of anti-money laundering efforts 
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and obligations by financial service providers. Terrorists are closely associated with 
criminals in that they make use of the same methods of money laundering and false 
identities in attempts to access the financial system without leaving a detectable 
record of their activities. Practices of identification are legitimised by reference to the 
ultimate, yet immeasurable, risk provided by terrorists freely operating under false 
identities.  
 
 
Proving your identity: makes it harder for terrorists to move money 
anonymously. Terrorists can use the financial system in preparing 
their attacks. The information gained during identity checks can be 
helpful in investigations.669 
 
Crime and terrorism need cash&ULPLQDOVWXUQWKHµGLUW\¶FDVKPDGH
IURPIUDXGGUXJWUDIILFNLQJVPXJJOLQJDQGUREEHU\LQWRµFOHDQ¶PRQH\
by using false identities or taking the names of innocent people ± like 
you. You can make life harder for criminals and terrorists.670 
 
Also, how can the cost of a terrorist or a convicted sex offender operating 
under an assumed identity be measured?671 
 
 
 
In anti-surveillance discourse the subject positions of terrorist and criminal are 
distinguished from the law-abiding majority of the population, but constructed in 
equivalence with each other. The discourse of opposition to identity cards has two 
main constructions of terrorists and criminals. The first discursive move is to show 
how terrorists and criminals will not be stopped in their malign activities by the 
introduction of identity cards. This can result from deficiencies in the design of 
identity schemes or from the skills of the terrorist or criminal. Terrorists and criminals 
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may even be able to exploit the existence of an identity system to enhance their 
malign activity. 
 
 
The Law Society does not believe the identity card scheme will 
significantly help combat crime and terrorism.672 
 
While a link between identity cards and anti-terrorism is frequently 
suggested, the connection appears to be largely intuitive. Almost no 
empirical research has been undertaken to clearly establish how identity 
tokens can be used as a means of preventing terrorism.673 
 
In fact it could make the terrorist¶s life easier, if anything. Even the 
JRYHUQPHQWGURSSHGWKHLUWLUHGµILJKWLQJWHUURULVP¶VORJDQLQ
UHJDUGLQJ,'FDUGVZKHQWKH\UHDOLVHGLWGLGQ¶WVWDFNXS7KHJRYHUQPHQW
has started using it again recently to bolster their other very weak 
arguments for this draconian measure. Imagine the Sept 11th terrorists 
DEDQGRQLQJWKHLUHYLOSODQEHFDXVH«WKH\GLGQ¶WKDYHDYDOLG,'FDUG
7KDW¶VQRWYHU\FUHGLEOH:LOOODFNRIDQ,'FDUGVWRSDQ\GHWHUPLQHG
terrorist? No. Also, many terrorists (e.g. Timothy McVeigh, Oklahoma 
ERPEHUDUHµFDUd-FDUU\LQJFLWL]HQV¶RIWKHLURZQFRXQWULHV7KH1DWLRQDO
Identity Card can and will be faked (see below) allowing terrorists to enter 
the country with fewer security checks than at present. Why? If they carry 
the card, and their eye scan matches the database ± WKHQLWZLOOEH³SDVV
IULHQG´ZLWKRXWDVHFRQGJODQFH674 
 
Even if there were evidence that identity cards could help combat 
terrorism full compulsion is not expected for nearly ten years. Until then it 
will be ineffective as a terrorist is unlikely to volunteer to register.675 
 
Research suggests there is no link between the use of identity cards and 
the prevalence of terrorism, and in no instance has the presence of an 
identity card system been shown a significant deterrent to terrorist 
activity.676 
 
 
 
Whilst negatively evaluated and depersonalised, terrorists are represented as mobile, 
tenacious, flexible, invisible, audacious, highly skilful, sophisticated and competent. 
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They are also represented as operating using their real identities more often than not, 
being more orientated towards hiding their intentions rather than their identities. This 
flexibility and skill allows them to subvert identity systems if they need or desire to, 
ZKLOVWWKHVXLFLGHERPEHU¶VXVHRIKLVRZQLGHQWLW\UHPRYHVWKHQHHGWRXVe a false 
identity. By demonstrating the ability of terrorists and criminals to operate with and 
potentially exploit the identity card system, the discourse attempts to deconstruct the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VDUJXPHQWVIRUWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRILGHQWLW\FDUGVEDVHGDURund 
countering the threat of terrorism and crime. 
 
 
Five keywords generally apply to the character of modern terrorism: 
mobility, flexibility, invisibility, tenacity and audacity. Any study of 
the modus operandi of terrorists will highlight skills in exploiting 
weaknesses and loopholes, manipulating administrative procedures and 
circumventing vetting systems. This is demonstrated with great clarity in 
the use by terrorists of tourist visas.677 
 
Given that a sophisticated terrorist network is likely to recruit those 
with no criminal convictions or history with the authorities it is difficult to 
see how the introduction of an identity card will have any real impact. It is 
safe to assume that British intelligence agencies already have gathered 
intelligence on anyone that they believe could constitute a risk to national 
security. We cannot imagine what information held on a massive identity 
register would add to that possessed by the security services. For the vast 
number of people who are not involved in terrorist activity, their entry is 
irrelevant in combating terrorism.678  
 
The men thought responsible for the bomb in Madrid all carried valid ID 
FDUGV6XLFLGHERPEHUVGRQ¶WJRWRJUHDWOHQJWKVWRKLGHWKHLULGHQWLW\; 
they want the world to know who they are. The Home Office has admitted 
that ID cards will not deter a determined terrorist.679 
 
The fundamental point that needs to be made about terrorists is that their 
aim is to hide their intentions. Establishing the identity (if such is 
possible) of a potential terrorist and issuing a registration card to 
them is of a minor concern. There is no correlation between acts of 
terrorism and the absence of a registration system.680 
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Criminals are also represented as being able to subvert and exploit identity 
systems. Criminals are represented as technically capable and motivated by the 
value of the information to be included on the register and the necessity of 
forging identity cards after the introduction of a national identity scheme. 
 
 
Many believed that by creating a centrDOLVHGGDWDEDVHSHRSOH¶V
information would be more accessible to those not entitled to it if a 
number of organisations and people were accessing the central database at 
any one time.681 
 
In addition, Mr Anderson also expects registration cards and passports to 
have the chip removed and a replacement added. This can occur to 
registration cards obtained improperly or where they are stolen. In 
addition, people will tamper with the chip itself, and the government 
can also expect the database to be manipulated.682 
 
'RQ¶WEHOLHYHWKRVHZKRVD\LWZLOOEHLPSRVVLEOHWRIRUJHWKHQHZ
µELRPHWULF¶FDUGV7KH\VDLGWKDWDERXWEDQNDQGFUHGLWFDUGVDQGLWWRRN 
the forgers just a few hours to prove them wrong. If someone can 
produce it, someone else can forge it. Plus industry experts say that 1 in 
10 biometric readings will be wrong.683 
 
The seizure of ID cards (like benefit-books and passports now) will 
become a means for extortion by gangsters.684 
 
 
 
However for opposition discourse, the identity card act has the potential to make 
non-criminals into criminals, and even to drive the marginalised towards 
terrorism. The discourse vocalises concerns about the way the identity card Act 
breaks down a privileged social distinction between criminals and innocent 
people - inappropriately criminalised for acts of omission relating to identity 
cards.  
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If someone thinks their card may be damaged they will have all the 
incentive needed to replace it as a consequence of no card will be 
disentitlement to services. We do not believe the criminal law is 
appropriate, yet the Government seems to wish to rely on criminal 
sanction wherever possible. At the heart of the criminal law should be the 
element of commission rather than omission. The state should 
criminalise people for acts they have done, rather than things they 
have forgotten to do.685 
 
This is likely to exacerbate divisions in society. The Chairman of the Bar 
&RXQFLOKDVDVNHG³LVWKHUHQRWDJUHDWULVNWKDWWKRVHZKRIHHODWWKH
margins of society ² the somewhat disaffected ² will be driven into the 
arms of extremists?686 
 
 
 
The second, less common, discursive construction of criminals and terrorists in the 
opposition discourse attempts to play down the threat of criminality and terrorism. 
Instead of representing criminals as technically skilled and not inhibited by identity 
cards, this model instead portrays these phenomena as exaggerated by a government 
UHOLDQWRQDµSROLWLFVRIIHDU¶ to introduce heightened security measures.687 Some 
opposition discourses of surveillance contest governmental constructions of crime as 
excessive and bringing too many activities within the sphere of criminality. 
 
 
Bearing in mind the expanding definition of crime is fast becoming 
µZKDWVPDOOPLQGHGSHWW\PLGGOHFODVVIRONGRQ
WOLNH¶WKHVFRSHIRUDQ,'
scheme seems limitless. It appears to tie in nicely with the huge number of 
CCTV cameras in this country (the most in Europe if not the planet) and 
anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs), dispersal orders and the other new 
powers given to police and courts to penalise people without even the 
DOUHDG\GXELRXVµGXHSURFHVV¶RIWKHODZ6KRSSLQJFHQWUHVDUHQRZEHLQJ
SUDLVHGIRUEDQQLQJ\RXQJSHRSOHLQEDVHEDOOFDSV	³KRRG\V´+RZORZ
have things got when your clothes are the defining mark of criminality, 
striking fear even into the heart of mighty John Prescott?688 
 
                                               
685
 Liberty, December 2004, pp.16-7. 
686
 NO2ID, 2005, p.3. 
687
 NO2ID, 20th December 2004, p.4. 
688
 Anarchist Federation. (April 2006) Defending Anonymity: Thoughts for the Struggle against Identity 
Cards. p.14. 
 260 
 
 
Banking and finance discourses break apart the category of criminal into lots of 
differential subject positions. Identity thieves and fraudsters are presented as a 
specific class of fraudster, which in turn is a sub-variant of criminal. All of these 
subject positions are negatively evaluated throughout the discourse of banks and 
financial institutions. They are enemies not antagonists. They do not have a legitimate 
right to exist. The operation of a logic of difference is discernable here, and because 
there is no typical profile of an identity fraudster, it leads to a diffusion of suspicion 
and risk across all subject positions; anybody could be an identity fraudster.  
 
 
Criminals who make money from drug-dealing, smuggling (people, 
tobacco, alcohol etc), robbery, gun crime, tax evasion, fraud and other 
crime use the financial system to hide where it came from. By putting it 
into apparently normal accounts they make it harder to trace where it 
came from and confiscate.689 
 
 
 
Identity thieves are presented as agents, the active and dynamic forces responsible for 
the creation of a social problem. They are highly present in the discourse. They are 
presented in generic and functionalistic ways with no nomination ± they are never 
given names but instead represented as anonymous (and unknowable) members of a 
particular denigrated group defined by what they do (steal identities) rather than other 
identities they may possess. This depersonalises them and removes them from the 
immediate experience of the audience of these texts.690 Identity thieves, along with 
other fraudsters and criminals, are presented as a faceless external threat to the 
continuation of that experience.   
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For crime to pay, criminals need to launder their profits (in other words, to 
PDNHµGLUW\¶PRQH\± money obtained illegally ± ORRNµFOHDQ¶&ULPLQDOV
can use false identities or the identities of innocent people to take out 
financial products such as bank accounts. They use these to launder 
money ± using false names makes it difficult to trace money back to them. 
But if they use their own names and there is an investigation, identity-
check records will help law enforcement.691 
 
Criminals are always looking for ways to get hold of your cards, PINs and 
card details and the industry is committed to fighting fraud on all fronts.692 
 
 
 
As in oppositional discourse, criminals are represented as sophisticated and highly 
technically skilled, operating in international organisations with complex organisation 
divisions of labour.693 They are presented as highly competent surveillance agents 
with the ability to acquire and use large amounts of personal information. 
 
 
To minimise their own chances of being uncovered, the gangs structure 
their operations in a complex manner, layering their external relationships 
and utilising the relative anonymity of the Internet to remain remote and 
unaccountable from other parts of the fraud ring. Even if a runner is pulled 
in, it is unlikely they will know anything about whom they are working 
for.694 
 
Fuelled by the growth of the Internet ± identity fraud has moved from 
being a predominantly opportunistic offence into the realm of organised 
crime, which accounts for the dramatic increases in identity fraud we have 
witnessed over the last few years.695 
 
The organised criminal identity fraudster ± who is now e-enabled, IT 
savvy and (anti-)social networked.696 
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This suggests that fraudsters are adopting strategies of adaptation and 
diversification in order to find innovative ways of committing card fraud 
in response to prevention measures such as chip and PIN.697 
 
Therefore, the proportion of identity theft/fraud facilitated online is 
expected to increase throughout 2007 as a result of the increasing 
technical sophistication and organisation of fraudsters and the increasing 
amount of identity information that may be gathered from online 
sources.698 
 
The increased level of current address fraud demonstrates that fraudsters 
DUHLQFUHDVLQJO\DFTXLULQJDYHU\WKRURXJKNQRZOHGJHRIWKHYLFWLP¶V
details. They will therefore supplement basic information with that 
available online in order to quickly build up a comprehensive portfolio of 
identity information relating to the victim.699 
 
 
 
The focus on bin-raiding (the practice of sorting through household rubbish to retrieve 
personal information) builds a representation of identity thieves as deviant and 
unclean. It is not normal practice in the UK for anybody except the desperate to sort 
through dirty, unhygienic household rubbish. As environmentalists have discovered, it 
is difficult to get households to sort their rubbish for recycling prior to collection. The 
actual scale of this practice has been contested by suggestions that sufficient data to 
conduct identity theft can more easily be acquired online. If bin-raiding is a myth, it is 
a persistent one, and one that is represented in the responsibilisation of the individual 
and the near constant exhortation to shred all personal documents before throwing 
them away.   
 
 
One North London Authority discovered that homeless people were being 
paid upwards of £5 by fraudsters for each document they found in the 
rubbish.700 
 
'RQ¶WPDNH\RXUUXEELVKELQDJROGPLQHIRULGHQWLW\WKLHYHV'HVWUR\DOO
confidential rubbish before throwing it away. You can get inexpensive 
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document shredders from many shops. Cross shredders offer the best 
protection as they turn documents into very small squares.701 
 
What is most alarming is that the numbers of households who are 
disposing of personal information in an unsafe manner have in many cases 
actually increased. For instance, the number of bins containing bank 
account numbers and sort codes has risen by a massive 20 per cent.702 
 
First, let's clear up a couple of myths. Fraudsters aren't rooting around in 
your rubbish looking for receipts. They can get all the information they 
need in a couple of hours online.703 
 
 
 
Victims and vulnerable people 
 
The third point of discursive contestation is the floating subject position of the 
vulnerable. This subject position is made available by all the discourses discussed 
here, although the filling in of the position varies significantly. There is also 
contestation over the reasons for this vulnerability. 
 
News media portrayals of surveillance often focus upon the victims of surveillance 
through the human impact frame. Personal anecdotes are used to illustrate the 
potential effects or dangers of surveillance practices. For example the victim of 
identity theft recounts how it took him several months and much inconvenience to 
rebuild his identity.  
 
 
IT TOOK James Bristow, the manager of a large property firm, 13 months 
to have his daughter Caitlin's DNA details erased from the national 
database.704 
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Leaving Mrs Howlett in the situation where she might be placed under 
surveillance at any time would cause her anxiety and uncertainty and was 
a course of conduct amounting to harassment under section 1(1) of the 
1997 Act.705 
 
 
 
In government discourse, these are the individuals and groups of individuals who are 
constructed as the most vulnerable groups in society. The exact content of this subject 
position is sometimes left floating or empty, but can include children, the elderly and 
the poor. The vulnerable are that way for two reasons: firstly, because malign actors 
are able to hide their intentions or escape punishment, and secondly because they may 
be direct targets of identity theft.  
 
The vulnerability of the population to identity theft is taken as environmentally 
homogeneous, with all individuals facing an equal level of danger. However, some 
individuals are best placed to mitigate that danger, either through personal 
information management practices or by engaging private sector information and 
identity security providers. Whilst government discourse is sceptical of the ability of 
the private sector to protect vulnerable identities, this still leaves some individuals 
more vulnerable than others, unless appropriate identity systems (such as the proposed 
ID card) are put in place. Vulnerability is constructed as a social problem of 
governance and acts as a drive for secure identity systems. 
 
Illegal immigrants are also constructed as vulnerable to employers who would exploit 
their illegal position. There is also concern that vulnerable people need to be included 
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in the identity card scheme from the early stages in order to continue their access to 
services.  
 
 
Enhance checks as part of safeguarding for the vulnerable: the 
Scheme will introduce a high level of efficiency in authentication of 
identity, and this will significantly support checks on people working with 
children and the most vulnerable.706 
 
To combat illegal working and help stop unscrupulous employers 
undercutting legitimate companies who are employing some of the most 
vulnerable members of society on the minimum wage.707 
 
Unless we invest in identity systems we leave our borders and our 
economy open to abuse, we leave individuals defenceless against fraud 
and we risk leaving the benefits safety nets we've worked so hard for, 
vulnerable to attack. Against all these risks, it's unlikely to be the most 
well off who will be hurt first - it will be those who cannot afford to buy 
their own defences.708 
 
 
 
The ICO discourse, whilst contesting the ability of government systems to remove the 
vulnerability, and highlighting individual responsibility, does situate all subject 
positions as functionally equivalent vis-à-vis the risk of identity theft. This can be 
seen in the way that all identities are assumed to be valuable. As with its portrayal of 
criminals, the discourse of the banking and finance institutions presents a much more 
differentiated representation of the victims of identity theft. Victims are generally 
passivated, appearing as the object of actions by others, until forced to exert agency to 
deal with the repercussions of identity theft. The claims that all subject positions are 
equally vulnerable are contested by the proliferation of subject positions as the 
discourse creates a huge range of categories distinguished by income, lifestyle, 
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occupation etc. The most likely victims, according to financial services providers, are 
the wealthy, professionals, directors and those living in affluent areas. The lifestyles 
of these subject positions are said to make them attractive to fraudsters, however it 
could be interpreted as the identity of these individuals that is attractive, granting 
access to high levels of credit. CIFAS statistics show that the most common victims 
of identity theft are those earning over £60,000, with settled suburban lifestyles.709 
 
 
Fraudsters increasingly move towards premeditating and implementing 
soSKLVWLFDWHGDWWDFNVDJDLQVWDZLGHUUDQJHRIµKLJKHUYDOXH¶DQGµHDV\
WDUJHW¶YLFWLPV9LFWLPVKDYHWKHZHDOWKRUDVVHWVWRDWWUDFWDWWHQWLRQRU
live in high-risk locations and circumstances.710 
 
The wealth of the Cream of the Crop, the top-salaried professionals, 
directors and business owners who often live in the most exclusive city 
flats and residences, makes them prime targets for identity thieves, who 
use a variety of techniques to target them. This group is statistically 
almost four times more likely to fall victim. The affluent company 
directors and business owners that that make up the Smart Money and 
Corporate Top Dogs types also feature amongst the higher risk 
groups.711 
 
The lifestyles of the top salaried professionals ± directors and business 
owners who often live in the most exclusive city residences ± continues to 
make them prime targets for identity fraudsters. They are almost four 
times more likely to fall victim than the average UK resident. Those 
renting ± either privately or from local authorities ± are also at high risk. 
Young singles and homesharers who live in flats rented from local 
councils or housing associations are more than twice as likely to fall 
victim, as are the young, single, wealthy people who rent high-value flats 
in fashionable areas.712 
 
London remains the identity fraud capital of the UK with all of the top 25 
most-at-risk areas located inside the M25. The area around Victoria Street 
in Westminster has overtaken Kensington as the highest risk area in the 
UK for identity fraud, with residents there being almost three-and-a-half 
times more likely to fall victim than the national average. Those living 
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inside the M25 are on average two-and-a-half times more likely to fall 
victim.713 
 
 
 
The discourse of opposition to identity cards provides a number of subject positions 
articulated as socially vulnerable: a situation which is likely to be exacerbated by the 
introduction of identity cards&RQWHVWLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDUWLFXODWLRQRI
vulnerability to environmental threat of identity theft, identity cards are constructed as 
potentially discriminatory and causing vulnerability. This forms a significant part of 
WKHRSSRVLWLRQ¶VQRUPDWLYHHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHLGHQWLW\FDUGVFKHPH7KHVHVXEMHFW
positions include minority ethnic groups, older people, the frail, the disabled, people 
with mental illnesses or mental health problems, those who live in insecure 
accommodation, move house frequently, the homeless, people with complex personal 
information, people whose personal information changes frequently, the 
disadvantaged, those least able to afford the cards, people with unstable lives, people 
fleeing domestic abuse, those who do not look white, people forced to depend on the 
black economy, and anyone whose circumstances are a little out of the ordinary. 
These diverse individuals are placed in a vulnerable relationship to the state or the 
government. 
 
 
A wide range of interest groups, including those representing minority 
racial groups, the homeless, and those with mental health problems 
have expressed concern at the implications of the scheme. We share these 
concerns that vulnerable groups may be adversely affected.714 
 
The Law Society has expressed concerns that the introduction of identity 
cards could have a disproportionate affect on minority ethnic groups, 
those with complex personal information, and those whose 
information changes frequently.715 
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 268 
Rethink expressed concerns over the possibility that people with mental 
illness may in some circumstances find it difficult to participate in an 
identity cards scheme. This may be as a result of living a chaotic life, not 
wishing to be identified, losing belongings, being vulnerable and relying 
on income from benefits. A particular concern is that individuals may be 
turned away from the public services they need and may have an 
additional financial burden.716 
 
7KH&LYLO6HUYLFH3HQVLRQHUV¶$OOLDQFHH[SUHVVHGFRQFHUQWKDWWKHVFKHPH
might disadvantage some older people, particular the disabled, frail and 
infirm. They pointed out that many older people would not be able to 
attend personally for registration, may have difficulties advising of 
changes in personal details or remembering the PIN numbers. CSPA also 
raised the issue of charging, arguing that all people of state pension age 
should be provided with a free identity card.717 
 
 
 
These subject positions are made more vulnerable by the introduction of identity cards 
for three main reasons. Many of these groups are represented as dependent on services 
which might be denied to them on the basis of the identity scheme, they may have 
additional problems in registering or updating information on the register. There is 
concern that the identity card scheme will lead to disproportionate targeting of people 
based on race or ethnicity. The identity scheme is constructed as creating a false 
division of the social space. 
 
 
Identity cards will have particular consequences for race relations. We are 
concerned by the disproportionate use of stop and search against 
ethnic minority groups«(YHQLILGHQWLW\FDUGVGRQRWKDYHWREH
produced to the police upon request, they will frequently have to be 
produced to access services. This is likely to predominantly affect ethnic 
minorities2XUFRQFHUQVDUHH[DFHUEDWHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDUJXPHQW
that identity cards will be an effective tool of immigration control.718 
 
The CRE have concerns in the light of statistics on stop and search in this 
country and of ID cards in other European countries, that they impact 
disproportionately on ethnic minority communities. Whilst the CRE 
noted the GovernmenW¶VVWDWHPHQWWKDWWKHUHZLOOEHQRQHZSRZHUVIRU
the police and the protections in Clause 19, they remain concerned that 
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Clause 19 protections are not applicable after compulsion. The CRE are 
similarly concerned that black and ethnic minority individuals are 
more likely to be asked to produce an identity card to prove identity 
or entitlement to services. The CRE contend that in the non-compulsory 
stage, particular racial groups might feel under pressure to obtain a 
card.719 
 
 
 
Banking and finance discourses attempt a rearticulation of a legal definition of victim. 
The vast majority of the constructions of victims across these discourses refer to 
individuals whose identity has been stolen. It is this victim who is advised to contact 
credit reference agencies, and police their credit record. It is however, often the 
EDQN¶VPRQH\WKDWKDVDFWXDOO\EHHQVWROHQ7KLVDUWLFXODWLRQWKDWWKHYLFWLPVDUHWKH
(generally non-liable) individuals whose accounts are used to defraud banks and 
companies supports the construction of appropriate conduct in protecting personal 
identity. Individuals should take appropriate steps in order to limit the likelihood that 
the banks will lose money. 
 
 
However, in the eyes of the law, the financial institutions/lending 
organisations are considered the only victims, because they are the ones 
who have been defrauded. As a result, the damage inflicted on the 
reputation of the victims and the time they spend mending the trail of 
destruction cannot easily be redressed. Any such compensation needs to 
be fought for through the civil courts. This is likely to continue to be the 
case until legislation is introduced to specifically outlaw identity theft, as 
in the USA.720 
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Conclusions 
 
Individualism is hegemonic in these discourses: rights, risk and costs of identity and 
surveillance issues are held and carried by individuals. All discourses construct 
outcomes in terms of what is best for the individual. The individual is positively 
evaluated in all the discourses of surveillance, and group experience and identities are 
downplayed.  
 
There is discursive contestation over the privacy rights of individuals and there is 
contestation over the degree to which the individual is or should be subject to 
surveillance practices. There is also contestation over the degree of capability and 
specific tactics of criminals, and who are the most vulnerable groups in society. The 
SRWHQWLDOµPRVWYXOQHUDEOH¶DUHRIWHQVLPLODUJURXSVEXWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFODLPWKDW
they are made vulnerable by the absence of a surveillance system is contested by 
claims that they will be placed at greater risk should a system be implemented.  
 
Logics of equivalence which articulate together a wide range of negatively evaluated 
subject positions quilted by the nodal point of terrorism are dominant in government 
discourse and largely accepted by media discourses. This serves to associate all 
subject positions in the chain with the ultimate contemporary evil of terrorism, and 
also to associate any desire for anonymity with malign and criminal subjects. Anti-
government discourses respond to perceived attempts to treat non-criminals as 
criminals. Whilst discursively, the government separates criminals from normal 
people, the material practices of the functioning of the NIR are understood as 
conflating two separate subject positions. 
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Across the discourses, and hegemonic in banking and finance discourses, there is a 
focus on the actions of criminal subject positions as the agents responsible for the 
social problems of identity fraud. This elides social problems caused by the practices 
and technologies of the finance industry itself. Any risks to individuals are caused by 
the actions of other (negatively evaluated) individuals. Because the identity thief is 
hard to identify, with no typical profile, anybody could be a potential identity thief, 
just as anybody could potentially lie about who they are, and a wide range of subject 
positions make illegitimate use of false identities. This leads to a diffusion of 
suspicion across society, presenting an environmental threat to identity. It is only 
banking and finance discourses that rearticulate the level of risk, revealing that it is 
the wealthy that are most at risk from identity theft.
 272 
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Chapter Six: The Articulation of Identity in Discourses of Surveillance 
 
This chapter presents the final empirical analysis results, answering the research 
question: how is the idea of individual identity articulated within contemporary 
discourses of surveillance in the UK? It does this by identifying cross-discursive 
regularities and points of antagonism and by laying out a schema of identity. This 
shows how identity is articulated in governmental discourses as ontologically 
objective, unitary, physical, shallow, behavioural, attributed, persistent and socially 
vulnerable. This chapter, in contrast to Chapter Five, focuses on the role of identity as 
contested signifier, the form rather than the content of identity. Once these two 
activities have been completed, it will be possible to examine the political and 
theoretical effects of this in the final chapter.  
 
Identity is ontologically objective 
 
The concept of the false identity is very commonplace throughout the governmental 
discourse. This suggests the presence of its binary opposite, the un-enunciated true 
identity against which false identity is compared. The existence and dominance of this 
concept suggests an evaluative schema for determining what counts as a true (or false) 
identity.  
 
 
The 'biographical footprint' check will make it extremely difficult to 
register with the National Identity Scheme under a false identity.721 
 
It is possible to assume a false identity or obtain false documentation 
used as evidence of identity whether the tests of identity applied are 
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³DWWULEXWHG´³ELRJUDSKLFDO´RU³ELRPHWULF´%XW³DWWULEXWHG´LGHQWLW\LVE\
IDUWKHHDVLHVWWRDVVXPHXQGHUIDOVHSUHWHQFHV´722 
 
 
 
False identities are almost universally negatively evaluated in government discourse; 
associated strongly with the subject positions of criminals, terrorists, benefit 
fraudsters and illegal immigrants. False identities are used to launder money, to 
perpetrate terrorism, and to defraud the social security system.  
 
 
It has been estimated that false identities are used to launder around 
£390m every year.723 
 
False identities DQGIDOVHLGHQWLW\GRFXPHQWVDUHVWDQGDUGµWRROVRIWKH
WUDGH¶IRUorganised criminal organisations.724 
 
The National Identity Scheme will disrupt the use of false identities by 
terrorist organisations, for example in money laundering and organised 
crime. We know that terrorist suspects make use of false identities. 
The scheme would also be a useful tool in helping to maintain and disrupt 
the activities of terrorist networks.725 
 
The use of false identities plays an increasing part in illegal activity, 
with sometimes devastating and costly results.726 
 
 
 
The distinction between true and false identities allows the construction of identity as 
possessing an essential ontological truth value. Identity can be authoritative, 
established without question if the right mechanisms are in place to achieve this. The 
identity scheme is not constructed as creating or fixing a social identity, but rather 
discovering and revealing something that already exists. Knowledge of identity is an 
epistemological and practical problem rather than an ontological or metaphysical 
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SUREOHP7KLVLVQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHGLVFRXUVH¶VIRFXVRQWKHZD\VLQZKLFKLGHQWLW\FDQ
be verified, checked, authenticated and fundamentally proven. 
 
 
 
Identity should be validated and verified on the basis of biographical 
checks for most applicants and checked against a register of known and 
suspected frauds ± with those not passing such checks invited in for face-
to-face interview.727 
 
 
 
Identity can be checked and authenticated, implying the existence of additional 
external sources of identity evidence. When an individual is questioned about their 
identity, their statements must be checked against an authoritative source. Only 
certain voices can act as this source, whilst others are denied this function. In this 
discourse, the external source of identity against which identity can be checked is the 
National Identity Register underpinning the ID card scheme. Again this constructs 
these social processes as revealing something pre-existing, rather than creating a 
social fact. 
 
 
(DFK,'FDUGZLOOEHXQLTXHDQGZLOOFRPELQHWKHFDUGKROGHU¶VELRPHWULF
data with their checked and confirmed Identity details, called a 
µELRJUDSKLFDOIRRWSULQW¶7KHVHLGHQWLW\GHWDLOVDQGWKHELRPHWULFVZLOOEH
stored on the National Identity Register.728 
 
Through the scheme, which will be run by the Identity and Passport 
Service (IPS), accredited organisations will be able ± with your 
permission ± to use your ID card and the NIR to check your identity.729 
 
Our vision remains focused on stronger identity authentication to 
continue to provide even better customer service by safeguarding our 
FXVWRPHUV¶LGHQWLWLHVDQGUHIOHFWLQJRXULQWHQGHGIXWXUHUROHLQWKH
*RYHUQPHQW¶VLGHQWLW\FDUGVVFKHPH730 
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Authentication requires both validation and verification: validation 
being the process of establishing that a claimed identity exists (ie. relates 
WRD³UHDO´SHUVRQDQGYHULILFDWLRQEHLQJWKHSURFHVVRIHVWDEOLVKLQJWKDW
WKHSHUVRQXVLQJWKHLGHQWLW\ULJKWIXOO\³RZQV´LWRIWHQGRQHE\testing for 
detailed knowledge of the identity which typically only the rightful owner 
would have).731 
 
 
 
Identity can be proven authoritatively. This creates an antagonistic relationship 
between the individual who is either placed in a position where she needs to prove her 
identity, or places herself in such a position, and the institution to which she must 
prove her identity. The accuracy or truth of identity presented by the individual is 
TXHVWLRQHG7KHSUHVXPSWLRQLVWKDWZKHQDVNHGµZKRDUH\RX"¶LQGLYLduals may 
lie.732 The need to prove identity is normalised as an essential part of modern social 
life.  
 
 
Being able to prove who you are is a fundamental part of modern life.  
We need a more robust and secure way to check that identities are real and 
that people are who they say they are.733 
 
<RXZRQ¶WQHHGWRFDUU\WKHFDUGZLWK\RXDWDOOWLPHVand if you need to 
prove your identity without the card you will be able to do so by 
providing a few details about yourself along with a biometric, such as a 
fingerprint or PIN.734 
 
The Scheme will provide a comprehensive and secure way of recording 
personal identity information, storing it and making it possible for you to 
use it if you want to prove your identity.735 
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As with government, identity is theoretically provable in banking and financial 
discourse. Ontologically, any given identity can be either true or false. However, 
epistemologically this cannot be known with complete certainty. Instead proof is 
always associated with concepts such as reasonable satisfaction and sufficient proof 
or evidence. Despite this scepticism towards any given proof of identity, identity is a 
non-subjective quality. The ability to prove identity is understood as a social 
necessity, a legal requirement, and a positive activity. 
 
 
Please remember though, the law requires that you must provide 
satisfactory proof of your identity. If you cannot meet this requirement, 
then under the law the bank or building society must not open an account 
for you.736 
 
Proving your identity can help to fight financial crime such as money 
laundering. This is why the law says financial services firms must check 
the identity of their new customers.737  
 
 
 
ICO discourse also accepts identity is capable of verification, thus attributing a truth 
value to identity. Identities can either be true and real (in which case they will be 
successfully verified) or false (in which case they will fail verification). This truth 
value may be very hard to access, as is seen in the doubts raised over the ability of the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSUoposed identity card scheme and its gold standard of identity 
verification738, but it exists ontologically. In this sense, the ICO discourse also 
subscribes to an ontologically realist understanding of identity. 
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If an entitlement card scheme was introduced the card itself would be 
viewed as having an unrivalled status in terms of identity verification. 
It may be relied upon as the GHILQLWLYHSURRIRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VLGHQWLW\ 
and other particulars relating to them.739 
 
 
As with ICO discourses, news media discourses largely accept the realist ontological 
status of identity, instead contesting the accuracy of surveillance systems and their 
ability to prove identity. There are risks to specific technological attempts to provide 
proof of identity, but these arise from the technologies rather than anything 
fundamental about attempts to prove identity. 
 
 
Looking through the ID card debates in Hansard, it becomes obvious that 
most MPs simply didn't understand that the threat comes not just from 
pooling everyone's information in one database, but from creating a single 
trusted identifier which is bound to become an irresistible challenge for 
criminals.740 
 
 
 
 
Opposition discourses contest the ease with which identity is proven in government 
discourse. Identities tend to be unknown rather than unproven. Identity is constructed 
in a way that suggests that difficulties in proving identity may not lie in simply 
pragmatic or technical deficiencies (although these are certainly present) but arise 
because identity may not be provable at all. At a certain point in the discourse, 
identity is constructed as metaphysical, something that does not easily map onto 
bureaucratic administration or measurable tokens, even if such mapping were socially 
desirable. 
 
 
                                               
739
 ,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFH-XQHThe Identity Cards Bill ± The Information 
&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V&RQFHUQV 
740
 Porter, H. (19th 1RYHPEHUµ6XUYHLOODQFHLVUHDOO\JHWWLQJXQGHUP\VNLQ7KLVXQLTXHKXPDQ
chip implant was supposed to protect me ± EXWLWMXVWPDNHVPHPRUHYXOQHUDEOH¶The Observer. 
 279 
Of interest is the concept of proving individual identity. We are familiar 
with a wide range of documents in the twenty first century, but all they do 
is record the name of an individual. No document acts to establish proof 
of identity, not even a birth certificate.741 
 
All a registration card will demonstrate is: That an individual might have 
attended a designated centre to have recordings taken of such biometric 
measurements of their body as are deemed required, and that they 
presented a sufficient number of other forms of record (such as a passport, 
driving licence and such like) to establish a causal link between the 
documents held in their possession and the claim that they are the person 
identified in these documents.742 
 
The point about identity is that it is a metaphysical concept, and as such 
it cannot be inextricably linked to a physical token. Even if it was possible 
to create such a bond, it is questionable whether our identity should be 
tethered in such a way.743 
 
 
 
Some elements of identity are constructed as social constructions rather than 
fundamental essential characteristics. Gender is regarded as particularly problematic 
given the existence of trans-gender individuals, who have willingly changed an 
element of their identity perceived as socially significant. This also contests 
constructions of identity as permanent over the life course, as gender identity is 
defined by the way an individual lives, not their origin.744 
 
 
With regard to what should be on the face of the card, Beaumont Trust 
asked that gender should not be included as means of identification as 
they believe this would embarrass both early stage transsexuals and 
transvestites. PFC commented that the flexibility of identity is necessary 
for those living dual-gendered lives and recommended that the Bill should 
either explicitly allow the issue of multiple identity cards or not record 
gender on the face of the card.745 
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Oppositional discourse does occasionally adopt the ontological distinction between 
true and false identity, but primarily for the purposes of providing a critique of factual 
claims about the use of false identities. Terrorists are constructed as using false 
identities, but claims that identity cards prevent or limit the use of false identities are 
contested. 
 
 
Almost two thirds of known terrorists operate under their true identity. 
The remainder use a variety of techniques to forge or impersonate 
identities. It is possible that the existence of a high integrity identity card 
would provide a measure of improved legitimacy for these people.746 
 
It is the detail on the card that can (and will) be faked. Thus a terrorist will 
have a false card with his iris scan or his fingerprint, but a fake name 
address and citizen number ± all illegally (but properly) registered on 
the National Identity Register by (say) a paid insider. When he uses the 
card at the airport, the iris scan will match the card and his record will 
come up as John Doe, 43 The Street, Anytown ± whereas he is really Mr 
A Terrorist, c/o Osama Enterprises etc.747 
 
 
 
Identity is unitary  
 
 
 
In addition to critiquing false identity, government discourse allows normal law-
abiding individuals to possess only one legitimate, true identity. The aim of identity 
mechanisms is to be able to link or tie a single identity to a single individual. 
Additional identities on top of this true identity are constructed as criminal, or at the 
very least suspicious. Multiple identities are the preserve of criminals and terrorists. 
There is no recognition in government discourse that there could be personal 
preferences for multiple or overlapping identities without malign intent. This is found 
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in references to identity in the singular when talking about a single individual: 
µSURWHFW\RXULGHQWLW\¶UDWKHUWKDQµSURWHFW\RXULGHQWLWLHV¶,WFDQDOVREHGLVFHUQHGLQ
statements similar to the following: 
 
The scheme would provide a step change in preventing people from 
obtaining multiple identities.748 
 
Identity fraud is not an offence per se, but an enabler for other offences. It 
is very rarely committed for its own sake. There are three basic reasons 
for a person to develop a second (and possibly, subsequent) identity. 
These reasons are: to avoid being identified in the original identity, to 
make financial profit from some form of fraud, or to avoid financial 
liability.749 
 
 
 
The one exception to this negative evaluation of multiple identities is the legitimate 
use of false identities by undercover law enforcement. The implication here is that if 
an individual is not an appropriate agent of the state, then they should not have a false 
identity. 
 
 
It is presence on historical databases that is the hardest test to pass for 
those wanting legitimately to develop false identities i.e. officials 
working undercover.750 
 
 
 
For banking and finance discourse it is not false identity itself that creates a social 
problem, but the act of adopting an additional identity is understood as a signal of 
perfidy or malicious intent. False identities are discarded, creating significant 
problems for a financial system predicated upon identity as a consistent, historical 
UHFRUGRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VUHOLDELOLW\RYHUDQH[WHQGHGWLPHSHULRG1RWDOOLGHQWLWLHVDUH
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equally valued; some are clean with a higher value to criminals. Multiple identities 
make risk assessment activities more problematic. 
 
 
Fraudsters are financial criminals. They are unlikely to use their own 
identity for their criminal activity. They will either create a new false 
identity, or, more commonly, will attempt to pose as someone else - 
someone with a clean identity, a good financial history and a reputation 
of settling their accounts on time.751 
 
Criminals can use false identities or the identities of innocent people to 
take out financial products such as bank accounts. They use these to 
launder money ± using false names makes it difficult to trace money back 
to them. But if they use their own names and there is an investigation, 
identity-check records will help law enforcement.752 
 
 
 
In a counter-articulation, ICO discourse allows for anonymity and fictitious identities 
in certain restricted circumstances. This shows that whilst identity has a truth/falsity 
characteristic, false identities are not universally discredited and negatively evaluated. 
False identities are however, overlaid over true or real identities (as seen with the 
priority given to biometric forms of identification). Control over identity is therefore 
limited to control over the presentation of identity, or decisions on where to make use 
of your identity. 
 
 
We must recognise that we may risk turning our society from one where 
the need to prove identity is commensurate with the service on offer, with 
complete anonymity being a real option in many circumstances, to one 
where the highest level of identity validation becomes the norm for the 
most mundane of services.753 
 
It has been suggested that a new criminal offence of identity fraud be 
created. Great care needs to be taken to avoid criminalising the 
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assumption of a fictitious identity to preserve anonymity in legitimate 
or inconsequential circumstances.754 
 
 
 
In a similar way, multiple or fictitious identities are not automatically evaluated as 
malicious or dangerous in ID card opposition discourse. Many statements draw upon 
common law tradition to represent multiple or fictitious identities as both legitimate 
and potentially necessary. Positively evaluated examples of fictitious identities are 
presented, including artists, writers, or groups of people constructed as particularly 
vulnerable to their identity. Multiple and false identities are emptied out of dangerous 
or hostile content. 
 
 
It has been a long-standing principle of common law in this country that a 
person is free to use more than one name... for example singers, actors 
and writers often use an assumed name for their art, and that name may 
carry over into wider usage... There are many... cases where a person 
would not want their two identities connected, and indeed it may be 
dangerous for them to be connected... To have a single identity in the 
NIR [National Identity Register] showing both current and previous 
names would immediately undermine that privacy whenever an identity 
check was made against it...Explicit restrictions on the disclosure of this 
crucial information [is required].755 
 
A variety of persons have good reason to conceal their identity and 
whereabouts, for example: those fleeing domestic abuse; victims of 
³KRQRXU´FULPHVZLWQHVVHVLQFULPLQDOFDVHVWKRVHDWULVNRINLGQDSSLQJ
undercover investigators; refugees from oppressive regimes overseas; 
those pursued by the press; those who may be terrorist targets.756 
 
 
 
Identity is associated with external physical characteristics 
 
Identity is a feature of individual humans, and is often associated with biometrics ± 
measurements of physical characteristics unique to each particular individual. ID 
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cards (and the government ID scheme more broadly) link an identity to a particular 
individual. This suggests the possibility of identity being ontologically separate (or 
separable) from individuals. Biometrics allow the possibility of preventing this 
coming loose of identity and the individual. Governmental discourse articulates the 
possibility that tying an individual to an identity has been difficult in the past. Identity 
has not been sufficiently tied to corporeality, and this is a social problem that requires 
action to rectify. The tight linking of identity and biometrics is constructed as a way 
of ensuring the security of identity systems. In government discourse, the component 
of identity understood as biometric identity is biologically determinist.757 It is derived 
from technologies of differentiation. Biometrics such as DNA profiling or 
fingerprinting allow the differentiation between human beings. These physical 
markers are constructed as persistent over time. Biological markers are constructed as 
unique and belonging to the individual. However, they (with the exception perhaps of 
older forms of identifier such as the facial image or the signature) only become visible 
through the use of specific technologies, which are often not possessed or controlled 
by the individual. Biometrics could have been alternatively constructed as a co-
creation between the individual and the technology operators or even as an invasive 
PRQLWRULQJRIWKHLQGLYLGXDOE\H[WHUQDODFWRUV&RQWUDVWµ\RXUELRPHWULFV¶ZLWKµRXU
PHDVXUHPHQWVRI\RXUSK\VLFDOIHDWXUHV¶. 
 
 
In future, the recording of biometrics, such as fingerprints, iris patterns or 
facial image means that we will have a much stronger way of linking 
identity to the person. A national ID card will be a robust, secure way to 
establish that identities are real, not fabricated.758 
 
Biometric technology now means that we can link people to a unique 
identity.759 
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There are already several government databases that hold biographical 
information used to identify people. The real step change in the 
National Identity Scheme is that biometrics, such as fingerprints, will 
be recorded and linked to a single, confirmed biographical record 
(covering name, address, etc.). Biometrics will tie an individual securely 
to a single unique identity.760 
 
The National Identity Scheme, to be phased in over a number of years, 
will link basic personal information, such as name and address, to 
secure biometrics - DFRPSXWHULPDJHRIDSHUVRQ¶VLULVIDFHRU
fingerprints. These are unique and provide a hi-tech form of security for 
every citizen.761 
 
Biometrics ± fingerprints, iris and facial data ± are now well established as 
the most secure way of fixing an individual to a unique identity.762 
 
 
 
In ICO discourse, identity has a physical component, although it is clear that this is 
not the sole component of identity. Biometrics ± measurements of physical 
uniqueness and difference, allow the strong linking of identity and an individual. 
 
 
If a reliable indicator of identity is the core aim of the scheme then it 
should seek to achieve this aim in the most reliable way. It is recognised 
that the inclusion of a biometric encrypted on a smartcard chip would be a 
way to OLQNLGHQWLW\WRDSDUWLFXODUSHUVRQE\ZD\RIDµXQLTXH¶
physical characteristic.763 
 
Other systems of checks are perfectly feasible such as a local card reader 
and biometric reader verifying identity.764 
 
 
 
Opposition discourses attempt to deconstruct links between biometrics and identity, 
and problematise the use of biometrics and the way that they are assumed to be 
unproblematic or to produce authoritative proof of identity. It draws upon a general 
narrative of science to contest claims by specific, interested technology vendors. 
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Biometrics can only provide probabilities not authoritative certainties. This scepticism 
is reflected in parts of the news media discourse, however the potential of 
technologies is more frequently emphasised.   
 
 
The government are assuming that biometric measurements are perfect ± 
an assumption that is not demonstrated by the scientific evidence. Worse 
still there is relatively little experience in the widespread deployment of 
systems involving biometrics and large population databases. Hence many 
of the claims being made can only be speculative and cannot possibly 
justify the expenditure of unquantifiable sums of taxSD\HU¶VPRQH\765 
 
Biometrics is not simple. Biometrics is the science of measuring and 
statistically analyzing human body characteristics, such as faces, iris 
patterns, fingerprints, voice recognition and so on. Features of them are 
not always unique, and so biometrics works with the statistical 
probability rather than offering definite identification. The idea is an 
added "safeguard" to prevent another person from using your ID card. A 
fingerprint is much more difficult to forge than a signature. But that relies 
on biometric data being checked every time the card is used. Each check 
against the national database will be recorded.766 
 
Biometrics raise very serious issues about civil liberties. The most 
important point is that, once submitted, they cannot be recovered and 
there is nothing to prevent them remaining on Government IT systems for 
all eternity. There is a good argument that our biometrics are essentially 
our own property and the business of no-one else, least of all 
Government.767 
 
 
 
Identity is shallow. 
 
The various discourses also provide various articulations of the concepts can be 
included within identity. Identity may, in this limited respect, be playing the part of a 
floating signifier that is filled in by competing discourses. Across several discourses 
identity is composed of a relatively limited set of data (deemed important) that 
excludes other information (deemed unimportant). In government discourse, the 
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boundaries of the concept of identity are expansive and somewhat fuzzy; indicating 
that even within the governmental discourse the concept is not fully hegemonic. Some 
articulations of identity include facts such as address whilst other articulations make 
such things separate from identity: 
 
 
These checks will simply confirm your identity or other known facts, 
such as your address details, from the NIR.768 
 
 
 
The apparent emptiness of the concept with regard to its particular content may be a 
requirement for the wider structure of government discourse. The structural elements 
RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V,' process suggest that a wide range of recordable information is 
included as part of identity. However, only surveillance-permeable information 
(registrable facts) is included. 
 
The concept of individual identity is explicitly articulated in financial discourse as 
name, personal details/information and the possession of a number of designated 
identity documents. It is this definition of identity as personal information that allows 
identity to be stolen during identity theft. 
 
 
Your identity is made up by your personal details (for example your 
name, address and date of birth), and a collection of documents and 
records (such as utility bills, passports, driving licences, birth certificates 
and your bank details). Any of these details are potentially useful to 
identity thieves.769 
 
Identity theft: When somebody steals your name and other personal 
information. The information can be used to get credit, goods and 
                                               
768
 www.identitycards.gov.uk/how-organisations.asp. 
769
 &,)$6XQGDWHGOHDIOHWµ:KDWLV,GHQWLW\)UDXG¶
http://www.cifas.org.uk/download/Identity_Fraud_Leaflet.pdf (26/09/2007). 
 288 
services in your name, or to provide thieves with false credentials so they 
can hide their own criminal identities.770 
 
The identity of an individual has a number of aspects: e.g., his/her given 
name (which of course may change), date of birth, place of birth. Other 
facts about an individual accumulate over time (the so-called electronic 
³IRRWSULQW´HJIDmily circumstances and addresses, employment and 
business career, contacts with the authorities or with other financial sector 
firms, physical appearance.771 
 
 
 
Similarly, in financial discourse, identity is closely associated with address ± the 
physical location at which an individual is assumed to be resident or closely tied to. 
The link between address and identity can be stronger than the link between identity 
and the individual ± identity can be left behind at a previous address. The linkage is 
represented as important for law enforcement purposes.772 
 
 
About 40% of the fraud people report to us involves their previous 
address. If you move, take your identity with you!773 
 
7KHDELOLW\WRDVNTXHVWLRQVUHODWLQJWRGDWDKHOGDWWKHDSSOLFDQW¶V
supplied previous address also serves as a powerful and unique 
impersonation fraud prevention capability.774 
 
If you move home, inform all the relevant organisations of your change in 
address straight away to make sure all your accounts move with you.775 
 
 
 
ICO discourse creates equivalence between identity and personal information (or 
personal data). $QLQGLYLGXDO¶VLGHQWLW\LVFRPSRVHGRISHUVRQDOGDWDDERXWDQG
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relating to that individual. SHFRQGO\DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VLGHQWLW\FDQEHUHDGRIIIURP
personal data used in the process of identification of an individual. 
 
 
µ3HUVRQDOGDWD¶PHDQVGDWDWKDWUHODWHWRDOLYLQJSHUVRQZKRFDQEH
identified from the information, either separately or together with other 
ELWVRILQIRUPDWLRQOLNHO\WRFRPHZLWKLQDQRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VSRVVHVVLRQ776 
 
Usually stored on computer, these are the jigsaw pieces which help to 
build up a picture of each one of us as a unique individual.777 
 
In practical terms, if individuals are capable of being identified from the 
relevant CCTV images, then it is personal information about the 
individual concerned.778 
 
 
 
In these discourses, there is frequent conceptual slippage between identity and 
personal information. Similar arguments and problem constructions are made around 
both signifiers, with similar outputs in terms of normative evaluations or suggestions 
for action. The use of the contested term identity theft allows this to be unpacked. 
Identity theft is an emotive term for what often turns out to be credit card fraud, but 
with more sinister connotations. Identity theft is the use of personal data to commit 
theft or fraud. Identity and personal data are therefore very strongly linked by this 
discourse. The discourse could have made use of alternate signifiers for such practices 
± for example simply fraud which would not signify the same level of importance 
attached to personal data in the construction of identity.  
 
Identity is represented as a contested concept much more frequently in opposition 
discourses than it is the other discourses. The definition can be contested and a 
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number of attempts re-define identity against a background of contention. Identity is 
contextual. 
 
 
The precise meaning of personal identity may differ, according to the 
circumstances, such as: a unique name of an individual, a name and an 
address, a name and a date of birth, or perhaps a name and an occupation. 
An identity can be the establishment of a relationship between one 
manifestation of personal activity and another.779 
 
This illustrates the point that there is a need to distinguish between the 
concept of identity and information associated with identity, such as 
the name, address and nationality of an individual. This distinction is 
important, because our identity does not change, but information relating 
to identity does. It is where an attempt is made to identify people by using 
the information linked with identity, that things go wrong.780 
 
 
 
In contrast to government discourse of identity, the discourse of identity scheme 
opposition attempts to narrow down the content of the concept of identity ± what 
information, or types of characteristics, comprise identity? This is a limitation of the 
strategies of filling for the empty signifier of identity. Identity is things other than that 
contained on the National Identity Register. It is clear therefore, that whilst identity is 
closely linked to personal data, identity is not all personal data. This serves to limit 
the concept of identity to specific information. 
 
 
In this response, Data Protection and Privacy Practice Editors, expressed 
the view that the contents of the National Identity Register are not 
related to identity or entitlement and is more concerned with linking 
Government databases together and serving the needs of the law 
enforcement agencies.781 
 
Liberty has expressed concerns on the possible inclusion of Police 
National Computer numbers and National DNA database numbers under 
Clause 1 (4)(g). They also question the reasoning of including past 
residential status (as under Clause 1 (4) (f)) wondering how such 
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information could be regarded aVOLPLWHGWR³LGHQWLI\LQJ
information.782 
 
 
 
The concept or characteristic most frequently ejected from the concept of individual 
identity articulated in the oppositional discourse is location, characterised in terms of 
address or previous places of residence. A chain of equivalences connecting address 
and name under the concept of identity is broken.  
 
 
7KHLQFOXVLRQRIDSHUVRQ¶VDGGUHVVDQGWKHVXEVHTXHQWUHTXLUHPHQWWR
inform of a change of address were unpopular with a number of 
respondents, who did not believe the inclusion of an address had any 
relation to their identity.783 
 
The Information Commissioner is concerned about the extent of the 
personal information that could be recorded on the National Identity 
Register and cannot see the relevance of some information to identity 
verification (e.g. previous residences). He is also concerned that 
information could be stored indefinitely.784 
 
For example individuals are obliged to tell the government about all the 
addresses they have lived at and any new places where they reside. It is 
difficult to see the relevance of all such details, once identity has been 
YHULILHGWRWKHµJROGVWDQGDUG¶WKHJRYHUQPHQWVHWVIRULWVHOI,IDSHUVRQ
issued with a card buys a second home this cannot affect their identity 
which would already have been verified and tied to them by a unique 
biometric. The requirement to register another address is excessive and 
LUUHOHYDQWWRHVWDEOLVKLQJWKDWSHUVRQ¶VLGHQWLW\785 
 
 
 
Also excised from the concept of identity is the requirement for some level of 
HFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\DVUHIOHFWHGLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VPRYHVWRFKHFNWKHDXWKHQWLFLW\RI
identity against credit reference agency databases. This is rearticulated as a 
problematic basis for identity: 
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I remain concerned that there may be an unrealistic view of the value of 
this sort of information particularly where individuals are young, 
involved in limited economic activity or have been absent from or are 
newly arrived in the UK.786 
 
 
 
There is significant attention paid to the rearticulation of many µUHJLVWUDEOHIDFWV¶DV
unnecessary, or unrelated to identity, and therefore invasive of privacy. The National 
Identity Register is rearticulated as exceeding the requirements of an identity system. 
 
 
The NIR would be the key to a total life history of every individual, to be 
retained even after death.787 
 
We are not convinced that non-identification material will be 
excluded.788 
 
We urge parliamentarians to bear in mind how the list of information is 
likely to increase once the register is in place. The list of what constitutes 
µLQWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVW¶DOORZLQJIDFWVWREHUHJLVWHUHGFODXVHZRXOG
not provide much limitation on what information could be added. National 
Security, crime, immigration, employment and the provision of services 
covers most facts that could realistically be recorded.789 
 
 
 
The articulation of identity in news media discourse is frequently mobile and floating, 
demonstrating absence of a hegemonic articulation of identity. Identity is however not 
explicitly theorised; it is rarely explicitly rearticulated in response to other 
articulations. In texts referencing ID cards, identity is constructed in similar ways to 
the government and financial perspectives on identity ± it can be checked and proved, 
and we each have one and only one true identity. In terms of identity theft, the 
                                               
786
 Thomas, 30th January 2003, p.4. 
787
 NO2ID, 2005b, p.1. 
788
 Liberty. (December 2004) ,'&DUGV%LOO/LEHUW\¶VEULHILQJIRUWKH6HFRQG5HDGLQJLQWKH+RXVHRI
Commons. p.1. 
789
 Ibid, p.12. 
 293 
construction of identity is similar to the banks and the ICO perspective ± identity is 
vulnerable and needs protection. 
 
Identity is behavioural, based upon probabilistic and actuarial logics 
 
In governmental discourses, biographical identity is based upon individual behaviour. 
,WLVDUHFRUGRIWKHUHFRUGDEOHIHDWXUHVRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHKDYLRXUDQGLQWHUDFWLRQ
with institutions. Biographical identity does not (in this construction) include how an 
individual feels about these interactions. Whilst many of these interactions could be 
understood as attributed, the construction here highlights the individual agency in 
undertaking certain behaviours and actions that leave recordable traces as 
biographical identity. The understanding of identity as composed of recordable facts 
is supported by the articulation of identity as being composed of registrable facts 
drawn from the statutory purposes in the Identity Cards Act 2006. Registrable facts 
have some overlap with the ,&2XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµSHUVRQDOGDWD¶VWULSSHGRIWKH
implications of personal ownership hegemonic in ICO discourse. The use of identity 
as a basis for risk assessments in banking and financial discourse mirrors the actuarial 
logics at play.  
 
 
The provision of a secure and reliable method for registrable facts about 
individuals to be ascertained or verified wherever that is necessary in the 
public interest.790 
 
Information provision: this is the ability to make data from the NIR 
available to other parts of government, to make sure that all parts of 
government are using the most up-to-date identity information about 
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you, for example to make it much simpler when you change your name or 
address.791 
 
 
 
Identity is not controlled by the individual but attributed by trusted sources 
 
 
$WWULEXWHGLGHQWLW\WKHFRPSRQHQWVRIDSHUVRQ¶VLGHQWLW\WKDWDUHJLYHQDW
ELUWKLQFOXGLQJWKHLUIXOOQDPHGDWHDQGSODFHRIELUWKSDUHQWV¶QDPHV
and addresses.792 
 
 
 
Although the governmental articulation limits attributed identity to components given 
at birth, it shows how identity is not an internal self-creation of the individual, but 
includes elements attributed to the individual by external actors. The distinction that is 
drawn between attributed identity and biographical identity breaks down in a number 
of cases, where identity is attributed to the individual later in life by a relatively 
constrained set of social actors (banks, creditors, utilities, public authorities). This is 
well summarised E\WKHWHUPµVWUXFWXUHGVRFLHW\¶793 This refers to established social 
institutions in relatively formalised and structured forms. In the Identity Card Act 
2006, identity is defined as full name, other names by which an individual might 
previously have been known, gender, date and place of birtKDQGµH[WHUQDO
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIKLVWKDWDUHFDSDEOHRIEHLQJXVHGIRULGHQWLI\LQJKLP¶794 Identity is 
constructed as a series of institutional reputations mediated through personal 
information disclosed to those institutions. 
 
Banking and financial discourses construct identity as best proven through the 
production of official documents issued by authorities that act as identity tokens and 
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authenticate claims to a specific identity by an individual. This occurs during the 
surveillant practice of identification. Identity is therefore fundamentally relational and 
reliant upon institutions. Identity is a placeholder for relationships with organisations. 
These organisations produce documents that act as signifiers of those relationships, 
allowing other organisations to base decision-making activity upon pre-existing 
relationships.  
 
 
Evidence of identity can take a number of forms. In respect of individuals, 
much weight is placed on so-FDOOHGµLGHQWLW\GRFXPHQWV¶VXFKDV
passports and photocard driving licences, and these are often the easiest 
ZD\RIEHLQJUHDVRQDEO\VDWLVILHGDVWRVRPHRQH¶VLGHQWLW\. It is, 
KRZHYHUSRVVLEOHWREHUHDVRQDEO\VDWLVILHGDVWRDFXVWRPHU¶VLGHQWLW\
based on other forms of confirmation, including, in appropriate 
circumstances, written or otherwise documented assurances from persons 
or organisations that have dealt with the customer for some time.795 
 
 
 
An alternate source of evidence of identity to identity documents is electronic 
LQIRUPDWLRQ7KLVLQYROYHVDµZLGHUDQJHRIFRQILUPDWRU\PDWHULDO¶WKDWFDQEHXWLOLVHG
for the purposes of identity verification without involving or informing the 
customer.796 This concept of the footprint emerges at several points through the 
discourse. It closely matches to the surveillance theory concept of the data double, or 
the image of the individual produced by the surveillant assemblage. The text suggests 
that having the correct or appropriate data image aids in identity verification. 
 
 
7KHVL]HRIWKHHOHFWURQLFµIRRWSULQW¶VHHSDUDJUDSKLQ relation to the 
depth, breadth and quality of data, and the degree of corroboration of the 
data supplied by the customer, may provide a useful basis for an 
assessment of the degree of confidence in their identity.797 
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The converse is that an incorrect footprint can suggest an identity is false, invalid, or 
otherwise cast doubt upon the individual, leading to his or her subjection to other 
mechanisms of risk management or surveillance. This can be linked to a politics of a 
personal identity management, as individuals begin to encounter the effects of their 
data image in a variety of circumstances as it begins to affect their real world lives. 
Possessing a flawed (for whatever reason) data image could cast doubt on the validity 
RIRQH¶VLGHQWLW\ 
 
There is possibility in financial discourse for the negotiation of identity. However, this 
is based upon the ontological assumption that identity can be divided into true and 
false identities, of which each individual has one true identity. Negotiation occurs in 
the ways that identity might be proven. Only individuals above a certain position in 
most organisations are capable of undertaking this negotiation. 
 
ICO discourse contests the role of external attribution in identity construction by 
placing identity under control of the individual, reflected in the responsibility of the 
individual to actively manage their identity. If identity was not under the control of 
the individual, then it would be nonsensical to require the individual to manage their 
identity ± it would be the responsibility of the organisation with control over identity. 
6HFRQGO\FRQWURORYHULGHQWLW\LVDUHTXLVLWHIRULWVFRQVWUXFWLRQDVWKHµSURSHUW\¶RI
the individual. The discourse surrounding ICO articulates identity as (normatively if 
not practically) under the control of the individual. This results in concerns over the 
introduction of identity cards, which are articulated as placing identity under the 
control of the government. 
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The Identity Cards Bill is not just about the introduction of ID cards for 
individuals, it will establish a whole system of identity verification with 
the recording of information about individuals on a government 
controlled central register with a record being kept of when it is checked 
by both public and private sector organisations.798 
 
 
 
Rather than identity being controlled by external actors, the ICO discourse states that 
it should be under the control of the individual. 
 
 
If we are to have an identity card, the Information Commissioner would 
like it to be a tool to assist individuals to demonstrate their identity 
when they find it useful. It should be a WRROZLWKLQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V
control.799 
 
The primary aim of Government with this legislation should be to 
establish a scheme which allows people to reliably identify themselves 
rather than one which enhances its ability to identify and record what its 
citizens do in their lives.800 
 
 
 
In a similar way, ID card opposition discourses understand identity as a possession of 
the individual. This is contrasted against possession, control or management of 
identity by the state. Identity should normatively be under the control of the 
individual, including the ability to access records and data (drawing on data protection 
and ICO discourses).801 This control is threatened by the identity card scheme. 
 
 
An individual should have the right to access their own record free of 
charge, including all associated information used to validate claimed 
identity, and any audit data of that record. The identity of the individual 
can be verified using biometrics.802 
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We believe that it is our fundamental right to assert who we are, 
without being checked against an approved list.803 
 
It is important that the data about an individual be owned by that 
individual and not by the State. Equally, individuals should maintain 
control over their own records, including the ability to view all aspects 
of their own records ² including the audit trail ² without additional 
charge. To ensure the accuracy of records, subject access disclosure 
(similar to under the Data Protection Acts) ought to be encouraged and 
occur regularly, without additional charge. The Bill makes such no 
provisions to ensure that individuals have an opportunity to check their 
records are reliable, accurate and up-to-date.804 
 
We must recognise that we may risk turning our society from one where 
the need to prove identity is commensurate with the service on offer, 
with complete anonymity being a real option in many circumstances, to 
one where the highest level of identity validation becomes the norm for 
the most mundane of services, one where we run the risk of the unique 
personal number being used to track our various interactions with the state 
and others, and to have all this recorded on a central register under its 
control.805 
 
The Identity Cards Bill is not just about the introduction of ID cards for 
individuals, it will establish a whole system of identity verification with 
the recording of information about individuals on a government 
controlled central register with a record being kept of when it is checked 
by both public and private sector organisations.806 
 
The Government wants state management of personal identity.807 
 
 
 
Because individual identity should be under individual control, the individual 
becomes of vital importance in verifying identity. Individuals are best placed to verify 
the accuracy of their own identifying information. This is antagonistic to the 
government and finance articulation that the individual is an unreliable (perhaps the 
worst) source of information, likely to lie or dissemble, and that more accurate 
sources are available in state and commercial databases.  
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While we maintain our opposition to the creation of a national identity 
register, if there is to be one it should be as accurate as possible. Self-
verification is the best way to ensure this.808 
 
 
 
In the following excerpt from an ICO code of practice for information-sharing 
addressed to institutions making personal profiles, the individual is positioned as a 
source of verification for identity, of confirmation in the last instance: 
 
 
You need to have procedures in place for dealing with situations where 
there are disagreements between organisations about the accuracy of a 
record. In some cases, the best course of action might be to ask the 
individual him or herself whether their record is correct.809  
 
 
 
Identity is historically persistent  
 
 
 
Documentary proofs of identity have been problematised by the government and 
financial discourses. An alternative proposal is the use of databases. These are 
constructed as a distinct privileged technology. Databases could instead be understood 
as another type of document, with similar inaccuracies, flaws, and potential for 
misuse. The response to the insecurity of identity is to increase the dependence of 
identity upon historical knowledge stored in databases. 
 
 
But more effective ways of risk profiling applications for passports, 
driving licences, and numbers that serve as unique identifiers would be 
based on ³ELRJUDSKLFDO´UDWKHUWKDQ³DWWULEXWHG´DVSHFWVRILGHQWLW\. 
At its simplest, this means FKHFNLQJVRPHRQH¶VLGHQWLW\DJDLQVW
historical information held on databases (whether government or 
private sector) rather than asking to see their birth certificate/seeking a 
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counter signatory to establish who they are. This essentially checks a 
SHUVRQ¶V³KLVWRULFDOIRRWSULQW´ on the world.810 
 
This methodology is tried and tested by the private sector, where any 
organisation wishing to give credit relies on the ability of credit reference 
agencies to draw together information from different sources to 
aXWKHQWLFDWHDFXVWRPHU¶VLGHQWLW\ and develop a measure of their credit-
worthiness.811 
 
It is presence on historical databases that is the hardest test to pass for 
those wanting legitimately to develop false identities i.e. officials working 
undercover. By the same token, biographical checking is potentially the 
surest way to find those seeking to defraud the state or the private 
sector under false identities, or to establish a false identity for other 
purposes (such as illegal working, money-laundering or drug 
trafficking).812 
 
 
 
The result is that databases can be used to store and check large amounts of 
biographical information. Biographical checking requires substantially more 
information to be stored and used in identity verification or authentication than under 
previous systems, where possession of particular documentation served as a token of 
an authentic identity.  
 
 
It would seem then that e-service delivery confirms the emerging 
conclusion: that the surest way to validate and verify identity is through 
face-to-face interview or through validating identity against databases 
and verifying identity by checking that the applicant knows information 
that others would not be aware of.813 
 
Verification being the process of establishing that the person using the 
LGHQWLW\ULJKWIXOO\³RZQV´LWRIWHQGRQHE\testing for detailed 
knowledge of the identity which typically only the rightful owner 
would have).814 
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The secondary implication here is that the database must contain information that only 
the individual and the databases have knowledge of. This is replicated in banking and 
financial discourses. Identity is also related to things that an individual knows. These 
can range from specific information about the biographical history of an individual, to 
PINs and passwords and shared secret information. For this information to be useful 
in proving identity, it must be something that the organisation to which identity is to 
be proven must also have knowledge of, or access to. An individual is assumed to 
have better knowledge of his or her identity than any impostor or fraudster. Self-
knowledge of identity is also constructed as a way to secure one¶s identity against 
usurpation. 
 
Identity is valuable and socially vulnerable 
  
Across all discourses examined here, identity is understood as valuable and incredibly 
important for the individual. It serves as a gateway to services and institutions. 
Without their identities individuals would be severely limited in their social and 
economic activities. In financial discourses, identities are understood as differentially 
valued. Some identities are simply better than others, more reliable, more predictable, 
or simply more profitable. Better identities arise both from quality of data and from 
what that data signifies. This supports the representation of the victims of identity 
theft. Some identities signify better types of relationships with institutions and so are 
more highly valued than others.  
 
 
Fraudsters are financial criminals. They are unlikely to use their own 
identity for their criminal activity. They will either create a new false 
identity, or, more commonly, will attempt to pose as someone else - 
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someone with a clean identity, a good financial history and a 
reputation of settling their accounts on time.815 
 
 
 
Individual identity is also constructed as highly valuable to other subjects ± primarily 
LGHQWLW\WKLHYHVDQGIUDXGVWHUV$FTXLULQJDQRWKHU¶VLGHQWLW\DOORZVIUDXGVWHUVWRPDNH
use of that identity to circumvent enhanced security in other areas of finance, in order 
to commit theft. 
 
 
3KLVKLQJRULJLQDWHGEHFDXVHWKHEDQNV¶RZQV\VWHPVKDYHSURYHG
incredibly difficult to attack. Criminals have turned their attention to 
phishing attacks to target individual internet users in order to gain 
personal or secret information that can be used online for fraudulent 
purposes.816 
 
The industry view is that as authentication procedures for credit cards are 
significantly strengthened over the next two years, fraudsters will shift 
their focus further upstream in the process, resulting iQPRUH³DFFRXQW
WDNHRYHU´ZKHUHE\JHQXLQHDFFRXQWVDUHKLMDFNHGIRUIUDXGXOHQW
purposes) and other identity fraud.817 
 
 
 
The articulation of identity as valuable in ICO discourses is often quite explicit: 
 
 
Your identity is one of your most valuable assets.818 
Your personal information is valuable, so you should treat it just as you 
would any valuable item.819 
 
There is nothing more sacrosanct to an individual than their own 
identity.820 
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This construction of identity as an asset demonstrates a particular regularity in this 
discourse. Identity is linked to financial status, and practically, the ability to gain 
access to credit. Identity therefore stands for the relationship an individual holds with 
institutions ± in this case institutions responsible for assessing financial status and 
providing financial services. Identity is differential; individuals have different 
identities. It is the differences between these identities that make some identities more 
valuable than others. 
 
 
Having an accurate credit file is essential. Before giving out credit, 
lenders such as banks, catalogue companies and shops have to be 
confident that the money will be repaid. To help them do this, they assess 
your credit rating using the information credit reference agencies hold on 
you.821 
 
 
 
The trend in the ICO discourse is to suggest all identities are valuable. However, there 
are some identities which are negatively valued ± for example people with a bad 
credit history, or in related circumstances, people with serious health problems 
attempting to gain health insurance. If identity is an asset, then it is a larger asset for 
some people than for others. This disparity is one of the motivators for identity fraud. 
If you are seen as an objectively bad credit risk, if you have a bad credit history (the 
assumption being that past behaviour is a strong predictor of future behaviour), then 
an accurate credit file reflecting this is not essential, but a disadvantage. Identity is 
never a liability in this discourse. This assumption of a positive identity may reflect 
the assumed audience for the statements ± people concerned with the damage that 
could be done to their (presumably good) financial identity. Individuals whose 
identity leads them to be less positively valued presumably have less to lose from 
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identity theft (although they could still incur debts or legal sanction). Conceptualising 
LGHQWLW\DVDSURSHUW\RIDQLQGLYLGXDOFUHDWHVVRPHµVSDFH¶EHWZHHQLGHQWLW\DQGWKH
individual. This can also be recognised in the way biometrics link an identity to an 
individual. 
 
In one of the strongest problem constructions across the discourses, identity (as 
personal information) is placed under threat: primarily by the phenomenon of identity 
theft. It is possible that your identity can be stolen from you. Identity is under threat 
IURPFULPLQDOVDQGµEODJJHUV¶ DQGWKLVWKUHDWLVERWKµZLGHVSUHDG¶DQGµLQFUHDVLQJ¶ 
 
 
Your identity is one of your most valuable assets. However, criminals can 
use a number of methods to find out your personal information and will 
then use it to open bank accounts, take out credit cards and apply for state 
benefits in your name. If your identity is stolen, you can lose money and 
may find it difficult to get loans, credit cards or a mortgage until the 
matter is sorted out.822 
 
At the same time security is increasingly at risk. Ever growing collections 
of personal data, more remote access and the prevalence of crime such as 
identity theft all create vulnerabilities.823 
 
With crimes like identity theft increasing, it is even more important for 
you to safeguard your information. Criminals can find out and use your 
personal details to open bank accounts, apply for credit cards and loans 
and get state benefits in your name.824 
 
The research shows that respect for their personal information is a high 
priority, and people worry especially about threats to their health and 
safety and to their finances. No doubt they are increasingly aware of the 
dangers of identity theft and the serious consequences if their health, 
financial and other personal records fall into the wrong hands or are 
otherwise misused.825 
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Protecting personal information is now ranked as one of the top three 
most socially important issues, according to new research published by 
the Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas, today. Delivering the 
DQQXDO6WHHOH5D\PRQG/HFWXUH³7DNLQJ,QIRUPDWLRQ5LJKWV6HULRXVO\´
at Bournemouth University, Mr. Thomas highlighted findings from the 
UHVHDUFKZKLFKVKRZWKDW³SURWHFWLQJSHRSOH¶VSHUVRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQ´ZDV
ranked behind crime prevention and improving education standards as an 
issue of concern, alongside the NHS and ahead of equal rights, freedom 
of speech, national security and environmental issues.826 
 
 
 
This particular construction emphasises the worry over identity theft. The statement 
that people are worried implies that the reader too should be concerned about the 
threat of identity theft. If many people worry about an issue, there is probably 
something to be concerned about, and the issue is constructed as something which 
requires a response. Additionally, the representation of this research serves to 
UHLQIRUFHWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFHLQWKHFRPSHWLWLRQ
for funding and resources in public policy. Finally, for the purposes of this thesis, a 
high proportion of the population articulating concern over identity theft and the 
security of personal information may represent the spread of this discourse and its 
potential hegemonic capacity. This strong construction of threat and worry continues: 
 
 
All the scripts are frighteningly plausible, as can be seen from the extract 
contained in Annex B. Recorded telephone conversations to call centres 
confirm how easy it can be to circumvent security questions designed to 
FKHFNWKHFDOOHU¶VLGHQWLW\6RPHEODJJHUVPDNHUHSHDWHGcalls to the same 
call centre adopting different identities (and occasionally different 
JHQGHUVDVWKH\VHHNWRµFKHFN¶SHUVRQDOGHWDLOVVXFKDVWKHLUFXUUHQW
employers.827 
 
Although most of the personal information stored about you will provide 
benefits like better medical care and financial reassurance, it also brings 
dangers. If your personal information is wrong, out of date or not held 
securely, it can cause problems. You could be unfairly refused a job, 
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benefits or credit, or a place at college. In extreme cases, you could be a 
victim of identity theft or arrested for a crime you did not commit.828 
 
 
 
This explicit articulation of threat is supported by a number of more subtle ways of 
constructing threat. An example given later in the same text suggests that one of the 
ways you might become aware you were a victim of identity threat is when: 
 
 
You apply for state benefits, but are told you are already claiming.829 
 
 
 
The double use of the word you conjures up images of threat to the you. This threat 
construction is evocative of the doppelgänger of mythology, a malicious spirit or evil 
WZLQWKDWDVVXPHVWKHLGHQWLW\RILWVYLFWLPLQRUGHUWRUXLQWKDWLQGLYLGXDO¶VOLIH
GHVWUR\LQJUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKIDPLO\DQGFRPPXQLW\DQGUXLQLQJWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V
reputation. 6HHLQJRQH¶VGRSSHOJlQJHUZDVEHOLHYHGWREHDQRPHQRILOOIRUWXQHDQG
eventually death.  
 
The predominant characteristic of identity in news media discourses of surveillance is 
that identity is under threat from identity theft. Identity theft is used much more 
frequently than the technically more accurate identity fraud. Technical and specialist 
discourses such as banking and finance attempt to differentiate and delimit this 
category. News media discourse tends to not make this distinction. Identity is under 
threat and it the responsibility of the individual to protect it ± although this threat is 
often portrayed as due to the shortcomings and failings of other actors or institutions, 
for example, the result of avoidable lapses in IT security by firms holding detailed 
                                               
828
 ,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFHS 
829
 Ibid., p.30. 
 307 
information on individuals.830 The responsibility of the individual for protecting their 
identity appears as a result of the frequent issuing of press releases on the subject 
featuring advice and guidance by banks, financial institutions, the Information 
Commissioner and the government. 
 
 Identity can be stolen 
 
The representation of identity theft in discourses of surveillance is analysed in 
Chapter Four. If identity theft is possible, then identity is articulated as something that 
can be stolen. This constructs identity as distinct and separate from the individual 
whose identity it is. Theft is clearly a pejorative term. The following extracts show the 
relation of equivalence drawn between identity fraud and identity theft in government 
discourse.  
 
 
Identity theft or fraud involves someone using your identity to, for 
example, open bogus accounts, apply for loans, buy goods over the phone 
or internet, or take over one of your bank accounts.831 
 
Our identities are incredibly valuable to us and too easily stolen. ID fraud 
is a growing crime which can ruin lives and underpin illegal activities 
from people-trafficking to credit card fraud, from abuse of our healthcare 
and benefits systems to terrorism.832 
 
 
 
This is the core articulation of the problem oIJRYHUQDQFHZLWKLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
discourse. Identity is problematised; it cannot be relied upon for the proper 
functioning of governance in society. )LQDQFLDOGLVFRXUVHVFRQVWUXFWLGHQWLW\¶V
vulnerability in similar ways. Because of its value, identity is constructed as under 
                                               
830
 Biever, C. (10th 6HSWHPEHUµ,'5HYROXWLRQ± 3UHSDUHWRPHHWWKHQHZ\RX¶New Scientist.p.26. 
831
 www.identitycards.gov.uk/benefits-society-idtheft.asp. 
832
 Home Office. (25th May 2005) Press Release: Safeguarding Our Identities: Government 
reintroduces the ID cards bill. 
 308 
threat. Identity is something that can be stolen ± denied to the individual constructed 
as the rightful owner and made use of by somebody who is not entitled to make use of 
it.  
 
 
Your identity is at risk every time you check your e-mails or use the 
Internet. The following tips will help you keep your details safe.833 
 
A criminal could falsely use your identity if these checks are not in 
place.834 
 
Identity theft: When somebody steals your name and other personal 
information. The information can be used to get credit, goods and services 
in your name, or to provide thieves with false credentials so they can hide 
their own criminal identities.835 
 
 
 
Mechanisms of identity are inadequate 
 
Government discourse evaluates the effectiveness of contemporary methods of 
establishing identity. This relies upon a hegemonic understanding of identity as 
relations with structured society. It is contextualised against the background of 
identity theft and identity fraud. The discourse constructs current social identity 
systems as inadequate to the demands placed upon them; the needs of modern society, 
the demands of organisations for identity verification, international obligations and 
the desire to introduce joined up government. The weakness of these systems leaves 
individuals and society open to the social threats of identity theft and fraud, and the 
associated risks of organised crime, terrorism, illegal immigration and benefit fraud. 
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Identity fraud is possible because of weaknesses in the processes used to 
issue documents used as evidence of identity, and the processes used to 
check identity at point of use.836 
 
Criminals can copy personal information (from a bank statement, for 
example) or steal or forge the documents ± such as utility bills ± we 
currently use to prove identity.837 
 
Processes used in the issue and checking of documents used as evidence 
of identity are not secure.838 
 
 
 
Continuing WKLVFRQVWUXFWLRQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLGHQWLW\V\VWHPVDUHVHHQDVQRW
reaching the standards of the private sector.  
 
 
Most current processes for issuing government documentation used for 
identity verification, and a range of unique identifying numbers, do not 
meet the highest private sector or overseas standards of security. 
Government databases are also considerably less than fully accurate, and 
checks on identity at point of use less than in the private sector.839 
 
 
 
A highlighted DVSHFWRIWKLVSUREOHPLVWKHZD\LGHQWLW\LVDVVHPEOHGIURPDµPRVDLF¶
of documentary sources. These documentary sources are understood as insecure, not 
primarily designed for identity verification purposes, or compromised by competing 
design incentives. For example, entitlement documents are not created for identity 
purposes. 
 
 
A variety of documents are used as evidence of identity and can be seen as 
forming a mosaic of documentary evidence for identity.840 
 
Each of these government-issued identifiers can be used as a starting point 
RUµEUHHGHUGRFXPHQW¶2QHGRFXPHQWFDQEHXVHGDVHYLGHQFHRILGHQWLW\
to obtain another, more persuasive item of evidence of identity.841 
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Our current system for establishing identity is generally to check the 
individual against a document, which can be anything from a driving 
licence to a utility bill. This approach works for now, but there are many 
problems associated with it: 
 different organisations establish identity in different ways using 
different documents 
 utility bills and similar documents can easily be altered or forged 
by people who want to create a false identity 
 criminals can steal documents and use them to assume other 
identities.842 
 
The two most widely used documents which are accepted as evidence 
of identity by public and private sector organisations are: 
 passport ± but this is a travel document rather than proof of 
identity (although it includes a photograph); 
 photocard driving licence ± but this is proof of ability/right to 
drive (although it includes a photograph).843 
 
 
 
The existing identity system is also seen as archaic and no longer appropriate to the 
modern age:  
 
 
The reliance on a countersignatory to verify identity smacks of a bygone 
age in which local professionals who had lived in a neighbourhood for all 
their working lives could vouch for the bona fides of people with whom 
they had a long-term professional relationship.844 
 
The long established ways of linking us to our identity ± a signature or a 
photograph - are no longer enough. ID cards will link your basic 
personal information to something uniquely yours - like the pattern of 
your iris, your face shape or your fingerprint.845 
 
 
 
This inadequacy results in a need to introduce new systems capable of meeting the 
demands of security and accuracy. Because identity is vulnerable to theft and forgery, 
because multiple identities are associated with negatively evaluated social actors and 
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practices, anGEHFDXVHLGHQWLW\¶VHVVHQWLDORQWRORJLFDOQDWXUHPDNHVLWSRVVLEOH
identity must be checked and secured. It cannot be left undetermined or ambiguous. 
This current inadequacy cannot be allowed to continue: 
 
 
The results speak for themselves: 
 criminals and terrorists use multiple identities to hide their 
activities 
 passports may be issued to people who should not have them 
 foreign nationals are able to live and work in the UK illegally 
 public services are abused by people not entitled to receive 
them.846 
 
Unless we invest in identity systems we leave our borders and our 
economy open to abuse, we leave individuals defenceless against fraud 
and we risk leaving the benefits safety nets we've worked so hard for, 
vulnerable to attack.847 
 
 
 
Governmental response: a more secure form of identity is necessary 
 
Government discourse defines the acceptable responses to the dual problem of the 
vulnerability of identity and the inadequacy of existing identity systems.  
 
 
We need a more robust and secure way to check that identities are real 
and that people are who they say they are.848 
 
Longer term options worth examining include: 
DUHJLVWHURISHRSOHHQWHULQJDQGOHDYLQJWKH8.DJDLQVWZKLFK 
applications can be checked; 
UHGXFLQJWKH³PRVDLF´RILGHQWLILHUVE\HVWDEOLVKLQJD single entitlement 
card, subject to very secure issuing processes, that would combine the 
functions of the driving licence, the passport and the NINO.849 
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Processes for issuing documents used as evidence of identity need to be 
made more secure. The source document on which passport and driving 
licence issue depends ± the birth certificate ± is not itself secure, nor is 
the system of countersigning by a professional. For most people, checks 
against databases run by credit reference agencies will give much more 
satisfactory validation and verification of identity. For others, face-to-face 
interviews represent a secure alternative.850 
 
The creation of a single document (an entitlement card) could be 
beneficial in UHSODFLQJWKHSUHVHQW³PRVDLF´RIGRFXPHQWVXVHGWR 
establish identity if accompanied by much more secure processes for the 
issue and use of the document.851 
 
 
 
Government discourse positions the proposed identity card and National Identity 
Register as the most appropriate way of responding to these problems.  
 
 
The National Identity Scheme is designed to be far more secure than 
anything we use at present.852 
 
The ID card will be the most secure and reliable form of verifiable 
identification issued by the Government. It will be designed to be 
verifiable in a way that is not possible with current forms of ID such as 
passports and driving licences.853 
 
 
 
The problem construction of the vulnerability of identity is answered by government 
GLVFRXUVH¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHLGHntity card scheme (see Chapter Four). It also 
includes an attention to the use of biometrics and biographical checking. These are 
both dependent upon the specific articulation of identity at play in this discourse.  
 
Response: individual responsibility and stewardship of identity 
 
ICO and financial discourse serves to provide alternate responses to state identity 
cards. With ICO, these fall into two main categories. Firstly, responses by governance 
                                               
850
 Ibid., p.5. 
851
 Ibid., p.5. 
852
 www.identitycards.gov.uk/benefits-society-idtheft.asp. 
853
 Home Office, 25th May 2005, p.22. 
 313 
agencies or the state, LQFOXGLQJWKHLQIRUPDWLRQFRPPLVVLRQHU¶VRIILFHDQGVHFRQGO\
responses by the individual whose identity is under threat. The relative weighting of 
these options clearly prioritises responses by the individual. This serves to create a 
pattern of appropriate behaviour when identity is constructed as under threat, placing 
a significant degree of responsibility upon the individual. Firstly, the response to 
threats to identity from ICO and other agencies:  
 
 
Our risk-based approach is in line with good regulatory practice. It does 
not mean that we seek to remove all data protection risk. We do what we 
can to moderate the most serious risks and protect those who are 
most vulnerable to improper use of their information.854 
 
More generally, the Information Commissioner recommends that all 
relevant regulatory and professional bodies should take a strong line to 
tackle any involvement in the illegal trade in personal information.855 
 
Take steps to ensure that data protection aims are given due weight in 
the early stages of the development of policy and legislation, rather 
than merely addressing the consequences when it may be too late to 
achieve anything.856  
 
 
 
A fundamental element of this institutional response, however, is to provide 
individuals with the awareness, knowledge, and tools to manage their own privacy/ 
identity threat risk. Individuals are awarded the status of key partners, a term normally 
reserved in policy discourses for institutions rather than individuals. Many of these 
statements can be linked to the representation of the individual subject as a bearer of 
both specific legal rights and universal human rights (see Chapter Five). 
 
 
Individual awareness: We have a major role in giving advice and more 
generally raising the awareness of individuals about how their info is 
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used and the rights they have. An aware and questioning population is a 
key partner in data protection regulation.857 
 
Part of our job is to equip individuals with the knowledge and tools to 
enable them to make their own well-informed decisions about the use and 
disclosure of their personal information.858 
 
Equip individuals to exert pressure themselves by asking the right 
questions and making their own choices.859 
 
Above all we see ourselves as working with those whose rights and liberty 
we are seeking to protect and enhance. We have a role in educating the 
public and raising their awareness and competencies but we must 
understand and respond to their interests and concerns.860 
 
We will also seek to mitigate the negative effects of surveillance by 
promoting privacy friendly approaches, influencing stakeholders, 
developing relevant tools and increasing the confidence of individuals 
in exercising their data protection rights.861 
 
Our vision is of a society where respect for personal information is 
guaranteed. A society where organisations inspire trust by meeting 
reasonable expectations of integrity, security and fairness in the collection 
and use of personal information. A society where individuals 
understand how their information is used, are aware of their rights 
and are confident in using them.862 
 
 
Across the range of documents and texts analysed, there are presented a wide range of 
strategies and behaviours that the individual is prompted to engage in. These are 
frequently linguistically addressed to the individual reader ± you, your information. A 
number of these are presented iQWKHUHFHQWO\SXEOLVKHGµSHUVRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQ
WRRONLW¶.863 Much of this is written in a deontic modality, referring to necessity or 
obligation DQGZLWKYHU\IHZµKHGJHV¶.864 In effect, this is an authoritative list of 
positively evaluated conduct, which should be followed. The document is framed as a 
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toolkit. The various areas of personal information issues are represented by tools 
normally found in a conventional toolkit such as a hammer or a spirit level. 
Preventing identity theft is a chisel. The metaphorical effect of this articulation is to 
create equivalence between this document, and the actions listed within it, and a 
familiar, practical DIY toolkit. A toolkit is associated with individual agency, and 
with fixing problems. 
 
 
There are a number of signs to look out for that may mean you are or may 
become a victim of identity theft.865 
 
If you think you are a victim of identity theft or fraud, act quickly to 
ensure you are not liable for any financial losses.866 
 
 
 
µ/LDEOH¶ZLWKLQDILQDQFLDODQGOHJDOIUDPHZRrk, can be understood as a 
placeholder for the concept of responsibility. 
 
 
Members of the public can also do a lot to protect their own information, 
by only giving it out if they are sure that a request is genuine and if they 
know what their information will be used for. People can also take active 
steps, such as shredding personal documents like bank and credit card 
statements and bills, and checking statements to ensure that they recognise 
all the transactions.867 
 
Regularly get a copy of your personal credit file to check for any 
suspicious credit applications. For more information on how to do this, 
see our website www.ico.gov.uk or ring 08453 091 091 for a free copy of 
µ&UHGLWH[SODLQHG¶.868 
 
Always be wary of those asking for your personal information. Are they 
genuine? How will they use it? Will it be passed on to others?869 
 
                                               
865
 ,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFHS 
866
 Ibid., p.31. 
867
 ,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFH (16 November 2005) Press Release: Protecting Your Personal 
Information ranked as a top issue. p.2. 
868
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If you receive letters, faxes, emails or telephone calls asking for your 
information, avoid replying unless you know they are genuine.870 
 
Always check your bank / credit card statements IRUSD\PHQWV\RXGRQ¶W 
recognise.871 
 
Safeguard your personal documents (such as bank statements, utility bills, 
debit or credit card transaction receipts etc.), so that nothing can be 
obtained by fraudsters showing your name, address or other details.872 
 
Shred or destroy personal documents you are throwing away such as 
bills, receipts, bank or credit-card statements and other documents that 
show your name, address or other personal details.873 
 
Always think about who you are giving your information to. Be cautious 
about providing any personal details to unsolicited callers by phone, fax, 
post, email or in person, unless you are sure the person is who they say 
they are. If you are suspicious, ring the organisation back on an advertised 
number or visit their website.874 
 
Even if you know who is asking for your information, think twice before 
\RXDQVZHUWKHLUTXHVWLRQV,ILW¶VQRWFOHDUZK\WKH\QHHGWKHLQIRUPDWLRQ
ask them or just move on to the next question.875 
 
 
 
Similarly, in financial discourses individuals need to protect and secure their identity. 
The individual should adopt strategies to ensure that their identity is safe and that it 
cannot be stolen (See Chapter Four). 
 
 
You can also help prevent crime against yourself and others by 
maintaining the confidentiality of your account details and identity 
documentation.876 
 
Given the increasing likelihood of all UK residents to fall victim, residents 
of these fast rising locations should take extra care with their identities.877 
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No matter how carefully you look after your personal details, you can 
never completely rule out the risk of someone stealing your identity. But 
if fraud does strike, Experian has a Victims of Fraud team ready to 
help.878 
 
 
 
The cumulative effect of these statements is to outline the appropriate individual 
actions in a situation where identity, understood as strongly linked to personal data, is 
under threat from external malicious actors. There is a heavy workload placed on the 
shoulders of the individual, who must engage in vigilant, suspicious and cautious 
interactions with others whilst exercising control over his or her personal data. It also 
HQFRXUDJHVDQDFWLYHPRQLWRULQJRIRQH¶VLGHQWLW\WKURXJKWKHFKHFNLQJRI
relationships with institutions such as banks. The two iconic images of these 
responses are the credit rating file, and the personal shredder. The individual is made 
responsible for the management of their own identity. If these efforts are not taken, 
then the individual is considered responsible for their own identity loss or damage. 
Identity needs to be actively cared for.  
 
The effect of this focus upon the responsibility of the individual, even backed up by 
appropriate guidance, is to diminish the responsibility of other social actors. The 
threat to identity is presented as environmental rather than agentic. The effect of this 
is to normalise the occurrence of identity theft. It cannot be prevented on a social 
level, but its effects can be mitigated at the individual level. This normalises the 
information infrastructure that encourages identity theft. This general acceptance of 
the contemporary model of information collection and processing can be seen in the 
following extracts. These are presented in a simple, factual modality, which 
downplays the social forces behind, or reasons for, this state of affairs. It is presented 
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as axiomatic. This is not a process we are invited to question. Whilst there has been an 
explosion in personal data holding, and a growth in supermarket loyalty cards, the 
reasons and motivations for these phenomena are not explored in this discourse.  
 
 
Today, like it or not, our personal information is held by many public and 
private organisations.879 
 
Almost every organisation we deal with in our daily lives holds some 
personal information about us.880 
 
There has been DUHFHQWµH[SORVLRQ¶LQWKHQXPEHURIEXVLQHVVHVKROGLQJ
personal information, and with that surge, an increase in the potential for 
the information to be misused.881 
 
In the private sector, our details will be recorded by utility and 
telecommunications companies, banks and other financial institutions, and 
credit reference agencies. The growth in supermarket loyalty cards has led 
to the creation of extensive databases containing details of our spending 
and shopping habits. Transport operators using smartcard technology will 
DOVRVWRUHGHWDLOHGLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VWUDYHOSDWWHUQV1RW
only do more and more bodies hold our basic personal details in their 
systems, but new information may be added every day. According to one 
estimate, information about the average working adult is stored on some 
700 databases. In both public and private sectors, much of the personal 
information stored about individuals is accessible via call centres, drawing 
on information held electronically and sometimes manually.882 
 
 
 
Even when this model of personal information collection is presented as a historical 
change, it is still expressed in a manner which elides the motives of agents and social 
actors involved in the process. 
 
 
'XULQJP\SUHGHFHVVRU¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRID SUHYLRXVJRYHUQPHQW¶V
proposals regarding identity cards back in 1995, she was unable to 
conclude that any of the predicted benefits outweighed the privacy and 
GDWDSURWHFWLRQFRVWV6LQFHWKHQVRFLHW\¶VQHHGVKDYHFKDQJHGZH
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conduct far more business electronically or through call centres, the 
government is encouraging increased electronic service delivery by the 
public sector, all with the result that there are fewer opportunities to 
conduct business face to face where one person is known to the other. 
Individuals may have increased needs to be able to prove their identity 
with reliability and in a convenient way.883 
 
 
 
Government, financial and ICO discourses therefore contain an ideological (in Laclau 
	0RXIIH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJHOLVLRQRIWKHFRQWLQJHQWpolitical nature of the 
contemporary identity structure. 
 
Counter-articulation: identity is not a social problem 
 
Opposition discourses challenge WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDQXPEHURIVRFLDO
ills as being about identity. The discourse rearticulates crime, terrorism and benefit 
fraud as not being fundamentally concerned with identity, or as only tangentially 
affected by identity.  
 
 
The government suggests that the scheme will help beat crime. However 
identity is rarely an issue in criminal cases. The vast majority of crimes 
never lead to arrest. This is nothing to do with identity but simply down 
to policing resources. Even where there is a suspect, the issue is rarely 
identity but whether sufficient evidence of culpability can be obtained.884 
 
Costs usually cited for of identity-related crime here include much fraud 
not susceptible to an ID system1RPLQDOO\³VHFXUH´WUXVWHG,'LVPRUH
useful to the fraudster. The Home Office has not explained how it will 
stop registration by identity thieves in the personae of innocent others.885 
 
Equally, there is no evidence to suggest the claim that an identity scheme 
ZLOODGGUHVVWKHSUREOHPRIEHQHILWIUDXG7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VILJXUHVVKRZ
that around five per cent of fraud relates to identity. The vast majority 
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of cases of benefit fraud involve lying about circumstances by, for 
example, claiming state benefit and working cash in hand.886 
 
The men thought responsible for the bomb in Madrid all carried valid ID 
cards. 6XLFLGHERPEHUVGRQ¶WJRWRJUHDWOHQJWKVWRKLGHWKHir identity; 
they want the world to know who they are. The Home Office has admitted 
that ID cards will not deter a determined terrorist.887 
 
 
 
Articulation of identity: identity µWKHIW¶LVQRWUHDOO\WKHIWRILGHQWLW\. 
 
Government discourse constructs identity theft as a wide range of phenomena in 
government discourse often used interchangeably with identity fraud. This is 
deconstructed in opposition discourse. This ranges from explicit deconstruction of the 
concept as an illegitimate conflation to the labelling of the term as emotive and 
encasing it in quotation marks ± linguistically reflecting a hedging of the concept. The 
opposition to identity cards attempt to undermine the threat of identity fraud, a key 
stated driver of the identity card scheme.  
 
 
Not only have the government failed to define what is meant by identity 
fraud, it has also sought to demonstrate a problem that does not exist by 
gathering various types of criminal acts together and asserting that these  
acts are collective examples of identity fraud.888 
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Conclusions 
 
It is possible now to summarise the articulations of identity at play in governmental 
discourses. Many of these characteristics of identity are shared across the discursive 
field analysed in this thesis. Identity is constructed as a series of institutional 
reputations mediated through specific types of personal information disclosed to the 
IRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVRIµVWUXFWXUHGVRFLHW\¶,WLVWKLVIRUPRILGHQWLW\WKDWWKHLOOHJDO
immigrant lacks and needs to acquire to affect a convincing social presence. Identity 
has a realist ontological truth against which images of that identity can be verified, 
whilst any given identity can be assessed as true or false. This truth is associated in 
the last instance with unique physical differences on an individual human being¶V 
body, and with the state as the authoritative source of identity. Verification is not 
always easy, and can be decidedly problematic, but is possible if the right 
technologies and systems are put in place. Identity is vulnerable but can be made 
secure. False and multiple identities are illegitimate and associated with malign social 
actors. A more secure form of identity is required to prevent abuse of identity. 
Opposition and ICO discourses argue that identity should be under the control of the 
individual, and identification systems should allow the individual to prove his or her 
own identity. Fictitious or additional identities are allowed, but are overlaid over the 
ontologically true identity shared with government conceptions of identity. Identity is 
a valuable asset, a type of property, which is under threat from malicious external 
actors. For ICO, financial and media discourses, this threat requires a substantial 
response placing substantial responsibility upon the individual to manage and care for 
his or her own identity. Identity requires work to protect and maintain. Media 
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articulations of identity vary depending upon the particular frame used to evaluate 
surveillant practices but frequently share the above characteristics.  
 323 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Implications 
 
This final chapter provides the conclusions of this thesis, drawn from the preceding 
three empirical chapters and based upon the theoretical framework developed in the 
first three chapters. It provides answers to the core research questions of this thesis, 
and explores the implications of these for both social and political theory, and for 
politics. The chapter concludes with a number of policy recommendations drawn from 
these implications, and from surveillance and governmentality theory.   
 
Research Questions 
 
What discourses of surveillance exist in the UK? 
 
This thesis shows that whilst there is not one single, hegemonic discourse of 
surveillance there are shared elements, regularities and patterns of articulation that 
refer to surveillance practices across a number of fields of discourse. These aspects 
have substantial interaction with other discourses. Whilst the five points of reference 
extracted from surveillance theory do have distinctive discursive formations 
surrounding them, the boundaries between these formations are distinctly fuzzy. 
There is substantial discursive convergence between government, governance, finance 
and the media, sufficient to conceive of these as forming a shared governmental 
discourse of surveillance. Points of conflict over the control of identity emerge 
between data protection discourse and governmental/financial discourses and between 
government and its various opponents over the key political issue of identity cards. 
Media discourses draw upon all the other discourses, in combinations determined by 
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the frame adopted for any given text and strongly structured by internal media logics. 
It is highly likely that discourses of surveillance can be identified in fields of 
discourse beyond those examined in this thesis. There is also substantial consistency 
of representation across different surveillance technologies, suggesting that it is 
articulations of technologies or practices, rather than inherent qualities of the practices 
themselves, that affect the varying evaluation of surveillant practices.  
 
What rationalities are at play in discourses of surveillance? 
 
There are a number of rationalities across these discourses. These include the 
governmental articulation of identity discussed below, the dominance of risk-averse 
rationality and variants of the precautionary principle, the common articulation of a 
number of subject positions (see below), a focus on political individualism, the 
reliance upon privacy as the core method for resisting the harms of surveillance, and a 
dystopian tendency in critical accounts of surveillance. Across the discourses, and 
hegemonic in banking and finance discourses, there is a focus on the actions of 
criminal subject positions as the agents responsible for the social problems of identity 
fraud. This elides social problems caused by the practices and technologies of the 
finance industry itself. Any risks to individuals are caused by the actions of 
themselves or other individuals. 
 
What are the problems of governmentality in discourses of surveillance? 
 
There are five problems of governmentality addressed in governmental discourses of 
surveillance: firstly, the challenges of the modern age: technology, modernisation and 
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globalisation; secondly, the threats of terrorism and crime; thirdly, the instability of 
cultural identity and the lack of a sense of Britishness; fourthly, that knowledge of the 
population is incomplete, due to illegal immigration, movement and covert behaviour 
of elements of the population; finally, and critically, identity itself is considered 
insecure. Documentary identity is undermined and existing systems are archaic and 
unfit for the modern world. The core articulation of the problem of governance within 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VGLVFRXrse is that identity is problematised; it cannot be relied upon 
for the proper functioning of governance in society. Because identity is vulnerable to 
theft and forgery, because multiple identities are associated with negatively evaluated 
social actors and SUDFWLFHVDQGEHFDXVHLGHQWLW\¶VHVVHQWLDORQWRORJical nature makes 
it possible, identity must be checked and secured. It cannot be left undetermined or 
ambiguous. 
 
What subject positions are available in these discourses? 
 
Whilst all discourses incorporate a large number of subject positions, three meta-types 
are privileged; the individual, the illegitimate, and the vulnerable. The individual is a 
formal subject position, describing the autonomous agent and bearer of rights (and 
sometimes normative control of identity) of liberal theory. Each individual is 
potentially a risk to organisations, sometimes a client or customer (distinguished from 
citizen) and each individual is both a producer and possessor of personal information 
± a data subject. Illegitimate subject positions include a long chain of equivalent 
positions contrasted against the normal majority and honest law-abiding citizens. 
These include illegal immigrants, criminals and organised crime, fraudsters, identity 
thieves, and terrorists. The subject position of the terrorist serves as a nodal point for 
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this chain of signification. These subject positions are negatively evaluated by all 
discourses, generally portrayed as enemies rather than adversaries. They are 
constructed as requiring identity in order to function; therefore they abuse and 
undermine the identity system. The content of this category is occasionally contested 
in opposition discourses. The exclusion of deviant social actors serves to provide a 
shared collective identity to normal, law-abiding people as non-criminals and non-
terrorists, thus occluding other potential sources of difference. The final category of 
subject position, the vulnerable, varies distinctly between discourses. Both 
government and ICO discourses construct subjects as equally vulnerable to the threat 
of identity theft, yet government constructs some as better able to weather the 
consequences on their own. Financial discourses break down this construction, 
identifying the wealthy as the most vulnerable to identity fraud. Opposition discourses 
construct the vulnerable in a highly distinct manner. For these discourses, the 
vulnerable are those who are already socially disadvantaged, such as the homeless, the 
poor, or the disabled, whose disadvantage will be exacerbated by the introduction of 
proposed identity systems.  
 
How is individual identity articulated in discourses of surveillance? 
 
The hypothesis derived from governmentality theory as outlined in Chapter Two 
holds substantially true on the basis of the analysed texts. Identity is a floating 
signifier contested by various discourses of surveillance. Across the governmental 
discourses of surveillance (discounting opposition and some media discourses), there 
is privileging of a surveillant identity. Whilst elements of the hypothesis are 
sometimes implicit rather than explicit, and thus requiring theorised interpretation, 
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many elements of the hypothesised articulation of identity are explicitly present in the 
discourses of surveillance. The governmental surveillance identity is ontologically 
objective, unitary, biologically determinist, shallow but compelling, behavioural and 
based on actuarial and probabilistic logics, attributed by structured society, 
historically persistent and resistant to change. Importantly, identity is articulated 
across many of the discourses as socially vulnerable. This is contested in opposition 
discourse, where identity is understood as not intrinsically vulnerable, but threatened 
by the govHUQPHQW¶VLGHQWLW\VFKHPH&RXQWHU-hegemonic discourse constructs social 
problems as not about identity and describes identity theft as emotively mislabelled 
fraud. 
 
 
Theoretical implications 
 
The implications for theory are explored below. In line with the construction of this 
research, there are implications for surveillance theory, governmentality theory, and 
for political and social identity theories. 
 
Surveillance theory 
 
The representation of surveillance in many of these discourses differs from academic 
accounts of surveillance. Many phenomena understood by surveillance theory as 
surveillance are not understood as surveillance in popular or governmental discourses. 
Given that surveillance theory is expansive and involved in showing the connections 
between apparently disparate phenomena, this is not unexpected. However there has 
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been interplay between surveillance theory and surveillance discourses. The findings 
of this thesis support elements of surveillance theory, highlight the need for continued 
outreach by surveillance researchers, and provide an addition to the understanding of 
identity in surveillance theory. Fundamentally, however, the thesis demonstrates the 
importance of a discursive approach to researching surveillance. 
 
'UDZLQJXSRQWKHVDPHWKHRUHWLFDOXQGHUSLQQLQJVRI+DJJHUW\DQG(ULFVRQ¶V
surveillant assemblage model, this thesis showed that enunciation, discourse, is a 
critical component of any surveillant assemblage. The semiotic is interwoven with 
and interpenetrates the social, and if one is to understand an assemblage, then one 
must pay attention to its discursive dimension. It is important to examine textual and 
linguistic connections, links and traces. In demonstrating the commonalities between 
seemingly separate discourses (such as between government, the banking and finance 
industry, and much of the media with regard to identity) such an approach exposes 
discursive links in the surveillant assemblage. Regularities in language can both 
demonstrate linkages between seemingly disparate surveillance phenomena, but they 
can also be such linkages. Just as there is not a single surveillant assemblage, there is 
not a single assemblage of surveillant enunciation. The surveillant identity emerges as 
one such regularity, as do shared rationalities and problem constructions. Particular 
ways of understanding risk, subjects of surveillance, or of representing surveillance 
technology, for example, allow the porting across of methods, technologies and 
strategies from one social sphere to another. Similar problem constructions across 
multiple discourses are part of the horizontal spread of surveillant assemblages, as are 
long chains of negatively evaluated subject positions.  
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Surveillance WKHRU\¶VDWWHQWLRQWRULVNLVVXSSRUWHGE\WKLVGLVFRXUVHDQDO\VLV5LVNLVD
core concept that structures many other elements. Many surveillance discourses 
exhibit strong risk-aversion and regard surveillance as a functional way to reduce risk. 
Risk assessments are highly dependent upon how issues relating to those assessments 
are framed and constructed through discourses.889 Identity often serves as a marker for 
risk information relating to an individual. 
 
Despite surveillance theory attempts to move beyond accounts of privacy, in actually 
existing discourses of surveillance, privacy is still the core concept used for resisting 
and contesting surveillance practices as demonstrated in ICO and opposition to ID 
card discourse. However, the ownership and control of personal data are increasingly 
becoming explicit points of contestation.  
 
The term surveillance society has seen growing use in ICO and media discourses, 
achieving hegemonic parity with Big Brother as a discursive trope. However the 
PHDQLQJLVRIWHQXVHGHTXLYDOHQWO\ZLWKWKH2UZHOOLDQPRGHOWKDWµVXUYHLOODQFH
VRFLHW\¶ZDVLQSDUWDQDWWHPSWWRPRYHEH\RQG7KHFRQcept of the data double and 
the associated digital footprints have started to gain common usage, especially in 
media accounts of surveillance. Elements of financial discourse encourage the active 
management of the data profile, and provide services to enable this.890 
 
This thesis adds to surveillance theory by providing increased understanding of the 
complex and nuanced understandings of identity actively in use in contemporary UK 
society. Prior to this, surveillance theory has either used identity in a technical form, 
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or in terms of some form of political subjectivity. These theoretical a priori accounts 
can be supplemented by incorporating accounts of the ways that identity, as a signifier 
and a concept is used in contemporary political discourse.   
 
Additionally, the range of surveillance discourses affects the extent to which it is 
possible (or analytically useful) to talk of a surveillance society. This research 
identifies and demonstrates a range of discourses of surveillance, which although 
possessing commonalities and interactions, each have their own logics and 
articulations. There are many different practices, evaluated in a wide range of ways, 
some of which are accepted, others condemned. This suggests that surveillance is a 
range of processes, rather than a single societal-level process. However, the linkages 
between discourses and the privileging of governmental interactions and partnerships 
(for example between ICO and data controllers in ensuring compliance or between 
government and credit reference agencies in identity checking) demonstrate a number 
of linkages in a surveillant assemblage model. 
 
Governmentality theory 
 
The findings of this thesis are generally supportive of the theoretical assumptions of 
governmentality theory, supporting the use of governmentality approaches in the 
analysis of surveillance practices. 
 
The wide range of actors involved in governance practices are demonstrated though 
the significant inter-textual and inter-discursive linkages of discourses. Rather than a 
monolithic picture of unified state control, the surveillance regulatory environment is 
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typified by a range of government and governmental agencies, regulatory bodies, 
oversight committees, private institutions and individual actors. These bodies are 
interlinked, interactive and draw upon shared discursive sources. Discourses of 
VXUYHLOODQFHVXSSRUWWKHJRYHUQPHQWDOQHFHVVLW\RINQRZOHGJHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQµ:H
QHHGWRNQRZSHRSOHDUHZKRWKH\VD\WKH\DUH¶LVDUHFXUULQJWURSHLQJRYHUQPHQWal 
discourse. Necessity is associated with security and economic productivity; the illegal 
immigrant and the terrorist threaten territorial security and integrity, whilst the benefit 
fraudster threatens economic productivity. 5DLVRQG¶Etat emerges as the state is 
articulated as competing with other nation states in a global market economy. Being 
cursed with a second class identity system hampers UK standing in this competition, 
whilst identity fraud costs the UK. The use of credit referencing agencies in 
determining governmental identity demonstrates the centrality of economic activity to 
the understanding of the productive citizen. 
 
The conduct of conduct, the shaping of conduct through norms, is a regular theme in 
these discourses. Many discourses provide a range of conduct articulated as 
appropriate; an exemplar is the steps an individual must take to guarantee the security 
of their personal data and to protect themselves from identity theft. Almost every text 
that articulates identity theft provides a range of strategies in response to the danger. 
There is a remarkable level of consistency in this advice, constructing a hegemonic 
articulation within this field of discourse of what is appropriate conduct and behaviour 
with regard to personal information. This conduct is explicitly framed in deontic 
modalities ± it must be followed. However, it is also presented as the best strategy for 
the individual. It is advice and guidance, not orders and directives. That failure to 
freely follow these apparently reasonable information security precautions can be 
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rearticulated as negligence and a signal of liability for financial loss underscores the 
conduct of conduct. Financial and ICO discourses are particularly replete with 
guidance and best practice articulated as attempts to inform and educate individuals 
enabling them to (freely) act in their best interests (which are also socially valuable 
interests). Following these strategies allows the individual to reduce risks to 
themselves and to institutions and thereby maximise productive resources.  
 
Governmentality accounts of surveillance are supplemented by an expanded 
understanding of identity as a contested concept articulated in particular ways in 
governmental discourses, rather than solely a theoretical marker for subjectivities. 
This expansion affects theories other than governmentality and is explored below. 
 
Political and social theories of identity 
 
It is possible to analyse usage of the concept of identity without making firm 
ontological statements. Whilst discourse and governmentality theories suggest an 
understanding of identities as subject positions or subjectivities, the discourse analysis 
in this thesis points to a distinct articulation of identity ± the governmental surveillant 
identity. This usage has implications for political and social theories of identity as this 
form of identity cannot be ignored.  
 
Subjectivity accounts are limited because they do not account for all processes which 
can be understood as creating identity, instead focusing on processes through which 
the individual becomes a subject or identifies with a subjectivity. Political theories of 
identity which only understand identity as subjectivities miss the important effects of 
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identity in active political use in contemporary societies. Identities are created, 
attributed, used, manipulated, exploited and sometimes negotiated in ways beyond 
that of subjectification processes. Whilst these identities may not be as deep as 
subjectivities, they have important political, social and economic effects. To this 
extent this form of identity could be understood as shallow yet compelling. The 
subject need not in any way identify with the attributed surveillant identity, for it to 
have effects upon them. For an examination of some of these effects, see the political 
implications below. The existence of surveillance-permeable, persistent, externally 
attributed identity casts doubt upon accounts emphasising the flexibility and fluidity 
of (post)modern identities. Whilst this may be true of subjectivities, or the multiple 
hybrid social identities available to subjects to identify with, the persistence of 
surveillant identities suggests that there exist forms of identity which are 
characteristically non-flexible.  
 
This thesis demonstrates that not all identity creation processes are self-creation, and 
that there are strong structure-like effects of discourses and practices. Agency exists 
theoretically through identification with subjectivities, but is politically constrained by 
the political attribution of identities. For example, governmental assemblages should 
be understood as powerful identifiers responsible for attribution of socially important 
identities to subjects: 
 
 
The stDWHLVWKXVDSRZHUIXOµLGHQWLIier¶ not because it can create 
µLGHQWLWLHV¶LQWKHVWURQJVHQVHLQJHQHUDOLt cannot, but because it has the 
material and symbolic resources to impose the categories, classificatory 
schemes, and modes of social counting and accounting with which 
bureaucrats, judges, teachers, and doctors must work and to which non-
state actors must refer. But the state is not the only µLGHQWLILHU¶ that 
matters. As Charles Tilly has shown, categorization does crucial 
³organizational work´ in all kinds of social settings, including families, 
 335 
firms, schools, social movements, and bureaucracies of all kinds. Even the 
most powerful state does not monopolize the production and diffusion of 
identifications and categories; and those that it does produce may be 
contested.891 
 
 
 
This analysis demonstrates the need to conceptualise both the form and the content of 
identity in modern society. Subjectivity accounts should be supplemented by an 
understanding of attributive identity at shallower levels.  
 
Political implications 
 
The following sections discuss political implications arising from the empirical 
findings of this research. This focuses primarily upon the near hegemonic 
representations of surveillance and articulations of identity characteristic of 
governmental discourses of surveillance, but found in other surveillance discourses. 
These implications can be divided into three categories: the implications of the 
representation of surveillance, the implications of subject positions and their 
articulations, and the implications of the articulation of identity in discourses of 
surveillance.  
 
The representation of surveillance 
 
The implications of the representation of surveillance in these discourse falls under 
six categories: normalisation, limiting surveillance, the limits of dystopia, data 
protection requirements as empty signifiers, the accuracy and effectiveness of 
surveillance and the related question of human truth versus machine truth. 
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 Normalisation 
 
The dominant representation of surveillance performs a normalising function in which 
surveillance practices are presented as normal and unavoidable aspects of life. 
Examples include the articulation of identification practices as legal necessity and the 
portrayal of surveillance and personal data gathering as inevitable in ICO discourse. 
This ideological function elides the contingent nature of political practices, presenting 
them as non-SROLWLFDOWHFKQRORJLFDOIXQFWLRQV-R\FH¶VPRGHORIWKHµWHFKQRSROLWLFDO¶ 
VKRZVKRZSROLWLFDOLVVXHVDUHUHQGHUHGµWHFKQLFDO¶DQGWKXVSODFHGRXWVLGHWKHVFRSH
of democratic debate.892 The substantial degree of technological determinism found in 
discourses of surveillance also creates a feeling of the inexorable, determinist spread 
of surveillance technology. Articulating a surveillance practice as inevitable 
complicates any attempts to resist or challenge surveillance practices; such 
contestation must first rearticulate the practice into the realm of the contingent. 
Representing imposed risks as natural phenomena has moral implications and breaks 
the moral distinction between imposed and natural risks.893 
  
/LPLWLQJµVXUYHLOODQFH¶ 
 
In the hegemonic representation of surveillance, the definition of surveillance is 
tightly constrained. Many surveillant practices are not identified as such. Given the 
negative connotations of surveillance this is unsurprising. For example, government 
actors go to great lengths to articulate identity cards as not surveillance. Surveillance 
often retains an archaic image of wire-taps and police stake-outs unreflective of the 
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 &UDQRQ&)µ7RZDUGVD Non-&RQVHTXHQWLDOLVWDSSURDFKWR$FFHSWDEOH5LVNV¶LQ7/HZHQV
(ed.). p.38. 
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contemporary reality of mass personal data gathering and processing. In this manner, 
linkages between practices are occluded and surveillance practices are frequently 
presented in isolation; as an isolated response to an isolated problem. The picture of 
surveillance islands may well retard the development of public critiques of 
surveillance as resistance to a particular surveillance practice does not frequently 
extend to widespread general resistance. This may be affected by the way the concept 
of the surveillance society has been adopted.  
 
 Data protection requirements as empty signifiers 
 
Dominant representations of surveillance also have implications for public acceptance 
of surveillance. Principles of data protection act as the standard frame for evaluating 
surveillance practices in the UK.894 The concepts of necessity, appropriateness and 
legitimacy, which surveillance practices must meet, are in reality frequently empty 
signifiers, which can be filled in in a broad range of ways. It is easy to articulate 
surveillance practices as necessary, especially given the predominance of risk-
aversion in surveillance discourses. If information can be used (or is thought to be 
potentially useful) in risk-analysis, then a claim for necessity can easily be made. 
Legitimacy is largely associated with the actor conducting the surveillance; therefore 
legitimate actors¶ activities are always legitimate, whilst illegitimate surveillance is 
practiced by illegitimate actors. It is discursively difficult for the activities of actors 
granted legitimacy to become illegitimate. Appropriateness has the additional problem 
of a positive feedback loop. If an installed surveillance system does not meet the ends 
it was installed to meet, it is inappropriate. If, however, it might meet those ends if 
                                               
894
 7KH,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFHProtecting Privacy ± Promoting Openness. 
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upgraded to gather more information, then meeting data protection principles could 
provide justification for upgrading the surveillance system until appropriate for its 
stated objectives.  
 
 Accuracy and effectiveness  
 
Representations of the accuracy and effectiveness of surveillance systems also have 
political implications. Governmental, financial and media discourses tend to privilege 
the assumption that surveillance systems are effective and accurate. Even opposition 
discourses tend to assume that statements of accuracy made for surveillance systems 
are themselves accurate. Mistaken assumptions of accuracy for surveillance systems 
can lead to mistaken decisions taken on the outputs of these systems. Additionally, 
information systems are frequently constructed as secure, when this may be highly 
questionable given the frequency of information loss. 
 
 
 Human truth vs. technological truth 
 
As Van der Ploeg has shown, the discursive strategies surrounding surveillance 
technologies have implications for the negotiation of human choices and values in 
relation to those technologies.895 The difficulty of contesting the output of 
surveillance systems constructed as accurate is developed with an account of human 
truth versus technological truth. Human truth is a placeholder for statements made by 
people. These statements can be accurate or mistaken, based upon imperfect 
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 9DQGHU3ORHJ,µ%LRPHWULFVDQG3ULYDF\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knowledge, or even deliberately misleading. Human truth is axiomatically subjective. 
However human psychology shows that human beings have developed a range of 
(imperfect) methods for assessing the veracity of human truth. Technological truth 
encompasses statements generated by machinic processes, either technological or 
bureaucratic. Technological truth is articulated by surveillance discourses to be 
cheaper, easier, and more reliable than human truth. There are situations where 
technological truth provides access to information inaccessible to human perception, 
for example a microscopic image of a cancer cell. However, many social encounters 
oppose human truth to machine truth, for example when a polygraph lie-detector test 
states a person is lying, who adamantly denies this. Human truth is discursively 
denied credibility in these encounters whilst the technological truth is not questioned, 
but instead understood to be authoritative. This is observed in the studied discourses 
UHJDUGLQJFUHGLWUDWLQJVLGHQWLW\FDUGVDQGEDFNJURXQGFKHFNVµ:HQHHGWRNQRZ
\RXDUHZKR\RXVD\\RXDUH¶LVDQH[DPSOHRIDPDFKLQHKXPDQWUXWKRSSRVLWLRQ
This privileging is based upon faulty application of the logic of arguments from 
authority. For a speaker to be considered an authority they must be qualified to pass 
judgement and have sufficient information. However, many actors lack the capacity to 
analyse the qualification of machine processes to produce authoritatively truthful 
statements. Given the scientistic privileging of technological methods and the 
assumption of surveillance system accuracy, in many cases authority may be 
substantially overestimated. Discourses construct technology as more reliable than 
human truth, whilst there are instrumental reasons for many interested actors to 
oversell the capabilities of surveillance technology. Critics attempting to dissuade the 
general public from accepting surveillance can also overplay the invasiveness of 
surveillance, accepting that surveillant systems perform as advertised. Specialist 
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training required to understand technical process is not widely possessed. This 
problem will increase as technologies become more complex, leaving fewer people 
DEOHWRMXGJHDWHFKQRORJ\¶VFDSDFLW\WRSURGXce authoritative statements. Finally, 
with de-skilling and automation, technological truth processes are frequently 
technologically opaque to their users, who are themselves unable to interrogate the 
processes. Human truth is understood to be subjective, so users can be cautious, they 
can look for alternatives, corroborating evidence, or check statements for errors. If 
technological truth is understood to be objective and authoritative then it will not be 
checked, but it will be used as the basis for decision-making. A reliance on 
technological truth diminishes the political value of transparency and potentially does 
not treat people as fully human agents in a Kantian sense. 
 
Subject positions 
 
Several discourses of surveillance, especially involving terrorism, immigration and 
FULPHSUHYHQWLRQDUHFKDUDFWHULVHGE\ZKDW/DFODXWHUPVDµSRSXODUDQWDJRQLVP¶D
simplification of the social space which reduces the number of available subject 
positions and brings about a particular relationship towards excluded subjectivities. 
Torfing identifies the popular antagonism as characteristic of wartime.896 Excluded 
subject positions (such as the terrorist and the criminal) are constructed as enemies 
(who cannot be tolerated) rather than opponents. The wartime logic allows for 
extreme measures of social control and supervision not acceptable in peacetime. This 
SDUDOOHOV$JDPEHQ¶VZRUNRQWKH6WDWHRI([FHSWLRQZKHUHE\FUHDWLQJDµZDUWLPH¶
environment through the war on terror, states have been able to avoid limitations on 
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 Torfing, 2003, p.126. 
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their activity.897 -DFNVRQ¶VDQDO\VLVshows how the language of the War on Terror has 
been used to justify and normalise a global campaign of counter-terrorism, and so 
regularise and institutionalise the practice of war.898 
 
The construction of subject positions identified in discourses of surveillance has the 
capacity to continue the expressive harms identified by Gandy ± the disproportionate 
WUHDWPHQWRIFHUWDLQJURXSVDVVXVSHFWV*DQG\¶VQRWLRQVRIFXPXODWLYHGLVDGYDQWDJH
DQGµUDWLRQDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶DOVR have applications for the way that subject positions 
DUHWUHDWHGGLIIHUHQWLDOO\E\WKHVHGLVFRXUVHVDVGRHV7XUURZ¶VZRUNRQPDUNHWLQJ
discrimination.899  
 
Not all identities are equally valued, with implications for egalitarian politics. In 
financial discourse, the interests of the wealthy are clearly privileged, whilst ICO 
discourses which construct identities as valuable assets elide the fact that for many 
their identity can be a source of problems and a limitation on their activities and 
choices rather than an enabling asset. For somebody with a poor credit rating, or high 
levels of debt, their identity is a constraint they may well be better off without. Why 
then should they protect their identities, or participate in practices which perpetuate 
this securitisation? CIFAS statistics on identity theft victims undermine the 
assumption that all individuals are equally at risk from identity theft. Identity is used 
in governmental discourses as a technology of discrimination, allowing differential 
responses to different risk profiles. Discrimination on the basis of identities allows 
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institutions to reduce their organisation risks. However it can also push costs onto the 
individual. 
 
Identity discrimination provides a motivation for a move to a politics (or perhaps a 
political-economy) of identity management. Organisations that exploit the insecurity 
of identity are likely to grow and organisations are likely to continue to shift the costs 
of information security onto their clients and customers. This may foster DµQHZ
FXOWXUHRIVXVSLFLRQDQGHQY\¶900 ,QGLYLGXDOVPD\EHHQFRXUDJHGWRµJDPHWKH
V\VWHP¶LQWKHLUIDYRXUPDQLSXODWLQJWKHLULGHQWLW\WRJDLQLQFUHDVHGEHQHILWV901 
Alternatively, identity management may become a requirement for all, but only 
achievable by the wealthy. 
 
Identity articulation 
 
This section examines the political implications arising from the governmental model 
of identity articulation ± the governmental surveillant identity. Whilst in discourse 
theory, identity articulation is axiomatically political, distinct political effects can be 
demonstrated. Effects of identity articulation can emerge either from elements of the 
articulation, or from the articulation as whole. The latter effect will be examined first.  
 
From an examination of the discourse, identity is a floating signifier, a contingent 
ideological element that can be articulated by opposed political projects.902 It should 
also be understood as an essentially contested concept, both on the range and 
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indeterminacy of many of its components.903 However, within governmental 
discourses there are active attempts to fix the meaning of identity, and construct a 
surveillance-permeable form that draws upon the privileging of machinic truth over 
human truth. In common social usage, identity has plural meaning. Brubaker and 
Cooper identity a number of usages ranging from a ground for social action opposed 
WRLQVWUXPHQWDOµLQWHUHVWV¶VHOI-understanding, particularity and position in social 
space, to a collective sense implying sameness amongst members oIDJURXSWRµGHHS
EDVLFDELGLQJRUIRXQGDWLRQDO¶HOHPHQWVRIVHOI-hood distinct from contingent, fleeting 
elements.904 As definition limits other identities, these forms of identity are reduced in 
importance in contrast to the surveillance identity, the typology of which is presented 
in Chapter Six. In order to define identity in a discourse, other non-identities must be 
excluded. In addition to the above, the governmental discourses explicitly exclude 
archaic historical systems of identity, and second-rate identity systems. The 
discourses also tacitly exclude organic social identity systems. A particular, context-
insensitive articulation of identity is spread across a number of social areas. 6 
identifies this as a problem with the entitlement card consultation documents.905 
However, this form of identity is prevalent across a wide range of social institutions 
and underpins the entire identity card project and government attitudes to identity and 
personal information. 
 
This is not to suggest that the privileging of surveillance-permeable identity 
automatically overwrites or prevents subjectivities. In many senses subjectivities may 
be compatible with the surveillance identity and have different social functions; 
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however there may be points where the surveillance identity comes into active 
conflict with subjectivities. The identity of identity-politics, focusing on subjectivities 
and collective identities is a different form of identity, and as such these debates cast 
little light upon the form of identity predominant in governmental information 
infrastructures. Subjectivities can be rendered irrelevant if decisions are made and 
actions taken on the basis of surveillant identities.  
 
Identities become the basis for risk assessments. Risk is based upon probabilities and 
decisions taken in a terrain of imperfect knowledge. Based on the information they 
contain, some identities are considered bigger risks than others. Organisations make 
use of inferential logics in determining which these are. Surveillance is used to 
provide the necessary data for these risk assessments, and risk rationality therefore 
promotes increasing acquisition of personal data. Identities therefore act as risk 
markers, or signifiers of collections of risk-relevant data. This is why false or multiple 
identities are problematic in these discourses; they obfuscate necessary risk 
information. Risk management also has a moral dimension, in that organisations must 
be seen to be performing risk assessment and management. This includes the need to 
check identities. Banks need to check their customers, governments need to check 
identities for national security and entitlement purposes, and individuals need to check 
who they interact with to guard against fraud. This also drives the appropriate conduct 
of individual information security; identities are less effective risk signifiers if 
individuals leave their identities unprotected. 
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Rose argues that identity becomes a µpassword¶, determining access to numerous sites 
and services and to active citizenship.906 This theoretical insight is reflected in 
surveillance discourses where background checks against individual identity are 
constructed as necessary to access financial or social services, and are increasingly 
conducted through electronic biographical checks. Passwords have certain qualities: 
passwords protect access to something, and if that something is valuable, then the 
password itself becomes valuable. If the password is stolen, or becomes common 
knowledge then it allows access to the protected thing. Therefore passwords need to 
be protected. However, substantial differences between identities and passwords 
complicate the use of the identity as a password, and make identity valuable, thus 
acting as a driver for identity fraud, or the (illicit) accumulation of personal data. If 
compromised, a password can be discarded and replaced with a new secure password; 
identity cannot be replaced. If an identity is compromised (for example when the 
holder suffers from fraudulent loans taken out in their name, or is wrongly accused of 
a crime on the basis of DNA evidence) then that identity, based as it is upon clusters 
of biographical information from divergent sources, cannot easily be discarded, but 
must be corrected, which involves questioning the (supposedly authoritative) facts 
that make up the identity. If identity theft does increase, many identities will become 
contaminated in this manner. Optimal passwords are unique and solely used as 
passwords, this allows their exposure to be limited, and reduces the likelihood of their 
discovery. Identity is used for many other activities with varying degrees of 
importance. This variety of uses means that identity information can be compromised 
from uses with low security, and then used to compromise higher security uses, in 
much the same way as using the same password for internet banking as for a 
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registering with a free website compromises security. The increased use of personal 
information leads to more and more personal information being in the public domain. 
Each database entry increases the potential for the information to leak or be stolen, as 
in the December 2007 loss of child benefit data. ,QIRUPDWLRQVXFKDVPRWKHU¶VPDLGHQ
name, routinely used by banks as shared secret information is intrinsically non-
valuable. However, precisely because it has been used as a form of password, it 
becomes valuable to criminals. Because of its continued use, this information should 
now be considered freely available and insecure. This leads to other types of 
information, and finally identities being used as passwords.  
 
The individual is placed in the impossible situation of having to police their personal 
data, in an environment where much of that data is out of their control. This has 
political implications as the individual is likely unable to control this information or 
the ability to do so is contingent on education and resources, and social implications if 
the individual must modify his or her behaviour in order to control their information. 
,IDQLQVWLWXWLRQ¶VVKDUHGVHFUHWLQIRUPDWLRQLVIDYRXULWHPRYLHRUSHW¶VQDPHWKHQWKH
individual can no longer freely and reflexively disclose that information to another 
without considering the implications for their financial security. This is exacerbated 
by the articulation that anybody could potentially be an identity thief. Individuals are 
told they should not post such information on social networking sites because it is 
frequently used as passwords. Better advice is that personal information should never 
be used as passwords. The same holds true for biographical identity. The duty of the 
individual to protect elements of their identity, whilst those elements are being 
exploited by institutions to provide institutional security, or to produce profit, raises 
questions of alienation and suspicion. 
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The articulation of identity described in this research is based upon a faulty 
construction of the normal individual with a normal lifestyle. The functioning of 
identity systems is predicated upon this normal individual with potential negative 
implications for those with abnormal lives. This can be seen in the use of the credit 
referencing agencies to check for economic activity as part of the identity verification 
process of issuing identity cards, and in the list of suitable documentary evidence of 
identity accepted by financial institutions. The assumption is that members of society 
interact with financial institutions, possess a passport and bank accounts, have some 
level of debt or credit, and a permanent address. People with alternative lifestyles 
already experience social difficulties, but these could be aggravated by the privileging 
of surveillance-permeable identities, which could prevent escape from problematic 
situations, or drag individuals back into contact with situations they had escaped. 
Three examples illustrate this point:  
 
People who have undergone gender re-alignment processes may be confronted by the 
spectre of their previous identity, especially by biometric markers of identity. The 
proliferation of actors making use of identity information makes this likely to be a 
common occurrence and complicates informing all information processors of such a 
change. The previous identity (or the transition itself) of such individuals may 
potentially be a source of shame or embarrassment, or a source of social difficulty or 
persecution, to the extent that the re-appearance of their previous identity could have 
harmful psychological consequences.  
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Surveillance discourses strongly tie identity to permanent physical address in 
surveillance discourses, and as such complicate identity for the homeless or people 
with insecure accommodation. These individuals are already in precarious situations, 
often suffering from mental health problems. Escape from this situation is likely 
predicated upon interactions with institutions demanding some form of proof of 
identity. Systems designed around the normal individual exacerbate the lack of 
freedom of the homeless to escape from their situation. Following Waldron, not only 
does everybody need a location to perform actions, but they likely need an identity 
too.907 Instead of basing systems of social identification upon the unacknowledged 
normal individual, a socially just approach would be to design systems to aid those 
most vulnerable, or face the greatest threat of social exclusion or stigma, thus 
reducing the problems of cumulative disadvantage, and arguably being in line with 
the Rawlsian difference principle.908 
 
Elements of identity 
 
 Ontological realism 
 
The surveillant identity is articulated as unquestionably ontologically objective. This 
can be understood as ideological; a denial of the fundamental contingency of the 
socially constructed political concept of identity.909 The articulation denies the 
construction of identity and acts as if identity is ontologically realist and placed 
outside of politics. Whilst identity systems might be technologically lacking, the 
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ontology behind them is never questioned. This attempts to create an impossible final 
closure of identity. Attempts to design technological systems and practices that 
assume that a negotiated, contingent process is an unquestionable reality are likely to 
cause problems. It may be a hypothesis worth exploring that essentially contested 
concepts (such as identity) may frequently cause problems and unintended outcomes 
for computer systems. 
 
 Identity can be either true OR false 
 
The individual can have one and only one identity. If identity is assumed to be true, 
then any mistakes in identity processes (for example, you are mistakenly identified as 
somebody else) can be hard for the individual to prove. If identity was instead 
understood as negotiated then people and institutions could be more prepared to  
negotiate access to services. The binary distinction reduces social flexibility and the 
potential for interaction or accommodation of difference or disadvantage. If a 
presented identity does not meet the required standards for a true identity (for 
example previously recorded biometric measurements do not match fingerprint 
VFDQVWKDWLGHQWLW\FDQQRWEHµSDUWO\WUXH¶EXWPXVWEHFRQVLGHUHGIDOVHDQGFDQQRW
be accepted. Finally, true identities are privileged over all other types of identity and 
what counts as a true identity is determined by the privileging of the surveillant 
identity discussed previously. 
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 No legitimate multiple identities 
 
Theorists routinely construct identity as multiple. For example, in discourse theory, 
subject positions are multiple, constantly shifting subversions.910 However, the 
governmental surveillance discourse constructs identities as singular, denying this 
multiplicity. Anonymity is denied through construction as akin to false (therefore 
illegitimate) identity. The discourse of opposition to identity cards constructs a 
number of valid multiplicities, (e.g. authorial pen-names) but even in this discourse, 
plural identities are abnormal. For surveillance discourses, knowingly presenting a 
false identity is an indication of criminality or perfidy. False identities are attempts to 
obfuscate risk-signifying information and thus frustrate the risk-based decision-
making of institutions. These discourses complicate the legitimate use of multiple 
identities (for example online) which could potentially reduce the risks of personal 
information disclosure, allow individuals to control their personal data, and allow for 
social experimentation, risk-taking and experimentation. Combining this articulation 
with the true/false binary means that if an organisation holds an image of an 
individual it assumes to be true, and your presented image differs, your image cannot 
also be true, and must be considered false. 
 
 
 Identity as recordable facts 
 
Surveillant governmental identity is understood as being composed of recordable 
surveillance-permeable facts; facts that can be produced and recorded through 
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bureaucratic or machinic processes. Permeable characteristics are a limited set of 
phenomena, but a set that is currently increasing through technological capacity (e.g. 
biometrics). If identity is broadly articulated, then all manner of information can be 
recorded in the category of identity. Identity then appears based upon the optimal 
inputs of surveillance technologies (what can be recorded) and the precautionary risk 
rationality ± if information can be collected, then it should be. What is included in 
identity is substantial and expanding. This can be invasive of privacy, inconvenient, 
demanding on the individual (when they are required to provide such information) 
and violate data protection principles when data is unnecessary but gathered just in 
case. Due to the use of biographical identity checks and identity as a password this 
information is made valuable, meaning that these facts must be managed and secured. 
Other problems emerge if identity is limited to facts recordable by machines and 
bureaucratic processes. The complexity of the social world and individual psychology 
is reduced and forced into categories. This reintroduces the recognition problems of 
more familiar identity politics ± for example the demands by minority religious or 
ethnic groups for inclusion on the census ± as people feel that important parts of their 
identity are not officially recognised, with implications for social trust and cohesion. 
As bureaucratic systems are reliant upon abstraction, they will likely never recognise 
all difference. Rather than attempting to do so by increasing the scope of recorded 
personal information, the limitations of categorisations should be acknowledged.  
 
Behavioural and inferential 
 
The articulation of identity as biographical and based upon records of previous 
behaviour combined with decisions made on the basis of identity result in the future 
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experiences of individuals becoming strongly determined by their past experiences. 
This can reduce social mobility (already low), trapping individuals in their social and 
economic positions. Identity requires an economic history, with credit agency checks 
to verify this. This normalises the current economic system and its distribution, and 
promotes cumulative disadvantage as those without an identity find it hard to get one. 
This is especially problematic for the poor or homeless. Incorrect patterns of 
behaviour attract institutional suspicion, disproportionately targeted against the 
abnormal defined statistically rather than normatively. People can feel uncomfortable 
when confronted with their spending pattern by their credit card company, and such 
over-watch makes changes in lifestyle problematic, as shifts in behaviour attract 
supervision and intervention.911 
 
Attribution 
 
The governmental articulation of identity as primarily attributed by trusted institutions 
(structured society) has implications for who can be said to control identity. The 
control by the individual of their own identity promoted by ICO is meaningless if 
identities are functionally created and attributed (and altered and withdrawn) by 
organisations, especially if organisational attributions are considered more 
authoritative than any account the individual can give of their identity. This is 
exacerbated if organisations hidden from the individual contribute to the identity, as 
the individual is hard pressed to monitor all organisations contributing to his/her 
identity, especially given the increased trade in personal data between organisations. 
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Monitoring the attributed image is costly, requiring knowledge, effort and resources 
not available to all citizens.  
 
Whilst the individual may have control over the subject positions they identify with, 
contingent on the degree of agency allowed by philosophical ontology, they have little 
control, if any, over their surveillance identity. This system of personal information 
and identity verification is weighted against the individual. Reliance upon subject 
access requests in data protection policy LVSUREOHPDWLFZKHQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VGDWDPD\
be present in (and therefore an identity attributed by) 700+ databases.912 An individual 
has limited resources, and cannot possibly issue subject access requests to all of these, 
JLYHQWKHOHY\RIDµUHDVRQDEOHKDQGOLQJIHH¶XSWRSHUUHTXHVWDQGWKH
prerequisite of knowing which institutions might hold their personal data. 
Additionally, this management of identity is not a one-time task, but a process that 
must be maintained if the individual attempts to retain any control over their identity.  
 
Thirdly, the individual becomes reliant upon relationships with organisations for 
identity in this sense. This places the organisations in a position of power, 
complicating any attempt by the individual to negotiate their own identity. 
Organisations can refuse, withdraw or lose identity information. Individuals may 
concede to demands from institutions in order to improve their attributed identity, 
undertaking behaviour they might otherwise avoid. Individuals may not want a 
relationship or interaction with certain institutions, but find that such relationships are 
necessitated by the way identity is assembled from multiple institutions. 
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Consistent over time and space  
 
'HVFULEHGE\%UXEDNHUDQG&RRSHUDVDµFRPPRQVHQVH¶XVHRILGHQWLW\, consistency 
of identity over time, space, and social sphere is required by surveillance discourse in 
order for identity to carry risk information and act as a risk-signifier.913 This 
permanence of identity arises from the reliance upon biographic identities and the 
ease of storage and retrieval of digital information. It problematises any legitimate 
attempt to change identity, for example, changing sex, fleeing persecution, escaping 
from previous experiences such as a criminal record or bad debts. Even state attempts 
to create new identities (for example witness protection schemes or undercover 
policing) will experience this difficulty due to the proliferation of identity data in the 
private sector. This raises questions as to when information included as part of an 
identity should be discarded by data processors. At what point does information 
become irrelevant for risk analysis and decision-making? Does a criminal conviction 
LQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V\RXWKVLJQDOWKDWWKH\deserve employment less than somebody 
without? A decreasing level of institutional forgiveness can be anticipated as 
institutional memories expand. In previous eras, an individual could escape from a 
past mistake by moving to a new city, or waiting for a period of time. With searchable 
databases, individuals are linked to less salubrious elements of their identities for 
longer timespans. This has implications for anybody considering public life, as they 
are liable to have any negatively perceived recorded events from their life revealed. If 
identity is discursively understood as consistent over time, then what happens when 
(counter to this construction) identity changes in some way? For example, if a 
recording error is made, data is lost or corrupted, or malicious hackers change 
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biographical details. Combined with the discursive assumption of accuracy, such 
changes are hard to refute. Individuals who believe themselves victims of identity 
fraud are able to request a note placed on their credit record to this effect. Does the 
note carry as much weight as the rest of the credit file?  
 
Identity is under threat 
 
The articulation of identity as something that can be stolen misrepresents financial 
crime, as identity theft is most frequently credit fraud.914 Government statements that 
identity theft costs the UK £1.7 billion per annum conflate a number of different types 
of crime, the majority of which should not be considered identity fraud. 915 The 
articulation of identity in this discourse is too extensive. What is actually occurring in 
many of these cases is fraudulent manipulation of the information security processes 
and practices of organisations. References to identity theft scare people and confuse 
the search for potential solutions. Practices of identification are legitimised by 
reference to the ultimate, yet immeasurable, risk provided by terrorists freely 
operating under false identities, and identity theft prevention is stated as a major 
driver for proposed identity cards. The response to identity threat by governmental 
discourses privileges strategies of response by the individual. These discourses 
provide substantial examples of appropriate conduct for individuals to follow, 
expressed in deontic modalities, and individuals are positioned as to carry the costs of 
self-surveillance and self-securitisation. For example, individuals are increasingly 
directed to take out insurance against identity theft. Across the discourses, and 
hegemonic in banking and finance discourses, there is a focus on the actions of 
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criminal subject positions as the agents responsible for the social problems of identity 
fraud. This elides social problems caused by the practices and technologies of the 
finance industry itself. 
 
Policy implications 
 
Discourse theory and governmentality help to inform a number of normative 
considerations. Discourse theory used analytically provides an examination of 
governmental language, whilst governmentality theory prompts the search for the 
utopian moment in political discourse. As such, this thesis has identified a particular 
government articulation of identity, as well as the utopian intentions that are 
constructed alongside this articulation. As a source of normative purchase, these 
intentions should be taken at face value, and used to evaluate policy. If the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VVWDWHGLQWHQWLRQLVWRSUHYHQWSHRSOHEHLQJYLFWLPVRILGHntity fraud, 
secure their personal data, and place identity under the control of the individual, then 
policies should be assessed against these intentions. The political implications in the 
previous section prompt a range of implications for current policy debates. In order to 
alleviate or avoid problems of political ethics and social justice presented above, a 
number of policy recommendations can be outlined.  
 
 Discourse theory demonstrates that identity should be understood as a socially 
constructed and negotiated category. Profiles and data images are only ever 
partial images of a person and alternative narratives can be constructed. Public 
awareness of this should be fostered, as well as amongst actors making 
decisions on the basis of data images and personal risk profiles.  
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 Given the over-emphasis of surveillance accuracy in governmental discourse, 
a distinction should be fostered between prognosis and prediction. A 
prognosis LVµWKHOLNHO\FRXUVHRIIXWXUHHYHQWVZKLFKDOWKRXJKZHOO-grounded 
in our analysis of the conditions and mechanisms underlying present 
SKHQRPHQDFDQQRWEHJHQHUDWHGRXWRIWKLVDQDO\VLVE\VLPSOHGHGXFWLRQ¶
ZKLOVWSUHGLFWLRQLVµDGHGXFWLRQRIZKDWZLOOQHFHVVDULO\IROORZLIFHUWDLQ
ODZV/«QWKHPVHOYHVGHGXFWLEOHIURPWKHRUy, T, obtain, and 2) requisite 
DQWHFHGHQWFRQGLWLRQV&«QDUHVDWLVILHG¶916 Prognosis has less logical force 
than prediction. Many outputs of social surveillance systems are (at best) 
prognoses not predictions, and should be regarded as such.  
 
 For the same reasons, the limitations of surveillance technologies should be 
acknowledged. If a decision or statement is reliant upon imperfect authority 
then the imperfections and the limitations should be acknowledged, allowing 
for proper public consideration. 
 
o System error rates for surveillance systems should be published and 
made available to those exposed to the surveillance system. 
o Independent assessment of the accuracy of surveillance technology 
should be undertaken and published. 
o Data controllers of personal information should acknowledge the 
information they use may very likely contain mistakes and 
inaccuracies, and caveat their outputs accordingly.   
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 Uses of identity in different spheres of social life, and with regard to different 
institutions should be context-sensitive. Separate identities for separate 
spheres of life should be possible, perhaps reinforced with pseudo-anonymity 
identity tokens. These tokens could limit the amount of information disclosed. 
The alternative identity scheme proposed by the L6(XVHVDPRGHORIµDVVXUHG
VHFWRUDOLGHQWLWLHV¶DNLQWRWKLV917 Not all institutions need to demand the 
FRPSOHWHSLFWXUHRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VOLIHMechanisms should be put in place to 
limit the information that organisations can characterise as necessary to 
prevent escalation of demands for information.  
 
 Surveillance systems, if necessary, should be designed so that socially 
acceptable inputs are optimal. Technologies are designed in ways such that 
they have optimal inputs. Some forms of inputs may be more socially 
acceptable than others, and some may have greater impacts, or levels of 
invasiveness. Systems should be designed so that they minimise invasive 
surveillance. Acceptability should be organic and not manufactured, and non-
invasive should not be understood as meaning covert or without the 
knowledge of the subject as surveillance harms can occur when subjects do 
not realise they are under surveillance, and such practices violate data 
protection principles. There should be democratic oversight of surveillance 
systems rather than their design being based upon hidden decisions of 
engineers and technologists.  
 
                                               
917
 The Identity Project, 2005, p.292. 
 359 
 The National Identity Card and Register should be suspended. If introduced 
and inaccurately assumed to be totally accurate and secure, it will exacerbate 
the problems of identity discrimination, fraud and the politics of identity 
management. Government discourses overstate the accuracy, security and 
reliability of the system and promote this assumption. The identity system is 
currently touted as a solution to a wide range of problems. Accurate 
identification of functions is a cornerstone of reliable and secure information 
systems design and confused objectives increase the risks of the system. If the 
social problems to which the identity card is addressed in discourse are 
accepted as pressing social problems, and it is believed that some form of 
identity system might address these, then alternate options should be explored 
that meet government statements with fewer negative consequences. The 
/6(¶VDOWHUnate proposal as part of the ID card report is one such model.918 
 
 If identity fraud is a significant enough problem to merit government action, 
then there is a need for clarity of language and thinking. One response to such 
a problem would be to insulate individuals from the risks of identity-based 
crime, especially those caused by the policies of organisations and institutions. 
Organisations, including the government and the media, should stop using the 
inaccurate and emotionally misleading term identity theft with connotations of 
doppelgangers and evil twins. Most so-called identity theft is credit card fraud 
and should be understood as such. Conflating different types of criminal 
activity, with different characteristics and effects, may prevent the 
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development of appropriate solutions. Theft connotes the denial of something 
to the legal possessor, which does not occur in identity theft.  
 
o Organisations should minimise the data they hold on individuals. Less 
data is required to perform identification, or even authentication, than 
attempts to capture identity. This should be encouraged through 
compliance with enforced data protection legislation.  
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Conclusions 
 
Through the theoretically supported empirical analysis of public texts, this research 
has identified the existence and extent of a governmental discourse of surveillance 
interacting with a number of other discourses and found in the statements of a range 
of political actors, including government, independent agencies, financial institutions 
and the media. The thesis identifies a commonality (although not a universality) 
between varying sites of surveillance. This commonality can be understood as the 
discursive components of the surveillant assemblage constituting identification in the 
United Kingdom. 
 
This discourse is characterised by a particular surveillant articulation of the concept 
of identity, in addition to a dominant representation of surveillance practices that 
normalises and legitimises surveillance practices. In focusing upon the supposedly 
factual and deterministic nature of identity for purposes of identification, this 
discourse denies the contingent and socially constructed nature of any form of 
identity. Identity is understood as a floating signifier that this governmental discourse 
attempts to articulate in a specifically delimited and defined way, so as to further the 
UDLVRQG¶HWDW, effect government and counter the proliferation of identities. The core 
articulation of the problem of governance within the governmental discourse is that 
older forms of identity are problematised; they cannot be relied upon for the proper 
functioning of governance in society and must be updated, modernised and critically, 
secured. From the reading of governmentality theory presented here, identification is 
a core component of governance, and improper systems of identification and therefore 
unknown identities are constructed as problems to be solved. Discourses of 
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surveillance position surveillance technologies as the proper solutions to those 
problems. 
 
This understanding of identity has social justice implications. It is likely to most 
negatively affect the most vulnerable in society, and be managed only by those with 
sufficient resources, as well as creating practical problems for processes, institutions 
and individuals. The discourse of surveillance normalises surveillance practices based 
on accounts of risk and necessity, and complicates any attempt to resist or oppose 
such practices. Despite policies and rhetoric pointing in the direction of individual 
control of identity, the amount of meaningful control an individual can exercise over 
their own identity is distinctly limited, with implications for autonomy and the 
relationship between individuals and institutions. 
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